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 This project examines Virginia Woolf’s conceptualization of the outsider as a political 
position with recourse to the figure of the common reader she theorizes early in her writing 
career. Woolf’s common reader, I argue, is first and foremost a response to the interwar “battle 
of the brows.” Unique in their belief in the common reader, Woolf’s early essays on form and 
aesthetics ask readers to consider their position as consumers in relation to the writers who 
insisted upon the discourse of the great divide between high and middlebrow art. This project 
suggests the common reader is more than Woolf’s contribution to the “battle of the brows,” 
however, and it presents the common reader as the precursory figure in a theory of intersectional 
subjectivity that is the foundation for Woolf’s politics of everyday life, which reached maturity 
late in her career with the “Society of Outsiders.” Viewing the common reader this way helps 
connect Woolf’s later works, which are generally viewed as her more political writings, with her 
early, formally experimental works by way of a theory of subjectivity that makes one’s 
discursive subject position central to an outsider politics based on performative subversion. 
Woolf’s focus on subject positions and performative subversion marks hers as a politics of the 
body, and this work explores the role various social institutions, including the university, the 
military, the family, and the asylum, play in disciplining subjects and their bodies in Woolf’s 
fiction and essays. In texts including Jacob’s Room, Mrs Dalloway, A Room of One’s Own, 
Three Guineas, Between the Acts, as well as a number of Woolf’s shorter essays, I examine 
Woolf’s depictions of subjects, their bodies, and the institutions that shape and mould them, and 
through her theorization of the common reader and society of outsiders explore Woolf’s theory 
of subjectivity designed to confound and subvert these institutions using the very same bodies 
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If not for a simple question asked by the right person at the right moment, this work 
would not exist. But let us not call it fate, for that would imply we knew where the answer would 
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Tuesday 22 November, 1938. I meant to write Reflections on my position as a 
writer. […] apparently I’ve been exalted to a very high position, say about 10 
years ago: then was decapitated by W[yndham] Lewis & Miss Stein; am now I 
think—let me see—out of date, of course; not a patch, with the young, on 
Morgan; yet wrote The Waves; yet am unlikely to write anything good again; am 
a secondrate, & likely, I think, to be discarded altogether. I think that’s my public 
reputation at the moment. It is based on C. Connolly’s Cocktail criticism: a sheaf 
of feathers in the wind. How much do I mind? Less than I expected. But then of 
course, its all less than I realised. I mean, I never thought I was so famous; so 
don’t feel the decapitation. Yet its true that after The Waves, or Flush, Scrutiny I 
think found me out. W.L. attacked me. I was aware of an active opposition. Yes I 
used to be praised by the young & attacked by the elderly. 3 Gs. has queered the 
pitch. For the G.M. Youngs & the Scrutineers both attack that. And my own 
friends have sent me to Coventry over it. So my position is ambiguous. 
Undoubtedly Morgan’s reputation is much higher than my own. So is Tom’s. 
Well? In a way it is a relief. I’m fundamentally, I think, an outsider. I do my best 
work & feel most braced with my back to the wall. Its an odd feeling though, 
writing against the current: difficult entirely to disregard the current. Yet of 
course I shall. (V. Woolf, Diary 5 188-9) 
 
 Looking back from our contemporary vantage point, where she exists as a literary, 
feminist, and intellectual icon, Virginia Woolf’s anxiety about her position as a writer in this 
diary entry is difficult to understand. After all, quite apart from the fact that her novels are 
touchstones in English Literature courses around the world and A Room of One’s Own is 
considered a foundational text for feminism, Woolf’s image is emblazoned upon everything from 
mock Saint Candles, to postcards, to t-shirts in what has practically become a cottage industry of 
cultural iconography (Silver 9). But here she is contemplating her fame after the poor reception 
of Three Guineas, comparing herself to T.S. Eliot (Tom) and E.M. Forster (Morgan), fearing 
what F.R. and Q.D. Leavis (the Scrutineers) and Wyndham Lewis think of her might be true, 
apprehending middle age (she was 56 at the time) as that transition between annoying the old and 
frustrating the young, and worrying about once again having to writing criticism to support 
	
 2 
herself. The Woolf of this passage is so far away from the Saint Virginia popular culture 
imagines that she is barely recognizable, yet it is perhaps the Woolf of this diary passage that I 
like the most. It is not that the passage somehow reveals the “real” Woolf, but rather that Woolf 
brings her existential crisis and the chaotic swirl of discourses that converge on her in this diary 
entry into order using the single word “outsider.” 
 While the word outsider has become fundamental to understanding Woolf’s work, her 
conception of identity, and her politics, she did not take the label on officially until quite late in 
her life. Her official acceptance of the term seems to come in an excited diary entry on 20 May 
1938 as she was awaiting the publication of Three Guineas: “my mind is made up. I need never 
recur or repeat. I am an outsider. I can take my way: experiment with my own imagination in my 
own way. The pack may howl, but it shall never catch me. And even if the pack—reviewers, 
friends, enemies—pays me no attention or sneers, still I’m free” (Diary 5 141). We know, of 
course, from her November entry above, that the pack did howl, but not enough to make Woolf 
forgo the title of outsider that she had chosen for herself. This is not to say, however, that Woolf 
did not think in terms of insiders and outsiders before 1938. In 1903, at twenty-one years old, 
Woolf showed a keen awareness of insiders and outsiders during a family trip to Wilton House, a 
grand house in Wiltshire: “We—Adrian and & I— […] professed to find the whole country side 
‘demoralised’ & clinging to the great man of the place. This I suppose is an exaggeration; at any 
rate if we had been inside those high brick walls our point of view might have changed” (A 
Passionate Apprentice 189-90). Moreover, insiders and outsiders play important roles in Woolf’s 
work from the beginning to the end of her career: from the consummate insider Jacob Flanders 
joining the Great War after a life spent being shaped and moulded by the patriarchal machine in 
Jacob’s Room (1922), to the consummate outsider Septimus Smith returning from the same war 
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only to have his shell-shocked body used politically by his doctors in Mrs Dalloway (1925); 
from the common reader Woolf suggested should read outside a system in The Common Reader 
(1925), to an elusive narrator carefully positioning herself outside the academy while lecturing at 
a women’s college in A Room of One’s own (1929), and thence to conceptualizing a “Society of 
Outsiders” for women to help men prevent war in Three Guineas (1938). 
 In the 20 May 1938 diary entry in which she officially accepts the term outsider, Woolf 
also writes that her decision is “the actual result of that spiritual conversion (I can’t bother to get 
the right words) in the autumn of 1933—or 4—when I rushed through London, buying, I 
remember, a great magnifying glass, from sheer ecstasy, near Blackfriars; when I gave the man 
who played the harp half a crown for talking to me about his life in the Tube station” (Diary 5 
141). There is no reference to this interaction with the harpist in her diary from that time so what 
he said to Woolf seems to have been lost, and the nature of her “spiritual conversion” is also 
vague but seems to have much more to do with politics than with religion given it is mentioned 
in relation to her discussion about Three Guineas and outsiders. Based on Woolf’s suggestion in 
Three Guineas that, for outsiders, “to be passive is to be active” because “[b]y making their 
absence felt their presence becomes desirable” (245), recent critical attention has tended to 
theorize Woolf’s politics as a politics of everyday life. J. Ashley Foster, for example, has 
recently noted that Woolf counted a number of Quakers amongst her family and Foster argues 
that Woolf’s passive activity is similar to Quakerism’s “strong history of civil dissent and 
fighting for egalitarian civil rights” (46). Foster never suggests that Woolf herself was a Quaker, 
but does note, referring to the distinction Woolf makes between the materialism of Edwardian 
writers and the spiritualism of Georgian writers in “Modern Novels” (177-78), that “writing for 
Woolf becomes a sacred act that can bridge the spiritual and material worlds, merging her 
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luminescent ontology of being with a call-to-action for a pacifism predicated on individual 
ethical participation in the global community” (43). Lorraine Sim, too, focuses on the 
individuality of Woolf’s political praxis, arguing that her ideas amount to a personal ethics of the 
ordinary that transforms things like clothing, gestures, and expressions into “the basis for 
moments of sympathy, intimacy and understanding between people” (177). And Charles 
Andrews focuses more on Woolf’s literary forms to note that the equivocating repetition of ideas 
and ellipses in Three Guineas constitute a style of passive activism that discursively counters the 
rapid escalation of masculine aggression and creates silences that demonstrate women’s 
“exclusion from masculine political discourse” (177). Common to all these discussions is a focus 
on the materiality of Woolf’s politics (for Foster and Sim in terms of actual actions in the world, 
and for Andrews in terms of formal innovations employed by Woolf herself) to point out that 
Woolf recognized politics was not only enacted in the bills and policies passed in Whitehall but 
expressed over and over again in the everyday actions of ordinary people. 
 My work likewise presents Woolf’s as a politics of everyday life, but in doing so it looks 
backwards from her later works that are generally considered Woolf’s most political to present 
these works as the culmination of many years thinking within, through, and against various 
cultural discourses during the interwar period. As her career-long focus on insiders and outsiders 
shows, if Woolf did go through a “spiritual conversion” in 1933 or 1934, it was certainly not 
brought about by a sudden recognition of the way power relations functioned in England’s social 
institutions. Nor was Woolf’s materialist understanding of politics and political praxis new in 
1938, for her works throughout her career are full of politicized and political bodies, and the 
roles they play in realizing—that is, in making real—the ideologies of social institutions. Woolf, 
I will argue, viewed bodies as political and ideological weapons throughout her career, her views 
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of the body aligning with the performative materialism Louis Althusser later theorized when he 
argued that “Ideology has a material existence” (1352) inasmuch as an individual “behaves in 
such and such a way, adopts such and such a practical attitude, and, what is more, participates in 
certain regular practices which are those of the ideological apparatus on which ‘depend’ the ideas 
which he has in all consciousness freely chosen as a subject” (1353). Over and over again in 
Woolf’s work one sees this performative relationship between subjects of ideology and the 
material existence of ideology: a presumed member of the English royal family passes by in a car 
on a crowded London street while Clarissa Dalloway buys flowers for her party, so people stand 
at attention to acknowledge the monarchy; soldiers dutifully perish “with perfect mastery of 
machinery” as their ship sinks and generals look on through binoculars in Jacob’s Room (125); a 
Beadle approaches the narrator of A Room of One’s Own as she absentmindedly walks on the 
grass of the Oxbridge quad and bodily instinct not reason comes to her aid to explain why what 
she has done is wrong (5). Furthermore, Woolf’s theorization of politics and ideology agrees 
with Althusser’s suggestion that “individuals are always already subjects” (1357) because there 
is no outside to discourse and the power relations constructed therein for Woolf. This may seem 
at odds with the fact that Woolf positions herself very clearly as a political outsider in her diary 
and posits the “Society of Outsiders” as a way to help men prevent war in Three Guineas; 
however, the outsider subject position for Woolf does not refer to escaping discourse, but rather 
to positioning oneself within discourse in a politically advantageous way by exploiting 
ideology’s reliance on performative materialism. Put simply, if realizing ideologies requires the 
participation of subjects, then Woolf advocates selective non-participation as an individual 
political praxis. This focus on actively choosing when and how one participates in political and 
ideological performances promotes a process of becoming in relation to one’s historical, legal, 
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economic, and educational realities, so there is for Woolf an intimate and reciprocal relationship 
between the subjects that perform actions in the material world and the subjectivities that guide 
these performances by choosing when and how to participate. 
 Subjectivity is a term that has seen a political rehabilitation since the rise of identity 
politics and theories of intersectionality. Drawing as it did upon an opposition with the term 
objective at a time when scientists were charting and defining the physical world empirically, 
subjective was made something of a dirty word during the scientific revolution. As Raymond 
Williams points out, it became associated with opinions “as based on impressions rather than 
facts, and hence as influenced by personal feelings and relatively unreliable” (311). Subjectivity 
was reexamined with recourse to discourse and psychoanalysis in the middle of the twentieth 
century when, Ruth Robbins notes, theorists began to suggest subjectivity was constituted 
discursively because “the subject is always subject to a pre-existing social, linguistic, and 
economic order over which he has very little control” (15). Subjection and the myriad discursive 
relationships that signify one’s subjection have played an important role in the way power is 
currently understood in theories of intersectionality, especially with regards to outsiders or 
marginalized people, identity politics, and political action. Intersectionality notes that identity 
markers such as race, gender, sexuality, and class, while they are codified and hierarchized 
discursively, affect one’s material existence depending on how words like “black,” “woman,” or 
“lesbian” function in cultural, legal, economic, etc. structures within society. Generally, 
intersectional approaches to identity have tended to produce political praxes focused on an 
essentialism that asks individuals to accept discursively hierarchized identity markers because, as 
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw points out, doing so “takes the socially imposed identity and 
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empowers it as an anchor of subjectivity; ‘I am black’ becomes not simply a statement of 
resistance but also a positive discourse of self-identification” (298). 
 While intersectionality’s focus on the discursivity of identity and the structural 
implications of identity markers makes it useful when discussing Woolf’s conception of insiders 
and outsiders, arguing that Woolf uses the term outsider as an anchor of subjectivity, even 
though she clearly chooses the label in her diary, is critically dubious. Woolf famously wrote in 
A Room of One’s Own that “‘I’ is only a convenient term for somebody who has no real being” 
(4), so let us take Woolf at her word and agree with post-structuralist and postmodernist critics 
like Toril Moi, Makiko Minow-Pinkney, and Pamela L. Caughie when they suggest Woolf 
practices “a ‘deconstructive’ form of writing” (Moi 9) that focuses on “no longer representing 
but rather presenting and constructing reality” (Minnow-Pinkney 3) to the extent that “I” for 
Woolf “is as much a fiction as is the text, for the ‘I’ is implicated in its own stories” (Caughie 
42). While agreeing with such critics that Woolf’s writing treats the self as a fundamentally 
discursive construction, however, let us also resist any notions that Woolf completely abandons 
the self to linguistic différance and disagree with critics like Herbert Marder and Tuzyline Jita 
Allen when they suggest that Woolf’s philosophy of anonymity “referred not only to self-
effacement but to an unknowable core or center of the being, which flourishes in obscurity” 
(Marder 102), or that Woolf enacts a “total erasure of the ‘I’” (Allen 135) in order to leave “the 
burden of proof of the maker’s personality in the hands of language” (136). Woolf’s notion of 
the “I” remains respondent to and dependent on discourse, that much is true, but she also realizes 
one’s discursive situatedness has material consequences, both in terms of how one is treated 
politically, legally, socially, and economically and in terms of how one can best effect political, 
legal, social, and economic change. “Woolf positions herself as part of a community of subjects, 
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accessible through language but with no transcendent position outside it,” Jane Goldman 
suggests, so what matters to Woolf is not that the subject is or is not defined (essentialism) or 
that subjectivity is or is not definable (post-structuralism), but instead the positionality of the 
subject at any given time and in any given place in relation to other subjects. Thus, rather than 
behaving as an anchor of subjectivity, the term outsider, I argue, provides a foundational but 
always becoming, never complete, subject position from which Woolf exposes the discursive 
power relations that intersect in her current outsider position in order to determine a political 
praxis based on and from that position. Her lived experiences as an outsider certainly help shape 
the outsider subjectivity Woolf uses to interpret the world, but her political praxis is guided not 
by her lived experiences but by what performative action is most politically beneficial given the 
temporal and spatial realities of the outsider subject position she currently occupies. 
 The mode of political praxis Woolf advocates in her writing appears to be akin ethically 
to moral relativism in that she picks and chooses how to respond politically based on the 
situation in which she finds herself, but her conceptualization of a performative politics makes 
sense given the historical realities of the Great War and the rise of ideologies like fascism and 
communism, which demonstrated the thresholds of biopolitical power. Biopolitics, according to 
Michel Foucault, was not new in the twentieth century and had existed to varying degrees since 
the Classical Age, finally reaching maturity between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
when Europe and America began moving from monarchies toward parliamentary governments 
that prioritized the rights of people, but it is in the total wars of the twentieth century that one 
sees the terrifying extremes of biopolitics. A form of government that focuses on disciplining the 
bodies of individuals, biopolitics aims to “incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and 
organize the forces under it” and establishes “a power bent on generating forces, making them 
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grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or 
destroying them” (The History of Sexuality 136). Biopolitics does this through the use of social 
institutions (educational, legal, economic, medical, and military) like universities, barracks, 
prisons, and asylums, all of which form a diffuse network of power that functions to create what 
Foucault calls “docile bodies,” which are bodies subjected by these state institutions to the point 
that “Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes 
these same forces (in political terms of obedience)” (Discipline and Punish 138). Such bodies 
represent the material reality of the state’s power, their disciplined actions performatively 
realizing the state’s ideologies each time they participate in the traditions and rituals of state 
institutions. Given the biopolitic order’s focus on closely monitoring and optimizing bodies, it 
seems counterintuitive to find the logical end of biopolitics in the total wars and Holocaust of the 
twentieth century, but as Foucault explains wars in the twentieth century were not fought on 
behalf of kings but “on behalf of the existence of everyone” (The History of Sexuality 137). If the 
true economic, military, legal, intellectual, and cultural wealth of a nation is in the bodies of its 
people, if every Tom, Dick, and Harry carries the nation with him in his actions, then the 
wholesale slaughter of populations is not merely justified but integral to military victory. 
Moreover, once life has been instituted and the body made the nexus of political power, the 
industrialization of death witnessed during mindless assaults across no man’s land in the Great 
War becomes a kind of perverse and macabre celebration of a life disciplined into complete 
mechanization.  
 If bodies are so integral to state power and materializing the ideologies of state 
institutions, however, then they can also be used politically to subvert these ideologies through 
careful and considered participation in ideological actions, which is the foundation of Woolf’s 
	
 10 
performative political praxis. Careful participation was a two-stage process for Woolf. First, 
since one is always already a subject of ideology given discursive power relations, one must 
determine and understand one’s position as a subject within the power relations currently in play. 
Second, one must decide on a political action that can be made from one’s current subject 
position. The first stage deals primarily with the mind (subjectivity) and the second with the 
body (the subject), but both are important to political action according to Woolf because, as a 
subject forced to participate, every decision about how one chooses to participate helps shape 
material reality. Thus, as Stephen M. Barber has argued, Woolf’s late-life political beliefs and 
praxis are similar to the mode of ethics Foucault espouses in his later writings, which promote an 
aestheticization of life that advocates “an ethical self-fashioning” of the body (48). Foucault’s 
later work deals with what he calls subjectivation, a process by which individuals establish a 
critical ontology of themselves as subjects in their biopolitical relationship with the state and its 
institutions. Just as the state never stops disciplining subjected bodies by expecting their 
continued participation in rituals that reify state ideologies, Foucault suggests that a “critical 
ontology of ourselves must be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even a 
permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it must be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, 
a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical 
analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond 
them” (“What is Enlightenment” 319). Subjection to the state and subjectivation both entail the 
body becoming a conduit for power through disciplined use, but whereas subjection disciplines 
the body to ensure the endless reproduction of state ideologies through ritualized actions, 
subjectivation practices politics with discipline through careful consideration of one’s subject 
position in discursive power relations and taking actions that are temporally and spatially 
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specific to counter and subvert ritualized ideological actions. Woolf advocates such a disciplined 
monitoring of oneself as a subject and of how one’s body is used when she says in Three 
Guineas that “to be passive is to be active” (245). Unlike Barber, I will argue this view of 
politics did not suddenly appear as a result of the “spiritual conversion” Woolf had in 1933-34 
but was, in fact, the culmination of many years of thought about how best to effect political 
change as one subject in a biopolitical system. My aim in this work is to create a genealogy of 
Woolf’s political thought by tracing political and politicized bodies through her works and, in 
doing so, establish a connection between Woolf’s formal experiments with subjectivity and 
positionality, and her later political conceptualization of subjects, subjectivity, and embodied 
political action. I argue, therefore, that Woolf presents a coherent theory of subjectivation in her 
works that suggests the best way to effectively stymie the state ideologies that led, during her 
lifetime, to two total wars and one Holocaust is to undermine these ideologies by denying them 
the ritualized bodily performances they need to bring them into material existence. 
 This work is split into three parts, each of which examines one portion of Woolf’s theory 
of politics by focusing on her conceptualization of subjectivity, the subject, and subjectivation. 
While these are not treated as being distinct from one another, the approach offers a convenient 
framework to discuss Woolf’s enactment of a political theory that focuses on the mind 
(subjectivity), the body (the subject), and the careful use and consideration of both in 
determining political praxis (subjectivation). Section One explores subjectivity via Woolf’s 
common reader, which I argue represents not only a theory of reading but also a theory of 
subjectivity for modern political subjects. Her theorization of the figure in The Common Reader: 
First Series offers the best way into Woolf’s politics because the common reader is not only a 
subject position created within and through the discourse of the “battle of the brows” that raged 
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in the interwar period, but is also representative of the spatially and temporally performative 
politics Woolf advocated.  
 Chapter One outlines the “battle of the brows,” presenting how the terms were used to 
market literature in a crowded literary marketplace as literacy rates continued to increase during 
the twentieth century. The goal of this discussion is not to create clear definitions of high 
modernism and middlebrow texts, but to suggest that the marketing practices of both stripped 
readers of agency by subjecting them either to highbrow calls for professional readers properly 
able to appreciate their craftsmanship, or to the tastes and values of the “common man” that, 
according to the middlebrow, did not align with the effete aestheticism of highbrow snobs and 
their small coteries. Woolf unabashedly defined herself as a highbrow in this cultural landscape, 
and Chapter Two, in part, explores how Woolf positioned herself as a writer, thinker, and 
publisher in the contested interwar literary marketplace. It begins by examining the way she and 
Leonard steered the Hogarth Press through the “battle of the brows” and, as it matured, made the 
Hogarth a more egalitarian press that published highbrow and working-class literature, as well as 
highbrow, middlebrow, and working-class pamphlets. Such diversity was relatively rare in such 
a bifurcated literary marketplace, and the owners carefully maintained the press’s cultural capital 
by monitoring how, when, and where their imprimaturs were used in the aesthetic discourses of 
interwar England. In particular, I explore the Woolfs’ seemingly paradoxical decision to support 
Radclyffe Hall against obscenity charges stemming from The Well of Loneliness while also 
refusing to publish a work by John Hampson about a homosexual working-class man as an 
example of the Woolfs’ careful performative politics based on their current subject positions as 
writers, thinkers, and publishers.  
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 Chapter Two then shifts to focus on two of Woolf’s shorter essays, “Character in Fiction” 
(1924) and “Street Haunting” (1927), to explore how Woolf, as a writer, publisher, and thinker 
who supported readers’ self-determination as both thinkers and consumers in the literary 
marketplace, placed her trust in the common reader to steer culture. In these essays, Woolf 
presents the common reader as a riposte to both highbrow professionalism and the middlebrow 
“common man” by defining a role for readers in cultural production beyond being partisan 
consumers in the “battle of the brows.” One of the most important characteristics of common 
readers according to Woolf is their critical deficiencies as they hastily and inaccurately “run up 
some rickety and ramshackle fabric” with which they build a critical structure that creates “a 
portrait of a man, a sketch of an age, a theory of the art of writing” (1). A deficient and 
ephemeral critical framework may seem like a detriment, but Woolf makes it the common 
reader’s saving grace against a discourse that asks readers to swear fealty to the high or 
middlebrow, for it outlines a theory of reading that focuses on active reading rather than reading 
according to a system. More than this, however, Woolf invites active reading in her essays by 
employing narrators that note the constructedness and positionality of their own arguments. Over 
and over again, Woolf’s narrators position and reposition themselves in relation to institutions, 
characters, and readers, thereby establishing intersectional identities that highlight their 
discursive situatedness while simultaneously entreating readers to think about their own 
positions in relation to these narrators. In “Character in Fiction”, for example, Woolf not only 
reveals how the high and middlebrow have constructed the “battle of the brows” to strip readers 
of their cultural agency but also invites readers, by performing the role of an inclusive hostess in 
the essay, to recognize they play an active role in cultural production and determine what books 
represent their own interests. Culture, Woolf argues, is always in the process of becoming and 
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should remain responsive to change as authors and readers negotiate the literary conventions and 
forms that best represent their shared time and place. The common reader’s hastily built critical 
frameworks, therefore, represent a corollary for Woolf’s theorization of modern political 
subjectivities that must take into account the myriad discursive power relations that intersect at 
one’s subject position. Just as readers must position themselves in relation to texts and authors as 
they read, so too must subjects position themselves politically within and through the 
institutional discourses that attempt to discipline their bodies. While “Character in Fiction” 
focuses on the role the common reader’s subjectivity plays in steering cultural production, 
“Street Haunting” highlights the subject’s role in cultural production by moving the reader into 
the streets where books are purchased. In the essay, Woolf argues that the act of buying a book 
represents one’s materiality in and material effects on the literary marketplace because in 
purchasing a book one guides culture, however slightly, toward one’s tastes. For Woolf, that is to 
say, buying books is a performative action that has consequences on cultural production in a 
similar way that participating or not participating in the ideological rituals of institutions has 
political consequences. In the common reader, therefore, Woolf presents a theory of subjectivity 
that serves as the foundation of her theorization of politics and political action, which she 
employs in her writing throughout her career. 
 In Section Two, I move to the subject as it appears within and outside cultural institutions 
through an exploration of Woolf’s fiction and the political and politicized bodies of Jacob 
Flanders in Jacob’s Room and Septimus Smith in Mrs Dalloway. While the agency of the 
common reader is the question underlying Woolf’s essays that address the “battle of the brows,” 
the agency of the individual within the British education, military, and health institutions that 
attempt to shape subjects and subjectivity itself is the focus of these texts. Jacob, the 
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consummate institutional insider, is the focus of Chapter Three, which tracks his progress 
through the patriarchal machine during his short life that leads him from Rugby, to the halls of 
Cambridge, to the courthouses of Whitehall, to the no-man’s land of Flanders. The novel, 
narrated by a female narrator using fragmentary vignettes gathered from the impressions of other 
women Jacob encounters throughout his life, positions Jacob as an absence at the centre of his 
own Bildungsroman, but it also provides an outsider’s perspective on Jacob’s experience as a 
cultural and institutional insider. The narrator, I argue, functions in the novel like a museum 
curator putting together an exhibition of artifacts from Jacob’s life, so what emerges from the 
novel is a story that is as much the narrator’s as it is Jacob’s. She positions readers and characters 
in each vignette, never allowing the narrative to be taken over by Jacob’s insider perspective 
while always allowing readers to track his progress through patriarchal institutions, especially 
the university, as his participation in their rituals progressively disciplines his body and strips 
him of his individuality. In the end, therefore, Jacob’s Room becomes a warning for the dangers 
of unthinking participation in state ideologies as Woolf depicts Jacob’s subjection to the state as 
something he willingly chooses over and over again throughout his life. 
 Chapter Four explores Septimus Smith as a liminal figure in a post-war England trying 
desperately to stabilize itself after the Great War, and suggests that his mad body, a constant 
reminder of the chaos the war wrought in England’s patriarchal establishments, becomes the 
scapegoat Sir William Bradshaw uses to both extend his personal institutional power and expand 
the power his laws of proportion and conversion have over the bodies of English subjects. 
Septimus’s mad body is the exception that Bradshaw, as a state functionary working for the 
government to help cure soldiers suffering from shell-shock, uses to establish the threshold of 
madness in England, thereby establishing a biopolitical space in which his laws of proportion 
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and conversion find legal coherence and can begin disciplining subjected bodies. When Septimus 
wrests control of his body back from Bradshaw, who wants to send Septimus to an asylum, by 
committing suicide, Bradshaw goes to Clarissa Dalloway’s party with the intent of expanding his 
ability to confine the mad by enlisting the help of Richard Dalloway, a Member of Parliament, in 
the drafting of a legal bill concerning the treatment of shell-shock. Bradshaw, therefore, makes 
Septimus and the subject position he occupies in post-war discursive power relations the saviour 
of a political establishment still struggling with the psychological harm its wartime decisions 
caused to soldiers. It is only when Bradshaw brings death to the party by discussing Septimus’s 
suicide, that Clarissa, deeply mistrustful of Bradshaw to begin with, has an epiphany that reveals 
how important Bradshaw’s role is in determining madness and disciplining the bodies of many 
lives in England. Inasmuch as Clarissa is responsible for assembling the party—her only talent, 
she believes, is as a hostess—and she is able to do so based solely on her subject position as the 
upper class wife of an MP, Mrs Dalloway reveals that while bodies can be used to extend the 
biopolitical power of state they can also be used to open spaces of potential from which 
discourse and discursive power relations can be recognized and challenged. And, once again, it is 
Clarissa’s performative action based on her subject position that brings about this potential. 
 In Section Three of this work, I present two examples of subjectivation using Woolf’s 
longer essays, A Room of One’s Own and Three Guineas. In A Room of One’s Own, which I 
discuss in detail in Chapter Five, Woolf employs a narrator whose political praxis in the essay is 
grounded in the close examination of subject positions and how her position as a woman writer 
can best be used to advance political ends. As Clara Jones has shown recently, Woolf was no 
stranger to political activism, in particular on behalf of The People’s Suffrage Federation and 
The Women’s Co-operative Guild (4), and that the experiences of woman are important to 
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Woolf’s argument in A Room of One’s Own is beyond dispute since the attacks her narrator 
levels at Oxbridge are born of her experience being shooed off the grass and excluded from its 
library. So it seems strange that Woolf’s narrator positions herself as an outsider when she 
lectures to a collective of women’s college students, despite the fact that the narrator supports 
women’s education and, presumably, has a lived experience similar to that of the students. 
Stranger still, she explicitly rejects the term feminism because it and its proponents, specifically 
Emily Davies and Anne Clough (prominent members of the Suffragette movement and the first 
head mistresses of Girton and Newnham women’s colleges respectively), divide the sexes from 
one another. In terms of political expediency, positioning oneself in this way amongst a group of 
women’s college students is questionable, and nothing would be easier for the narrator than 
delivering a speech that affirms women’s rights and their right to an education, but in this time 
and place the narrator writer views promoting a theory of the androgynous mind as the most 
politically and culturally useful thing she can do. She does not deny the historical patriarchal 
oppression of women and even repeatedly suggests topics—the role of chastity in women’s lives, 
the effect of money on women’s literature—that the women in her audience may explore to 
expand England’s understanding of women’s history. She asserts, however, that her contribution 
as a woman writer cannot be and will not be to write on behalf of her sex. Freed by her room of 
any anger she feels at being excluded from social institutions because of her gender, the narrator 
wants to write about things other than her gender because, she argues, it will repair a relationship 
between men and women that has been fractured by women’s fight for civil rights and men’s 
desperate attempts to prevent these civil rights by reasserting ever more vociferously their fragile 
superiority. An anchoring feminine subjectivity may have been politically necessary during the 
fight for women’s civil rights and women’s colleges, Woolf implies in the peroration of A Room 
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of One’s Own, but now that women have the vote and educations and occupations there is no 
excuse for them not to invent, to write, and to imagine free from men and the femininity they 
discursively impose upon women, for at long last, Woolf argues, “our relation is to the world of 
reality and not only to the world of men and women” (102). Her call for gender neutrality in the 
essay may be naïve or quixotic given there were then and still are many social inequalities 
women face, but Woolf uses her narrator’s outsider subject position to ask women what it has 
meant to anchor themselves to a feminine subjectivity for the last half-century or so in their fight 
for civil rights. 
 In contrast to her call for gender neutrality in A Room of One’s Own, nearly ten years 
later in Three Guineas Woolf would argue almost the exact opposite when she called for 
outsiders to ground their politics in the subjective differences their exclusion from England’s 
social institutions had created. Woolf’s reversal in argument comes down largely to context: in 
1929, England had put the Great War behind it for the most part and, along with much of the 
developed world, was enjoying an economic upturn, but by 1938 the Great Depression had taken 
its toll on the global economy and fascism was pushing Europe to the brink of war once again. If 
women could afford to work with men in building a more equitable society at the time Woolf 
was writing A Room of One’s Own, they could ill-afford to do so as she was writing Three 
Guineas and while Hitler and Mussolini were elevating all the worst aspects of patriarchal 
hegemony to support their ideology. Chapter Six examines the way Woolf positions herself as an 
outsider in Three Guineas to make the argument that women must be careful when joining men 
in universities, businesses, and professions that they do not end up supporting patriarchal 
hegemony in England’s educational, economic, and legal systems. Woolf employs an 
argumentative structure in Three Guineas that pays homage to the formal essays written in 
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England’s public educational institutions, but she also subverts this structure using an epistolary 
form—long associated with women and the private sphere—that continuously disrupts and 
intervenes in her argument. For Woolf, letters represent a highly personal, performative, and 
temporalized form of writing because what is captured in letters is a writing subject and a 
reading subject, both imagined through their shared relationship, as they exist on a given day in 
any given place. By disrupting her essay’s structure with an epistolary form, therefore, Woolf 
models the type of careful private and disruptive engagement with public patriarchal institutions 
she councils for her Society of Outsiders in the text. In the end, then, Three Guineas represents a 
purposeful failure at communication between her as the daughter of an educated man and the 
educated man she writes to, for Woolf breaks an argumentative structure long used by men and 
familiar in the public sphere with a personal, performative form that promotes timely political 





How Should One Sell a Book?: High- and Middlebrow Marketing Strategies Between the 
Wars 
 Any discussion of modernism’s history must take into account the rapidly changing 
literary marketplace modernism found itself within. By the twentieth century, the literary 
marketplace in England was characterized by, above all else, competition. The English 
Education Acts of 1870 and 1881 had guaranteed free and compulsory education for all children 
in England, the result of which was the near eradication of illiteracy by 1900. “In 1841,” Paul 
Delaney writes, “a third of English men and half the women could not write their own names in 
the marriage registers; by 1900, only three percent of both sexes were unable to do so” (101). To 
attend to the needs of this quickly expanding literate society, the production of books, 
magazines, and newspapers increased drastically. This increase can be seen in terms of material 
production and in terms of cultural production: from 125,000 in 1871, the number of workers 
employed in the production of paper and printed material had reached 397,000 in 1911, and the 
amount of paper produced rose “from 120,000 tons in 1870 to 774,000 tons in 1903” (102). The 
ranks of literary professionals in England also swelled: “in 1881, 3,400 authors, editors, and 
journalists [made lives in England]; in 1891, around 6,000; in 1901, about 11,000, and in 1911, 
around 14,000—a quadrupling in size in thirty years” (Miller 8). Thus, “By 1900 there were an 
estimated 50,000 periodicals being published in Britain by 200 publishers,” of which the most 
popular saw rapidly escalating sales through the turn of the century and beyond: “The Daily 
Mail, launched in 1896, with a circulation of about 200,000, achieved 1 million circulation in 
1906 and about 2.7 million by 1927” (Collier 18).  
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 The literary marketplace was not only trying to keep up with the sheer demand for new 
things to read, however; it was also trying to cater to a diversity in taste heretofore unseen in the 
English reading public. Democratizing literacy had thrust literature, over the span of about half a 
century, into a market economy that had no clear qualitative distinctions concerning literature 
and was, instead, dominated by individual interests and tastes. The writers of high literature 
could to a great extent once have distanced themselves from the rigorous competition of the 
market economy either by seeking the patronage of an upper class invested in promoting high art 
or by finding work with literary periodicals, many of which functioned in ways not dissimilar to 
patronage. In the early twentieth century, modernist writers took this same approach to funding 
their art: Ezra Pound, for example, used patronage as his primary source of income well into the 
twentieth century, receiving £200 of his £400 annual salary in 1912 from Margaret Cravens, an 
American bohemian expatriate (Rainey 15). Literary periodicals also offered writers of high 
literature a reprieve from the market economy inasmuch as they were primarily supported by 
wealthy patrons and thus did not depend to any great extent on making money through 
advertising, a relationship that could potentially steer artistic production by placing demands or 
expectations on writers. The Little Review, for which Pound was foreign editor beginning in 
1917, and The Egoist, co-edited by Richard Aldington from 1914-1918 and edited by T. S. Eliot 
from 1918 to 1919, both carried very few advertisements and were paid for primarily by wealthy 
benefactors: the former was supported by four contributors whose total contributions equalled 
$2,350 per year, and the latter was supported by Harriet Weaver at the cost of £253 ($1,265) per 
year (Rainey 94). And higher circulation literary publications could be much more expensive. 
The Dial had much higher advertisement to content ratios (1:3) than smaller reviews such as The 
Little Review and The Egotist (1:10), but it still required massive support from private 
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benefactors: “its deficits for the three years from 1920 to 1922 were, respectively, $100,000, 
$54,000, and $65,000, a cumulative deficit of $220,000 that was paid for directly by [Scofield] 
Thayer and [James Sibley] Watson at the rate of $4,000 per month from each” (Rainey 94). 
While such publications remained a part of the literary marketplace throughout the modernist 
period, the rapid increase in literacy and readership in the early twentieth century was beginning 
to change the landscape of the literary marketplace as reading became a big business. “For the 
first time,” John Carey explains, “a huge literate public had come into being, and consequently 
every aspect of the production and dissemination of the printed text became subject to 
revolution” (5). Put most simply, the writers of high literature had to leave the drawing rooms of 
the coterie publics they had traditionally served in order to make their literature viable and 
sellable in a marketplace that had many more buyers than ever before. They had to make 
themselves commodifiable in a marketplace that demanded writers devise new marketing 
strategies to sell their products to an ever-increasing number of readers. 
 This chapter focuses primarily on how highbrow modernist writers positioned themselves 
and their writing within the large, varied reading publics of the twentieth century literary 
marketplace, and it provides an overview of recent critical work on the marketing strategies 
modernists used to sell their products. Through this discussion, this chapter maps the cultural and 
discursive landscape of the literary marketplace that produced Virginia Woolf’s 
conceptualization of her common reader. As Kathryn Simpson points out, Woolf’s common 
reader “was brought into being by the emergence of the literary marketplace, opening literature 
up to readers other than the wealthy patrons of the arts” (Gifts 13), but her reliance on a figure 
other modernists abandoned—often times very publicly—indicates that Woolf wanted to stake 
her own ground in a literary marketplace that too often forgot the reader in its aesthetic squabbles 
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about browism. In the “battle of the brows,” that is, Woolf’s common reader not only reveals the 
inadequacies of an aesthetic discourse that, in pitting highbrow professionalism against 
middlebrow commonness, casts readers as mere passive consumers of culture, but also positions 
them as a cultural theorists, the common reader becoming a theory of subjectivity meant to 
demonstrate the active role individuals can and must play in their cultural, political, and 
ideological realities. 
 The “battle of the brows” was ostensibly concerned with marking clear qualitative 
distinctions between literatures, but this work treats them as terms in an aesthetic discourse that 
was constructed and used by writers from both sides in order to sell their products in the literary 
marketplace. That being said, I do want to make it clear from the outset that the terms high and 
middlebrow as I will use them here have nothing to do with phrenology and its debunked beliefs 
that racial differences in forehead size are indicative of racial differences in intelligence. The 
term highbrow was used in the interwar period to signify intellectual superiority, but as Melba 
Cuddy-Keane has pointed out, highbrow was generally used at the time as a pejorative because 
the term highbrow “usually assumes an attitude held by intellectuals toward non-intellectuals 
and, used with this connotation, it generally betrays and attitude toward intellectuals on the part 
of the user” (16), so at the time the term highbrow “is less about attributes than attitudes” (16). 
The word’s basis in attitudes rather than a clearly defined concept makes it particularly useful for 
advertising and marketing because, firstly, it carries connotations that evoke an emotion and, 
secondly, it makes the word particularly malleable as a signifier. Many modernist writers, who 
were generally accused of being highbrows by critics and other writers, took the word on, 
however, reappropriating it and using it to define themselves and their works. This includes 
Virginia Woolf, who wrote an essay, written as a letter to the New Statesman and Nation but 
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neither sent nor published during her lifetime, called “Middlebrow” (1932), in which she offers 
these rather difficult to parse definitions of the high, middle, and lowbrows: the highbrow is a 
person “of thoroughbred intelligence who rides his mind at a gallop across country in pursuit of 
an idea” (196); the lowbrow is a person “of thoroughbred vitality who rides his body in pursuit 
of a living at a gallop across life” (197); and the middlebrow is “the man, or woman, of 
middlebred intelligence who ambles and saunters now on this side of the hedge, now on that, in 
pursuit of no single object, neither art itself nor life itself, but both mixed indistinguishably, and 
rather nastily, with money, fame, power, or prestige” (199). In and of themselves, these 
definitions do little to explain how we might distinguish between the brows, but Woolf does 
offer us one diagnostic tool for defining the middlebrow when she notes their strange passion 
“for being ‘seen’” (199)—being seen owning the right things, wearing the right things, and doing 
and saying the right things. Woolf’s is a useful definition because it notes the highbrow 
assumption that the middlebrow traded in mass-produced homogeneous art designed for a 
consumerist reading public, proving that highbrow definitions of the middlebrow were also 
based on attitudes with emotional resonance rather than actual attributes. Woolf admits as much 
in a letter to Ethyl Smyth, writing that she was “wound into a pitch of fury the other day by a 
reviewers attacks upon a friend of mine” when she wrote the essay and that she was glad 
Leonard Woolf talked her out of sending it by pointing out that “its [sic.] all about yourself” 
(Letters 5 194-95), a point she admitted two weeks later when she re-read the essay and 
discovered “there was ‘I’ as large, and ugly as could be” (195). Thus, while Woolf was very 
much aware of and interested in the “battle of the brows,” she was very careful about how she 
forayed into the discourse publicly. For the most part, however, each brow ultimately settled on 
definitions of the other that allowed them to best market their respective products, so this work 
	
 25 
focuses on how these definitions were created and used for marketing purposes rather than 
attempting to define what constituted high and middlebrow literature during the interwar period. 
 Highbrow modernist writers transitioned from writing for the smaller reading publics 
established by patrons to writing for larger, more varied reading publics by establishing a niche 
market of their own based on the concept of craftsmanship, a marketing strategy that opposed 
mass-production and homogeneity to focus on a secondary economy that centred on cultural 
capital. This chapter begins with an examination of marketing strategies used in department 
stores like Selfridges that were designed to reinvigorate the aura of mass-produced goods by 
creating a commodified authenticity that centered on a product’s value as a class or cultural 
signifier rather than its use value. By selling the culture associated with certain products instead 
of just the product itself, Selfridges created a secondary economy in which goods gained cultural 
value that could confer status onto their owners. Despite public claims that they eschewed the 
marketplace and created art for art’s sake, many modernists employed similar marketing 
strategies to sell modernism. To distinguish their works as the authentic productions of 
professional writers as opposed to the homogenous offerings of mass-produced literature created 
merely for its high saleability, they established a secondary economy that traded in the cultural 
value connected to highbrow modernism and modernist writers. Based primarily on the creation 
and maintenance of authorial imprimaturs that could be used to confer status in the form of an 
introduction, a foreword, or a publishing insignia, this secondary economy was also manipulated 
in other ways, such as inciting bidding wars between competing modernist publications or 
creating market scarcity through limited editions. All of these marketing strategies helped create 
for modernism an authenticity and cultural value that was commodifiable and exchangeable, 
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helping modernists transition into a diverse marketplace dominated by niche demographics 
concerned more than ever with distinguishing themselves from one another. 
 Distinguishing themselves from the middlebrow, their main competitors in the interwar 
literary marketplace, was a crucial element of the selling of highbrow modernism. The 
foundation for the distinction between high- and middlebrow was a perceived cultural crisis as 
new literature flooded the marketplace and reading interests and tastes became more diffuse. The 
causes and symptoms of this cultural crisis, however, were different depending on which brow 
was making the argument. Highbrow writers and critics argued that the middlebrow pandered to 
readers by employing traditional narratives and familiar literary forms in order to ensure the 
saleability of products designed to be consumed easily and to reaffirm normative middle-class 
values and tastes. Middlebrow critics and writers, conversely, argued that the highbrow 
modernists had retreated to their ivory towers and abandoned readers with their experimental 
forms designed to impress small, elitist coteries and to neglect the material reality of common 
people. Thus, the marketing strategies of both high- and middlebrow hinged on what Andreas 
Huyssen has called the “great divide,” a “discourse which insists on the categorical distinction 
between high art and mass culture” (viii), and which provided each brow with a convenient 
enemy against which to position itself in the marketplace. The highbrow would be the breakers 
of literary tradition and counter the homogeneity of mass production with difficulty in the form 
of unconventional signifying systems, formal innovation, and non-traditional narrative structures. 
The middlebrow would be the maintainers of literary tradition and present conventional forms 
that adequately represented the material reality of the majority of the reading public.  
 While this antagonistic discourse or “battle of the brows” was mutually convenient from 
a marketing standpoint, I argue that it largely neglected the reading public, who gradually 
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became either the bane of highbrow attempts toward aesthetic innovation due to that public’s 
loyalty to traditional forms, or the object of middlebrow novels in which middle-class desires, 
tastes, and cultural signifiers were legitimized, normalized, and prioritized. Both high- and 
middlebrow writers, therefore, abandoned Dr. Johnson’s “common reader”—a figure who 
represented “the common sense of readers uncorrupted with literary prejudices” (456) and could 
be trusted to judge literature impartially—and focused on demographics and niche markets in 
which their art could be more commodifiable in the changed literary landscape. To aid in this 
process of niche building, middlebrow novels became sites of middle-class self-fashioning, texts 
in which middle-class readers could negotiate class performance and discover what it meant to 
be middle-class. Similar to behaviour manuals or buying guides, middlebrow novels were less 
focused on the common reader and oriented instead towards establishing the “common man,” 
who ostensibly represented the desires, goals, and tastes of the everyday Briton, but who actually 
normalized the lifestyles of the middle-class as an arbiter and disseminator of taste. The 
highbrow abandoned the common reader for the professional reader, believing that 
professionalism both on the part of the reader and of the writer could begin to reshape and 
rebuild an English culture that was regressing due to mass-production and the crush of new 
literature. This was the landscape, then, for Virginia Woolf’s writing, publishing, and marketing: 
the culture wars of interwar modernity. 
 
Commodifying Authenticity: Selling Culture in a Mass-produced World 
Just as the literary marketplace was going through its revolution in production and 
dissemination, the marketing of products in general was also going through a revolution as the 
growing middle classes acquired more expendable income. In the simplest terms, the dynamic of 
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production and consumption in England was transitioning throughout the beginning of the 
twentieth century from a capitalist to late-capitalist marketplace, in which products are marketed 
more in accordance with their status as signifiers of culture than with their use-value. As 
Elizabeth Outka explains in Consuming Traditions, marketers in twentieth-century Britain 
“began to focus less on a particular object for sale at a particular price, and more on aura and 
setting” that promised consumers “new identities and new ways to live,” a sales strategy that 
“was not simply a transition from formerly fixed identities or lives to the mobile flux brought by 
modernity, but a simultaneous embrace of modernity’s promise of exchange and the equally 
alluring promise of authenticity” (7-8). In a world in which mechanical reproduction provides the 
capability to endlessly produce objects for rapid consumption, any aura new products have is 
stripped away as the marketplace becomes saturated with many similar and almost 
indistinguishable products. In order to sell products that vary only slightly from any number of 
other products, businesses began promoting certain products as being indicative or symbolic of 
certain cultures, classes, and lifestyles, a process that worked to reinvigorate the aura of the 
product by attaching it to certain modes of consumption and to certain classes of consumers. The 
sales techniques employed in this new form of marketing were often quite intricate. Selfridges 
department store was one of the first examples of selling culture to its customers, and in order to 
do so set up ornate vignettes within the store that showed manikins performing in still life the 
tasks of the average middle-class or working-class family. Such scenes are, of course, common 
today, but at the time they were revolutionary. Packed with products that signified the class of 
the manikins, these vignettes served as mirrors for consumers: they allowed consumers to see 
what it meant to be middle class, and because the products they saw were available for purchase 
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just a short distance away, consuming these products became a process of self-fashioning, of 
becoming middle class by buying the lifestyle presented in the vignettes.  
 To facilitate the process, Selfridges made shopping an experience rather than a mundane 
chore. As one commentator noted at the store’s opening, “The Selfridge idea—that Selfridges 
exists for the convenience and service of the public—took possession of every one who entered 
the building, and made every one easy. […] There is nothing ugly from the garden on the roof to 
the ground floor. Everything is well chosen, in good taste, in harmony with everything else” (qtd. 
in Outka 104). This description captures the paradox of buying objects to self-fashion or signify 
class: the store was designed to make browsing and, just as importantly, being seen browsing the 
primary function of commerce by making shopping a public event, yet it promised to every one 
who entered the store a measure of personal service that created the illusion of individual 
importance. “One” and “We” simultaneously, the Selfridges consumer was able to feel a part of 
something and apart from everything in equal measure. In creating vignettes to sell culture and 
transforming shopping into an event, Selfridges had shown England that culture was 
commodifiable, and that any person could present oneself as middle- or upper-middle class 
merely by consuming the right products. 
The view of consuming as self-fashioning is connected in several critical paradigms to 
the insidious operation of mass culture and the impulse to brainwash the masses by creating 
ideology-laden products and art that, as subjects unthinkingly consume them, creates an all-
pervading and pernicious homogeneity. As Theodor Adorno argues “What parades as progress in 
the culture industry, as the incessantly new which it offers up, remains the disguise for an eternal 
sameness; everywhere the changes mask a skeleton which has changed just as little as the profit 
motive itself since the time it first gained its predominance over culture” (100). The end of 
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consumption in this theory is consumption itself. As one consumes the same movies, the same 
sports, the same fashion, the same home decorations, the same literature as everyone else, one 
identifies oneself as a part of the whole, with the goals of the whole, the interests of the whole, 
and the desires of the whole becoming the goals, interests, and desires of the individual. 
However, the Frankfurt School’s view of consumption and mass culture is not just potentially 
condescending and reductive regarding the masses themselves, but also misreads a crucial 
dynamic of consumerism: the goal of consumers is not sameness but difference, not a desire to 
be just like everybody else but a desire to distinguish oneself from everybody else.  
That consumer decisions are driven by a desire for distinction is not a new idea. Indeed, 
economist Thorstein Veblen first presented this idea in 1899 with the publication of A Theory of 
the Leisure Class, in which he suggests that “Wherever the institution of private property is 
found, even in a slightly developed form, the economic process bears the character of a struggle 
between men for the possession of goods” (24). The struggle for possession of goods, moreover, 
is particularly acute in advanced capitalist societies in which one sees a superfluous 
accumulation of wealth, as possessions become more and more important to the process of 
conferring and maintaining status. The acquisition of possessions in advanced capitalist societies 
is not necessarily attached to consumption for Veblen, but is, instead, attached to the idea of 
accumulation since property becomes “the accepted badge of [one’s] efficiency” within capitalist 
systems to the point that the “possession of goods, whether acquired aggressively by one’s own 
exertion or passively by transmission through inheritance from others, becomes a conventional 
basis of reputability” (29). Accumulation of property through wealth thus creates what Veblen 
calls an “invidious distinction” (26), as people accumulate more and more in order to distinguish 
themselves both within the community and from the community. As if this form of consumption 
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for the purpose of conferring status through the accumulation of property is not already 
conspicuous enough, we must also add to it class expectations regarding which products should 
be consumed. Where property is used to confer status, it is not considered sufficient to be seen 
accumulating property: one must accumulate the right property by cultivating the ability to 
“discriminate with some nicety between the noble and the ignoble in consumable goods” (75).  
It is at the intersection of the conspicuous consumption practiced in advanced capitalist 
societies and the new marketing techniques practiced by stores like Selfridges that one finds 
what Elizabeth Outka refers to as the “commodified authentic,” a mode of commodification that 
constructs the authenticity of an object through class exclusivity while insisting that such 
authenticity can be had for a price. “Selfridges,” she explains, “was not simply selling notions of 
the authentic but frankly avowing that this authenticity was commodified, and that this very 
commodification in turn made the authenticity that much more appealing and available” (104). 
Put differently, the items in Selfridges vignettes were valuable only because they conferred status 
as class signifiers. They were not inherently more valuable or inherently more authentic than any 
other mass-produced products, but their authenticity was constructed, their aura reinvigorated, by 
their position as class signifiers: as that which symbolized membership in an exclusive club but 
also that which was readily accessible to the consumer. A secondary economy, therefore, was 
created based on class signification and the transfer of distinction or exclusivity that took place 
as one consumed and was seen consuming the correct items. Within this secondary economy, 
items that lacked authenticity were authenticated as they accumulated cultural value. 
 This secondary economy, based on distinction and exclusivity, promoted product 
authenticity—small batches of handmade products made by skilled craftspeople—within its 
marketing strategies in order to present the new and manufactured as if it were the old-fashioned 
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and crafted, thereby distancing products from the mass market while simultaneously making 
them consumable. As Outka demonstrates, much ink was spilled in advertising that promoted the 
authenticity of hand-made products in the old-fashioned ways used in English villages, which the 
taint of the mass production had not yet reached. An article entitled “How Selfridge’s [sic.] 
Gathers Its Goods from All Parts of the World,” which appeared in the Times leading up to the 
opening of Selfridges, decries the “painful uniformity” of mass produced products and points out 
that Selfridges buyers seek original products that “strike a distinctive and individual note” by 
travelling not only to places such as Japan, Germany, and the English countryside but also 
“literally off the high road of commerce to penetrate into little known villages, and sequestered 
districts where manufactures are still carried on in a simple human way by men and women 
whose workshop is their home and who themselves are artists in their craft rather than artisans” 
(qtd. in Outka 111). Mass production is both avowed and disavowed in this advertisement: the 
simple, commercially untainted, and authentic lifestyles of the English, German, and Japanese 
peasantry are juxtaposed against the homogeneity of heavily commercialized cities, yet these 
places are “penetrated” by Selfridges, who bring the authenticity of that place and its people to 
the city for the discerning consumer. The sexual language in this passage reveals much, both 
about what Selfridges was offering their customers and what their customers desired. Customers 
desired exclusive access to the pure wares of the peasantry because this access offered them 
power over a mass production process that stripped them of their individuality and the product of 
its aura, and Selfridges’ tireless search for the authentic ostensibly fulfilled this desire while, in 
reality, selling them the representation of purity. Thus, it seems Selfridges penetrated both 
peasantry and consumer, the former for the aura their evocation conferred and the latter for the 
exclusivity their consumption of these products established. Selfridges’ courtship of customers, 
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however, did not end with print advertisement. In the early years of the store’s existence, the 
store offered exhibitions of “Old-time Industry” once a year, during which a skilled craftsman 
would come and make the actual products for sale in Selfridges so that customers could observe 
products in the making, thereby strengthening the veneer of Selfridges’ incessant search for the 
authentic (Outka 112).  
Still other attempts to capture the authentic centred on the marketing of what were 
considered more authentic cultural traditions. For example, as Michael North argues, with the 
increased excavation of Egyptian tombs during the early twentieth century, some clothing 
designers looked backward to find inspiration for the present. Bedell’s in New York ran an ad in 
1923 saying that the store was sponsoring “the Tut-ankh-Amen Influence in Silhouette and 
Embellishment in Spring Apparel,” further explaining that “Bedell, always responsive to the 
newest and ever changing trends in fashion, takes the initiative in presenting the Tut-ankh-Amen 
silhouette, colorings and artful embellishment […] inspired by the delicately wrought Egyptian 
carvings of three thousand years ago” (qtd. in North 25). The ad goes on to explain that “Just as 
the ancient tombs are resplendent with their rare works of art, so the Bedell Salons disclose a 
magnificent ensemble of brilliant attire for Springtime. As each treasure has its own particular 
beauty, so is there a treasured beauty in Bedell Apparel—each with an individuality so pleasing 
to the feminine heart” (qtd. in North 25). This ad obviously plays on many of the same principles 
as the Selfridges ads—invigorating the aura of mass-produced clothing, evoking Ancient Egypt 
as a time before mass production, and promising the consumer individuality—but note, too, how 
this marketing strategy is mirrored in the construction of a number of the sentences. The 
subordinate clauses that begin the last two sentences harken back to Ancient Egypt, which is then 
brought into the present through Bedell’s fashion, promising as it were a direct connection 
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between the authenticity of Ancient Egypt and the consumer of Bedell fashion. Wearing Bedell 
clothing was not only stylish but showed also a discerning taste born of and borne by the 
authenticity of an ancient culture much more closely connected to the real than twentieth-century 
consumer society. Therefore, as North points out, “the Tut treasures themselves became valuable 
because they could be known, discussed, and reproduced, literally as well as figuratively. Thus, 
the ultimate auratic paradox governing the Tut phenomenon was that the new, the secret, the 
hermetic had to be hurriedly exploited before if became too common, and yet common 
knowledge of it was itself the value being mined” (24). Sellers, that is to say, had found a way to 
manufacture the authentic by selling culture rather than products, which became cultural 
signifiers imbued with value according to the distinction they conferred in secondary cultural 
economies governed by conspicuous consumption. 
In addition to constructing these secondary cultural economies, sellers had found a way to 
ensure that the search for distinction through consumerist self-fashioning became an endlessly 
reproductive cycle. In part, the reproductive cycle of self-fashioning occurred naturally, for as 
one symbol became too ubiquitous it was replaced by other symbols capable of conferring 
cultural status. But because its value lay more in who was consuming it than in what was being 
consumed, commodified authenticity was much more malleable than product authenticity. 
Consequently, sellers could to a great extent manipulate the process of self-fashioning to suit 
their purposes. If one wanted to sell a new product as an upper-middle class cultural signifier, 
then one merely had to start selling old upper-middle class signifiers as new middle-class 
signifiers. In this way, the commodified authenticity of the product, which once conferred upper-
middle class status, is transferred to confer middle-class status, and as more middle-class people 
consume the product, its commodified authenticity as an upper-middle class cultural signifier is 
	
 35 
exhausted and new signifiers are needed to demonstrate one’s exclusive inclusion in the upper-
middle class. And this process repeats itself as old middle-class cultural signifiers become lower-
class signifiers. At Selfridges, this entire process of distinction, exhaustion, and transformation 
was as easy as moving a product from one floor to another: what started on the upper floors as 
upper-middle class and middle-class wares eventually found themselves as sale items in the 
basement, where their commodified authenticity was exhausted for the final time. 
 
Whither the Common Reader?: Cultural Crisis, the Leavises, and Professional Readers 
Writers of both highbrow and middlebrow literature employed marketing strategies based 
on the construction of niche markets and commodified authenticity, and the foundation upon 
which these strategies rested during the pre- and interwar period was a perceived cultural crisis 
most clearly outlined in Q. D. Leavis’s Fiction and the Reading Public (1932). In this work, 
Leavis produces a bleak picture of the literary marketplace, suggesting that, as book and 
magazine publishers were becoming more involved with selling books than with producing 
serious literature, the reading public’s critical faculties were steadily disintegrating. This 
disintegration did not take place for any one reason, according to Leavis, but was, rather, the 
result of an expanding reading public and the introduction of mass marketing approaches to 
selling literature. Magazines, she writes, now “provide reading fodder for odd moments, 
travelling and after business hours, glanced through with a background of household chatter or 
‘the wireless,’” and goes on to suggest that “it is essential too that the stories they provide should 
be short, ‘snappy,’ as crudely arresting as a poster and for the same reason, and easy enough for 
the jaded mind to take in without exertion” (28). Consequently, magazines advertised for easy-
to-digest, not-too-difficult stories, and publishers refused work that mentally strained the reader, 
	
 36 
issuing instead works that were “carefully chosen by the editors in accordance with the policy of 
what is called ‘Giving the Public what it wants’” (27). Publication, therefore, had become akin to 
a scientific formula, Leavis argues, as “the editor sets out to satisfy the common measure of 
taste, and he cannot (or thinks he cannot) afford to publish any story which fails to conform to 
type” (27).  
Leavis illustrates her concerns regarding the formalization of taste in Fiction and the 
Reading Public, as does F.R. Leavis in Mass Civilization and Minority Culture, with reference to 
lectures and books that outlined not just how to market fiction but, more specifically, how to 
write fiction that would sell. Such lectures and books became popular in the interwar period as 
the literary marketplace expanded, and Q. D. mentions in particular an instance in which editor 
‘Bob’ Davis of the Centurion hosted a series of lectures in 1930 entitled “You Can Learn to 
Write Stories that Sell.” These lectures included topics such as “Write so a blind man can read,” 
“Write for children to read. If you must say it with flowers, go sell your stuff to the highbrow 
magazines,” and “Stories that Do Not Sell; Stories Editors do not Like; The Stories that do Sell; 
Selecting the Market” (qtd. in Q. D. Leavis 30-31). Things in the world of novels were not much 
better, according to F. R., due to book-borrowing clubs and book-selecting societies. Rapid 
turnover rates in book-borrowing clubs meant that readers frequently read novels, as they did 
magazines, for entertainment, so that “the book-borrowing public has acquired the reading habit 
while somehow failing to exercise any critical intelligence about its reading” (7). Similarly, book 
societies standardized the taste of readers by promising their selection committees would choose 
for their customers the right books for their shelves. As one Book Society advertisement read: 
“How often, sitting in some strange house, have your eyes wandered to the bookshelves in an 
effort to get some idea of the character of its owner? The books you read are often a guide to 
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your character. The Book Society will help you to get those books you most want to have on 
your bookshelf” (qtd. in Mass Civilization 23). Books, then, were marketed by these societies as 
cultural signifiers just like many other products, gaining and retaining value in secondary 
economies in which the person who was reading the books was as important as what was 
contained within their pages. That books had entered into the world of commodified authenticity 
is perhaps nowhere more clear than in one winner’s answer to a Book Society essay contest that 
asked clients to explain “What the Book Society Has Meant to Me”: “I have looked on the Book 
Society as a fold into which I can creep for shelter, knowing that the fleeces of the other sheep 
will be the same colour as my own” (qtd. in Q. D. Leavis 25-26). Q. D., not unjustifiably, sees in 
this response a pernicious and troubling homogenization of taste within the Book Society’s 
clientele, but there is also an element of exclusivity—of belonging to a distinguished club—in 
this response, for the client knows that they are part of a community, the shared values, interests, 
and goals of which are indicated by the books they keep on their shelves as cultural signifiers. 
The end result of literature’s induction into the mass market and the use of mass 
marketing techniques to sell literature, as posited by Q. D. and F. R. Leavis, was a crisis in 
culture as the common reader of the English reading public became a less and less reliable judge 
of literary taste and value. The idea that the English common reader should be considered the 
ultimate arbiter of literary taste and value first appears in Samuel Johnson’s Lives of the Poets 
(1779-81), where, in the “Life of Gray,” he writes, “In the character of [Gray’s] Elegy [Written 
in a Country Churchyard] I rejoice to concur with the common reader; for by the common sense 
of readers uncorrupted with literary prejudices, after all the refinements of subtilty [sic.] and the 
dogmatism of learning, must be finally decided all claim to poetical honours. The Churchyard 
abounds with images which find a mirror in every mind, and with sentiments to which every 
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bosom returns an echo” (456). This definition is troublingly vague, but Johnson seems to be 
suggesting that literature can be deemed great only if the common reader sees himself reflected 
back within that art, even if he is unaware he shares anything in common with the text until after 
he has read the text. There is a mutual and continuous creative process in this definition of the 
common reader: the common reader and literature inform one another, with neither existing in 
isolation from the other and both helping to create one another. Consequently, the common 
reader and literature should ideally grow together, the values, interests, and goals of one 
reflecting the values, interests, and goals of the other.  
 For the Leavises, this process of mutual growth had ceased entirely, in part because the 
market was deciding what common readers wanted by refusing to publish anything that didn’t fit 
a specific mould, but also because mass marketing techniques designed to sell culture were 
creating niche markets that increasingly fractured the reading public and made one common taste 
an impossibility. Nowhere was this fracturing of the literary marketplace more apparent than in 
the literary magazine genre, which was designed, as Mark S. Morrisson has pointed out, to 
“control the market from production to consumption, using advertising to craft market niches and 
foster consumer demand for the products they produced” (4). Thus, as Q. D. Leavis explains, 
“The Criterion will review only those novels which have some pretentions to literary merit and 
can be criticised by serious standards (it is common even in literary circles to fling the epithet 
‘highbrow’ at it); the Times Literary Supplement, representing a ‘safe’ academic attitude, will 
summarise and comment on the plot and merits of any work by a novelist of standing; while a 
handful of cheap weeklies appear to satisfy a demand for literary gossip and information about 
the readableness of books” (20). Leavis extrapolates from this information the suggestion that 
“We now have, apparently, several publics, loosely linked together, with nearly a score of 
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literary weeklies, monthlies, and a quarterly which serve to standardise different levels of taste” 
(21). One thus arrives at the foundation of the Leavisite cultural crisis, for F. R. Leavis writes 
much the same thing in Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture (1930): “Here we have the plight 
of culture in general. The landmarks have shifted, multiplied and crowded upon one another, the 
distinctions and dividing lines have blurred away, the boundaries are gone, and the arts and 
literatures of different countries and periods have flowed together” (19). Gone were the “images 
which find a mirror in every mind” and the “sentiments to which every bosom returns an echo,” 
subsumed in a cultural wasteland that caters to the tastes and lifestyles of certain groups of 
readers. Faced with this dilemma, both Q. D. and F. R. pronounced the death of the common 
reader in the twentieth century. That death, according to Q. D., stemmed from what was 
perceived as an increasing divide, where “the lowbrow public” was perceived to be “ignorant of 
the work and even the names of the highbrow writers,” and where the common cultural texts are 
for “the highbrow public” known “from hearsay rather than first-hand knowledge” (35). For 
Q.D., this divide in reading publics 	
means nothing less than that the general public—Dr. Johnson’s common reader—
has now not even a glimpse of the living interests of modern literature, is ignorant 
of its growth and so prevented from developing with it, and that the critical 
minority to whose sole charge modern literature has now fallen is now isolated, 
disowned by the general public and threatened with extinction. (35) 
For F. R., too, the notion of the common reader was a thing of the past. Johnson’s age, he opines 
in How to Teach Reading, “enjoyed the advantages of a homogenous—a real—culture” that 
allowed readers “to move among signals of limited variety, illustrating one predominant 
pervasive ethos, grammar and idiom […] and to acquire discrimination as one moves” (3). In 
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such a homogenous literary marketplace, one was able to “defer to the ultimate authority of the 
Common Reader” because one could trust the common reader’s cultural competence, but in a 
marketplace as diverse as that of the twentieth-century, F.R was forced to conclude that “There is 
no Common Reader: the tradition is dead” (3-4).  
 Never ones to use a rapier where a cudgel will do, the Leavises’ statements are steeped in 
the hyperbole that became a hallmark of their critical work, which, as Iain Wright points out, 
tended to represent the cultural crisis “in histrionically absolute and apocalyptic terms” and 
positioned the Leavises and their retinue as “lonely heroic figures silhouetted against the lurid 
glow of the Last Days” (54). Wright is, of course, countering hyperbole with hyperbole with this 
statement, but reading the Leavises is indeed akin to reading a cultural battle manifesto. In Q. D. 
Leavis’s assertion that, under the influences of the mass market, “the reading habit is now often a 
form of the drug habit” (7), one recognizes how invested she was in solving the cultural crisis. In 
the Leavisite narrative, fiction “had once been in harmonious alignment with a reading public,” 
Jennifer Wicke explains, since “good literature has also, in effect, been popular literature, and 
there was no discrepancy between popular taste and high culture,” but “mass culture was an alien 
wedge” that was separating the two and rendering the common reader valueless as cultural 
arbiter (8).  
The solution to this cultural crisis, according to the Leavises and their supporters, was the 
reinstitution of critical practices through a minority of people properly trained to effectively read 
modern texts and help guide culture in the right direction. This minority is alluded to by Q. D. in 
the passage above, but it finds its most cogent definition in F. R.’s Mass Civilisation and 
Minority Culture when he argues that the minority capable of appreciating earlier as well as 
contemporary masters demonstrate a “responsiveness to theory as well as to art, to science and 
	
 41 
philosophy in so far as these may affect the sense of the human situation and of the nature of 
life,” and among them “they keep alive the subtlest and most perishable parts of tradition” (4). 
Within this minority, Leavis argues, reside the “implicit standards that order the finer living of an 
age, the sense that this is worth more than that, this rather than that is the direction in which we 
must go, that the centre is here rather than there” (5). What Leavis is suggesting is the 
professionalization of a minority of readers, trained by him and the other members of newly-
formed English Departments in British universities, who would then be able to act as something 
of an Arnoldian cultural steering committee to ensure that the best in culture was kept alive and 
passed on to future generations. Such intervention was perceived as necessary in the age of 
mechanical reproduction, for within the pages of great literature was contained the essence of 
what it meant to be human, an essence that was slowly being stripped away as increased 
mechanization made automatons of people. In the Leavisite conception of the twentieth-century 
cultural crisis, reading thus became both the poison and the remedy for a consumer culture that 
alienated people from themselves. The Leavises urged for rigorous textual analysis, Terry 
Eagleton states, “not simply for technical or aesthetic reasons, but because it had the closest 
relevance to the spiritual crisis of modern civilization,” a crisis in which “Literature was 
important not only in itself, but because it encapsulated creative energies which were everywhere 
on the defensive in modern ‘commercial’ society. In literature, and perhaps in literature alone, a 
vital feel for the creative uses of language was still manifest, in contrast to the philistine 
devaluing of language and traditional culture blatantly apparent in ‘mass society’” (27-28). 
Readers could be reinvigorated and brought back in touch with their humanity according to the 
Leavises and their critical retinue at Scrutiny, but first culture must be saved by properly trained 




Make it New Again: Literary Modernism’s Aura Enters the Marketplace 
In an academy in which postmodernism’s near complete deconstruction of the divide 
between high and low culture makes it possible to attend conferences on both Marcel Proust and 
Buffy the Vampire Slayer in the same calendar year, the idea of a minority of well-trained readers 
acting as cultural arbiters seems, at best, quixotic and, at worst, quaint beyond compare. Indeed, 
Eagleton suggests that the “whole Scrutiny project was at once hair-raisingly radical and really 
rather absurd,” entailing as it did a plan that suggested “the Decline of the West was […] 
avertible by close reading” (30). But this seems a little harsh. Yes, the Scrutiny project was 
unquestioningly elitist; and yes, in the words of Eagleton, it “betrayed a profound ignorance and 
distrust of the capacities of those not fortunate enough to have read English at Downing College” 
(30); but the Scrutineers were by no means the only literary figures in the interwar period trying 
to teach people how to read. Writers, critics, and journalists of every class and brow attempted, 
in various ways, to instruct readers how to navigate the expanded literary marketplace. Virginia 
Woolf’s The Common Reader: First Series (1925) and Second Series (1932) are clearly part of 
this instructional trend, as are T. S. Eliot’s The Sacred Wood (1920) and The Use of Poetry and 
the Use of Criticism (1933), Wyndham Lewis’s Men Without Art (1934), and Ezra Pound’s How 
to Read (1931), which would later become The ABC of Reading (1951). Reading instruction and 
the fashioning of taste were central to discourses of aesthetics in interwar England, as these are 
but a few of the more well-known book-length tomes, essay collections, and pamphlets on 
reading. Literary periodicals and journals were also the sites of numerous essays and letters 
concerning reading instruction and taste. Thus, as Melba Cuddy-Keane points out, if “the 
nineteenth century had been able to achieve almost universal functional literacy, cultural literacy 
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then became the immediate and more difficult goal” (60) for critics and writers in the twentieth 
century. The problem for literacy in the twentieth century, that is to say, became one not of 
teaching people how to read, but rather of teaching the reading public, first and foremost, what 
books were worth reading and, secondly, why those books were worth reading. 
What books to read and why—questions that took on a magnified significance in a 
literary marketplace seemingly in the midst of cultural crisis—became the background against 
which the high- and middlebrow marketed their works, and through which writers attempted to 
theorize and utilize literature’s entrance into the mass market. If “The difference between the 
nineteenth-century mob and the twentieth-century mass is literacy” (Carey 5), producers of 
literature—of all genres, brows, and creeds—had to learn how to effectively sell their products in 
the mass market. This necessitated close attention to the fractured reading public outlined by the 
Scrutineers, for, as Paul Delany points out, “the sharper and more systematic segmentation of the 
literary marketplace after 1870 forced authors to be aware of their dependent and relative status 
as producers: to think more of how they were situated between readers, publishers, genres and 
potential rivals, and less of the intrinsic moral or formal possibilities of a given subject matter” 
(99). Prompted to think in terms of niche markets, to think of readers’ genders, lifestyles, 
aesthetic tastes, and interests, producers had to understand that the selling of literature, as of any 
commodity in an advanced capitalist economy, had become a careful negotiation of supply and 
demand, and, above all else, a creation of cultural niches in which one’s product could entice 
consumers. In short, selling literature had become a careful game of positioning oneself within 
the marketplace. 
The first order of business in this game of positionality was to define precisely what one 
was selling, for doing so allowed one to begin constructing a sales niche in which one’s own 
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literary and cultural values could be validated. Thus, modernists began constructing a cultural 
space for modernism based on the idea of newness, the assertion that they were doing something 
fundamentally different than both their predecessors and their less serious contemporaries who 
wrote popular fiction for the masses. Newness is perhaps most fetishized in the Futurist and 
Imagist manifestos of the early twentieth century. Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, in the aggressive 
tone that characterized Futurism, makes it clear in “The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism” 
(1909) that his movement intends to wake literature from its long slumber, proclaiming that 
“Courage, audacity, and revolt will be essential elements of our poetry,” and that “Up to now 
literature has exalted a pensive immobility, ecstasy, and sleep. We intend to exalt aggressive 
action, a feverish, insomnia, the racer’s stride, the mortal leap, the punch and the slap” (251). 
Similarly, in his Imagist manifesto, “A Few Don’ts by an Imagiste” (1913), Pound excoriates the 
old conventions of poetry for the restraints they place on expression and demands: “Don’t chop 
your stuff into separate iambs. Don’t make each line stop dead at the end, and then begin every 
next line with a heave. Let the beginning of the next line catch the rise of the rhythm wave, 
unless you want a definite longish pause” (357-358). Imagism, then, suggested the poet must try 
to find the correct form for the idea being communicated rather than making that idea fit a 
specific form, a goal reiterated in the “Preface to Some Imagist Poets” (1915), where the 
contributors urge poets “To create new rhythms—as the expression of new moods—and not to 
copy old rhythms, which merely echo old moods. […] In poetry, a new cadence is a new idea” 
(Lowell, 269). T. S. Eliot also takes up this notion of newness in “Tradition and the Individual 
Talent” (1920), but the impersonal theory of poetry he presents in the essay contrasts with 
Marinetti and Pound’s view of newness inasmuch as Eliot recognizes the importance of tradition 
and suggests tradition, a living, changing thing, is not something to be broken but rather 
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expanded. “The existing monuments [of art],” Eliot argues, “form an ideal order among 
themselves, which is modified by the introduction of the new (the really new) work of art among 
them. The existing order is complete before the new work arrives; for the order to persist after 
the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered; and the 
relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the whole are readjusted; and this is 
conformity between the old and the new” (50). Not long after publishing this essay that primed 
readers to reconceptualise literary tradition, Eliot published The Waste Land (1922), which with 
its many allusions to the work of writers past would slide quite easily into the modernist canon, 
representing as it did les mots justes of Eliot’s conception of a tradition that, to use Michael H. 
Levenson’s terms, “widens” rather than lengthens so as to create a “meaning-giving system” 
(187).  
Through such stances, reinvention and upheaval were being billed as art’s greatest 
promise in the early twentieth century, but meaning had to be made of these new forms, these 
cultural reinventions and upheavals, and modernists acknowledged that fact as they explained the 
significance of such art through their critical and essayistic writings. Wyndham Lewis writes in a 
review of a 1914 Cubist exhibition in London, “These painters […] form a vertigineous [sic.] but 
not exotic island, in the placid and respectable archipelago of English art. This formation is 
undeniably of volcanic matter, and even origin; for it appeared suddenly above the waves 
following certain seismic shakings beneath the surface. It is very closely-knit and admirably 
adapted to withstand the imperturbable Britannic breakers which roll pleasantly against its sides” 
(“The Cubist Room” 9). Woolf asks readers in “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” to “Tolerate the 
spasmodic, the obscure, the fragmentary, the failure,” and ends the essay with “one final and 
surpassingly rash prediction—we are trembling on the verge of one of the great ages of English 
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literature” (337). Even Bennett, Woolf’s sparring-partner and the defender—at least in her 
view—of the old literary ways, recognizes the innovative value of modern painting in his review 
of the first Post-Impressionist exhibition of 1910. He begins the review by stating that the 
guffaws being levied against the Post-Impressionist paintings are “merely humiliating to any 
Englishman who has made an effort to cure himself of insularity” (280), and asks the public for a 
little patience when considering art that, while new and odd, is not without its own merit, 
explaining that the Post-Impressionist is “illustrating his philosophy and consolidating his 
position” (284) rather than seeking realism in his art. The ubiquity of modernism’s discourse of 
newness suggests the vital part this discourse played in most modernists’ conceptions of 
themselves, their various schools, and the modernist movement in general. 
At first glance, this attention to newness seems like a relatively simple marketing 
strategy: in an instance of supply and demand, the modernists noticed a gap in the market, a 
literary need that wasn’t being fulfilled, and created works designed to fill this gap. But there is 
much more to the modernist fetishization of newness than marketing, for if mechanical 
reproduction stripped mass-produced products of their authenticity, then it could be argued that 
popular literature, written according to specific formulas in order to achieve maximum sales 
amongst the masses, likewise stripped literature of its authenticity or “aura.” The notion of aura, 
an artwork’s “presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to 
be” (Benjamin 220), has played a smaller part in the production of books since the invention of 
the printing press made texts easily reproducible, but modernist attention to form, formal 
experimentation, and the ceaseless invention of new techniques became ways of infusing their 
literary works with a market-based and commodifiable aura. By marking clearly through form 
how the artist’s hand had manipulated the text, modernists could distinguish their “handmade” 
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literature from the mass-produced literature that followed well-worn narratives and formal 
structures, for modernist formal experimentation, as Edward P. Comentale has suggested, 
“transfers all positive value from the object of mediation to the process of mediation itself. Art’s 
significance […] lies solely within the activity of its production. Only the eccentric work of art, 
in its radical break from the commonplace, suggests both individualism and order” (54). Part of 
what modernists hoped to achieve through their formal experiments, therefore, was an aura that 
was severely lacking in mass-produced literature. Front and centre in their works was the author, 
not as key to textual interpretation—that author died for modernists long before Roland Barthes 
wrote his official obituary in 1967—but as maker, as fashioner, as arranger of the work. The 
Waste Land’s fragments, for example, bore Eliot with them as their catalyst if not their maker, 
for it is his arrangement that forges connections between shards and transforms literary tradition. 
Just as a master cobbler would be invited to construct “authentic” boots on the sales floor of 
Selfridges, so the master modernists built “authentic” literature apparently freed from mass 
culture’s homogeneity through its attention to crafted and innovative forms. Theirs was literature 
worthy of appreciation and valuable because it bore the skilled maker’s touch; but, more than 
this, and as Leonard Diepeveen has argued, the difficulty of modernism acted “as a barrier to 
what one normally expected to receive from the text, such as logical meaning, its emotional 
expression, or its pleasure” (x). Modernism, therefore, was most emphatically not Q. D. Leavis’s 
“reading fodder for odd moments” (28), but instead literature that was meant to be consumed 
slowly and with care, sufficiently suffonsifying readers’ appetites, not merely abating their 
hunger.  
While the care with which modernist texts were created and meant to be consumed lent 
them gravitas as “authentic” cultural productions, it must be remembered that this authenticity 
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was also designed for commodification. Discussing modernism’s widespread and well-
documented break from representing a purely material reality, Comentale writes that “Since the 
autonomy of the art object exists only as long as it can claim difference from actual life, it 
immediately ceases to hold any aesthetic value once it establishes that relational position. 
Significance is simultaneously produced and consumed and thus exists only in its continuous 
renewal. Order must be upheld by the ceaseless production of ‘shocks,’ each reviving and 
confirming all that has occurred before” (55). This is not an entirely different situation than the 
one faced by marketers trying to capitalize on the Tut discoveries, as the new in modernism must 
be hurriedly exploited. In the modernist fetishization of the new, the sense of authenticity created 
by new formal experiments in individual modernist texts could reinvent the modernist tradition 
and reinvest modernism with positive auratic potential. However, it must be remembered that 
this new formal experimentation was also consumed by readers as a signifier of modernism’s 
cultural value in the process. Created and consumed, the new became a part of the modernist 
tradition, something that could be looked back upon and transformed, but something that was no 
longer the new. Modernism’s newness, which was claimed to represent authenticity in the 
literary marketplace, must be viewed as a commodified authenticity; that is, as a mode of 
commodification that constructs the authenticity of an object through exclusivity while insisting 
that this authenticity can be had for a price. In short, modernism was not viewed as authentic 
because it excluded itself from the mass market and held art to a higher standard, but rather 
because it was able to effectively position itself within and against the mass market and, thereby, 
create a market niche in which its products could be interpreted as authentic precisely because 
they were exclusive.  
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Modernism’s commodified authenticity in the literary marketplace was, recent studies 
have shown, monitored very closely by modernist writers, who oftentimes found subtle ways to 
manipulate the marketplace in order to maintain the cultural value of modernist texts and 
authors. For example, Aaron Jaffe argues that, in order to deal with the constraints of a modernist 
marketplace that demanded constant reinvention, formal experimentation, and the simultaneous 
creation/consumption of the new, modernists built between themselves a complex relational 
network that produced a secondary economy of cultural exchange based on the “imprimatur” or 
signature of the artist. Essentially cultural reservoirs in which cultural value could be stored 
depending on one’s fame within the discourse of modernism, these imprimaturs were established 
based on the writer’s original literary output but generally maintained by secondary or extra-
literary output. When Eliot, or Pound, or Woolf wrote an introduction for another’s book, or 
wrote an article for a magazine, or decided to publish a writer’s work in their magazine or 
through their press, a working relationship was implied with these modernist elites, their name 
functioning as a stamp of approval. In essence, this secondary economy based on fame “turns the 
author into a formal artefact, fusing it to the text as a reified signature of value” (Jaffe 20), and 
what emerges in the marketing and dissemination of modernism is a modernist marketplace in 
which names are hierarchized and exploited to confer cultural value upon works. “In the critical 
wings of modernism,” Jaffe argues, “1) authors’ names are compared and weighed, until 2) they 
come to comprise makeshift registers, in which value is adjudicated relationally, that is, 3) they 
are couched in a mystified entreaty to the things in themselves, to the originals” (62). 
Imprimaturs functioned to mitigate the bind of simultaneous creation and consumption in a 
modernist market that fetishized newness, for those truly original and ground-breaking works 
became the cultural references that empowered author imprimaturs and that allowed these 
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imprimaturs to “regulate a literary ideology based on exhaustively maintained scarcity” (62). In 
other words, the imprimatur allowed those artists who had already created truly original, ground-
breaking works to act almost as surrogate patrons to works they chose to support with their 
signature, an act which had a profound effect on the saleability of new artists and texts but which 
also played an important role in maintaining the exclusivity of modernism by prioritizing texts 
within the modernist marketplace. An introduction written by Eliot or a wolf’s head stamp from 
the Hogarth Press told readers roughly the cultural value of a work at a glance, helping to inform 
the reading habits of modernism’s audiences and controlling the number of works that were 
associated with modernism’s greatest successes. “Ironically,” therefore, as Jaffe points out, 
“writers often so censorious about the de-creating consequences of capitalist valuation were 
actively involved in the promotion of an economy that was itself based upon a kind of fetishized 
commodity, the scarce supply of literary ‘originals’” (62). Conspicuous consumption through the 
buying and selling of products as cultural signifiers was, whether modernists admitted it or not, 
as much a part of the modernist marketplace as it was for the low- and middlebrow. 
Indeed, Lawrence Rainey argues that the selling of Eliot’s The Waste Land relied on the 
careful marketing of its cultural value as—in Pound’s opinion—the preeminent example of the 
modernist project up until that point. The poem, whose marketing was largely overseen by 
Pound, was set to be published in the Eliot-edited British magazine the Criterion in October 
1923, but it was also being considered for publication in three American magazines—the Little 
Review, the Dial, and Vanity Fair—in November 1923. Unremarkably, Eliot chose to publish in 
the Dial after they offered him the annual Dial Award of $2000 in addition to the $150 they paid 
all literary contributors for their work. Combined, Eliot’s pay out totalled “nearly three times the 
national [US] income per capita” (Rainey 88). Somewhat more remarkably, the Dial offered him 
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the award without ever having seen The Waste Land. Why had they paid so much? First of all, it 
was due in no small part to Pound’s ability as a salesman. Second, and as a result of Pound’s 
efforts, the text became “important precisely for its representative quality, and publishing it was 
not necessarily a matter of appreciating its literary quality or sympathizing with its substantive 
components […] but of one’s eagerness to position oneself as the spokesperson for a field of 
cultural production” (81). Pound and Eliot were selling modernism as much as they were selling 
The Waste Land, the latter being transformed through the marketing process into a cultural 
signifier valuable in accordance with its ability to confer status and distinction—conferred firstly 
on the Dial, which got to publish the work that was set to expose once and for all the 
“intellectual moribundity of England” (qtd. in Rainey 80), and secondly on the readers of the 
poem, whose belief in the modernist project was justified. This is not, of course, to say that The 
Waste Land has no cultural value based on its own merits as a work of literature, but it is to 
suggest that its marketing demonstrates clearly the poem’s participation in a secondary economy 
that generates cultural value through conspicuous consumption.  
Conspicuous consumption also lay behind the marketing of Joyce’s Ulysses. Originally 
published in France, Ulysses would appear in three limited editions with prices corresponding to 
the ornateness and scarcity of each edition: copies 1 to 100 were to be sold at 350 francs (£7 7s 
or $30); copies 101 to 250 at 250 francs (£5 5s or $22); and copies 251 to 1,000 at 150 francs (£3 
3s or $14) (Rainey 62). Such prices, at the time, were nothing short of exorbitant. In 1924, the 
average English household per capita made around £210 per year, about £3 per week (63), 
meaning the average worker in England would have to work for two and a half weeks in order to 
pay for the deluxe edition of Ulysses. Further, one thousand copies was a very small print run for 
a book that was already famous due to the fact that when the Little Review published the 
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“Nausicaa” episode of the novel in September, 1920 the magazine was charged with distributing 
obscene material, a crime of which they were found guilty when the case went to trial in 1921 
(47-48). When the publication of Ulysses was announced in the middle of 1921, orders began 
almost immediately, and when it was published in February 1922, there were very few editions 
left unaccounted for. That the deluxe and limited editions were selling was almost 
inconsequential, however; what mattered was who was buying the editions and for what purpose. 
By and large, the editions were sold to book dealers and collectors not because they wanted to 
read Ulysses but because they wanted to flip the text for a profit, a gamble that paid off in a big 
way for most. By March 1922, the $14 edition was generally selling in New York for $20, and 
one sold for $50; in June 1922, the 150 franc edition was selling in Paris for 500 francs; and in 
August 1922, the £3 3 s. edition was regularly fetching £10 with some going for £20 (69-70). 
The astonishing increase in prices for Ulysses can be attributed to two factors: firstly, these 
deluxe and limited editions, much more than simply books, were art objects similar to paintings; 
and, secondly, due to Ulysses’ publication history and the manufactured scarcity of the first print 
run, the editions became powerful signifiers both of culture and class. As Rainey writes, Ulysses 
“was an experiment in adopting exchange and market structures typical of the visual arts, a realm 
in which patronage and collecting can thrive because its artisanal mode of production is 
compatible with a limited submarket for luxury goods” (75). More than anything else, therefore, 
the first editions of Ulysses were designed to be displayed on shelves: certainly they contained a 
literary work that would become central to modernism, but their marketing depended largely on 
their ability to confer status on the owner seen consuming them.  
 
Fighting Words: Literary Modernism’s Difficult History 
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Eliot’s poem and Joyce’s Ulysses were products that conferred and continue to confer 
status, thanks in no small part to the cachet of newness and scarcity, yet they display another 
facet of modernist marketing too: rebellion and conflict, even beyond the rejection or inevitable 
transmutation of tradition. In a literary marketplace oversaturated with books and in which an 
attention to one’s relative status as a producer was imperative, modernism had its product in 
newness, but it also needed a sales pitch. Any marketers worth their salt will tell you that nothing 
sells like a good fight, and this lesson was not lost on the modernists. “Literary enemies were 
useful,” Leonard Diepeveen explains, for “they allowed one to heighten the rhetoric, to draw in 
one’s arguments with decisive strokes, and to point out the clear direction literature, if it was to 
have any integrity at all, must follow” (1), and so it was that modernism set about finding literary 
enemies. In the early years of English literary modernism, roughly the two years before World 
War I, modernists tended to choose enemies from within: Vorticists fought with Futurists, 
Imagists fought with each other, and Futurists fought with everyone, all in a bid to shock the 
reading public into paying attention to art in general and to their art in particular. This was a 
sales strategy Pound learned in the spring of 1912 when Marinetti made his second Futurist tour 
of England. Pound was still under the patronage of Margaret Cravens at the time, but he and 
Marinetti, it turned out, were both presenting lectures in London in March 1912. Pound’s were a 
very exclusive series of lectures held at a private home and attended by upper-class supporters of 
the arts who had paid 10s. 6d. (about half a pound). Marinetti’s lectures, on the other hand, were 
held in a hall that seated over five hundred people, were open to the public, and were accessible 
for as little as 1s (Rainey 28). Pound’s lectures, because they were attended by those who were 
essentially his patrons, demanded that Pound maintain his relationship with the audience, but 
Marinetti’s events were very different for he had “not flattered his audience but berated it, 
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castigating the English as “a nation of sycophants and snobs, enslaved by old worm-eaten 
traditions, social conventions, and romanticism” (28). Marinetti’s lectures were also lucrative: 
his instant notoriety (some 350 newspaper articles were written about the Futurists during the 
tour) earned for the Futurists about £440 through the sale of paintings (28). Thus, Marinetti’s 
1912 tour was “Pound’s first experience of what might be termed ephemeral seduction, the 
powerful allure of art conceived as public practice, as a spectacle capable of attracting an 
audience much larger than fifty, as performance that could arouse curiosity, debate, desire” (28). 
The precise role Marinetti’s lectures played in Pound’s personal beliefs concerning how best to 
market modernism is hard to determine, but there is little doubt that Pound helped shape English 
literary modernism through directly antagonistic relationships to other works in the literary 
marketplace, and there is little doubt that he and others in his retinue often used spectacle to do 
so.  
This love of spectacle was perhaps no more apparent than in Marinetti’s return to London 
in 1914, during which Pound and some of his Vorticist retinue disrupted one of Marinetti’s 
lectures. In a Futurist manifesto published in the Observer, at a point in his 1914 tour, Marinetti 
had berated a few English artists, including Wyndham Lewis, for their conventionality and 
unwillingness to accept technological progress. In response, the artists, “joined also by Pound 
and Aldington, sent a letter to the Observer, dissociating themselves from the Futurist 
movement” (Levenson 124) and setting the stage for their intervention of Marinetti’s lecture a 
few nights later. The encounter is remembered in Lewis’s Blasting and Bombardiering (1937) in 
his description of Marinetti’s desire for “a Futurist Putsch”: 
 It started in Bond Street. I counter-putsched. I assembled in Greek Street a 
determined band of miscellaneous anti-futurists. Mr. Epstein was there: Gaudier 
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Brzeska, T. E. Hulme, Edward Wadsworth and a cousin of his called Wallace, 
who was very muscular and forcible, according to my eminent colleague, and he 
rolled up very silent and grim. There were about ten of us. After a hearty meal we 
shuffled bellicosely round to the Doré Gallery. 
 Marinetti had entrenched himself upon a high lecture platform, and he put 
down a tremendous barrage in French as we entered. Gaudier went into action at 
once. He was very good at the parlez-vous, in fact he was a Frenchman. He was 
sniping him without intermission, standing up in his place in the audience all the 
while. The remainder of our party maintained a confused uproar. 
 The Italian intruder was worsted. (36) 
The absurdity of this situation is almost palpable, and even Lewis himself comments upon this 
absurdity when he writes that all of the artistic in-fighting in the early days of modernism, all of 
the manifestoes, and all of the grown men turning art lectures into public spectacles was merely 
“organized disturbance” and “Art behaving as if it were Politics” (35). Most importantly, 
however, Lewis and Pound had staged this entire spectacle to help sell the first issue of Blast.  
 A Vorticist magazine they were working on at the time, Blast was—from its very name to 
the seemingly endless manifestoes contained within it—quite consciously marketed to 
antagonize the art world in general and the Futurists in particular: in its pages Pound called 
Futurism one of the artistic schools that formed the “CORPSES OF VORTICES” and 
proclaimed Marinetti “a corpse” (“Vortex” 154). But perhaps the best example of just how well 
organized artistic disturbance became before the war comes in the actions of one little magazine, 
the New Weekly. At one point in 1913, the magazine “recruited [G. K.] Chesterton to attack 
Futurism, and then recruited Lewis to attack Chesterton” (Levenson 137). As mawkish as all this 
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sounds, the artistic in-fighting, the manifestoes, and the public disturbances appear to have 
worked according to Ford Madox Ford, who wrote in Thus to Revisit that “it was amazing to see 
these young creatures not only evolving theories of writing and the plastic arts, but receiving in 
addition an immense amount of what is called ‘public support’” (136), for “in 1914 Les Jeunes 
[…] had forced the public to take an interest not in the stuff but the methods of an Art” (137). 
Such modernist in-fighting ended on July 28, 1914 with the start of World War I. The public 
suddenly had real battles to worry about and soon lost interest in battles over whether the 
machine or the vortex was the most apt metaphor for modernity. 
Luckily, however, Pound had found another enemy just before the outbreak of war that 
was to relieve English literary modernism of its cannibalistic beginnings and that would prove a 
far more useful and enduring enemy for modernism: the reading public. In the “The New 
Sculpture” (1914), Pound writes that “The artist has no longer any belief or suspicion that the 
mass, the half-educated simpering general, the semi-connoisseur, the sometimes collector, and 
still less the readers of the ‘Spectator’ and the ‘English Review’ can in any way share his 
delights or understand his pleasure in forces” (68). Consequently, he argues, “The artist has at 
last been aroused to the fact that the war between him and the world is a war without truce” (68). 
Richard Aldington would continue in this vein in “Some Reflections on Earnest Dowson” 
(1915): “The conditions of modern popular art are so degrading that no man of a determined or 
of a distinguished mind can possibly adopt them. ‘What the public wants’ are the stale ideas of 
twenty, of fifty, of seventy years ago, ideas which any man of talent rejects at once as banal” 
(42). So banal had the masses become, according to Aldington, that “The arts are now divided 
between popular charlatans and men of talent, who, of necessity, write, think and paint only for 
each other, since there is no one else to understand them” (42). These are just two of many 
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modernist statements about the reading public, but Pound’s use of the word “masses” and 
Aldington’s use of the word “public” as a pejorative represent an increasingly important facet of 
the way modernists spoke about the reading public.  
The meaning of the word “mass” was changing in the twentieth century as it increasingly 
became used to signify the causes or symptoms of the homogenous culture created in advanced 
capitalist societies and designed to optimize, prioritize, and organize the tastes of the people. As 
Raymond Williams points out, in the twentieth century, “masses was a new word for mob, and 
the traditional characteristics of the mob were retained in its significance: gullibility, fickleness, 
herd-prejudice, lowness of taste and habit. […] Mass-thinking, mass-suggestion, mass-prejudice 
would threaten to swamp considered individual thinking and feeling. Even democracy, which 
had both a classical and a liberal reputation, would lose its savour in becoming mass-democracy” 
(288). It was this definition of the masses as a homogenous, undifferentiated mob that 
underscored the Leavisite cultural crisis, for the masses and their literary tastes, which had 
become unreliable because mass-produced literature aimed at saleability rather than challenging 
readers, were used to insist on the need for English literature departments capable of creating 
capable, professional readers. For similar reasons, the masses offered modernists a useful enemy 
against which they could create their own niche market, and it is remarkable how many 
modernists comment—whether with open or veiled negativity—upon some aspect of mass 
culture (the masses, mass production, mass marketing) in the process of positioning themselves 
within the interwar literary marketplace. Modernists publicly decried the masses for their 
unwillingness to accept experimental literature, allowing themselves, on one hand, to further 
establish their own cultural space within the literary marketplace, and, on the other hand, to 
clarify how their formally difficult and innovative texts would solve the cultural crisis that had 
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ostensibly been brought about by mass production and that was transforming the reading public 
into the homogenous masses.  
Difficulty is advocated most famously, perhaps, by Eliot in his essay “The Metaphysical 
Poets” (1921) when he writes “it appears likely that poets in our civilization, as it exists at 
present, must be difficult. Our civilization comprehends great variety and complexity, and this 
variety and complexity, playing upon a refined sensibility, must produce various complex 
results. The poet must become more and more comprehensive, more allusive, more indirect, in 
order to force, to dislocate if necessary, language into his meaning” (31). As much sales pitch as 
sincere criticism—notice how Eliot’s justification for the use of difficulty supports his own mode 
of allusive and indirect writing—this passage nevertheless offers insight into the reasons as to 
why difficulty could be potentially useful for modernists. Their project was to represent as best 
they could a chaotic, swirling modernity of rapid technological progress, depersonalizing 
metropolitan centres, speeding automobiles, and even faster cultural production, or variety and 
complexity as Eliot calls it. Formal difficulty better captured this complexity than did 
conventional forms.  
Formal difficulty and innovation, however, did much more than merely allow modernists 
to capture modern reality; they also allowed modernists to actively manipulate the reading 
process. Each new text required new interpretative strategies, forcing readers to approach each 
text afresh and to resist the engrained reading strategies forged by the homogenous output of 
mass culture. This aspect of formal experimentation is explained by Eliot in The Use of Poetry 
and the Use of Criticism, in which he points to four reasons modern poetry tended to be difficult. 
Firstly, he suggests that “there may be personal causes which make it impossible for a poet to 
express himself in any but an obscure way”; secondly, he suggests that “difficulty may be due 
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just to novelty” and points out that the Romantics were at one time considered obscure; thirdly, 
he argues that readers’ expectations of difficulty can adversely affect their ability to read obscure 
works because, “Instead of beginning, as he should, in a state of sensitivity, he obfuscates his 
senses by the desire to be clever and to look very hard for something, he doesn’t know what—or 
else by the desire not to be taken in”; and, finally, he suggests that some readers get frustrated 
when they fail to find something they expect to find in the text, “so that the reader, bewildered, 
gropes about for what is absent, and puzzles his head for a kind of ‘meaning’ which is not there, 
and is not meant to be there” (150-151). The first of these reasons is immaterial (the inability to 
express oneself in any but an obscure way is a failure of the writer rather than of the reader), and 
the second is a consequence of cultural change as much as of literary trend, but the third and 
fourth reveal how modernists used difficulty to rectify the ills of the mass literary market. The 
third reason on Eliot’s list—in which the reader approaches difficult texts with the desire to see 
something clever in them or to cleverly avoid being taken in by them—is what he refers to not as 
a case of “stage fright” on the reader’s part but as a case of “pit or gallery fright” (151). Readers 
in Eliot’s view are afraid to engage with difficult texts because they are afraid of not 
understanding or of misunderstanding the text. More than this, they are afraid of how this not 
understanding or misunderstanding will be perceived by others and with whether or not they will 
see in the text what others expect them to see in the text. Reading is reduced, then, from an 
individual search for enjoyment, intellectual engagement, and enlightenment to a closely 
monitored public experience, the rules of which seem based upon the formulaic conventions of 




These regulative textual standards that are imposed by mass culture are the foundation for 
Eliot’s final suggestion that readers find texts difficult because they go to literature expecting to 
find certain formal elements they have been trained to look for, and thus these standards serve as 
the very reason many modernists suggested difficulty was so necessary. Difficulty, as Diepeveen 
explains, “stymied the strategies one typically used to generate meaning from a text, and it 
demanded to be addressed first in order for one to have a significant interaction with the text” 
(49). The desire to provide a unique aesthetic experience, to confound traditional reading 
strategies, was therefore intended to reinvigorate readers who were being reduced to the mere 
consumers of spoon-fed ideology by mass culture. There was also a marketing dimension to 
difficulty’s reinvigoration of the reader, however, because difficulty was also seen as that which 
prevented the mindless consumption of literature. Comentale writes that “The work’s very 
promise of fulfillment is denied by its own coldness or inaccessibility; it thus both inspires and 
impedes the spectator’s desire for identification or sublimation. British artists valued this 
intentional halting insofar as it could transform blind desire into conscious choice, as it could 
expose the treacherous identifications of modern culture and reground the subject within the 
world” (8). Comentale certainly affords difficulty much gravitas in the modernist project with 
this statement, suggesting as he does the profound impact difficulty can have on subject 
formation, and I don’t disagree with his argument; but in downplaying that this subject formation 
is being negotiated through commodified objects in the literary marketplace, he elides the fact 
that modernist difficulty also played a role in the marketing of modernism. Modernists, contra 
the purveyors of mass culture who made their products as consumable as possible, offered the 
not-so-easily consumable and relied on its difficulty to confer distinction unto those readers who 
put the time and effort into reading such highbrow cultural productions. While modernists were 
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adjusting the speed of the consumption process that fulfills the reader’s desire for sublimation, as 
Comentale suggests, it is dubious to argue that this halting process necessarily transformed desire 
into conscious choice. Instead, it seems more likely that, as Jaffe points out, modernist culture is 
“ordinary” and that “modernist cultural production is, in fact, cultural production” (7). In short, 
modernists knew they were selling difficult literature to serious readers, and they also knew that 
having names such as Eliot and Pound signified one’s exclusion from the unwashed masses and 
their conventional, formulaic fare, so to keep their names valuable in the marketplace they 
retained difficulty as an integral part of their profession. 
Thinking about the act of writing modernist texts as a profession, and regarding difficulty 
as the key tool of that profession, allowed modernists to further position themselves against the 
mass market, but it also offered their project an end goal in terms of solving the cultural crisis. 
As Diepeveen explains, professionals address crucial needs in society that amateurs or the 
general public cannot effectively address (engineering bridges, performing open heart surgery, 
colliding sub-atomic particles, etc.); their work is viewed as urgent and important, for the 
“profession argues that its activities are specialized, demanding full-time attention and education 
if the work of the profession is to develop and the crisis is to subside” (96). The language of 
professionalism is employed by Pound in “The Serious Artist,” an essay published in The New 
Freewoman in October 1913. In the essay, he suggests that the serious artist “is as often as far 
from the ægrum vulgus as is the serious scientist” (47) and laments the fact that the “people 
would rather have patent medicines than scientific treatment” (48). Pound’s essay shies away 
from directly critiquing the reading public and directs itself primarily toward the artist, and 
suggests that serious art should not offer the patent medicine of conventional forms but, instead, 
the scientific treatment of language in an attempt to communicate an idea using the most 
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effective forms, meters, rhythms, and techniques. In this way, the serious artist shapes and 
transforms the tastes of a reading public grown, in Pound’s opinion, unreceptive and 
unappreciative of all but the most conventional forms of literature.  
Professionalism, too, lies at the heart of Eliot’s conception of tradition in “Tradition and 
the Individual Talent.” Eliot glorifies “the mind of Europe” in his essay and suggests that the 
artist must be much more aware of this mind than his own (51), but Eliot’s mind of Europe is not 
coterminous with the opinions and tastes of the reading public. The mind of Europe is directly 
connected to tradition for Eliot, for if the “existing monuments [of art] form an ideal order 
among themselves” (50), so too do these existing monuments form the ideal order of the mind of 
Europe. It is incumbent upon the individual talent (a figure that seems very much like the serious 
artist Pound writes of in his essay) to speak from and with this mind of Europe if his art is to be 
truly new and valuable. In other words, his work is valuable precisely because it interacts with 
and within the meaning-making systems of tradition. Similar to Pound, Eliot uses the language of 
science to describe the process by which the individual talent becomes a catalyst. He explains 
that oxygen and sulphur dioxide only form sulphuric acid if a filament of platinum is present and 
suggests that the “mind of the poet is the shred of platinum” that causes the reaction but remains 
unchanged itself, for “the more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the 
man who suffers and the mind which creates; the more perfectly will the mind digest and 
transmute the passions which are its material” (54). In their use of scientific language to describe 
the process of writing, Pound and Eliot do not view art as an amorphous feeling and expression 
of an inner voice; theirs is an art of almost empirical detail, of le mot juste, of capturing one 
single image in one single phrase of unparalleled precision and concision, of cultural erudition 
that allowed them to first break and then reassemble the traditions of Western culture. But most 
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of all, as they would have their readers believe, their art involved the martyrdom of self in the 
cultural waste land of Europe in order to invigorate it anew. Experts of culture, Pound and Eliot 
presented themselves as professionals who would tame the chaos of the literary marketplace 
using formal difficulty, for “the crisis at the beginning of the twentieth century was not the 
fashion for difficulty, as modernism’s opponents argued; rather, the crisis was that there was so 
much sloppy writing being produced, to which difficulty was the necessary corrective” 
(Diepeveen 102). Objectivity was required to solve the cultural crisis according to Pound and 
Eliot, a de-personalized art that could reemphasize and realign the literary marketplace with the 
mind of Europe to create in the reading public a standard of aesthetic value and taste based on 
the existing monuments of art. Difficulty played a key role in this objective art as it let readers 
know they were reading art that was crafted carefully by cultural professionals, that they were 
receiving the highest quality literature, and that they must, likewise, work to appreciate this 
difficulty if they were to become serious readers who rose above the fray of mass culture. 
 
Money Can Buy Me Class: Self-Fashioning the Middlebrow’s “Common Man” 
Purveyors of mass culture, especially the middlebrow, saw modernist difficulty as being 
the root cause of the cultural crisis inasmuch as it distanced writers from the reading public and 
abandoned that public using needless erudition and formal experimentation. While not 
technically a middlebrow publication, Harold Monro’s mock review of The Waste Land in little 
magazine The Chapbook in February 1923 offers an introduction to the basic argument between 
the middlebrow and the modernists. Entitled “Notes for a Study of ‘The Waste Land’: An 
Imaginary Dialogue with T. S. Eliot,” much of the review comes in the form of Monro’s 
questions or observations about The Waste Land, to which a fictional Eliot infrequently interjects 
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with comments such as “Well?”, “I am not prepared to judge,” and “That depends” (162). Eliot’s 
longest answer comes at the end of an exchange in which Monro’s speaker points to the poet’s 
distance from his audience: 
May I direct some criticism upon your poem? But first I should mention that I 
know it was not written for me. You never thought of me as among your potential 
appreciative audience. You thought of nobody, and you were true to yourself. Yet, 
in a sense, you did think of me. You wanted to irritate me, because I belong to the 
beastly age in which you are doomed to live. But, in another sense, your poem 
seems calculated more to annoy Mr. Gosse or Mr. Squire, than me. I imagine 
them exclaiming: ‘The fellow can write; but he won’t.’ That would be because 
just when you seem to be amusing yourself by composing what they might call 
poetry, at that moment you generally break off with a sneer. And, of course, they 
can’t realise that your faults are as virtuous as their virtues are wicked, not that 
their style is, as it were, a mirror that distorts the perfections they admire, which 
are in truth only imitations of perfections. Your truest passages seem to them like 
imitations of imperfections. I am not indulging in personalities, but only using 
those gentlemen as symbols. – Well, direct your criticisms anywhere you like. You 
are becoming slightly amusing, but not yet worth answering…. (163-64) 
This passage, inasmuch as it presents Eliot as a characteristically pompous elitist who, rather 
than writing for a wide audience of ordinary readers, writes for a small coterie of high-minded, 
professional aesthetes, cleverly lampoons many of the middlebrow’s initial reviews of The Waste 
Land, which accused Eliot of being obfuscating, needlessly complex, and purposefully 
exclusionary. For example, Louis Untermeyer’s January 1923 review in the Freeman proclaims 
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Eliot’s poem “a pompous parade of erudition,…a kaleidoscopic movement in which the bright-
coloured pieces fail to atone for the absence of an integrated design” (151). Likewise, in his 
October 1923 review for the Manchester Guardian, Charles Powell wrote that the poem “is not 
for the ordinary reader,” as “meaning, plan, and intention alike are massed behind a smoke 
screen of anthropological and literary erudition, and only the pundit, the pedant, or the 
clairvoyant will be in the least aware of them” (194). And, as Monro predicted, it seems that The 
Waste Land did indeed irritate J. C. Squire. In Squire’s October 1923 review for The London 
Mercury, of which he was the long-time editor, he suggested that Eliot’s poem hopes to impose 
upon the credulity of his reader through “the cultivation of a deliberate singularity” (“On Eliot’s 
Failure to Communicate” 191), and that while the poem seems to present “the poet’s wandering 
thoughts when in a state of erudite depression” there is little doubt that “a grunt would serve 
equally well” for “what is language but communication, or art but selection and arrangement?” 
(192). It’s important to note, however, that none of these responses to The Waste Land dispute 
the existence of the cultural waste land in crisis Eliot presents in the poem. Indeed, most of these 
reviews recognize in the myriad allusions, difficult syntax, shifting perspectives, and 
fragmentation of The Waste Land a formal experiment that attempts to represent modernity. 
What they questioned was whether this experimentation achieved anything other than the 
exclusion of ordinary readers. Did superfluous erudition and formal experimentation, the 
middlebrow asked, help ordinary readers navigate the current cultural crisis or merely further 
their disorientation? After all, as many in the middlebrow pointed out, not everyone was looking 
for difficulty. 
In his autobiography Delight, J. B. Priestley, one of the best know middlebrow writers in 
the interwar years, recounts a conversation between he and a young man in which the young man 
	
 66 
claims his writing seems “too simple” (71). Priestley responds by explaining that the simplicity 
the young man sees as a vice is what he sees as a virtue, suggesting that the young man “and his 
lot, who matured in the early ’thirties, wanted literature to be difficult” because they “did not 
want to share anything with the crowd” (71). Priestley and his lot, on the other hand, grew up 
unafraid of the crowd, and he explains that “No matter what the subject in hand might be, I want 
to write something that at a pinch I could read aloud in a bar-parlour” (72). Priestley’s comments 
bring up an important aspect of the middlebrow’s conception of themselves and their literary 
project: namely, as John Baxendale and Chris Pawling have suggested, “in the readers who, 
finding Joyce, Woolf and Lawrence hard to take, sought the continuance of nineteenth century 
realism, the ‘middlebrow’ was born” (qtd. in Habermann 32). Put differently, the formal 
elements of the middlebrow novel—realism, linearity, sustained narrative viewpoint—were the 
formal elements that had largely defined the novel since its inception in the seventeenth century. 
The vast majority of people, if we judge by the popularity of middlebrow novels, wanted their 
literature to retain these more accessible literary features. As Diepeveen explains, middlebrow 
writers “considered themselves as the defenders of tradition, who thought that modern art had 
abandoned the universal qualities of great art” (13). They were loyalists who sought to 
democratize art and ensure its values remained the values of the people—values the highbrow 
had apparently abandoned. Much more than merely aesthetic abandonment, however, the 
highbrow abandonment of the “crowd” had tangible political implications for Priestley. The 
highbrows, Priestley claimed, “grew up terrified of the crowd, who in this Mass Age seemed to 
them to be threatening all decent values” (71), and, consequently, came to fetishize complexity, 
which became less a formal necessity than “a password to their secret society” (70) that 
restricted access to their art. Having self-consciously cut themselves off from the ordinary 
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reader, highbrows removed themselves and their texts from social and cultural obligation 
according to Priestley, so that, as Baxendale explains, while “The nineteenth-century narrative of 
social progress had promised a steadily more inclusive political and cultural community […] the 
avant-garde of the 1920s and 1930s had deliberately reneged on this promise, for purely selfish 
reasons” (17). Withdrawing inward to the small coteries in which they found unanimous and, to 
Priestley, uncritical support, highbrows ceased to concern themselves with projecting their 
voices outward, thereby abandoning their readers in the cultural waste land they themselves had 
mapped. 
 Priestley’s criticisms of modernist exclusivity have become relatively common in 
contemporary critical discussions of the middlebrow, one of the most interesting of which is 
Nicola Humble’s innovative article “Sitting Forward or Sitting Back: Highbrow v. Middlebrow 
Reading.” In the article, Humble notes the “nebulousness of the divide between the highbrow 
and the middlebrow” (42), and suggests critics navigate this ambiguity by understanding that 
“middlebrow and highbrow books are distinguishable, fundamentally, not by any stable intrinsic 
differences, but by how they are read” (46). Humble bases her argument on the suggestion that, 
in the twentieth-century literary marketplace, there was a gradual separation between 
professional readers and leisurely readers, and that, in in their condemnation of the masses, 
highbrow, professional readers were reacting more against the changing uses for reading than 
against the content of middlebrow literature. The “self-appointed guardians of the highbrow,” 
according to Humble, modernists and their supporters were concerned about the “co-option” of 
literature into entertainment (48). That said, to position the highbrow as the only guardians of 
literature in early twentieth century England downplays the fact that the middlebrow was striving 
just as hard to steer aesthetic taste. While we can learn much from the highbrow “acts of 
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inclusion and exclusion” and their “various models of literary culture preoccupied with…what 
can be ruled out in order to validate and place as securely ‘literary’ that which is ruled in” (43), 
we can learn as much from middlebrow acts of inclusion and exclusion. 
 One of the best examples of middlebrow exclusion comes in the “Editorial Notes” of the 
November 1919 first issue of the London Mercury, in which J. C. Squire attempts to explain the 
purpose of his magazine by purposefully positioning it against modernists and their experimental 
literature. His “Notes” start out rather innocuously, stating that the magazine is an “attempt to 
make known the best that is being done” in British literature, and is not an attempt “to make 
universal the shibboleths of some coterie or school” (2). Honourable indeed; there was a catch, 
however, for Squire continues: 
There has been [in contemporary England] a central body of writers—from Mr. 
Hardy, Mr. Bridges, and Mr. Conrad to the best of the younger poets—who have 
gone steadily along the sound path, traditional yet experimental, personal yet 
sane. But there has been also a large number of young writers who have strayed 
and lost themselves amongst experiments, many of them foredoomed to sterility. 
[…] They have been, such of them as profess the moralistic preoccupation, very 
contemptuous of “clean living and no thinking,” but the dirty living and muddled 
thinking that they have offered as a substitute have been no great improvement. 
They have been, such of them as have the preoccupation of the artist, so anxious 
to look at the abnormal and the recondite that they have forgotten what are and 
must be the main elements of man’s life and what the most conspicuous features 
in man’s landscape. We have had an orgy of undirected abnormality. […] Bad 
writers will, without intellectual or aesthetic impulse, pretend to burrow into 
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psychological (or physical) obscurities which are no more beyond the artist’s 
purview than anything else, provided he responds to them, but which have the 
advantage for an insincere writer that they enable him to talk nonsense that honest 
unsophisticated readers are unable to diagnose as nonsense. (4 emphasis added) 
The “they” Squire is referring to in this passage are highbrow modernist writers, and while it’s 
comforting to know that literary journalists have always been blatantly if naively hypocritical, 
what interests me in this passage is the way Squire positions these writers. His objection is not 
that the modernists write bad literature; rather, it’s that they are insane, dirty living things who 
take advantage of honest unsophisticated readers in their orgies of undirected abnormality. 
Squire’s criticism is not merely a critique of literature; it is the active marginalization of certain 
artists. Significantly, this marginalization is connected to a discourse of perversity and is based 
upon what are considered abnormal bodily states: madness, dirty living or immoral behaviour, 
and orgies. Such criticism is designed not to determine the value of experimental modernist 
literature but to discipline readers by branding certain artistic expressions as not just uncommon 
but aberrant.  
Determining the abnormal or different is, of course, to simultaneously construct the 
normal, and, following Richard Hoggart, I want to suggest that what was being constructed as 
normal by the middlebrow in the wake of modernist abnormality is the “common man.” The 
common man, Hoggart suggests, was a fictional figure who ostensibly represented the shared 
cultural and social values of common Britons but who, in fact, represented the homogenous 
values of commodity capitalism built on class conflict and the conspicuous consumption of the 
right things. It was, therefore, the common man who arose out of the cultural crisis the Leavises 
had mapped in their work, for the production of the common man in middlebrow culture, 
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Hoggart claims, was a byproduct of the democratic egalitarianism that accompanied increases in 
worker’s rights and literacy levels in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. While 
greater equality amongst people was undoubtedly a positive change, Hoggart suggests that, as an 
assertion of “self-respect, ‘Ah’m as good as you’ can turn into the surly ‘Yer no better than me’, 
which is the harsh ass-cry of the philistine in his straw, who will tolerate no suggestion of a 
challenge or awkward example. It can become a cocksure refusal to recognize any sort of 
differentiation, whether of brains or of character” (180). To put that a little less bluntly, the 
common man became the subject and hero of magazine and newspaper articles written for the 
increasingly literate English masses, but he also became a specific construction of what the 
majority should be and acted as the arbiter of proper taste and artistic achievement for this 
majority. He teaches people, Hoggart claims, that “since [they] share the opinions of the great 
majority, [they] are more right than the odd outsiders” (179), and tells them that modernism is 
not worth their time because it is difficult and does not seem to represent their material reality. 
This common man makes an appearance in Squire’s passage as the “honest unsophisticated 
reader” unable to diagnose modernist experimentation as nonsense. As Diepeveen points out, 
Squire’s main criticism is that the modernist “coterie of professionals is self-serving and self-
congratulatory, and…ignores, or worse, abuses, the common reader” (10). Thus, what starts for 
the modernists as a strategic marginalization designed to protect highbrow art’s integrity against 
the homogeneity of mass culture, becomes an increasingly forcible exclusion through which 
mass culture—and particularly middlebrow culture—positions itself as not merely more 
accessible, but normal. 
The use of deviance to establish the normal was a prominent and conscious element of 
feminine middlebrow novels, which became the sites of much self-fashioning through the 
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conspicuous consumption of commodity culture but which were also sites of class negotiation. In 
the pages of feminine middlebrow novels, class and cultural signifiers were created, transformed, 
and destroyed, a process that provided middle-class women readers with a comprehensive guide 
to what and how one must consume to become a proper member of a certain class. What unites 
the feminine identities being created in the feminine middlebrow to the concept of the common 
man, therefore, is an attention to prioritizing consumption in order to ensure that middle-class 
women supported the right moral and class values with their increasing economic empowerment. 
It was not enough, in other words, that middle-class women consumed; they must also consume, 
firstly, things that conveyed the appropriate values of the middle class, and, secondly, things that 
conveyed they were respectable middle-class women who have money and recognize signs of 
class distinction. The rise of feminine middlebrow novels in the interwar period, Nicola 
Beauman argues, positively correlates with the changing lives of middle-class women at the 
time, for advances in household technologies and rising levels of expendable income meant that 
middle-class women “had time, warmth, freedom from drudgery and an intelligence unsullied by 
the relentless and wearying monotony of housework” (6). Alison Light, too, notes the changing 
conditions of women in the interwar period, arguing that, while, “as the nomenclature suggests, 
the ‘inter-war’ years are easily seen, from the masculine point of view, as a kind of hiatus in 
history, an interval sandwiched between more dramatic, and more historically significant acts,”, 
women at the time were offered “new kinds of social and personal opportunity […] by changing 
cultures of sport and entertainment, from tennis clubs to cinema-going, by new forms of 
spending which hire-purchase and accessible mortgages made possible, by new patterns of 
domestic life which included the introduction of the daily servant rather than the live-in maid, 
new forms of household appliance, new attitudes to housework” (9). The feminine middlebrow 
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thus became a significant niche in the interwar literary marketplace, and the lifestyles, beliefs, 
and politics of middle-class women were both represented and made manifest within feminine 
middlebrow novels. Within the given social circles described in the texts, Beaumann argues that 
“writer and reader were linked by their mutual ‘pre-assumptions’; they spoke the same language, 
were interested in the same kind of things, led the same kind of lives” (4). Feminine middlebrow 
novels, therefore, played a significant role in establishing what it meant to be a middle-class 
woman in interwar England by providing textual spaces in which normative middle-class identity 
was negotiated and deviance from this identity was measured.   
This is not to suggest, however, that feminine middlebrow novels were merely middle-
class propaganda or the stuff of homogenous ideologues trying to impose their normalizing 
beliefs onto readers. Indeed, the “‘middle class’ was itself undergoing radical revision between 
the wars and any use of the term must ideally stretch from the typist to the teacher, include the 
‘beautician’ as well as the civic servant, the florist and the lady doctor, the library assistant and 
the suburban housewife, and the manifold differences between them,” meaning, Light argues, 
“that being ‘middle-class’ in fact depends on an extremely anxious production of endless 
discriminations between people who are constantly assessing each other’s standing” (12, 13). 
Thus, in middle-class symbolic economies, in which almost everything one did (how one spoke, 
what one wore, what one ate, what one read, etc.) signified class in some way, and in which 
adequate navigation required a keen knowledge of oftentimes rapidly changing class signifiers, 
feminine middlebrow novels became sites “where the battle for hegemonic control of social 
modes and mores was closely fought by different factions of the newly dominant middle class” 
(Humble, Feminine 5). Middle-class identity in these novels was fluid, shifting, and provisional: 
class signifiers were frequently created, consumed, and destroyed in a never-ending attempt to 
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distinguish oneself as an exclusive member of a certain class. “In an era when almost every 
member of the middle class experienced grave anxieties about their class status,” Humble notes, 
“there was something deeply seductive in a mode of thinking about class that allowed you to 
confirm your own status by ruling others out” (84). This process of ruling others out meant that 
one could learn how to become upper-middle class by reading feminine middlebrow novels and 
mimicking the actions and consumption habits of the protagonists; consequently, the relational 
dynamic created between the reader and the classes being represented in the novel is 
simultaneously inclusive and exclusive.  
Interestingly, what one read played an important signifying role in middle-class inclusion 
within feminine middlebrow novels, with the books that characters read often acting as 
surrogates for character description. Books and the relative values they held as cultural signifiers 
let readers know what kind of person a character was, but more importantly told readers what to 
read if they wanted to emulate that character. Thus, books in the feminine middlebrow were 
“enjoyed, ridiculed, used as social and moral guides, as comfort objects, as symbols of class and 
status; they formed bonds between people, or emphasized their difference” (Humble, Feminine 
46-47). A certain amount of modernist reading was acceptable as it connected one to bohemian 
lifestyles that were oft-romanticized in the feminine middlebrow, but reading Karl Marx, 
according to Humble, was a sign not only that characters did not fully understand their social 
position within the bourgeoisie but also that they had pretentions toward seriousness. The 
normalizing relationship between middle-class women’s buying power and the purpose for 
which that buying power should be used is never more obvious than in this feminine middlebrow 
tendency to marginalize those who read Marx. One should partake in what the marketplace has 
to offer, readers are told, but consuming the wrong things reveals not only that one considers 
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oneself above others in one’s class but also that one’s deviance from this norm betrays a serious 
lack of understanding in what it means to be middle-class. Buying as self-fashioning in the 
feminine middlebrow, therefore, becomes as much an act of stabilization as it is an act of 
fluidity: certainly the ever-changing signifiers of class offered buyers ever-changing ways of 
presenting themselves, but buying is a fundamentally stabilizing act because the goal remains 
always the reification of class as opposed to the individuation of the buyer. 
Masculine middlebrow novels of the same period tend to be less concerned with self-
fashioning, but they maintain a focus on stabilizing class inasmuch as they attempt to rediscover 
and reconstruct English character by providing the reader with strong, morally upright characters 
on whom normal Britons could model themselves. Rather than focusing on middle-class identity 
as fluid and commodifiable, they tended to present characters who could, in representing all that 
was best in the English character, act as the focal points of a renewed and stable identity. Thus, if 
the feminine middlebrow presented the reader with identities furbished by commodified class 
signifiers meant to be quickly consumed while they still retained cultural value, the masculine 
middlebrow presented the reader with what Ina Habermann calls “an imaginative projection of 
lived experience conducive to a negotiation of identity and emotional ‘entertainment’ in the 
sense of providing sustenance” (35). To provide this sustenance, masculine middlebrow writers 
often employed symbols from the various mythologies that make up English masculinity, and 
these symbols in their collective form created an Englishness that had “a definite shape, although 
it is represented, or expressed, by a multitude of divergent and often contradictory images” (20). 
Thus in J. B. Priestley’s The Good Companions (1929), as Habermann explains, the music hall is 
used as a “symbol of English community life” and connotes creativity, wit, and social 
involvement (50), but this symbol is juxtaposed with the North of England, which embodies the 
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“rough, masculine and working class, while the Cotswolds are genteel and feminine and peopled 
by the descendants of the builders and administrators of Empire” (49). What emerges from this 
combination of images, then, is a vision of English masculinity that valourizes individualism and 
hard work rather than Imperialism and greed, but that also valourizes the ability to be of the 
people and to partake joyfully in the simple entertainments of the masses. More importantly, 
however, as John Baxendale has noted, redemption is always at hand in Priestley’s writing, for 
even in the Cotswolds, a den of Imperial vice, the locally quarried stones are used to build 
houses, a fact that “establishes an organic relationship between people and the landscape, the 
connection between the two made by human labour” (84). In Priestley’s work, therefore, a 
common sense of Englishness can be saved if people abide by those symbols that have always 
founded the English character. Identity formation in his work becomes an act of imagining 
oneself as stoical and ever-enduring rather than of ceaseless self-fashioning.  
The identity that is situated as normal and as a given rather than as constructed, marketed, 
and normalized is a symptom of the interwar period in Britain. The middlebrow speaks to what 
many saw as a cultural crisis caused by rapidly increasing literacy rates and rapidly expanding 
literary tastes among the reading public. But highbrow as well as middlebrow writers adjusted to 
this changing marketplace by commodifying their work and developing marketing strategies that 
focused on notions of inclusivity and exclusivity. Making formal innovation and difficulty a 
fundamental part of their art, many modernists used the idea of commodified authenticity to sell 
their art by suggesting that fine art must be finely crafted art, the originality and skill of the artist 
maker establishing the auratic value of the work in a marketplace full of homogenous, mass-
produced literature. This strategy focuses on creating a feeling of exclusive inclusion for the 
readers of modernism, for it positions them amongst an elite group of readers who recognize and 
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appreciate good art. Contra to modernist difficulty, the middlebrow insisted that the formal 
experimentation of modernism was needlessly complex and abandoned the reading public to 
pedantry and intellectual elitism. In place of this difficulty, the middlebrow advocated art that, if 
it was not formally experimental, ostensibly represented the shared cultural, social, and moral 
beliefs of common Britons but that, in fact, represented the ideological and economic values of 
the middlebrow in the figure of the common man. The middlebrow, then, focused more on 
fostering a feeling of inclusive exclusion in its readers, for it represented accessible literature that 
marginalized the abnormal or different formal elements of modernism	that were out of touch with 
the material reality of the reading public. These were the battle cries in what has become known 
as the battle of the brows, a discourse that positioned the middlebrow and the highbrow against 
one another and asked readers to choose which side they supported. The reader’s choice, both 
brows agreed, had the most dire cultural consequences, but the oppositional discourse of the 
battle of the brows stripped readers of agency by suggesting there was no middle ground to this 
debate. Neither the middlebrow nor the highbrow, then, chose to place their faith in common 
readers coming to their own aesthetic and critical decisions concerning literature, for readers 
must become either professionalized according to the highbrow or prioritized consumers 
according to the middlebrow.  
 What makes Virginia Woolf unique in this cultural landscape is her continued faith in the 
common reader. And rather than staying out of or positioning herself above the limiting 
discourse of the battle of the brows, Woolf participated actively in the debate, positioning both 
highbrow—herself included—and middlebrow within a shared cultural landscape, and operating 
a press that blurred the boundaries by publishing diverse works that ranged from lowbrow 
publications, highbrow art, and even middlebrow pamphlets. Through her careful positioning of 
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the brows in her minor essays and through the intersectional nature of the Hogarth Press, Woolf 
acknowledged the discursive framework of the battle of the brows and showed readers the active 




“His deficiencies as a critic are too obvious to be pointed out”: Virginia Woolf’s Common 
Reader as a Theory of Intersectional Subjectivity  
 Where the previous chapter represents an overview of the literary marketplace and its 
stakes in interwar Britain, this chapter aims to position Virginia Woolf as publisher, writer, 
thinker, and consumer in that literary marketplace and to examine how these various roles 
intersected in her conception of the Common Reader. Amongst modernists and highbrows, 
Woolf demonstrated a firm commitment to Dr. Johnson’s common reader, putting faith in the 
idea that, given the opportunity, the reading public and their tastes could be trusted to steer 
English culture. The problem was that the reading public was rarely given the opportunity to 
trust their own tastes in the literary marketplace of interwar England: told by the Eliots, Pounds, 
and Leavises of the world that the acquisition of cultural taste required studied professionalism, 
and told that the highbrows were out of touch with the common man and his concerns by the 
Squires, Bennetts, and Priestleys of the world, the common reader was forced to choose sides in 
a debate that divested them of individual agency and seemed to reduce them to mouthpieces for 
one of two literary camps. Each of these camps focused on creating the readers they wanted by 
identifying the aspect of the reader and of the act of reading they believed most important. The 
highbrows, arguing that a disciplined mind would allow readers to discriminate more effectively 
and efficiently between books in an over-saturated literary marketplace, aimed publicly to save 
culture from the waste land Eliot predicted by teaching readers how to read the right books to 
foster cultural taste. The middlebrow, on the other hand, focused their public efforts on 
disciplining the bodies of readers by telling them that buying the right books could demonstrate 
they represented the interests and material existence of common Britons. Importantly, therefore, 
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each brow’s public persona downplayed certain aspects of the newly expanded literary 
marketplace—commodification in the case of the highbrows, and the growth and maintenance of 
cultural originality and ingenuity in the case of the middlebrow—as a reasoned strategy to sell 
their wares to the reading public.  
 Woolf, however, walks something of a middle ground between these two extremes by 
employing the common reader as a negation of the professionalism advocated by much of the 
highbrow and as a foil to the common man of the middlebrow. She was able to position the 
common reader in this dual role by focusing on the reading public as both reading subjects (or 
minds) and as buying subjects (or bodies) in the literary marketplace. Her common reader is thus 
an intersectional subject who exists simultaneously in multiple historical, socio-economic, 
cultural, and personal narratives, a subject far too complex to be adequately represented in what 
amounted, in the end, to a rather limiting discourse of reading and culture put forth in the battle 
of the brows. My goal is not to suggest that Woolf, ever the consummate rebel and freethinker, 
stood outside this discourse wagging her finger and poo-pooing the other combatants. Like other 
modernists, she knew her way around the no man’s land of the battle of the brows: she built the 
same imprimatur in the same secondary cultural economy in the same commodity cultures as did 
Eliot and Joyce. Where she differs from other modernists is in her active critique of the very 
discourse they were using to sell modernism to the reading public. Woolf’s shorter essays, which 
are the focus of this chapter, are full of references—some subtle, others overt—to the battle of 
the brows; but rather than propping up this discourse and entrenching herself on one side of the 
great divide, Woolf constantly punctures its assumptions, allowing readers to see and navigate its 
dimensions with increased clarity. Let there be no mistake: Woolf was unequivocally and 
unapologetically highbrow. At the same time, she was not averse to pointing out that hers was a 
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position with inherent bias, and that she and other artists, both the high- and the middlebrow, 
benefitted financially and culturally from the discourse they had created to sell literature. She 
was also not averse to pointing out that readers, as buyers and consumers of high- and 
middlebrow cultural products, had a special and active role to play in cultural production. Put 
simply, she was bad at keeping guild marketing secrets. She was good, however, at providing 
readers with textual spaces in which they could exercise their agency as textual analysts and 
buyers in the literary marketplace of interwar England.  
 Woolf’s ability to occupy a liminal space in the institutions of modernism in particular 
and in the literary marketplace in general was predicated on her ownership of the Hogarth Press, 
which typified in the books it produced the intersectionality she advocated for her common 
reader, and from which she was able to publish with near total freedom. While many other 
modernists were using the battle of the brows to create niche markets in which they could sell 
their products to select groups of properly educated readers, the Woolfs were creating a more 
democratic press that sold everything from highbrow literature and criticism, to working-class 
literature and socialist pamphlets, to middlebrow poetry, novels, and criticism. The press, 
therefore, provided a rather unique publishing space in interwar Britain that brought interests 
together and provided writers from diverse social backgrounds, many of whom had very 
different political and cultural beliefs, a place to publish. Hogarth, that is to say, operated under 
the premise that a plurality of voices would most benefit their readers. In this plurality, readers 
could find authors writing with, to, and against one another, and thus could begin to form ideas 
and opinions with and between these voices, actively participating in a production of knowledge 
that resisted the oppositional logic of the battle of the brows. Woolf made this active 
participation in the reading process and in the production of knowledge the keystone of her 
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conception of the common reader, and suggested that providing readers with a plurality of voices 
helped them identify and challenge their deficiencies as critical readers. Woolf’s common reader, 
therefore, was based upon a recognition of the reader’s critical deficiency rather than an 
enforcement of the middlebrow status quo or highbrow cultural efficiency. Where the 
middlebrow focused on prioritizing the buying body and the highbrow on professionalizing the 
reading mind, Woolf’s focus on interpretive limitations and critical deficiencies provides a 
foundation that allows readers to recognize their own agency as a subject within the various and 
varying narratives of the literary marketplace and beyond. In the end, Woolf’s theory of the 
common reader is as much a theory of subjectivity as it is a theory of reading, for her common 
reader’s intersectionality within textual spaces comes to represent the subject’s intersectionality 
within the political and cultural spaces of interwar Britain. 
 
A Press of One’s Own: Intersectional Identity and the Hogarth Press   
 The Hogarth Press began, rather inauspiciously it must be admitted, when the following 
notice was sent to certain of the Woolfs’ friends: 
      HOGARTH HOUSE 
      RICHMOND 
THE HOGARTH PRESS 
It is proposed to issue shortly a pamphlet containing two 
short stories by Leonard Woolf and Virginia Woolf, (price, 
including postage 1/2). 
If you desire a copy to be sent to you, please fill up the 
form below and send it with a P.O. to L.S. Woolf at the above 
address before June. 
A limited edition only will be issued.  
 
 Please send    copy of Publication No. 1 to  for 
which I enclose P. O. for 
NAME 




Two important aspects of the Hogarth Press are revealed in this notice. Firstly, the exclusivity of 
the press is conveyed by the phrase “limited edition,” and, secondly, the amateurism of the press 
is betrayed in the unevenly inked and evidently hand-set lettering. In the beginning, the press 
was what Leonard Woolf called “a hobby which [he and Virginia Woolf] carried on in 
afternoons, when [they] were not writing books and articles or editing papers” (78), and the 
mistakes made by the Woolfs as they learned how to print were many and varied. “Among the 
more famous printing faux pas,” Drew Patrick Shannon notes, were 
errors in the running head of a Katherine Mansfield story (“The Prelude” rather 
than “Prelude”, with the offending pages not being corrected once the error was 
noted); Leonard crossing out Laura Riding’s married name with black bars rather 
than printing out a new title page; “campion” for “champion” in Virginia’s own 
On Being Ill, to note one of many misspellings and typographical errors; and 
many instances of poor inking, awkward typography, skewed spacing. (130)  
The Woolfs’ lack of ability as printers were the hallmark of the press in its early years, yet this 
seems to have made their books more enchanting to some of their customers. In the age of 
mechanical reproduction, the amateurishness of Hogarth hand-printed editions connected them to 
the Arts and Crafts movement, which sought to reinvigorate the aura of art works by expressly 
revealing their history as original handmade objects rather than mass-produced products. When it 
comes to the aura of an art object, Shannon notes, “The key difference is not in the content, 
which in the original and the reproduction are the same (at least theoretically, not taking into 
account mistakes in printing, typographical errors, and so on), but in the context surrounding the 
original, the knowledge on the part of the observer that the act of creation occurred here, that this 
is the site, to some extent, of the artist’s creativity made manifest” (127). What one received in a 
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Hogarth hand-print—in addition, apparently, to some rather unevenly printed text—was the 
knowledge that what one held had been printed at Hogarth House by Leonard and Virginia 
Woolf. The cultural capital associated with this history contained an authenticity that was readily 
commodifiable and that set it apart from the large publishing houses’ mass-produced editions; 
and because it carried with it the Woolf imprimatur, a stamp that conveyed the cultural status of 
Bloomsbury, the text itself connected the buyer, however tangentially, to one of the most 
exclusive highbrow coteries in England. 
The Woolfs were not oblivious to the fact that they were dealing in a secondary economy 
based on cultural capital and commodified authenticity, and they took steps to ensure the press 
and their names remained under their control as the enterprise became an increasingly viable 
economic entity. In Downhill All the Way, Leonard writes that by 1922—the year that saw 
literary modernism blossom with the publication of T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land, James Joyce’s 
Ulysses, and Virginia Woolf’s Jacob’s Room, and just the fifth year after the Hogarth printed its 
first publication—the press had become much more than a “hobby,” so much so that he and 
Virginia entertained offers from bigger publishing houses and investors. Ultimately, they 
declined deals from both American business man James Whitall and the Heinemann publishing 
house that sought to help the Woolfs with production by taking the Hogarth in as a subsidiary. 
Heinemann’s offer to take over the production process and the advertising of the press but leave 
the Woolfs the autonomy to select what the Hogarth would print (L. Woolf 79) reveals just how 
valuable the Woolf name was in the literary marketplace at the time, and Leonard’s response to 
Heinemman’s and Whitall’s offers suggests that he and Virginia wished to retain control over the 
cultural capital their names had accrued. Leonard’s fear was that under either Heinemann’s or 
Whitall’s influence the press would  
	
 84 
become one of those (admirable in their own way) ‘private’ or semi-private 
Presses the object of which is finely produced books, books that which are meant 
not to be read, but to be looked at. We were interested primarily in the immaterial 
inside of a book, what the author had to say and how he said it; we had drifted 
into the business with the idea of publishing things which the commercial 
publisher could not or would not publish. […] We also dislike the refinement and 
preciosity which are too often a kind of fungoid growth which culture breeds 
upon art and literature; they are not unknown in Britain and are often to be found 
in cultivated Americans. (80) 
Virginia agreed with Leonard, writing in her diary on 16 August 1922 that she and Leonard were 
“a little alarmed by the social values of Mr W[hitall] for we don’t want the Press to be a 
fashionable hobby patronized & inspired by Chelsea. Whittal [sic.] lives only two doors off 
Logan” (Diaries 2 189-90). These responses can be viewed as a resistance to production 
strategies that, as in the case of Joyce’s Ulysses, centered on the creation of deluxe editions for 
collectors and dealers rather than for readers, and Woolf’s snobbish disdain for Chelsea shows 
her reluctance to wade too willingly or naively into the economy of deluxe editions, 
manufactured scarcity, and conspicuous consumption.  
 Virginia’s diary entry about Heinemann’s offer is even more candid: “The Hogarth Press 
is a travail. Heinemanns made us a most flattering offer—to the effect that we should give us 
[sic.] our brains & blood, & they would see to sales & ledgers. But we sniff patronage. If they 
gain, we lose. Our name has to be coupled with theirs. […] We are both very willing to come to 
this conclusion, & have decided for freedom & a fight with great private glee” (Diaries 2 215). 
Virginia’s entry, which recognizes that the Woolf name was as valuable culturally as Hogarth’s 
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books were economically, also reveals anxieties about her position as both a writer and a 
publisher in the literary marketplace. As the former, Woolf required freedom to write what she 
liked, and it was her position as the latter that allowed her that freedom. Just how valuable the 
press was to Virginia’s writing is made clear in her diary entry on 22 September 1925:  
what I owe the Hogarth Press is barely paid for by the whole of my handwriting. 
Haven’t I just written to Herbert Fisher refusing to do a book for the Home 
University Series on Post Victorian—knowing that I can write a book, a better 
book, a book of my own bat, for the Press if I wish! To think of being battened 
down in the hold of those University dons fairly makes my blood run cold. Yet 
I’m the only woman in England free to write what I like. (qtd. in Marcus 130)  
Her roles as writer and publisher became inextricably interrelated for Virginia, since the 
existence and maintenance of the one was dependent on the existence and maintenance of the 
other. Heinemann’s offer to hitch their economic capital to the Woolfs’ cultural capital, 
therefore, signaled a concession to Virginia because it meant splitting her mind (which created 
her art and which held great cultural capital) from her body (which created books at the Hogarth 
Press and which connected her physically to the literary production process and to the economic 
capital required to allow her mind freedom). The press, that is to say, enabled Virginia to stay 
connected to myriad aspects of literary production, for, as Kathryn Simpson has pointed out, it 
signaled “a more holistic process of literary production, as [she] was involved not only in the 
writing of her texts, but also in their printing, binding, marketing, packaging and posting—the 
elements that capitalist mass production isolates in the production of alienable commodities 
exchanged in an impersonal market” (Gifts 9). The Hogarth became for Virginia, then, a means 
of control within a marketplace that, due to its distribution of production, too often placed writers 
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and publication houses at odds. In other words, it allowed her not only artistic freedom but also 
market freedom by providing her with agency to decide how she was presented, as writer and 
critic, to the reading public. 
 The Woolfs’ responses to Whitall and Heinemann mark the Hogarth Press’s rather 
complicated and conflicted position in the institutions of modernism. The Hogarth was an 
exclusive press and it undoubtedly used the cultural capital associated with its owners’ names to 
foster this exclusivity, but it was also remarkably democratic, providing a voice to highbrow 
authors as well as to middle- and lowbrow authors. The Hogarth’s place within the institutions of 
modernism is the topic of an increasing wealth of critical discussion, much of which aims to 
reevaluate the press in light of the critical dismantling of the Great Divide and the complex 
interrelationships between high art and mass production. Such a reevaluation is useful because, 
of all the modernist institutions (little magazines, coterie presses, deluxe editions, imprimaturs) 
the Hogarth is perhaps the most troubling to position effectively. For instance, the Woolfs did as 
much to build and safeguard their imprimatur as any other highbrow, guarding the press from 
bigger publishing houses, but their wolf’s head logo encapsulates how important marketing and 
branding were in the newly expanded literary marketplace and how important they became to the 
Woolfs. Most of the press’s early newspaper ads were created by Leonard, who gradually got 
better at designing ads. The first Hogarth Press ads, J. H. Willis points out, were “functional but 
inelegant,” pronouncing the name of the press at the top of the ad before listing the authors and 
titles of the books to be published (375). This style soon changed to position the name of the 
press below the authors and titles to be published, a common practice amongst presses that 
wished to promote the value of their writers more than the value of the press, but the ads were 
still “visually unsophisticated, the type heavy and black, the copy cramped, the list of titles and 
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prices assaulting and dulling the eye” (375). By 1926, Leonard had become a much better ad 
man inasmuch as he “had lightened the Hogarth Press ads, reducing the number of titles to two 
or three and using a variety of type sizes so that the author’s name or the book’s title stood out 
clearly from the supporting copy” (376), yet the Woolfs still thought they needed something to 
make their ads stand out. Thus, in 1928, they hired E. McKnight Kauffer, who had been a part of 
Roger Fry’s Omega workshop earlier in his career and had experience as a poster designer. 
Kauffer designed the now unmistakable wolf’s head logo and Leonard employed it first in 
December 1928. The logo, Willis suggests, “communicated a new degree of stylishness, 
efficiency, and crisp intellectuality” and finally struck the right balance between advertising the 
press and its owners as well as the author’s name and title of the work (377). The design of the 
logo—a wolf’s head based on bold, geometric shapes, which played on modernist trends of 
abstraction in both the art and the advertising worlds—was important to be sure, but the logo 
also had value as a unifying symbol between and among Hogarth texts. As Elizabeth Wilson 
Gordon has pointed out, while logos indicate “merit, authorization, [and] the symbolic capital the 
publisher confers on the book,” they must also be “transferable, a unifying element among 
various objects” (“On or About” 194). Each Hogarth title was unique in its content, since the 
press began, as Leonard pointed out in his response to Heinemann, with the “idea of publishing 
things which the commercial publisher could not or would not publish” (Downhill All the Way 
80), but each Hogarth title was also brought together, made part of a set, under the wolf’s head, 
so that what remained constant and, according to Gordon, what “creates the possibility of 
ongoing demand” is the reputation associated with the logo rather than the uniqueness of the 
book (“On or About” 194). The logo, that is to say, created brand recognition and thus became 
cultural currency within the secondary economy of the institutions of modernism. 
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 The uses to which this carefully maintained imprimatur were put reveal the press’s 
complicated position at the intersections of modernism’s institutions, for the press, especially as 
it matured in the late 1920s and early 1930s, began publishing work that seemed outside the 
highbrow art and ideas associated with its owners and the Bloomsbury group. Indeed, Laura 
Marcus has argued that the “distinguishing characteristic of the Press was heterogeneity,” and 
that while it was responsible for publishing many modernist texts and pamphlets, it also had 
“strong links to the political institutions of the Left, including the Labour Party and the Fabian 
Society” (128). While this is hardly surprising considering Leonard’s political beliefs, the result 
was that, increasingly, voices from the working-class and even the middlebrow found a home at 
the Hogarth. Where middlebrow writers were concerned, the press published mostly those 
political and critical pamphlets that bigger publishing houses wouldn’t publish. As Melissa 
Sullivan has pointed out in her work on Rose Macaulay and E. M. Delafield, middlebrow writers 
were doubly rewarded in terms of cultural capital when they published with the Hogarth, “for 
they were first approved by the audience of their editors, the highbrow Woolfs, and then 
integrated with the network of readers, contributors and supporters of the well-respected press” 
once their work was emblazoned with the wolf’s head (55). But the Woolfs, too, gained 
something from the arrangement, as they “used the Hogarth Press to craft a new portrait of the 
literary field that included a heterogeneous modernism and a hybrid middlebrow; this accounted 
for the diverse tastes of the reading public and created new opportunities for women writers to 
refigure the contentious concerns over interwar cultural hierarchies” (54). Thus, where many 
presses, small magazines, and periodicals were trying to carve out a niche for themselves in an 
increasingly segmented and specialized literary marketplace, the Hogarth Press began 
diversifying its publications by providing an outlet for writers who would otherwise not be 
	
 89 
published. Such diversification addressed several cultural gaps that existed in the literary 
marketplace, but, more importantly, it challenged the cultural hegemony of large presses that 
marginalized certain voices and expanded the boundaries of both literature and public 
intellectualism in England. 
 The balancing act of managing the press’s identity within various cultural and economic 
spaces was not always easy, which becomes clear in the relationship between the Woolfs and 
John Hampson, a working-class writer who had a number of novels published by the Hogarth 
Press, beginning in 1931 with Saturday Night at the Greyhound. As was the case with the 
middlebrow pamphleteers Macauley and Delafield, the relationship between Hampson and the 
press seems to have been mutually beneficial. In addition to benefitting from the cultural cachet 
associated with being published by the Woolfs, Hampson, Helen Southworth explains, gained 
literary mentors, including E. M. Forster and William Plomer, and the press gained “access to a 
network of Midlands and northern writing talent” (“‘Going Over’” 223). The relationship 
between the Woolfs and Hampson had not started very smoothly, however. Hampson sent the 
manuscript of his first novel, entitled Go Seek a Stranger, to the Woolfs in 1928. About a gay 
working-class man who aspires to be a writer, the manuscript was rejected by the Woolfs. In the 
rejection letter to Hampson, Leonard admits that the manuscript “has interested [he and Virginia] 
greatly and has such merits that we should have liked to publish [it],” but continues that 
“unfortunately we do not think that this would be possible under present circumstances” (qtd. in 
Southworth, “‘Going Over’” 218). The present circumstance Leonard refers to is the obscenity 
trial that was underway against Radclyffe Hall and The Well of Loneliness. The Woolfs’ 
willingness to speak at the obscenity trial on behalf of the defense, and their unwillingness to 
publish literature similar to that being tried, reveals what seems to be a paradox in their political 
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and artistic support for queer literature and queer voices. In fact, it reveals the fraught nature of 
the dual roles they fulfilled as both writers/thinkers and publishers. Agreeing to speak at Hall’s 
trial seems like no small gesture when one considers that such a public statement would connect 
the Woolfs with the book and influence the way they were perceived in the literary marketplace, 
especially given the much more covert but still potentially objectionable content of Orlando, 
published in the same year. That said, the number of prominent intellectuals who had 
volunteered to speak at the trial suggests that the Woolfs with their cultural capital as public 
intellectuals did not face much danger in testifying. Indeed, if anything, their personal connection 
to the trial could have had the effect of strengthening the cultural value of their imprimatur by 
adding to the Woolfs already well-established liberal views of gender and sexual fluidity.  
 The press’s place in the literary marketplace was somewhat different though. An 
obscenity trial of one’s own—a distinct possibility were the Woolfs to publish Hampson’s book 
in the midst of the trial—could have hampered the press’s ability to continue publishing. Any 
legal problems at the press would limit not only the Woolfs’ ability to publish their own work 
but also the work of other writers, some of whom may not have found publication outside the 
Hogarth Press, since for many, Southworth notes, the press represented an “alternative to the 
commercial press” (“Introduction” 8). Put differently, the Woolfs occupied a contentious 
position in the literary marketplace that was simultaneously inside the judicial obscenity laws 
governing publication, given their role as press owners, and outside the hegemonic values of 
many social and political institutions, given their positions as writers and thinkers. As 
individuals, the Woolfs were able to perform a tactical micro-politics by attending the trial: their 
presence at the trial confirmed and strengthened their outsider status as thinkers and artists who 
cared about art for art’s sake and who positioned themselves against the idea that art must 
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represent the moral principles of hegemonic institutional powers. As publishers, the Woolfs had 
to perform a strategic macro-political positioning within the body politic of the literary 
marketplace: the absence of queer literature (at least overtly queer literature like Hampson’s Go 
Seek a Stranger) at the Hogarth Press helped maintain the Woolfs’ insider status in a 
marketplace still governed by delimiting social and political institutions. What unites the two 
positions the Woolfs occupied as artists and publishers, therefore, is performance: a shrewd 
understanding, on one hand, of how to position oneself at the intersections of numerous cultural 
and economic spaces, and a keen awareness, on the other hand, of the role performative actions 
can play in such cultural and economic spaces. 
 The Hogarth Press had, therefore, what might be best called an intersectional identity 
within the literary marketplace and within the institutions of modernism. The Woolfs understood 
that the press existed simultaneously in a number of different cultural and economic spaces that 
operated according to distinct discourses, and they worked hard to ensure that the press occupied 
the best possible position within these discourses to make money while at the same time 
upholding the artistic and political principles of its owners. Their management of the press, 
Gordon argues, shows “a sophisticated and productive negotiation of seemingly contradictory 
positions,” including the “commercial/artistic, professional/amateur, traditional/avant-garde, 
elitist/democratic” (“How Should” 108), and it is precisely this careful negotiation that made the 
press both economically viable in the saturated literary marketplace and culturally significant in 
the institutions of modernism. The Hogarth Press, therefore, truly was a press of the Woolfs’ 
own, for the identity of the press within the literary marketplace mirrors the identities of the 
Woolfs within the cultural and political institutions of England. The Woolfs, particularly 
Virginia, practiced an intersectional form of personal and political identity in which the “I,” 
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rather than being viewed as a stable self unchanging over time and space, was considered a fluid 
subject position capable of change depending on the various cultural spaces in which it was 
located. The Woolfs extended this notion of complex relationality and of a subjectivity at the 
intersections of competing discourses to their press, creating a business that was never one thing 
at all times and in all spaces but, rather, a malleable entity that could be positioned differently as 
required. This malleability gave the press the ability to both benefit from and challenge the 
multiple cultural and economic spaces it functioned within, and made it a much more democratic 
press than many commercial publishing houses and modernist institutions. A democratic press 
was important because it could accommodate artists unable to publish elsewhere, but it was also 
important to Virginia Woolf’s concept of the common reader, a figure that she believed should 
read without specific goals or ends and who would necessarily benefit from a press that 
fetishized neither difficulty and professionalism nor the common man. 
 
Virginia Woolf’s Common Reader: Critical Deficiency and the Reading Subject 
 Virginia Woolf’s conceptualization of the common reader can be separated into two 
different but, to Woolf, connected aspects of the reading process: how a text is read and what text 
is read. To employ one of the Western critical traditions most enduring dichotomies, we might 
say that the how of reading is concerned with the mind of the reader (how the reader shapes and 
is shaped by the reading process), whereas the what of reading is concerned with the body of the 
reader (what books one buys and what one does while reading). Because the bulk of critical 
discussion concerning Woolf’s common reader has focused on the how of reading or the mind of 
the reader, it is here that I begin.  
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 Woolf’s definition of the common reader in The Common Reader: First Series (1925) 
does not seem too much different than the definition of the common reader Samuel Johnson gave 
some 150 years earlier in Lives of the Most Eminent English Poets (1779-81). Indeed, when 
Woolf defines the common reader in her introductory essay, “The Common Reader,” she pays 
homage to Johnson, quoting from his work this passage: “‘I rejoice to concur with the common 
reader; for by the common sense of readers, uncorrupted by literary prejudices, after all the 
refinements of subtilty and the dogmatism of learning, must be finally decided all claim to 
poetical honours’” (1). To this definition, however, Woolf adds: 
The common reader, as Dr Johnson implies, differs from the critic and the 
scholar. He is worse educated, and nature has not gifted him so generously. He 
reads for his own pleasure rather than to impart knowledge or correct the opinions 
of others. Above all, he is guided by an instinct to create for himself, out of 
whatever odds and ends he can come by, some kind of whole—a portrait of a 
man, a sketch of an age, a theory of the art of writing. He never ceases, as he 
reads, to run up some rickety and ramshackle fabric which shall give him the 
temporary satisfaction of looking sufficiently like the real object to allow of 
affection, laughter, and argument. Hasty, inaccurate, and superficial, snatching 
now this poem, now that scrap of old furniture, without caring where he finds it or 
of what nature it may be so long as it serves his purpose and rounds his structure, 
his deficiencies as a critic are too obvious to be pointed out. (1) 
There are two important characteristics of the common reader raised in this definition. First is the 
ephemerality of his critical vision, which Woolf conveys using words associated with 
temporality and change: he “never ceases” to create “rickety,” “ramshackle” theories and 
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frameworks of knowing; he enjoys only “temporary satisfaction” with these frameworks before 
he must change them; he is “hasty,” “inaccurate,” and “snatches” at fragments all in an attempt 
to build “some kind of whole” that will inevitably disappear. The ephemerality of the common 
reader’s perception is, of course, opposed to the supposed timelessness of the critic’s attempt to 
“impart knowledge” and “correct the opinions of others” in Woolf’s description. Her common 
reader, put simply, has not become a professional reader with all the academically-provided 
critical tools required to understand the text once and for all; instead, he is always becoming a 
reader—reviewing, revising, changing with each new text.  
 It is during the process of becoming a reader that her common reader reveals his second 
most important characteristic: deficiency. Woolf not only casts critical deficiency, often 
considered something one should downplay or elide as a critic, as a positive attribute of her 
common reader; she makes it his salvation. The common reader’s deficiencies make him 
receptive, and make it impossible for him to complete the action of becoming. Indeed, as Randi 
Saloman has argued, “It is [the reader’s] ‘deficiencies’ that force him to work as hard as he does 
to construct his readings and to enter into dialogue with the works he encounters. Determined to 
succeed in his attempt to produce meaning, the common reader turns these deficiencies to his 
own advantage. He becomes writer as well as reader, adopting a hybrid role that brings about 
new possibilities for the essayistic experience” (59). In this view of deficiency, Woolf differs 
from other modernists, as from the purveyors of mass culture. Instead of trying to cure the 
common reader’s taste with professionalism, and instead of fetishizing the common man whose 
taste ostensibly represented all Britons and was an egalitarian rallying cry against elitism and 
intellectualism, Woolf places her trust in the gaps and inconsistencies of the common reader’s 
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knowledge. Neither abandoning the common reader nor forcing him to embody the arbiter of 
common tastes and values, Woolf believes in the power of his deficiencies. 
 This notion of deficiency plays a role in many critical discussions of Woolf’s common 
reader, but these discussions usually focus on the way Woolf modeled common reading in her 
essays: that is, the formal aspects of Woolf’s essays that invite readers into the essay and ask 
them to become active participants in the production of knowledge with her essay’s narrators, 
who are constructed within the essays to facilitate this active participation. Katerina Koutsantoni 
as well as Beth Carole Rosenberg, for example, compare Woolf’s common reader to Johnson’s 
in order to show that both authors believed the relationship between reader and writer depended 
on an active dialogue between two personalities and the sharing of authority. As Koutsantoni 
points out, Woolf insists on the authority of both the writer and the reader in the reading process 
throughout her essays and, in doing so, “stresses the power of personality possessed by both” (3). 
Concerning individuality in the essay, Woolf writes in an early essay, “The Decay of Essay-
writing” (1905), that “Almost all essays begin with a capital I—‘I think’, ‘I feel’” (25). She goes 
on to suggest that the personal essay “owes its popularity to the fact that its proper use is to 
express one’s personal peculiarities, so that under the decent veil of print one can indulge one’s 
egotism to the full” (26). Such words seem to suggest the tyranny of the authorial “I,” but Woolf 
explains that the personal essay is decaying precisely because its writers refuse to express their 
own opinions and, instead, choose to write in generalities so as to please their readers’ 
expectations and confirm their opinions: “if [essayists] told us frankly not of the books we can all 
read and the pictures which hang for us all to see, but of the single book to which they alone 
have the key and of that solitary picture whose face is shrouded to all but one gaze—if they 
would write of themselves—such writing would have its own permanent value” (26). As is so 
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often the case with Woolf’s essays, the pronouns are the most important elements here. Indulging 
one’s egotism in the essay is useful, Woolf argues, precisely because it creates a dialogic 
relationship between “they” (the writer) and “us” (the reader) in which each side plays an active 
role. Woolf’s they/us dichotomy marks for her readers that there may be discrepancies between 
the opinions “they” espouse, how “we” receive those opinions, and the opinions “we” ourselves 
hold as readers. What may at first look like a clash of personalities becomes for Woolf a 
discussion of peculiarities, a feeling out of where and how one’s own opinions differ from 
others’ opinions. This exploration of particulars and positions creates the potential to find one’s 
deficiencies as a reader, so that active participation as a reader for Woolf is less an aggressive 
search for answers and more a dialogical back-and-forth, in which meaning is created between 
writer and reader. Thus, Rosenberg argues, in Woolf’s essays the “authority of the essay, which 
was once found in the author, is now found in the reader, who constructs meaning as he or she 
moves through the text” (71). Reading becomes a creative process in Woolf’s conceptualization, 
for one reads not as a means to an end but in order to explore the boundaries of one’s knowledge 
and experience, where the limitations or deficiencies of readers and writers bring them together 
in order to create, as best they can and however temporarily, some kind of understanding of the 
text. 
 In her own personal essays, Woolf frequently emphasizes the relationship between active 
writer and active reader by demonstrating in many instances her narrator’s lack of authority and 
deficiencies. The dismantling of authorial authority is perhaps most blatant in A Room of One’s 
Own (1929), in which Woolf’s narrator freely admits, “I should never be able to fulfil [sic.] what 
is, I understand, the first duty of a lecturer—to hand you after an hour’s discourse a nugget of 
pure truth to wrap up between the pages of your notebooks and keep on the mantelpiece for 
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ever” (3). As if this does not undermine her narrator’s authority enough, Woolf writes shortly 
afterwards that,  
I need not say that what I am about to describe has no existence; Oxbridge is an 
invention; so is Fernham; ‘I’ is only a convenient term for somebody who has no 
real being. Lies will flow from my lips, but there may perhaps be some truth 
mixed up with them; it is for you to seek out this truth and to decide whether any 
part of it is worth keeping. If not, you will of course throw the whole of it into the 
waste-paper basket and forget all about it. (4) 
The reader’s role could not be stated more plainly: yea verily, Woolf hits the reader about the 
head with the narrator’s deficiencies, almost goading the reader to intervene immediately in the 
reading process and question the veracity of what is to come. That a one-hundred page essay 
begins with the immediate and thorough dismantling of its narrator’s authority is remarkable, but 
this tactic speaks to the fact that Woolf was trying to create with her essays an alternative to the 
academic essay of the learned man. The reader is given an example of this learned man later in A 
Room of One’s Own when the narrator discusses Mr A, a novelist who possesses a “well-
nourished, well-educated, free mind” (90). Nevertheless, the narrator finds Mr A’s work tiresome 
to read, for “after reading a chapter or two a shadow seemed to lie across the page. It was a 
straight dark bar, a shadow shaped like the letter ‘I’” (90). Here, then, is the tyrannical “I” Woolf 
tries so hard to avoid presenting at the beginning of her own essay, and her narrator continues, 
“One began to be tired of ‘I’. Not but what this ‘I’ was a most respectable ‘I’; honest and logical; 
as hard as a nut, and polished for centuries by good teaching and good feeding. I respect and 
admire that ‘I’ from the bottom of my heart. But—here I turned a page or two, looking for 
something or other—the worst of it is that in the shadow of the letter ‘I’ all is shapeless as mist” 
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(90). It’s important to note that there are two I’s here: one is the I of Woolf’s narrator, already 
described as a personal, malleable “convenient term for somebody who has no real being” and 
full of biases and deficiencies (4); the other is an unchanging “I” imbued with all the institutional 
knowledge that comes of a good but restrictive education spent chasing ends rather than 
questioning means. The problem with this second “I” is its impersonality, for it has been 
polished for centuries by the academic institution and represents that institution, its discipline 
and training, rather than the individual. Oxbridge strips away the individualities and peculiarities 
of its students and dons, and so Woolf’s narrator, when she is turned away from the library, 
thinks that however “unpleasant it is to be locked out” of Oxbridge, “it is worse perhaps to be 
locked in” (21). This imprisonment is visually represented in the passage, for it is only the “I” of 
Mr A that is surrounded by quotation marks, which become physical representations of his 
mental rigidity.  
 On the other hand, in accepting his or her outsider status, Woolf’s common reader resists 
closed systems of institutional knowledge and, as Susan Stanford Friedman argues, “establishes 
an authority outside the university, one that reflects, assesses, prods, probes, pushes and judges 
what s/he reads” (119). To prod and to push requires, at least according to Woolf, that one write 
personally—limited though personality may be by critical deficiencies and ignorance—to allow 
for the productive meeting of reader and writer. More than this, however, Woolf fairly dares the 
writers of impersonal academic essays to acknowledge the limitations of their own writing, for, 
according to Anne E. Fernald, in “objecting to a criticism that was broad, impersonal, and 
interested in fixing boundaries, Woolf accepted and even rejoiced in a criticism that would 
necessarily be limited, personal, and erratic. By describing her method in terms of its 
disadvantages, Woolf forces her critics to defend an impersonal reading of literature, if they can” 
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(198). Woolf’s introduction to A Room of One’s Own, therefore, draws attention to its own form 
as a personal essay in relation to a “you,” holding itself to account for its flaws and shortcomings 
in order to expose how the formal elements of essays shape the content within, and to ask 
impersonal essays to do the same. She offers through her deficient I a place for the reader in the 
critical and creative process, and provides the reader the authority needed to become an active 
participant in the making of the text. 
 It’s important to note, however, that Woolf’s attempts to share her authorial authority are 
not designed to completely blur the boundaries between reader and writer but, quite the opposite, 
to draw attention to how writer and reader intersect with one another as distinct subjects in the 
text. We’ve already seen that Saloman conflates writer and reader when discussing the common 
reader when she suggests that the reader “becomes writer as well as reader, adopting a hybrid 
role that brings about new possibilities for the essayistic experience” (59), and this sentiment is 
mirrored by Rosenberg, who writes, “We find that, ultimately, for Woolf, there is no difference 
between reader and writer; they are one and the same, and they both participate in the interactive 
and interdependent process of creation and interpretation” (xxi). A more productive approach to 
understanding the relationship between writer and reader and the way subjectivity is imagined in 
Woolf’s essays is offered by Friedman when she suggests that the “defining element of the 
‘common reader’ is his or her positionality as outsider—or to be more precise, since no one can 
exist ‘outside’ culture, as one who occupies and interrogates the borders between canonical and 
marginalized traditions” (118). I agree with Friedman that Woolf conceptualizes the common 
reader as a cultural outsider, but I think the far more important point being made in this passage 
is that Woolf, by thinking in terms of the subject’s positionality within discourses, or without as 
the case may be, is advancing a theory of relational and intersectional subjectivity. Leila Brosnan 
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describes the relational status of readers and writers in Woolf’s essays when she suggests that the 
“dialogue Woolf imagines [between writer and reader] abandons the paradigmatic subject/object 
configuration of the essay—a binary which is traditionally a sexed one with the masculine as the 
privileged term—in favour of a temporary yet ongoing intersubjective collision, thereby avoiding 
the exclusion and restriction contingent upon the established ‘I’ of the essay and language” 
(120). To discuss Woolf’s essays in terms of abandoning the subject/object paradigm of the 
traditional critical essay in a temporary gesture towards a shared position acknowledges Woolf’s 
frequent invitations to the reader to become an active participant in the creative process of 
making the essay. More than merely revealing the role of readers in the reading process, Woolf’s 
essays actually create spaces for readers by asking, perhaps even requiring, them to assume a 
subject position in relation to the narrator. This interactive process between writer and reader 
ends in the consistent renewal of the “I” in the essay, according to Brosnan, for she explains that, 
“By writing the oppositional object as another subject or the space in which another subject can 
speak, and then letting that process recreate the original scriptive subject, by a self-reflexive 
reflection, the ‘I’ of the essayist is created anew” (122-3). I’d add to this that both subject 
positions—the “I” of the writer and the “I” of the reader—are renewed in the self-reflexive 
repositioning of the reader, for with each repositioning of the authorial “I,” the reading “I” is 
ever so slightly repositioned as well and must forge anew his or her subjectivity within the new 
discursive space created by the authorial “I.” In short, both reader and writer are both subject and 
object in a complex game of identity formation within Woolf’s essays: both are placed within a 
textual space in which their “I”s take on meaning in relation to each other. The subject 
positioning of one, that is to say, affects the subject positioning of the other—a process that 
inevitably reveals each other’s status as objects within the system of meaning created in the text. 
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One clearly sees the positioning and repositioning of the authorial “I” in one of Woolf’s 
most famous shorter essays, “Character in Fiction” (1924), and with each new positioning Woolf 
compels her readers/audience, oftentimes very outwardly, to reposition themselves as their 
relational position to the authorial “I” changes. “Character in Fiction” (originally presented as a 
speech to the Cambridge Heretics Club in May 1924, published in the Criterion in July 1924, 
and later published by the Hogarth Press in October 1924 as “Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown”) was 
penned in response to Arnold Bennett’s March 1923 review of Jacob’s Room, and attempts to 
explain what Woolf and many other Georgian writers saw as a shift in the cultural and aesthetic 
ground of English literature. Bennett’s review, entitled “Is the Novel Decaying,” asserts that the 
“foundation of good fiction is character creating,” and that the Georgians, while having “a 
number of young novelists who display all manner of good qualities,” have failed to write good 
fiction because they “are so busy with states of society as to half forget that any society consists 
of individuals, and they attach too much weight to cleverness, which is perhaps the lowest of all 
artistic qualities” (113). About Jacob’s Room specifically, he writes that he has “seldom read a 
cleverer book than Virginia Woolf’s Jacob’s Room, a novel which has made a great stir in a 
small world” (113). Bennett’s charge of cleverness refers to the formal complexity of Jacob’s 
Room, a critique that positions his review firmly within the realm of the “battle of the brows” 
inasmuch as it imagines the difficulty of Jacob’s Room as an attempt to exclude the vast majority 
of the reading public and to appeal to a small coterie of highly educated readers, hence Bennett’s 
claim that Woolf’s clever book “made a great stir in a small world.”  
Woolf responds to Bennett in “Character in Fiction” with an in-depth discussion of the 
differences between Georgian and Edwardian literature, and while she agrees with Bennett that 
character is central to good fiction, she argues that the Georgians have failed because the tools 
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the Edwardians used to create characters are of no use to the Georgians. Too concerned with 
what Woolf calls in “Character in Fiction” “the fabric of things” (432), the Edwardians displace 
in various ways their central subject. Woolf reduces the Edwardian propensity to entangle 
readers in the “fabric of things” down to the single term “materialist” in “Modern Fiction” 
(1921)—Woolf’s other famous essay on modernist aesthetics and very much a companion piece 
to “Character in Fiction”—where she argues that in Edwardian materialism one finds only an 
immense amount of time and energy “making the trivial and the transitory appear the true and 
the enduring” (105). What lasts for the Edwardians are the external realities of existence. Where 
Mrs Brown lives, who her father is, how her mother died, what she pays in rent: these details 
form the basis of character development in Edwardian fiction and are conventions that, if they 
make sense when describing a hierarchical social structure where tradition may determine 
character with at least some degree of accuracy, fail to be useful in a chaotic, swirling modernity 
of rapid technological progress, depersonalizing metropolitan centres, speeding automobiles, and 
even faster cultural production. Thus, Woolf writes the Edwardians “have looked very 
powerfully, searchingly, and sympathetically out of the window; at factories, at Utopias, even at 
the decoration and upholstery of the carriage; but never at her, never at life, never at human 
nature” (“Character in Fiction” 430). The Georgian view of character, as presented in “Modern 
Fiction,” is identified as an “attempt to come closer to life, and to preserve more sincerely and 
exactly what interests and moves them, even if to do so they must discard most of the 
conventions which are commonly observed by the novelist. Let us record the atoms as they fall 
upon the mind in the order in which they fall, let us trace the pattern, however disconnected and 
incoherent in appearance, which each sight or incident scores upon the consciousness” (106-
107). This description of what Woolf suggests is a general shift in Georgian fiction toward 
	
 103 
presenting psychological reality rather than material reality has become central to the study of 
modernist fiction, and represents one of the most accurate definitions of free indirect discourse 
narration, a style of writing that Woolf helped popularize in her novels.  
“Character in Fiction” is most remembered for this aesthetic discussion, but it’s important 
to note that it is also a skirmish in the much larger interwar debates over culture and literary 
markets, a point that becomes clear when Woolf very consciously and very visibly takes a 
position within the “battle of the brows” discourse. “Do not let me give you the impression that I 
do not admire and enjoy their books” (427), Woolf says of Wells, Bennett, and Galsworthy, but 
“what odd books they are! Sometimes I wonder if we are right to call them books at all. For they 
leave one with so strange a feeling of incompleteness and dissatisfaction. In order to complete 
them it seems necessary to do something—to join a society, or, more desperately, to write a 
cheque. That done, the restlessness is laid, the book finished; it can be put upon the shelf, and 
need never be read again” (427). Woolf’s critique is scathing. At once, she lampoons the trinity 
not only for writing what she believes is inadequate literature but also for writing the types of 
books that book clubs and societies would choose for their readers—often with an eye to the 
class performance entailed by the contents of the bookshelf. Woolf, therefore, takes up the 
mantle of the downtrodden highbrow Georgian artiste trying to make art new and positions 
herself against the stodgy decrepitude of middlebrow Edwardian traditionalists like Bennett, 
Galsworthy, and Wells. She does so again when discussing the particulars of her debate with 
Bennett. Woolf disagrees with Bennett’s assertion that the measure of effective character 
construction in fiction is the reality with which the character is represented, yet defers to the 
reader by saying “I am well aware that this is a matter about which I am likely to be prejudiced, 
sanguine, and near-sighted. I will put my view before you in the hope that you will make it 
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impartial, judicial, and broad-minded” (427). This critical deferral reinforces the highbrow 
Georgian subject position Woolf is taking and situates the Edwardian writers and the reading 
public in relation to this subject position, but it simultaneously acknowledges how her position 
creates critical deficiencies and outwardly asks the reader to intervene in the critical argument. 
Such self-reflexive interventions create critical moments for readers to privately readjust their 
beliefs about aesthetics and asks they test the validity of Woolf’s argument in light of the 
discursive space in which they find themselves, but, more than this, they demonstrate how the 
reader is implicated in the literary process as an active participant within both the text and the 
literary marketplace.  
Woolf’s use of exaggeration within the essay likewise asks the reader to identify her 
critical deficiencies and intervene where necessary. Indeed, while the grand proclamation that 
“on or about December 1910 human character changed” (421) has become, like Pound’s demand 
to “Make it New,” a foundational statement of modernist aesthetics and modernist studies, in the 
moment before she utters the pronouncement, the narrator “hazard[s]” that her audience will find 
it “more disputable perhaps” than her previous arguments in the essay (421). And in the moment 
after the claim, the narrator immediately equivocates: “I am not saying that one went out, as one 
might into a garden, and there saw that a rose had flowered, or that a hen had laid an egg. The 
change was not sudden and definite like that. But a change there was, nevertheless; and since one 
must be arbitrary, let us date it about the year 1910” (421-422). On the surface, such 
performative phrasing does not matter much—after all, it is the value of the idea rather than the 
sincerity of the speaker that should be considered when evaluating ideas—but Woolf’s 
exaggeration once again positions her as the highbrow defender of Georgian aesthetics and 
Bennett, Gallsworthy, and Wells as the middlebrow defenders of Edwardian aesthetics, a 
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relational paradigm between the authors that, in turn, places the reader firmly in the “battle of the 
brows” and creates a space into which the reader can intervene and become an active participant 
in both the text and the debate. Thus, by abdicating her own authority to the reader and by 
exaggerating her own claims, Woolf demonstrates her own critical deficiencies in order to 
activate the reader/audience and to demonstrate that they, too, must play a role in the production 
of literature. 
The role readers must play in the “battle of the brows” is, according to Woolf, very much 
different than the role they are currently playing, yet both their current role and their ideal role 
are explored through Woolf’s analysis of the power that literary conventions wield in the debate. 
Woolf suggests that aesthetic conventions can be compared to social conventions:  
A convention in writing is not much different from a convention in manners. Both 
in life and in literature it is necessary to have some means of bridging the gulf 
between the hostess and her unknown guest on the one hand, the writer and his 
unknown reader on the other. The hostess bethinks her of the weather, for 
generations of hostesses have established the fact that this is a subject of universal 
interest in which we all believe. […] The writer must get in touch with his reader 
by putting before him something which he recognises, which therefore stimulates 
his imagination, and makes him willing to co-operate in the far more difficult 
business of intimacy. (“Character in Fiction” 431) 
Positioning the writer as host to the reader, where both are guided by a common understanding 
of practices, be they social or literary, emphasizes the most important aspect of reading for 
Woolf: the relationship between reader and writer, in which each participant carries an equally 
important and active role as the co-creators of a space in which ideas can be exchanged and 
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dialogues created. Just as importantly, this comparison removes the reading process from places 
like Eton, Oxford, and Cambridge—institutions that Woolf believed responsible for both 
propagating and normalizing the patriarchy and for teaching an impersonal form of reading—and 
relocates it to the home, an important site in many of Woolf’s novels and a place in which 
hostesses such as Clarissa Dalloway and Mrs Ramsay act as central nodes in relational networks. 
Reading is cast, here, not as an individual search for knowledge, a search for a “nugget of pure 
truth” (AROO 3), but as a relational activity. Shortly after the passage about hosting in 
“Character in Fiction,” however, Woolf neglects her own advice and is unspeakably rude to the 
English reading public. “In England,” she writes, “[the public] is a very suggestible and docile 
creature, which, once you get it to attend, will believe implicitly what it is told for a certain 
number of years” (432). She continues by comparing the reading public to lap dogs who, “sitting 
by the writer’s side” (433), attend to the trinity too faithfully, and who believe that materialist 
realism is the only appropriate novelistic convention because “‘Old women have houses. They 
have fathers. They have incomes. They have servants. They have hot water bottles. That is how 
we know that they are old women. Mr Wells and Mr Bennett and Mr Galsworthy have always 
taught us that this the way to recognise them’” (433). Such mimicry is most unbecoming in a 
hostess, but, once again, one must ask to what end Woolf employs this mockery of the public. 
Here it seems that imitation is the most flattering form of insincerity, for Woolf, far from 
desiring actual separation from the public, positions herself antagonistically to the public in order 
to distance the common reader from both the Georgians and the Edwardians, who are the real 
antagonists in this aesthetic debate as they vie for market share and recognition. The reader is 
urged by Woolf to begin realizing that it is they, not the Georgians or the Edwardians, who must 
inform literary conventions if literature is to achieve its highest aim: i.e. to accurately represent 
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Mrs Brown. Their role is not to sit and say in a “vast and unanimous way” (433) what they have 
been told to say; theirs is to reason why, to think and make reply, as writers try to reshape 
conventions that can build an intimacy once more between reader and writer.  
 For all her lampooning of the trinity, for all her equivocatory pronouncements about 
human character, for all her suggestions that the Georgians have had to reinvent the tools of 
literature anew, Woolf very clearly positions herself, the Georgians, the Edwardians, and the 
readers in the aesthetic debate so that the reader might understand where they fit into the cultural 
landscape. In the end, she admits that such debates are perhaps “inevitable whenever from hoar 
old age or callow youth the convention ceases to be a means of communication between writer 
and reader, and becomes instead an obstacle and an impediment. At the present moment we are 
suffering, not from decay, but from having no code of manners which writers and readers accept 
as a prelude to the more exciting intercourse of friendship” (434). On one hand, Woolf 
personifies writing conventions in this passage, their age and innocence becoming factors that 
limit their usefulness in creating connections between reader and writer. On the other hand, this 
passage concisely sums up the “battle of the brows” that, by pitting the hoary old age of the 
Edwardian conventions against the callow youth of the Georgian conventions and asking readers 
to choose a side, has created an impediment to the common reader and created of him an 
obedient lapdog good for little else than yapping out the pronouncements of his chosen master. 
Neither the Georgians nor the Edwardians are let off the hook in “Character in Fiction,” for both 
play their part to win readers and convince them there is a wrong and a right way to write. 
 This is not, of course, to say that Woolf does not come down firmly on one side of the 
debate, for, in soliciting her readers’ help in discovering what aesthetic conventions best 
represent the change in human character she espouses in “Character in Fiction,” and by asking 
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them at the end of the essay to “Tolerate the spasmodic, the obscure, the fragmentary, the 
failure” (436) that has, up to that point, defined the Georgian writing conventions, she 
undeniably makes an argument that supports Georgian rather than Edwardian conventions. But at 
the same time, Woolf is remarkably candid with her reader about how the “battle of the brows” is 
constructed, and she goes to remarkable lengths to ensure that her reader is empowered. In fact, 
at the end of the essay, Woolf thoroughly challenges her own position by foregrounding the 
active, authoritative role of the reader—the ideal role of the reader according to Woolf—and 
using shifts in pronouns, where repetition becomes a visual not merely linguistic mode of 
emphasis. These pronouns draw attention to the reader’s responsibility in relation to literature 
and literary practices: 
Thus I have tried, at tedious length, I fear, to answer some of the questions which 
I began by asking. I have given an account of some of the difficulties which in my 
view beset the Georgian writer in all his forms. I have sought to excuse him. May 
I end by venturing to remind you of the duties and responsibilities that are yours 
as partners in this business of writing books, as companions in the railway 
carriage, as fellow travellers with Mrs Brown? For she is just as visible to you 
who remain silent as to us who tell stories about her. In the course of your daily 
life this past week you have had far stranger and more interesting experiences 
than the one I have tried to describe. You have overheard scraps of talk that filled 
you with amazement. You have gone to bed at night bewildered by the complexity 
of your feelings. In one day thousands of ideas have coursed through your brains; 
thousands of emotions have met, collided, and disappeared in astonishing 
disorder. Nevertheless, you allow the writers to palm off upon you a version of all 
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this, an image of Mrs Brown, which has no likeness to the surprising apparition 
whatsoever. In your modesty you seem to consider that writers are of different 
blood and bone from yourselves; that they know more of Mrs Brown than you do. 
Never was there a more fatal mistake. (435-6 emphasis added) 
The heavy repetition of “I” at the beginning of the passage demonstrates the personal nature of 
the argument Woolf has presented thus far and positions her with authority within the “battle of 
the brows,” but once she begins to discuss the role of “you” the reader this “I” changes to “us,” 
the authors, as Woolf becomes part of an aggregate while increasingly allowing the “you” to 
become the nexus of power in the passage. By the end, she abandons all personal pronouns for 
writers, either singular or plural, and refers to them simply as “the writers” who “palm off” 
inaccurate versions of Mrs Brown and as “writers” whom readers believe to be “of different 
blood and bone from [themselves]” (436). More than merely a slow reversal of power, however, 
this play with pronouns and positioning asks readers to continually re-evaluate their position and 
centrality as Woolf slides from prominence to near obscurity in the space of a paragraph. 
Readers, that is to say, are asked to recognize that they are, in addition to being individual 
consumers, both a subject and an object in a far vaster artistic discourse and literary economy. 
This complex positioning of the reader is most clearly acknowledged when Woolf then suggests 
that “It is this division between reader and writer, this humility on your part, these professional 
airs and graces on ours, that corrupt and emasculate the books which should be the healthy 
offspring of a close and equal alliance between us” (436). Reader/writer, yours/ours: with this 
labeling Woolf presents the intersectional identities that inform both production and 
consumption in the literary marketplace, and she brings these intersectional identities together in 
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the end with the personal pronoun “us,” a word that suggests community, unity, and, as she 
suggests, “a close and equal alliance” between members. 
 The suggestion that the division between reader and writer “emasculates” literature is 
particularly interesting because it challenges the idea that impersonal objectivity and an 
unwavering and authoritative “I”—the very foundation of institutional educations and patriarchy 
according to Woolf—are necessary for effective critical argumentation. In “Character in Fiction” 
one does not find the same Mr A one finds in A Room of One’s Own, does not find the “I” that, 
although it has been “polished for centuries by good teaching and good feeding,” casts a shadow 
that renders everything “shapeless as mist” (90). Such “I’s” are the very stuff of the institutional 
masculinity polished at Eton, Cambridge, and Oxford, yet they lead, paradoxically, to an 
emasculating infertility inasmuch as they allow only submission to authority and, thereby, limit 
the reader’s role in the text. Relocating power to the aggregate or communal, however, Woolf 
favours an “I” that is much more intersectional and relational; an “I” that does not assert its 
power but, rather, invites dialogue and asks readers to express their personality in the presence of 
and in relation to the organizing personality of the narrator. Fertility becomes possible in such a 
textual space, for this is the space of the gracious hostess rather than of the learned scholar. 
Much like Clarissa Dalloway, whose “offering” to society it is “to combine, to create” by 
bringing people together at her parties (MD 103), and who “must assemble” (158) her guests 
even after the Bradshaws bring Septimus’s death to her party, or like Mrs Ramsay, who acts as 
the central node in the domestic life of her family and assembled guests so that, as Lily Briscoe 
finally realizes, in “bringing them together” she makes “of the moment something permanent” 
(TtL 133), Woolf’s narrator brings all of the protagonists—Georgians, Edwardians, and common 
readers—together in “Character in Fiction.” The speaker also organizes the protagonists, 
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positioning them in relation to one another, laying bare their deficiencies and acknowledging 
their roles in the “battle of the brows,” thereby enabling them to enter into discourse more 
productively and more equitably. Or, as Fernald has suggested, Woolf asks “readers to form their 
own conclusions not only about the books themselves but about the shape of the essay that has 
discussed them,” so that she “creates a map of discovery, suggesting much about what is yet 
unknown as it traces the uncertain boundaries of what is” (209). Woolf’s essays on reading, 
though, are much more than maps: they create a living space in which all participants are invited 
to recognize themselves as active members in the reading process, for the creation of knowledge 
and meaning in the text becomes a process of communal making rather than of singular 
authority.  
 
Virginia Woolf’s Common Reader: Shopping For and Buying a Culture of One’s Own 
 Unlike modernists such as Pound, who offered readers a reading syllabus in The ABC’s of 
Reading, or the Leavises, who predicted the downfall of Western society if people continued to 
read the wrong books, or Eliot, who believed authorial professionalism could save European 
culture by reforming literary production and creating professional readers, Woolf neither made 
suggestions concerning what readers should read, nor saw any reading as wasted reading. This 
does not mean that Woolf believed there were no poorly written books: in an interview she and 
Leonard gave on the BBC, Virginia argued that first editions of books should be printed on 
“some perishable material which would crumble to a little heap of perfectly clean dust in about 
six months time,” giving readers ample time to decide which books “could be printed on good 
paper and well bound” in second editions (qtd. in Cuddy-Keane 66). Woolf’s argument leaves 
readers to discover and hone their literary tastes on their own, and reading bad books, for Woolf, 
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thus remains an integral part of this process. She reinforces this idea in “Hours in a Library” 
(1916), in which Woolf writes that “We owe a great deal to bad books; indeed, we come to count 
their authors and their heroes among those figures who play so large a part in our silent life” 
(37), not because they inform good taste but because “we soon develop another taste, unsatisfied 
by the great—not a valuable taste, perhaps, but certainly a very pleasant possession—the taste 
for bad books” (37). Woolf offers much the same advice in “How Should One Read a Book?” 
(1935), the final essay in The Common Reader: Second Series, when, after again warning readers 
not to blindly acquiesce to the evaluations of critics and suggesting that “we cannot suppress our 
own idiosyncrasy without impoverishing it,” she writes,  
as time goes on perhaps we can train our taste; perhaps we can make it submit to 
some control. When it has fed greedily and lavishly upon books of all sorts—
poetry, fiction, history, biography—and has stopped reading and looked for long 
spaces upon the variety, the incongruity of the living world, we shall find that it is 
changing a little; it is not so greedy, it is more reflective. It will begin to bring us 
not merely judgments on particular books, but will tell us that there is a quality 
among certain books. (268)  
Here again, one sees Woolf’s desire to empower the reader by insisting that they, and not only 
professional critics, are perfectly capable of making decisions about taste if they only enter the 
text as active participants in the reading process. Her agenda is not to fashion good taste in the 
reader by prescribing a course of “good” reading—a palliative treatment that ignores the 
underlying causes of the “culture crisis” in Europe—but rather to show readers that they can 
come to know the good by discerning the bad. In this context, “good” pertains to a personal 
critical assessment come to on one’s own or in collaboration with other readers after close 
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examination of the text and other like texts. Conversely, “bad” pertains to an impersonal critical 
assessment to which a reader acquiesces, taking on the critic’s judgment of a work without 
testing those official pronouncements. The reader’s deference to authority, whether critical or 
authorial, rather than the reading of “bad” books, is the ultimate sin according to Woolf, for it 
transforms reading from an active gathering of ideas and impressions into a passive moving of 
one’s eyes over the page.  
 But if prescribing “good” books is merely a palliative treatment to the cultural crisis, then 
Woolf’s suggestion that readers should read what they want seems to be no treatment at all. After 
all, the fact that readers were being subsumed under a crush of new literature (much of it “bad” 
according to the highbrows) and didn’t know what to read was precisely the problem in the 
newly expanded literary marketplace. It’s here that the other role of the common reader as an 
economic subject plays an integral role in Woolf’s conception of that figure. Woolf herself had a 
strained relationship with money. Forced to live frugally for much of her young adult life, by 
1925 Woolf was able to begin spending more freely due, in no small part, to her success as an 
essayist. In 1924, she received £10 per 1000 word article in Vogue, but by 1927 she was making 
considerably more, as she was able to “boast to Vita that she was being paid £120 to write four 
reviews for the Herald Tribune” (Lee 559). These rises in rates for individual essays 
corresponded with an overall rise in the Woolfs’ total income. As she noted in her diary “In 1924 
our income was £1,047 and our expenditure £826, in 1934 our income was £3,615 and our 
expenditure £1,192” (qtd. in Lee 559). Much of the Woolf’s increasing wealth came via the 
press, especially when Vita Sackville-West published the enormously successful The 
Edwardians (1930) through Hogarth. A best-seller, The Edwardians boosted the press’s sales 
enormously in 1931-32: in 1931 the press made the Woolfs £2,373, up from just £530 in 1930; 
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and 1932 was their most profitable year as writers and publishers, the press making them £2,209 
and their total income equaling £4,053 (Barkway 242). While the Woolfs’ income was rising 
quite considerably, their expenses stayed roughly the same over a ten-year period, so that, for 
Woolf, “money changed its dimensions, and became something she could control” for the first 
time in her life (Lee 562). And control it she did, writing to Sackville-West that “out of the 
profits [from The Edwardians]—did I tell you?—I’ve bought a boat and a camera. Such are the 
blessings you shower” (qtd. in Barkway 242). Woolf’s excitement at having money is palpable in 
these passages, but this excitement belies Woolf’s rather conflicted relationship with 
consumerism and capitalism.  
 Woolf recognized that consumerism, bound so inextricably to the marketing of both 
culture and status, had the positive potential to offer the consumer agency within the marketplace 
by allowing one to “become” what one pleased through the act of buying, and the negative 
potential to divest one of this agency when consumption becomes merely conspicuous. The 
negative potential of conspicuous consumption is presented clearly in “Middlebrow,” a 
posthumously published essay originally written as a letter to the editor of the New Statesman in 
1932 but never sent. “Middlebrow” is recognized as the essay in which Woolf offers her most 
clear and concise definition of the middlebrow as a “man, or woman, of middlebred intelligence 
who ambles and saunters now on this side of the hedge, now on that, in pursuit of no single 
object, neither art itself nor life itself, but both mixed indistinguishably, and rather nastily, with 
money, fame, power, or prestige” (199). In and of itself, this definition does little to explain how 
we might distinguish a middlebrow, but Woolf does offer one diagnostic tool when she notes 
their strange passion “for being ‘seen’” (199) owning the right things, wearing the right things, 
and doing and saying the right things. Conspicuous consumption by another name, it is this 
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criterion, this passion for performing one’s commodified identity that Woolf returns to again and 
again to critique the middlebrow. Seeing and being seen create a culture of commonness in 
which variety is diminished and ordinariness (or at least the appearance of ordinariness) is 
fetishized, and it is this culture that the middlebrow “try to teach the [the lowbrow] culture,” thus 
becoming in Woolf’s eyes the “bane of all thinking and living” (202). Consumerism’s negative 
dimension is most exposed by middlebrow status seekers, according to Woolf, as any potential to 
individuate oneself through consumerism is replaced by the homogenizing desire to represent a 
certain construction of social class. 
 Consumerism is not, however, always treated so disparagingly in Woolf’s essays, for it is 
frequently connected to the idea of individuation in that it is seen as a way for consumers to 
abandon those objects that have come to define their lives and identities, and to begin the process 
of identity-building anew. Woolf does not suggest that people can escape capitalism and 
consumerism—indeed, none of Woolf’s works ever suggest there is an outside to capitalism—
but she does suggest that one can control how to become as a consumer because one has agency 
in choosing what to buy and in enjoying the goods. As Kathryn Simpson has suggested, 
“Although Woolf’s representation of consumer culture in her essays is tempered always by a 
firm resistance to capitalist values and activities, and also exposes the exploitative power at work 
in this consumer (and consuming) activity, her essays also delight in the sensual, erotic pleasures 
and creative stimulation that commodity culture can offer” (Gifts 15). Simpson’s assessment of 
Woolf’s ambivalent relationship with consumerism is important because it draws attention to the 
fact that Woolf frequently distinguishes between the act of shopping (looking at products) and 
the act of buying. It’s dangerous to risk conflating these separate but equally important aspects of 
consumerism when discussing Woolf’s essays because each act plays a specific role in what she 
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sees as the positive potential of consumerism. Shopping is important to Woolf because it allows 
the shopper to imagine themselves differently through the process of browsing crowded city 
streets and shopping districts. Moving, browsing, looking, for Woolf, were actions associated 
with possibility and fluidity, where the density of (culture, gender, class) signifiers and the 
vastness of the symbolic field offers the browser freedom to begin thinking of themself not as a 
static individual with an essential being but as a subject becoming in relation to other subjects 
and objects. Shopping, then, was an action that challenged essentialist views of identity and 
reified the intersectionality of subjectivity by exposing the relationship between consumerism 
and identity formation, for if one could buy the right things in order to become a middle-class 
English woman, then the innateness of class, gender, and culture must be questioned and 
performativity examined. If shopping created possibilities for consumers to imagine differently, 
then buying brought these possibilities into material existence. Buying, Woolf suggests, is the 
material action the consumer performs in order to realize the ideology of consumerism, and, as 
such, buying judiciously and with purpose is the best way to ensure that producers create objects 
worth consuming. “Buy the change you want to see” might be Woolf’s motto concerning 
consumerism—a motto that may seem hopelessly naïve with the critical hindsight of the 
Frankfurt School’s explanation of the culture industry—but it suggests how subjects can deploy 
their agency as consumers in a commodity culture.   
 Shopping’s positive potential as a liberating action is explored in “Street Haunting: A 
London Adventure” (1927), in which the narrator walks through the streets of London on her 
way to buy a pencil. Upon leaving the house to go shopping, the narrator suggests “we shed the 
self our friends know us by and become part of that vast republican army of anonymous 
trampers, whose society is so agreeable after the solitude of one’s own room. For there we sit 
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surrounded by objects which perpetually express the oddity of our own temperaments and 
enforce the memories of our own experience” (256). One’s own room, which would become the 
symbol of freedom just two years later in A Room of One’s Own, is presented as confining and 
claustrophobic here, the objects within impressing the narrator with a meaning she longs to 
escape, if only momentarily, as she walks to buy a pencil. The street, on the other hand, offers 
freedom in the form of a “vast republican army of anonymous trampers.” A study in seeming 
contradictions, this phrase suggests, all at once, that the crowded streets create a republican 
equality amongst individuals, allow shoppers take on the unity of a military unit, and provide 
shoppers a diversity through anonymity. Thus, as Leslie K. Hankins has pointed out, the interior 
is “associated with capitalism, the bourgeois subject, possession of objects and protection” while 
the exterior scene is a “radically different space,” through which the essay “probes dialectical 
tensions between the sometimes claustrophobic individuality of the room and the adventure and 
mutability of the street” (18). If the street is freeing, that is to say, it is so because it removes the 
individual from the small symbolic economies of the home, in which one’s objects signify one’s 
identity to friends, family, and guests. By inserting the individual into a much vaster and denser 
symbolic economy, the subject’s significance can become partially obscured by the 
oversaturation of a symbolic field in which sales items, shop windows, cars, animals, signs, and 
people all fight for the viewer’s attention. However, there are some signifiers one cannot so 
easily leave behind. It may be true, as the narrator suggests when she leaves the house, that 
“when the door shuts on us […] [t]he shell-like covering which our souls have excreted to house 
themselves, to make for themselves a shape distinct from others, is broken, and there is left of all 
these wrinkles and roughness a central oyster of perceptiveness, an enormous eye” (257), but it is 
worth noting that, even though she has been synechdochially reduced to nothing more than an 
	
 118 
eye, the narrator becomes a flâneuse strolling the streets and indulging in their visual pleasures. 
Woolf is careful not to make gender the issue for her narrator flâneuse, using the gender neutral 
first-person pronouns “we,” “us,” and “our” throughout the essay, but she does let slip the fact 
that a bowl from Mantua was sold to the narrator by a “sinister old woman [who] plucked at our 
skirts” (257), and later imagines herself transformed into a woman attending a dinner party in 
Mayfair while looking at a string of antique pearls (260). From the beginning, then, we are able 
to situate Woolf’s narrator in terms of gender and in terms of class, for she has money enough 
for her own room and leisure enough to go shopping for a pencil in the late afternoon “between 
tea and dinner” (256). Moreover, Hankins argues, Woolf’s flâneuse in this essay is positioned 
historically in relation to first-wave feminism, for “freely occupying a street of one’s own was 
impossible until one had a room of one’s own” (19). If the narrator is nothing more than an 
enormous eye, therefore, it is an eye that is positioned, however subtly, at the intersections of 
gender, class, and history to remind the reader that bodies matter and play a role in the agency 
the subject has within different spaces. 
 So much do bodies matter, indeed, that not even the shiny commodities of consumer 
culture, which Woolf points out when the narrator delays her shopping trip to describe a dwarf in 
a women’s shoe store, can gloss over the body’s importance to subjectivity. Although the dwarf 
is initially treated irreverently by her companions and the shop worker, they are all amazed when 
she unveils a foot that is “the shapely, perfectly proportioned foot of a well-grown woman” 
(258). Glad of the viewers’ attention, the dwarf self-confidently tries on shoe after shoe while 
people watch her so that “this was the only occasion upon which she was not afraid of being 
looked at but positively craved attention, she was ready to use any device to prolong the 
choosing and fitting” (259). The act of shopping relieves the dwarf of her self-consciousness, the 
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store and the commodities held within allowing her to imagine herself as an object people look at 
with respect, perhaps even envy, rather than with derision. Having made a decision and paid for 
her purchase, however, “the ecstasy faded, knowledge returned, the old peevishness, the old 
apology came back, and by the time she reached the street again she had become a dwarf” (259). 
Suddenly and harshly returned to her—in her opinion—malformed body, the dwarf once again 
feels herself an object of derision as she goes out into the street where the glossy items in the 
store cannot hide her from the eyes of strangers. As Simpson argues, in the attempt to buy her 
way out of her body, the dwarf reveals to the reader “the way capitalism not only manufactures 
desires in the consumer, but does so through engendering a powerful sense of lack that is […] 
out of all proportion to our needs or to actuality” (Gifts 23). Worse still, Simpson continues, the 
“impossibility of commodity culture being able to deliver all its promises causes the bubble of 
illusion, the fantasy of perfection, to burst but, simultaneously, keeps the cycle of desires in 
motion, shoring up the imperative to buy more” (23). Here is revealed the dark side of 
commodity culture that produces and then preys upon people’s desires to ensure that 
consumption continues, that status signifiers continue to change, and that people continue to 
need the right things. The grand illusion that one can buy whatever identity one wants is pierced 
by the reality of the body in this scene: some things, it seems, cannot be covered over by 
commodity culture’s glossy veneer.  
 A consequence of the dwarf’s attempt to buy away her body is that the illusion of 
consumption is ruined for the narrator as well. “She had changed the mood,” the narrator says; 
“she had called into being an atmosphere which, as we followed her into the street, seemed 
actually to create the humped, the twisted, the deformed” (259). The dwarf initiates a change to 
the very street and the people on it for the narrator, for she “had started a hobbling grotesque 
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dance to which everybody in the street now conformed” (259). Gone is the care-free narrator 
who can enjoy the liveliness and spectacle of the street; her illusion, too, must burst, Simpson 
suggests, as the “essay scratches beneath the glittering surface of the consumer economy to 
glimpse the ruthlessness that underlies it, and the effects of an economic ethos based on 
acquisition and greed rather than on a redistribution of wealth” (Gifts 19). At the same time, 
however, the scene points out the body’s power in commodity culture as much as it points out 
the power of commodity culture. There is no doubt that the bodily deficiencies that the dwarf 
experiences and the desire she feels to control these deficiencies are preyed upon by commodity 
culture, but this same body reveals the mechanisms of consumerism to the narrator. After all, the 
street as a space of commerce takes on the same physical deformities as the dwarf once the 
narrator witnesses her buying shoes; her lack becomes the lack at the heart of commodity culture 
in the narrator’s mind. Woolf suggests, therefore, that what we do with our bodies in commercial 
spaces matters. It is unfortunate that what the dwarf does with her body in buying the shoes leads 
to little more than unfulfilled desires, but Woolf does point out that the actions we undertake can 
have a profound effect not only on our own identity but on the spaces in which we live. 
 All these negatives attributes of commodity culture and consumerism are not to suggest, 
however, that Woolf found nothing of positive value in commerce, for before her encounter with 
the dwarf the narrator flâneuse imagines new selves and identities as she walks through the busy 
streets of London looking at the objects for sale. It is imperative, Woolf writes, that consumers 
encountering the thick, tangled, signifiers of the streets remain steadfastly noncommittal to 
buying and focus instead on “only gliding smoothly along the surface” of the street’s visual 
pleasures (257). It is this gliding on the surface of things, this remaining ever the shopping eye 
while resisting the buying “I,” that brings forth consumerism’s positive potential, for  
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With no thought of buying, the eye is sportive and generous; it creates; it adorns; 
it enhances. Standing out in the street, one may build up all the chambers of a vast 
imaginary house and furnish them at one’s will with a sofa, table, carpet. That rug 
will do for the hall. That alabaster bowl shall stand on a carved table in the 
window. Our merrymakings shall be reflected in that thick round mirror. But, 
having built and furnished the house, one is happily under no obligation to 
possess it; one can dismantle it in the twinkling of an eye, build and furnish 
another house with other chairs and other glasses. Or let us indulge ourselves at 
the antique jewelers, among the trays of rings and the hanging necklaces. Let us 
choose those pearls, for example, and imagine how, if we put them on, life would 
be changed. It becomes instantly between two and three in the morning; the lamps 
are burning very white in the deserted streets of Mayfair. (260)  
Goodness, how much rests on the short dependent clause that begins this passage. The caveat to 
consumerism’s positive potential—not buying indiscriminately—is small only in its expression; 
it is massive in its performance, and is made all the more massive by the ostensible promises of 
commodity culture. With this passage, Woolf shows us once more that consumerism does not 
permit dreaming easily. Ceaselessly creating desire that is ceaselessly deferred in increasingly 
ephemeral status symbols, consumerism’s price of admission is the act of buying the 
commodities that correspond to whatever it is one wants to become. After all, it is owning the 
pearls, not necessarily the pearls themselves, that changes one’s life because it is their 
commodity value that confers social status. The relationship between shopping and buying, 
therefore, is a dangerously tenuous one full of both positive and negative potential depending on 
one’s ability to look without necessarily buying. Such an ability, Woolf suggests in the essay, 
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requires in many regards a cognitive dissonance between eye and mind: “The eye is not a miner, 
not a diver, not a seeker after buried treasure. It floats us smoothly down a stream, resting, 
pausing, the brain sleeps perhaps as it looks” (257). The form of the last sentence demonstrates 
the difficulty of looking without becoming desirous, of creating the cognitive dissonance 
necessary to harness the positive potential of consumerism and commodity culture. All that 
separates the eye from the brain is a comma splice, but which comma is the agent of the splice 
remains frustratingly unclear: is it the eye that rests and pauses on object after object as it looks 
or is it the brain falling into slumber? The conditional “perhaps” almost transforms the final 
clause into a question that challenges this dissonance still further, transforming it from an easy 
task into an endeavour that requires constant vigilance. 
 And constant vigilance is necessary, too, if one is to manage the desires manufactured by 
commodity culture, a reality Woolf reveals to the reader directly after the passage in which she 
imagines how pearls can change one’s life. “What could be more absurd,” the narrator asks, than 
looking at a string of pearls and imagining one is on a balcony in Mayfair rather than on the 
Strand going to buy a pencil? “Yet,” she continues, “it is nature’s folly, not ours. When she set 
about her chief masterpiece, the making of man, she should have thought of one thing only. 
Instead, turning her head, looking over her shoulder, into each one of us she let creep instincts 
and desires which are utterly at variance with this main being, so that we are streaked, 
variegated, all of a mixture; the colours have run” (261). Finally, Woolf brings the reader to the 
crux of the problem concerning consumerism: humans, she argues, are not singular entities so 
they become easy prey to a commodity culture that promises them unity through the acquisition 
of things. Buying things centres the individual; it offers coherence to the fragmented or variable 
being. And yet, Woolf does not look upon this function of buying as necessarily a bad thing, for 
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“Circumstances compel unity; for conveniences’ sake a man must be a whole. The good citizen 
when he opens his door in the evening must be banker, golfer, husband, father; not a nomad 
wandering the desert, a mystic staring at the sky, a debauchee in the slums of San Francisco, a 
soldier heading a revolution, a pariah howling with scepticism and solitude” (261). Tempered 
buying is presented almost as a social moral imperative in this passage, the suggestion being that 
one should be careful to buy only that which is either required of their position or that which will 
not directly harm society, rather than buying to fulfill flippant desires. Such desires are to be 
squelched in deference to the betterment of the individual and, consequently, to the betterment of 
society in general. There seems to be an element of social conservatism in this statement 
inasmuch as Woolf suggests one must be this or that if society is to be upheld, but her end here is 
to point out that wandering the desert, heading a revolution, or howling with scepticism and 
solitude is as absurd for most people as believing one’s life will be transformed simply by buying 
a string of pearls or by buying the right pair of shoes. Behind the glossy simulacrum of 
consumerism, behind the status symbols of commodity culture, reality must eventually and 
finally intervene, as it intervenes in the life of the dwarf. Looking and browsing are fine, 
imagining too, yet the reader is given constant reminders in “Street Haunting” that the eye must 
“be content still with surfaces only,” and that one must not risk the “danger of digging deeper 
than the eye approves” (258) lest one become lost seeking status rather than buying 
discriminately.  
 To buy discriminately, however, requires that the creeping desires and instincts of the 
variegated shopper, aroused by viewing the glossy veneer of the street, be quenched, a problem 
Woolf solves by suggesting that books represent a different kind of commodity than the 
ephemeral status symbols of the street which create lack and desire only to leave them 
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unfulfilled. For what if, after attending the narrator through the streets, one still wants to become 
the desert wanderer, the howling sceptic, the pearled lady, the shoed dwarf? What if one wants to 
touch, to buy, to fix one’s lacks or deficiencies as well as to look? To fulfill these desires, Woolf 
suggests, one has always the second-hand bookstores, where “we find anchorage in these 
thwarting currents of being; here we balance ourselves after the splendours and miseries of the 
streets” (261). Books occupy the common ground between the spectacular veneer of 
commodities in the street and the abject sense of unfulfilled promise one feels when, like the 
dwarf, one purchases the status object. They manage this, Woolf argues, not by embodying 
existence in a marketed form but by bringing the reader into contact with another’s existence:  
There is always a hope, as we reach down some grayish-white book from the 
upper shelf, directed by its air of shabbiness and desertion, of meeting her with a 
man who set out on horseback over a hundred years ago to explore the woollen 
market in the midlands and Wales; an unknown traveller, who stayed at inns, 
drank his pint, noted pretty girls and serious customs, wrote it all down stiffly, 
laboriously for sheer love of it (the book was published at his own expense); was 
infinitely prosy, busy, and matter-of-fact, and so let flow in without his knowing it 
the very scent of hollyhocks and the hay together with such a portrait of himself 
as gives him forever a seat in the warm corner of the mind’s inglenook. One may 
buy him for eighteen pence now. (262)  
What gets exchanged in the second-hand book store is radically different than what gets 
exchanged in the street. Outside, one buys the right products to signify the right life at this 
moment; inside, one buys lives of “variegated feather,” unchanged over centuries, to fulfill other 
lives that “are streaked, variegated, all of a mixture” (261). Thus, as Simpson argues, books form 
	
 125 
a “different kind of ‘commerce,’” for they “are not simply alienable objects generating a short-
lived moment of ecstasy. Rather, they fulfill a social and emotional function that can be long-
lasting. The narrator’s description of the different relation books create with the buyer—an 
intimate or capricious friendship, an affectionate bond—recalls Woolf’s own notion [in “How 
Should One Read a Book”] of the ideal reader for her books: a ‘fellow worker and accomplice’” 
(Gifts 24-25). Much more than this, however, it is deficiency that brings reader and book 
together in this passage: after having one’s desires piqued to chaos by the commodities sold in 
the street that are marketed as compensation for some perceived lack, the shopper finds 
“anchorage” in the second-hand bookstore (261). And yet it is also some perceived lack in the 
books that have landed them in the second-hand book store. Indeed, it is the second-hand book’s 
very deficiencies—its prosaic awkwardness, the jejune topic that required it be self-published—
that endears it so to the reader and infuses it with the “very scent of hollyhocks and the hay.” 
This description mirrors the crucial role deficiency plays in Woolf’s conception of the common 
reader, for it is in the bringing together of the common reader’s critical deficiencies and the 
deficiencies of the text that each finds ultimate fulfillment and agency. Just so, it is the 
shopper/narrator’s ability to manage consumer desire, which functions by revealing all that she 
lacks, that brings her to the bookstore, where she finds a more lasting fulfillment in the lives she 
finds within the books. 
 And yet, all the glittering surfaces of commodity culture, all the “splendours and miseries 
of the street,” have not been for naught. All she has seen (the dwarf in the shoe store, some blind 
men navigating the streets, a quarrel in a store), all she has imagined (the party at Mayfair) may 
all be used. “Into each of these lives,” the narrator says, “one could penetrate a little way, far 
enough to give oneself the illusion that one is not tethered to a single mind but can put on briefly 
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for a few minutes the bodies and minds of others” (265). In the final thoughts of the essay, 
therefore, the reader is reminded of the positive potential of consumerism, for by leaving the 
comfort and confinement of her room and browsing the streets as a shopper, the narrator sees 
different lives, begins to understand how these different lives and bodies influence and are 
influenced by space, and imagines the possibilities and limitations of her own intersectional 
subjectivity. For these reasons, it is no small thing with which the narrator has returned from her 
journey: “here—let us examine it tenderly, let us touch it with reverence—is the only spoil we 
have retrieved from the treasure of the city, a lead pencil” (265). Safely at home again, where 
“the old prejudices, fold us round; and the self, which has been blown about at so many street 
corners, which has battered like a moth at the flame of so many inaccessible lanterns, sheltered 
and enclosed” (265), the narrator is free to begin creating in her own room. She has survived the 
gauntlet of the glistening commodities in the street, enjoyed their surfaces, and bought 
discriminately to return with what she needs rather than with what she has desired. What she 
does not buy, therefore, is as important as what she does buy: in determining how she will use 
the marketplace—what she will buy and what she will only allow her eye to glide over—she 
exercises a consumer’s agency in the only way she can: through active, mindful, and vigilant 
choice.  
 The powerful role consumers play within consumer societies is similarly revealed in “The 
Docks of London,” the first essay in a series Woolf wrote for Good Housekeeping in 1931-32, as 
her narrator wanders near the docks of London and realizes consumers help determine what is 
produced with the raw products that enter England by boat. On the docks, where cargo is 
unloaded from ships and where “every commodity in the world has been examined and graded 
according to its use value” (12), the narrator comes to recognize that the cranes and warehouses 
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and workers all have a “rhythm in their regularity” (13), as if they are part of some vast and 
powerful mechanism beyond her control. In the final paragraph of the essay, however, she 
realizes that rhythm of the docks mirrors the rhythm of buyers: “It is we—our tastes, our 
fashions, our needs—that make the cranes dip and swing, that call the ships from the sea. Our 
body is their master. […] Trade watches us anxiously to see what new desires are beginning to 
grow in us, what new dislikes. One feels an important, a complex, a necessary animal as one 
stands on the quayside watching the cranes hoist this barrel, that crate, that other bale from the 
holds of the ships that have come to anchor” (14). Consumers’ choices in the marketplace steer 
production and determine the value of every commodity, and so these choices must be made 
reasonably and judiciously if the buyer is to have any agency in the marketplace. If production is 
to mirror our desires, Woolf’s narrator implies, then let it mirror them as accurately as possible 
by buying, or not buying, those objects that do not disfigure our reflection in the marketplace. In 
the end, the marketplace can be used subversively as a powerful tool for identity formation and 
individuation, but only if consumers bend it to their will. 
But I began this section talking about common readers and their reading choices, and one 
may look to the reader’s buying potential to discover how Woolf imagines consumer agency in 
the literary marketplace. Woolf tries to foster reader agency by democratizing the reading 
process and, in insisting that common readers mark their own role in the creative process, 
revealing to common readers the co-creative role they play in cultural production as the 
consumers of culture. In order to reveal just how much agency reader-buyers have abandoned in 
the literary marketplace, Woolf returns in a number of her essays to the middlebrow and their 
strange fascination for being seen to remind readers that their choices matter. In “The Modern 
Essay,” for example, Woolf suggests that middlebrow essayists lack a vital personal voice. In 
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part, she blames this on the writing requirements of the modern literary marketplace. Essayists of 
the past, she argues, had the luxury of knowing their readers had the time to read carefully and 
contemplate their writing, but modern essayists, writing as they do for a much greater readership 
with much less leisure time, are forced to start writing “as close to the top of the sheet as 
possible, judging precisely how far to go, when to turn, and how, without sacrificing a hair’s-
breadth of paper, to wheel about and alight accurately upon the last word his editor allows” 
(218). Consequently, Woolf insists, modern essayists “must masquerade” so as to “draw out of 
harm’s way anything precious that might be damaged by contact with the public, or anything 
sharp that might irritate its skin. And so if one reads Mr. Lucas, Mr. Lynd, or Mr. Squire in the 
bulk, one feels that a common greyness silvers everything” (219-220). This is as much a critique 
of the reading public as of the middlebrow, so that what rests at the heart of her essay is the 
intimate relationship between reader and writer. Readers are asked to become more active and 
demand something more from their essayists, but also to accept writing that may irritate their 
skin. The middlebrow essayist is asked to stop writing the “common man” into a bland and 
confined and commodified existence by writing with personality and in spite of possible 
irritation. “We have no more the ‘I’ of Max [Beerbohm] and of [Charles] Lamb,” Woolf 
concludes, distinguishing that writer’s voice from the arid “I” of A Room of One’s Own, in 
whose shadow nothing whatever can grow (90), through her invocation of a personalized “I” 
who experiences art for and by itself, free from the limitations of a constructed communal 
identity. The contrast is thus “the ‘we’ of public bodies and other sublime personages. It is ‘we’ 
who go to hear the Magic Flute; ‘we’ who ought to profit by it; ‘we’ in some mysterious way, 
who, in our corporate capacity, once upon a time actually wrote it. For music and literature and 
art must submit to the same generalisation or they will not carry to the farthest recesses of the 
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Albert Hall” (220). This “we” attempts to define what should be read and how it should be read 
through a common and restricting denominator. 
While “The Modern Essay” focuses on the relationship between essayist and reader and 
asks the common reader to acknowledge his position in cultural production, “Reviewing” 
promotes reader agency through the strategic exclusion of the reader, thereby marking their 
current absence in cultural production. The essay focuses on the relationship between artist and 
reviewer, and Woolf again returns to the middlebrow’s strange passion for being “seen” in order 
to make her argument. Comparing the writing process in the literary marketplace to working in a 
tailor’s shop, Woolf asserts writers must “work under the curious eyes of reviewers,” who ill-
content to “gaze in silence…comment aloud upon the size of the holes, upon the skill of the 
workers, and advise the public which of the goods in the shop window is the best worth buying” 
(204). Such a practice has the result, Woolf argues, of transforming the reviewer into a louse 
whose job it is to entertain the public by deriding the writer and by pandering to the public. Far 
more could be accomplished with private reviews, according to Woolf, as, out of the public eye, 
the reviewer “would speak honestly and openly, because the fear of affecting sales and of hurting 
feelings would be removed. Privacy would lessen the shop-window temptation to cut a figure, to 
pay off scores. The [reviewer] would have no library public to inform and consider; no reading 
public to impress and amuse” (212). Woolf seems to ride roughshod over the public in this 
passage, as she casts them as gaping fools staring blankly at the showmanship of the reviewer. 
Indeed, Patrick Collier notes that Woolf vacillated “between the poles of a deep respect for the 
audience’s claims and a more pessimistic view of the public that led her to flirt with writing only 
for her coterie of friends and colleagues,” and suggests that this essay “ultimately shuts out the 
book-buying public” (76). Collier has a point: the public is rarely mentioned in this essay. But to 
	
 130 
believe with Collier that Woolf positions the public as relatively meaningless to the production 
of art is to neglect the strong compliment she pays the public when, after noting that the demands 
of the literary marketplace force the reviewer to act first this part and then that in order to please 
an audience, she writes: “Now the public though crass is not such an ass as to invest seven and 
sixpence on the advice of a reviewer writing under such conditions; and the public though dull is 
not such a gull as to believe in the great poets, great novelists, and epoch making works that are 
weekly discovered under such conditions” (209). A back-handed compliment if ever there was 
one, but what it acknowledges is both the role readers can play in cultural production within the 
literary marketplace and their complete absence in the economy of reviewing that, like it or not, 
has a profound influence on what culture is produced. The reviewer cares nothing for the actual 
reader; instead his performance is aimed at the “common man,” to whom the reviewer pitches 
works that will make them proper cultural citizens. It is the public, facetiously mocked in 
Woolf’s humourous rhyming, who has the last laugh however. They have the seven and sixpence 
to spend in the literary marketplace, and they should demand more, she tells them, than an 
affected reiteration of the “common man.” 
 Woolf, therefore, defines reader agency in the literary marketplace of early-twentieth 
century England partly in terms of the buying potential that defines their relationship to writers. 
Woolf was not naïve enough to believe that one could exist outside or escape culture: again and 
again in her works readers are asked to recognize that as individuals they are always intertwined 
in a complex network of power relations where position matters immensely. The choices readers 
make concerning how they position themselves in the marketplace, how they choose to spend 
their seven and sixpence, and thus interact with it, make a tangible difference in the reality of the 
marketplace. They should neither read by a system in order to become a professional, as some 
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highbrows advocated, nor should they buy those books one most wants “seen” on one’s 
bookshelf, as the middlebrow advocated. Rather readers should shun the posturing and 
affectation of the critic who writes for an imaginary “common man,” and choose a position 
within the literary marketplace from which they, and only they, can decide how to spend their 
seven and sixpence. And, by doing so, readers can change the landscape, however incrementally, 
of the literary marketplace by making it reflect the personal desires of a self-conscious and self-
fashioned “I” rather than the desires of a louse-ridden, limited conception of the “common man” 
and his culture based on conspicuous consumption and being seen. 
Woolf’s construction of and faith in the common reader is not just a commitment to 
active cultural participation, but also a theory of subjectivity that acknowledges the 
intersectionality and relationality of identities caught at the cross-roads and thresholds of diverse 
cultural, historical, and personal narratives, and that resists a normalizing discourse of exclusion. 
These are the identities she traces in her fiction and theorizes in her critical work through 
analyses of the institutions that work to mould bodies and minds, and to exclude others. Such 
institutional spaces are met by the textual space created relationally by the common reader and 
the modernist writer. Jacob Flanders in Jacob’s Room (1922) becomes representative of the 
young men interpellated by the traditions of Oxbridge and who make material the ideology of 
patriarchal capitalism and its cultural exclusions, as he fails to engage meaningfully with the 
discourses that shape his identity. In contrast, Septimus Smith’s practices as a common reader 
position him as an outsider to the educational systems that mould Jacob, as well as an outsider to 
the ruling class that is the focus of Woolf’s critique in Mrs Dalloway (1925). In this role, he 
demonstrates his lack of access to institutions that determine—as in Jacob’s experience—the 
bodies that come to control cultural and social capital. His trauma is produced by such systems, 
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and then his mad body is policed by the medical establishment and Dr Bradshaw who, as a 
representative of the state, attempts to position Septimus as a scapegoat to further legitimate the 
nation’s and his own discursive power over madness and mad people. These disciplined male 
bodies inform the unease that is evident in the lecturer-narrator’s position in A Room of One’s 
Own (1928), where the common theme of the individual’s relationship to the group, and its 
institutions and expectations, is made manifest through the speaker’s address to a woman’s 
college at Oxbridge. The lecturer’s thesis regarding the necessity of social and economic capital 
is a way to position herself in connection to that group, but she complicates an easy identification 
with a collective through the theory of the androgynous mind that maintains her autonomy as an 
“I” but in relation to a “we.” An intersectional, multiply-positioned speaker is evident also in 
Three Guineas (1938), which represents one of Woolf’s most overt critiques of patriarchal 
capitalism and the educational and political institutions that entrench its power. Against such 
discursive systems, Woolf enacts a textual strategy that calls for the common reader and their 
labour. The text’s formal and stylistic complexities—in particular, its blurring of the boundaries 
between the personal and the public, or the private letters between people and the larger 
discourses and forces that frame such correspondence—makes overt the primary reader’s, the 
imagined readers’, and the speaker’s critical deficiencies, positioning them as subjects and 
objects that may resist systems of inclusion and exclusion towards a truly common and 
interpersonal cultural exchange. 
Indeed, Woolf’s figuration of the common reader connects powerfully to the political 
strategy she presents in Three Guineas, where the same sense of individual choice and 
positioning anchor her conceptualization of the Society of Outsiders. The main distinction 
between the Society of Insiders and the Society of Outsiders, she writes, is that “whereas [the 
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Society of Insiders] will make use of the means provided by your position—leagues, 
conferences, campaigns, great names, and all such public measures as your wealth and political 
influence place within your reach—we, remaining outside, will experiment not with public 
means in public but with private means in private” (239). In the context of Three Guineas, such 
experimentation means choosing not to perform those public displays of power connected to 
patriarchal militarism and to the “Mulberry Tree” (190), a clear echo of the rejection of 
conspicuous consumption associated with the middlebrow; but it is also a troubling of the 
capital, both cultural and socioeconomic, one may accrue through the institutions of the 
professional class. This political strategy compares to the reading strategy Woolf advocates for 
the common reader in the literary marketplace: for outsiders, “to be passive is to be active” 
because in “making their absence felt their presence becomes desirable” (245), and Woolf’s 
common reader demonstrates a politics of presence through absence by refusing to perform the 




“To see what the other side means”: Woolf’s Bildungsroman of the Patriarchal Machine 
The common reader models a theory of subjectivity that focuses on both the buying and 
reading strategies of readers within the discourse of the “battle of the brows” that shapes the 
literary marketplace, and, as figured in Woolf’s fiction, such a reading position offers an 
estranged perspective not merely on the debates surrounding writing, reviewing, buying, reading, 
and interpreting literature in the early twentieth century, but also—and especially—on the 
patriarchal traditions and institutions that inform the structures and stakes of these disputes. For 
example, in Jacob’s Room (1922) Jacob’s battle is not against a fate randomly assigned: his end 
is propelled forward by his participation, and the participation of so many others, in patriarchal 
institutions that promise to create autonomous individuals ready to change the world but, in 
reality, produce disciplined subjects ready to serve institutional ends. Thus, it is the patriarchal 
machine that Woolf approaches in Jacob’s Room through a narrator who enacts the dynamic 
figured by the common reader and by the Outsider alike. In the novel, Woolf explores systems of 
inclusion and exclusion from the outside, presenting Jacob as a cultural artefact positioned within 
the patriarchal machine, and presenting the narrator as a common reader whose agency in the 
modern era represents a strategic riposte to Jacob’s uncritical participation in the rituals of the 
cultural institutions he moves through in his short life. The novel represents Woolf’s own refusal 
to perform the reading, writing, and above all the legitimation of patriarchy as expected, but it is 
Jacob’s engrained inability to do the same that marks the power of the “I” cultivated by 
Cambridge. A Bildungsroman that foregrounds not individual agency but the interpellating 
power of a class and gender ideologies, and ultimately a tragedy in terms of its depiction of the 
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title character’s truncated existence as a subject to patriarchy, the novel represents a curated, 
critical presentation of cultural systems predicated upon the entrapping norms of inclusion. 
In her memoir A Sketch of the Past (1939), Virginia Woolf mentions reading her cousin 
H.A.L. Fisher’s autobiography, and she asks herself what effect his privileged access to 
England’s educational and governmental institutions had on his life and career. Fisher had been a 
civil servant much of his life, having served as a commissioner to India, as Vice Chancellor of 
the University of Sheffield, as a Member of Parliament for Sheffield, and as the President of the 
Board of Education during David Lloyd George’s Premiership, yet Woolf’s comments focus less 
on his achievements than on the social institutions that helped provide the opportunity for those 
achievements: 
What, I asked myself, […] would Herbert have been without Winchester, New 
College and the Cabinet? What would have been his shape had he not been 
stamped and moulded by that great patriarchal machine? Every one of our male 
relations was shot into that machine at the age of ten and emerged at sixty a Head 
Master, an Admiral, a Cabinet Minister, or a Warden of a college. It is as 
impossible to think of them as natural human beings as it is to think of a carthorse 
galloping wild maned and unshod over the pampas. (Moments of Being 153) 
Woolf spent her entire life surrounded by men who were cast into this “great patriarchal 
machine”: her father, her brothers, her husband, and most of her male Bloomsbury friends had 
gone from English boarding schools to Cambridge, and many, at some point during their lives, 
filled either a governmental or academic position in England’s educational and political 
establishment. Moreover, from Arthur’s Education Fund (Three Guineas), to Shakespeare’s 
sister (A Room of One’s Own), to Jacob’s feeling of being the rightful inheritor and protector of 
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English culture at Cambridge (Jacob’s Room), Woolf’s work is full of examples that demonstrate 
men’s privileges within England’s social structures. And yet Woolf’s criticisms of male privilege 
and the institutions that shape and maintain this privilege are always more sympathetic than they 
are envious. This sympathy for the men cast into the “patriarchal machine” finds its most 
succinct expression in A Room of One’s Own when, having been scolded for walking on the 
grass at Oxbridge and denied access to its library because of her gender, its narrator reveals, “I 
thought how unpleasant it is to be locked out; and I thought how it is worse perhaps to be locked 
in” (21). These words echo through Woolf’s comments about her cousin Herbert Fisher: what 
must it be like, she asks, to be stamped and moulded by England’s patriarchal machine? To have 
one’s life trajectory decided by one’s gender? Such questions are integral to Woolf’s work, for, 
whether her focus is on women’s exclusion from England’s social institutions or on men’s 
inclusion therein, it is the unnaturalness of the lives produced by England’s patriarchal 
institutions that is revealed in so much of her writing. 
 This chapter examines the unnatural life of Jacob Flanders, a young man who seems not 
to want the life he inherits when he goes to Cambridge yet is so unable to escape the patriarchal 
ideologies he learns at this institution that he becomes little more than an absence at the centre of 
Jacob’s Room. Woolf’s first extended experimental work, Jacob’s Room is a Bildungsroman that 
follows the life of Jacob Flanders as he grows from childhood to young adulthood before dying 
in the Great War. Like so many heroes of Bildungsromans past, Jacob is well-positioned socially 
to make his emergence into manhood, yet the novel provides less the roving adventures of a 
young man overcoming adversity than the story of a young man largely subsumed by the 
educational tradition he finds himself within when he goes to Cambridge. In the majority of 
Bildungsromans, Mikhail Bakhtin notes, the protagonist is presented as a “ready-made” hero 
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whose character remains stable throughout the novel and who changes the world around him for 
the better as he passes through it (20), while in a smaller number of Bildungsromans time 
becomes an important part of the hero’s development so that he “emerges along with the world 
and he reflects the historical emergence of the world itself” (23). Inasmuch as Jacob’s 
development fits neatly into either of these two typical growth patterns, it fits more neatly into 
the latter, but Jacob’s historical emergence is cut violently short because it coincides with a 
world emerging into the industrialized death made possible by the Great War’s technology and 
deemed permissible by the patriarchal traditions that supported and propagated patriotic notions 
of sacrifice and honour. As she describes Jacob and his friends at Cambridge, the narrator’s blunt 
assertion that “there is no need to think of them grown old” (32) serves as a fitting refrain for her 
protagonist who emerges, along with the world, into death. Yet Woolf’s decision to create a 
doomed young protagonist is important because it helps shift the narrative focus from the 
individual subject being formed to the processes behind the formation of the subject. Jacob’s 
Room, that is to say, is less about the man Jacob transforms into than it is about the traditions that 
shape and discipline him as a subject of patriarchal ideology. Jacob becomes the ceaselessly 
vanishing ground of the great patriarchal machine in Woolf’s Bildungsroman, and those things 
that are supposed to transform him into an individual—Cambridge, the Grand Tour, and finally 
the military—only obscure Jacob further by submerging his character within their patriarchal 
traditions and ideologies.  
 While Jacob is obscured within traditions and institutions he is scarcely able to see 
beyond, the narrator of Jacob’s Room, “Granted ten year’s seniority [over Jacob] and a 
difference of sex” (74), has been excluded from England’s patriarchal institutions and chooses a 
narrative form to accentuate the unnaturalness of Jacob’s life within these places by relying 
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mostly on the accounts of other women outsiders. The narrator is less a biographer of Jacob’s 
experiences or stenographer of his thoughts than she is the organizer of the impressions Jacob 
leaves upon the mostly female subjectivities that focalize the narrative in Jacob’s Room. The 
impressions of these women are often dubious according to the narrator, who frequently 
intervenes in the text to complain about the quality of the scraps of information these women 
provide about Jacob, yet they represent an intersectional form of narration that, by juxtaposing 
institutional outsiders and insiders, presents a layered view of Jacob that is not limited to his 
perception of reality. This layering of voices subverts the common Bildungsroman mode of 
narration that relies on an authoritative subjectivity to centre the text, for the narrator denies her 
Bildungsroman an “I” that might positively distort and justify patriarchal hegemony. Like a 
museum curator, then, the narrator constructs Jacob’s story by organizing disparate pieces of his 
life into an exhibit for our perusal. The narrator’s curatorial approach to narration captures a 
single moment of time in Jacob’s life while simultaneously acknowledging the apparent 
timelessness of the institutions he exists within, an approach to temporalizing Jacob that helps 
reveal how the actions of one individual are connected to the ideologies that shape his existence.  
 When Jacob’s Room was published in 1922, its initial reviewers focused primarily on the 
layering of voices in the text, many arguing that the novel fails to tell a choate narrative and 
represents Woolf’s modernist vanity and sensibilities more than anything else. This is not to 
suggest that Jacob’s Room received no critical praise for its formal innovation, just that any 
praise it did receive was tempered equally with questions concerning the literary usefulness of 
her innovations. Most reviewers examined the usefulness of Woolf’s style by comparing it to 
visual art, but most ended up proclaiming the novel a failed experiment. Rebecca West, for 
example, praised Woolf’s craftsmanship by comparing the novel to an artist’s portfolio filled 
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with individual sketches, but she suggested that Jacob’s Room privileged form over the 
exploration of humanity and demonstrated “that [Woolf] is at once a negligible novelist and a 
supremely important writer” (101). W. L. Courtney made the visual art comparison more bluntly, 
writing that “To be impressionist is often to be incoherent, inconsequent, lacking all design and 
construction” (105). And Courtney’s focus on Woolf’s failure as the maker or shaper of the text 
was mirrored by many other early reviewers. Arnold Bennett most famously levied complaints of 
Woolf’s intervention in the novel in his review of Jacob’s Room, “Is the Novel Decaying,” in 
which he argued that moderns like Woolf forgo creating characters in their novel because they 
“are so busy with states of society as to half forget that any society consists of individuals, and 
they attach too much weight to cleverness, which is perhaps the lowest of all artistic qualities” 
(113). Bennett’s position was hardly new, however. Gerald Gould made much the same 
argument in his review months earlier when the wrote “to stress one’s own cleverness by a sort 
of humorous indulgence toward one’s creations, and to leave the simple-minded reader guessing 
at connexions which might just as well be made clear for him, is a positive injury to art” (106). 
This charge of elitism was also leveled by Courtney, once again more bluntly: “Mrs Woolf 
confidently chatters as though she were seated in an armchair playing with her puppets. It is she 
who gives them life. It is she who imparts to them such character as they are allowed to possess” 
(104). The discourse of the Great Divide is evident in many of these comments, as reviewers 
accuse Woolf of elitist cleverness to suggest the work is written for none but a small coterie of 
highbrow readers, but contained within their focus on Woolf’s formal failures is a key to 
understanding the difficulty of Jacob’s Room.  
 Woolf knew from the time she conceived of Jacob’s Room that its form would need to be 
innovative in order to achieve her aims for the novel, and she wondered privately in her diary 
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whether she was skilled enough to manage the project effectively. Imagining what the novel’s 
form would be before she even had a subject for it, Woolf wrote in her diary that her goal was to 
create a novel in which “one thing should open out of another” before asking “doesn’t that give 
the looseness & lightness I want: doesnt [sic.] that get closer & and yet keep form & speed, & 
enclose everything, everything?” (Diary 2, 13). It’s difficult to know precisely what Woolf 
means when she suggests that one thing should open out of another, but it’s clear that she is 
searching for a form unlike the weighty descriptive materialism of the Edwardians she critiqued 
in “Charcter in Fiction,” where she argues that the Edwardians have not provided her generation 
with the tools they needed to create modern fiction because they “laid an enormous stress on the 
fabric of things” and have thereby “given us a house in the hope that we may be able to deduce 
the human beings who live there” (432). There’s a heaviness, a permanence, that exists in 
Edwardian materialism, therefore, that Woolf abandons to create a form capable of capturing 
looseness, lightness, and speed. Rather than telling her readers where and how her characters 
live, Woolf aims to express why they live the way they live—what motivates their decisions, 
what limits their experiences, what influences their perceptions. The goal of Woolf’s writing, in 
other words, is psychological realism, not so much the accurate presentation of her character’s 
material existence but the presentation of characters shaped by their material existence. Thus, in 
1920—two years before she published Jacob’s Room, and three years before she accused the 
Edwardians of giving readers a house rather than characters—she wrote in her diary that her next 
novel would be completely different than anything she’d written before, for it was to have “no 
scaffolding; scarcely a brick to be seen; all crepuscular, but the heart, the passion, humour, 
everything as bright as a fire in the mist” (Diary 2, 13-14). Woolf not only abandons the master’s 
tools but also disassembles his house to show him, finally, what lives within. Her characters will 
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not appear in the bright light of midday, however, but in the twilight of the evening, when all 
things become indefinite shadows backlit by the reds and oranges of the setting sun. The physical 
details of her characters, Woolf intimates, are less important than the light in which one sees 
them.  
 Positioning her characters in this way allows Woolf to focus on them less as individual 
characters than as the subjects of social institutions, her fiction becoming an examination of the 
ideologies that hail her characters and, when answered, shape and define their lives rather than 
the creation of characters who transform their world through individual heroism or greatness. For 
Louis Althusser, ideology “represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence” (1350) and constitutes an illusion that people use to make sense of their 
existence and determine their actions. In the example of his cultural protectionism, Jacob is 
hailed by the privileges he enjoys at Cambridge and, imagining he and his friends are the rightful 
inheritors of England’s cultural and intellectual traditions, goes to burn the moderns on the altar 
of these traditions. In doing so, Jacob and his friends also demonstrate that “Ideology has a 
material existence” that is constituted by and constitutive of the subjects interpellated by an 
ideology (Althusser 1352), for the young men reinforce their subject positions by metaphorically 
destroying modern writers, which in turn reifies the protectionist ideology they serve. Jacob’s 
Room is less a story about one young man’s coming of age at Cambridge, therefore, than it is the 
story of the various social institutions that shape his life. Thus, as Edward L. Bishop argues, the 
text is not interested in “representing character” but in “exploring […] the construction, and 
representation of, the subject” (148). “Don’t palter with the second rate. Detest your own age. 
Build a better one” (Woolf, JR 85): these are the interpellative hails Jacob answers on his 
excursion to the British Library, calls from an ideology that promise him inclusion in a 
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patriarchal educational institution that provides its members life-long economic, legal, and 
governmental privilege.  
 Of course, Jacob never really gets to take full advantage of the economic, legal, and 
governmental privilege being a Cambridge graduate confers because the very same patriarchal 
ideology that is meant to grant him a place in the world ends up sending him to the Great War 
that cuts his life short. Jacob’s ironic reversal of fate from the inheritor of patriarchal power to 
cannon fodder in the Great War has formed the central focus of most critical interpretations of 
Jacob’s Room. Discussing expectations about character, Bishop suggests that readers often look 
to “attribute the cause of events to characters rather than to other circumstances in the situation” 
(148), but this expectation goes unfulfilled with Jacob because his motivations are not apparent, 
resulting in a “slight sense of dislocation” that derives from the fact that he “seems continually 
impinged upon” (149). Bishop associates Jacob’s continual impingement with a lack of freedom 
that persists throughout his short life, and compares Jacob to a crab the boy catches in a bucket in 
the novel’s opening scene. The crab, “trying with its weakly legs to climb the steep side; trying 
again and falling back, and trying again and again” (Woolf, JR 9), metaphorically represents 
Jacob, Bishop argues, but the image “is more of a motif than a method of characterization” 
inasmuch as the image “is the text associating Jacob with entrapment and death rather than 
anything in his character deciding his fate” (151). And Jacob’s own entrapment is often 
metaphorically extended to the entire generation of young European men who lost their lives in 
the Great War, particularly since his last name is Flanders. Alex Zwerdling, for example, argues 
that Jacob’s Room initiates a “covert critique of the romantic posturing so common in the 
anthems for doomed youth” (73) in order to reveal that Jacob’s youth is doomed by a patriarchal 
establishment that, rather than providing him a comfortable, privileged life, “sends him off to 
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war instead” (74). Likewise, Christine Froula describes Jacob Flanders as “at once an elusive 
being no net of words can capture and […] a puppet moved hither and thither by fate, one of the 
war dead, a ghost” (63). Froula, Zwerdling, and Bishop all point toward a paradox that underpins 
Jacob’s life: as Froula so succinctly points out, Jacob is both an “elusive being” and the “puppet” 
of a patriarchal ideology that pervades English social institutions—literally an everyman whose 
last name commemorates all of England’s dead yet, at the same time, an unknowable product of 
the patriarchal machine. 
 Woolf presents this central paradox in Jacob’s life formally using free indirect discourse 
and a narrator who not only shifts perspectives at will but also takes up different subject 
positions as a metanarrative character depending on the events she is narrating and the 
participants in the event. This complex narration has been theorized in a number of different 
ways in the past, but my theorization of Jacob’s Room’s curatorial narrator draws, in particular, 
on the work of Froula, Kathleen Wall, and Pamela L. Caughie. Froula refers to the narrator of 
Jacob’s Room as an “essayist-narrator,” which she characterizes as an invention of Woolf’s that 
allows her to examine her subject without directly embodying his voice. Froula argues that this 
essayist-narrator creates a formal freedom that allows Woolf to explore Jacob from a number of 
different subject positions, the result being a novel in which “Woolf does not tell Jacob’s story 
but unwrites it to expose the social forces that initiate him into masculinity and leave him dead 
on the battlefield” (69). Froula’s essayist-narrator, therefore, does not occupy a single subject 
position in relation to the text, but is able to shift and examine people, institutions, and events 
from many perspectives, often choosing a position that subverts Jacob’s story. Wall also notes 
the slipperiness of the narrator’s subject position, pointing out that Woolf employs a figure that is 
both outside the text inasmuch as she “possesses the authority of the omniscient narrator or 
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narrator-focalizer,” and inside the text inasmuch as she is, at times, “a character-focalizer who 
functions simply as a witness” of the events in the novel (289). The effect of this dual positioning 
is a work in which the narrator creates the text while also commenting upon the text as she 
creates it, a strategy that allows her, “through the use of vivid, composed descriptive passages 
which resemble verbal paintings […], to create both a momentary timelessness and an almost 
tragic fall back into time, in order to fix images of Jacob and of his world in her text” (283). 
Woolf’s form supports her elegiac intent according to Wall because it allows her to memorialize 
the dead without memorializing the war by juxtaposing the timeless, aestheticized fragments of 
Jacob’s life with the historic time period that led him and so many other young men to war. Such 
an emphasis on time and on moment intersects with what Caughie suggests is the narrative 
uncertainty of Jacob’s Room, which, rather than being Woolf’s way of pointing out the 
unreliability of individual perspective, emphasizes “the observer’s situatedness, both the 
narrator’s and the characters’ in relation to Jacob and the readers in relation to the narrative. 
Knowledge of another is not relative to each individual but to certain perspectives and 
relationships” (69). For Caughie, the narrative difficulty of Jacob’s Room is connected to the 
positioning and repositioning of the narrator, for as she shifts positions in the text she highlights 
different aspects of Jacob and her characters depending on where she stands and how she 
chooses to position herself in relation to these characters. The reader, too, is taken into account 
when the narrator chooses a narrative position because how she chooses to relate herself to the 
text influences how she presents the material. Sometimes very earnest while other times 
irreverent and even dismissive of her characters, the narrator’s position—especially because she 
makes a habit of making her position overt—always asks readers to decide on their own position 
within the fragment they are reading. Thus, as Caughie points out, “Jacob changes shape, not 
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because the modern (or postmodern) self is unstable, and not because the modern (or 
postmodern) character is unreal, but because the narrator changes roles” (69). To read Jacob’s 
Room, then, is to constantly reassess where one stands in relation to the characters, the narrator, 
and the events taking place, for the narrator, like the narrator hostess in “Character in Fiction,” 
invites readers to explore the relationality between Jacob, the women passing through his life, 
and the institutions that shape his subjectivity, so the point of the novel becomes less about the 
limitations of perspective than about how perspectives change depending on one’s position.  
The significance of such shifting locations is evident in a fragment in which the narrator 
travels through the streets of London on her way to the Covent Garden Opera House. The 
passage begins with the narrator as flâneuse walking through the crowds of London commenting 
on random passers-by: it moves to the street-sweeping Mrs. Lidgett, who sits resting at the feet 
of the Duke of Wellington’s statue in St. Paul’s looking at the carved cherubs on the wall 
opposite (50); to the businessmen James Spalding and Charles Budgeon passing one another on 
omnibuses and each with “his own past shut in him like the leaves of a book known to him by 
heart” (49); to Mr. Sibley, the accountant, who sits late into the night transferring “figures to 
folios” from “a bunch of papers, the days nutriment slowly consumed by the industrious pen” 
(51). As in Woolf’s “Street Haunting,” the narrator revels in the movement, liveliness, and 
variety of the city streets, and when she gets to the opera house can hardly contain herself as she 
looks through the crowd trying to comment on everyone before admitting that “the observer is 
choked with observations” (53). To prevent the chaos this glut of observation brings, the narrator 
explains that a simple classification system has been designed using “stalls, boxes, amphitheatre, 
gallery” (53) to indicate who belongs where. However, this system still requires the narrator to 
choose where she sits: “Never was there a harsher necessity! or one which entails greater pain, 
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more certain disaster,” she explains, “for wherever I seat myself, I die in exile” (53). This death 
in exile comes because where one sits in the opera house both limits one’s perspective and 
influences the way the other boxes are viewed, but the narrator solves this problem by refusing to 
use just one narrative voice. By narrating in the aggregate, she limits herself to a certain view for 
a time, but each new situation of the narrator brings with it a new set of intersectional 
relationships that the reader must parse. The novel, therefore, continually dislocates readers 
using a difficult form that forces them to purposefully relocate themselves in each new fragment 
of the novel, and through this realignment process readers play a creative role—the role played 
by Woolf’s ideal “common reader”—as they determine how each new situation alters their view 
of the narrator, characters, and events. 
 I draw from all these ideas in my theorization of the narrator as a curator who provides 
artefact after artefact of Jacob’s life less as fragments meant to be pieced together to present 
Jacob, and more as an exhibit that represents, aesthetically, historically, and culturally, what he is 
at various stages of his life. I use the word “what” rather than “who” because Jacob very rarely 
feels like an autonomous character in the novel: his thoughts are so rarely transcribed and so 
often filtered through the subjectivity of the narrator that he becomes an object for the reader to 
look at and examine rather than a character whose interests, desires, and goals drive him forward. 
Who Jacob is existentially, in other words, is largely irrelevant to Jacob’s Room, but this 
existential irrelevance does not mean that Jacob is insignificant. Indeed, by making Jacob so 
common for his class, Woolf highlights his importance to the ideologies he manifests materially 
through his actions, for Jacob becomes a conduit for these ideologies rather than an interesting 
character readers might look to as an agent of change in the world. An interesting man might 
journey out to Cambridge in search of an answer to some burning question that would improve 
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his life and the lives of the people around him, or he might go off to war for some reason that 
rises above rank notions of nationalism and duty. Jacob is unerringly average and does neither, 
going to Cambridge because his mother tells him he must and going to war because the 
patriarchal notions of manliness he learns at Cambridge tell him he should. And it is precisely his 
unmitigated averageness that makes Jacob useful to England in the lead up to a war between the 
nation states of Europe, for while he is no agent of change in the world, his unwavering 
adherence to the status quo makes him a valuable asset to the state and its institutions. Every now 
and then interesting men do interesting things that change the world, but the world, Woolf’s 
Bildungsroman reminds us, is shaped by Jacob and his kind: government, business, education, 
the law, all are shaped by the actions and performances of average, conventional men. The 
narrator’s exhibition of Jacob, therefore, is an ode to a most unremarkable man who, at each 
stage of his life, maintains the patriarchal establishment simply because, after many years in the 
patriarchal machine, he lacks the imagination to do anything other. She asks readers to 
contemplate what it means to eulogize men like Jacob as heroes by presenting him as a singular 
example of a cultural, historical, and aesthetic object that represents the millions of men who 
died in the Great War, but the narrator also never lets readers forget that men like Jacob made 
total war possible by not refusing to perform what they’d learned in Europe’s patriarchal 
institutions. 
 The figure of the narrator as curator is implicit in both the imagery of the novel and the 
artefacts that are displayed to mark Jacob’s progression through the patriarchal machine. Early in 
the novel, a then tourist-narrator visits Scarborough, the home of the Flanders family, and 
provides a brief recounting of her time in the city: she visits the Aquarium, goes to the pier 
where a “band played in the Moorish kiosk” (12), and takes a trip to the museum to see 
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“Cannon-balls; arrow-heads; Roman glass and a forceps green with verdigris” (12), all of which, 
as explained on a “little ticket with faded writing on it” (12), had been unearthed near the Roman 
fort on Dods Hill. Museums are places that simultaneously celebrate and collapse time. Taken 
from their temporal context, the artefacts in museums become timeless pieces of a historical 
collection, yet these artefacts are venerated precisely because they signify humankind’s 
achievements and the relentless march of human progress. Each artefact in a museum, that is to 
say, is a curio that reveals a single, static moment of time, but it is also one piece of a temporal 
spectrum that stretches back into the past and forward into the future to reveal how the passage 
of time effects humanity, consciousness, and being. As she leaves the museum the narrator asks 
“what’s the next thing to see in Scarborough?” (12), there is a section break, and we find Mrs. 
Flanders, who has climbed Dods Hill with her sons, sitting mending clothes near the Roman fort. 
The narrator, therefore, positions herself as the curator of the Flanders’ lives, specifically 
Jacob’s, a role that is unique in that it allows her the closeness to describe the fragments she 
includes and the distance to determine how the fragments will be exhibited. Each piece in the 
exhibit is chosen by her, but so too is the overarching narrative produced by the exhibit, so that 
Jacob’s Room is as much the narrator’s story as it is Jacob’s. Each static fragment she presents 
for the reader’s inspection constitutes one moment in Jacob’s life while simultaneously marking 
his progression through the patriarchal machine—one piece of a larger continuum that reveals 
the intersection between Jacob and the institutions he exists within. Because these fragments are 
constructed mainly by the voices of women who exist outside England’s patriarchal traditions, 
however, neither Jacob’s consciousness nor England’s patriarchal ideology are given authority 
over the text. Indeed, even the authority of the narrator is constantly in question as the fragments 
she must use to build her story are frequently interrogated for their veracity or, on occasion, 
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outwardly distrusted. The result is a text that insists on its own constructedness even while it is 
being constructed. And this constructedness begs our participation as readers because it demands 
we attend to how the narrator, characters, and events are situated within both the singular 
fragment and the curator’s exhibit as a whole. In short, Jacob’s Room is about storytelling more 
so than it is about Jacob. Certainly, Jacob’s is the life around which the narrator’s story 
coalesces, but by using outsider accounts not determined by the sacrosanct notions of national 
sacrifice propagated by England’s patriarchal institutions, the narrator eulogizes Jacob as not 
merely the victim of a patriarchal machine that delivers him to his death but as an active 
participant in the ideologies that fuel this machine. 
 Before young adulthood Jacob has little say in the way his life will proceed, for many of 
the decisions concerning his education and what university he will attend are decided for him by 
his mother and her social network. It is Mr. Polegate, of whom nothing is known save that he is 
an acquaintance of Captain Barfoot, who advises Captain Barfoot that there could be “nothing 
better than to send a boy to one of the universities” (20), and it is upon this recommendation that 
Jacob goes to Cambridge. Jacob’s entrance into the patriarchal machine, however, comes at age 
thirteen when he attends Rugby public school. There is little indication before this that Jacob 
takes much interest in school, for, of his Latin lessons with the clergyman who helps Mrs. 
Flanders by seeing to Jacob’s education before he goes to Rugby, Jacob says “Oh, bother Mr. 
Floyd!” (13). Jacob’s interests lie more in the outside world: collecting crabs on the beach and, 
even at Rugby, collecting butterflies. Nevertheless, when Mr. Floyd offers Jacob and his brothers 
a present each before leaving for another parish, “Archer chose a paperknife, because he did not 
like to choose anything too good; Jacob chose the works of Byron in one volume; John, who was 
still too young to make a proper choice, chose Mr. Floyd’s kitten, which his brothers thought an 
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absurd choice, but Mr. Floyd upheld him when he said: ‘It has fur like you’” (14). When Mr. 
Floyd then goes on to speak “about the King’s Navy (to which Archer was going); and about 
Rugby (to which Jacob was going)” (14) the boys’ choices become more meaningful. Archer’s 
simple paperknife is in keeping with the austere simplicity of military service, something Captain 
Barfoot has surely instilled in the boy over the years, and Jacob’s choice of Byron’s works is 
symbolic of the public school education that will initiate him into the patriarchy. Just twelve or 
thirteen in this passage, Jacob has already begun shaping an image of himself that fits the life 
chosen for him, despite the fact that this image seems ill-fitting to his personality and interests. 
Already becoming obscured by an education he is disinterested in, Jacob plays no role in the 
decision to attend Cambridge, for after hearing Mr. Polgate’s recommendation via Captain 
Barfoot, Mrs. Flanders makes the decision, which is relayed simply with the single sentence 
“Jacob Flanders, therefore, went up to Cambridge in October, 1906” (21). Preceded by a textual 
break like the ones Woolf uses throughout Jacob’s Room to separate the fragments in her text, 
and followed by a chapter break, this decision stands entirely apart from the rest of text. While 
isolating the passage seems to signify that Jacob’s entrance into Cambridge is a significant event 
in his young life, the conjunction “therefore” marks the inevitability of Jacob’s progress to 
Cambridge and connects the important decision to a letter from an unknown contact of Barfoot’s 
rather than to anything Jacob actually wants. 
 In addition to using her contacts to procure Jacob’s access to Rugby and then Cambridge, 
Mrs. Flanders works very hard to shape Jacob for success in the patriarchal machine by roughing 
away personality traits unnecessary to his future success. Described by his mother as an 
“obstinate” child (6) and the “only one of her sons who never obeyed her” (16), Jacob has a 
wandering spirit as a child and teenager that angers and concerns Mrs. Flanders in equal 
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measure. Mrs. Flanders is well acquainted with spirited men—her deceased husband Seabrook 
“had broken horses, ridden to hounds, farmed a few fields, and run a little wild” in his youth 
(10), and her brother Morty seems to have disappeared without a trace and is rumoured to have 
become a “Mohammedan” (28)—so she is resolute in her attempts to ensure her boys become 
responsible, productive men. These attempts begin with an inspiring, if somewhat revisionist, 
engraving on Seabrook’s tombstone that refers to him as a “Merchant of this city” (9) and is 
meant to serve as an “example for the boys” to follow (10). In reality Seabrook had only “sat 
behind an office window for three months” when he died (9), yet Mrs. Flanders is shrewd 
enough to know that “she had to call him something” on his tombstone (10) and chooses a label 
that gives her boys something to aspire toward by prioritizing Seabrook’s more conventional 
late-life achievements rather than his early life adventures. Concerning Jacob specifically, Mrs. 
Flanders focuses her attention on eliminating Jacob’s love of butterflies, which she finds 
worrisome because the hobby gets in the way of his responsibilities. Her worries are not 
misplaced. What little influence Jacob may have had on Mrs. Flanders’ decision that he will 
attend Cambridge is squandered because he is “after his butterflies as usual” (20) when Mrs. 
Flanders and Barfoot discuss Mr. Polegate’s letter. The night before the meeting, moreover, Mrs. 
Flanders chastises Jacob when he returns home at midnight from chasing butterflies because, 
firstly, there was what sounded like “a volley of pistol-shots” in the woods that night and she 
“thought something dreadful had happened” (16) and, secondly, because he wakes the maid, 
Rebecca, “who [has] to be up so early” (16). Mrs. Flanders, then, attempts to curtail Jacob’s 
butterfly chasing because she sees the activity as unproductive and inessential. More a pastime 
than something he can pursue as a career, this interest is extraneous to his future success and she 
begins shaping and moulding him before sending him to Cambridge where he will be hewed, 
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chiselled, and sanded down into a productive and disciplined member of the English social 
establishment.  
 Mrs. Flanders’s decisions demonstrate that her agency is limited inasmuch as it depends 
on her position within a social network that she works to maintain so that her sons may reap the 
benefits of her position. Since the death of Seabrook, Mrs. Flanders has been living in relative 
“poverty” (9), but she does have social connections that enable her to provide Jacob 
opportunities that will essentially guarantee him a place in the English social establishment. 
Using her connections and position to enhance her sons’ lives is a balancing act for Mrs. 
Flanders: she must be careful to advance their causes while closely monitoring how her own 
position will either aid or hinder their futures. Her careful positioning is necessary because, as 
Kathleen Dobie has pointed out, Mrs. Flanders, being a woman, is only able to accrue social 
status through her relationships with powerful men, thereby acting as a conduit that “merely 
transfers that status from educated and influential men to her sons” (196). For example, when she 
turns down a marriage proposal from Mr. Floyd, she justifies the decision to herself by 
remembering that she “had always disliked red hair in men” while justifying it to him by citing 
their age difference in a “motherly, respectful, inconsequent, regretful letter” (14). It is her 
youngest son, John, chasing geese through the yard that actually makes the decision for her 
though. Until John and the geese come rushing by, Mrs. Flanders is overtaken with emotion by 
Mr. Floyd’s letter, for her breast moves up and down as she leans “against the walnut tree to 
steady herself” while remembering Seabrook and looking “through her tears at the little shifting 
leaves against the yellow sky” (13). But in an instant the emotions Mrs. Flanders feels while 
reading the letter change to anger as she seizes hold of John, snatches the stick from his hand, 
and scolds the child, crumpling Mr. Floyd’s letter in the process and muttering “‘How could I 
	
 153 
think of marriage!’ […] to herself bitterly” (14). John’s intervention reminds Mrs. Flanders that 
any relationship she makes will adjust the relational network she is able to provide her children, 
so against Mr. Floyd’s marriage proposal she must weigh what access he would grant them to 
England’s social establishment and whether that access will be more gainful than what she and 
Captain Barfoot currently provide. After he and Mrs. Flanders decide that Jacob will go to 
Cambridge, Barfoot reveals that a councilman has recently resigned and when Mrs. Flanders 
asks “‘Then you will stand for Council?’” he responds, “‘Well, about that,’ […] settling himself 
rather deeper in his chair” (21). The fragment of their discussion ends here and leaves Barfoot’s 
personal involvement with the government frustratingly unclear, but the presumption of Mrs. 
Flanders’ question makes it apparent they have discussed Barfoot’s running for council before 
while his motion to make himself more comfortable suggests he sees Mrs. Flanders as a 
confidant. Captain Barfoot’s secondary connections to government are more than theoretical, 
however: his wife, Ellen, is the daughter of James Coppard, the “mayor [of Scarborough] at the 
time of Queen Victoria’s jubilee” who erected a fountain in her honour (17), and whose name is 
still “painted upon municipal watering-carts and over shop windows, and upon the zinc blinds of 
solicitors” (17). Through Barfoot, therefore, Mrs. Flanders offers her sons the best chance at 
becoming successful in England’s social establishment by providing them a ready-made social 
network that includes connections in the military, government, and academy. 
 Mr. Floyd’s social network, on the other hand, is smaller and offers Mrs. Flanders’ sons 
considerably less social leverage, and while she does not explicitly state that she rebuffs Mr. 
Floyd for calculated reasons, she is happy to have avoided the marriage when she discovers Mr. 
Floyd has taken a job as a school administrator in a small town. Mrs. Flanders finds out one 
morning as she sits reading the Scarborough and Harrogate Courier, and, looking around the 
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dining room at Rebecca and her sons eating breakfast, thinks about how “They were all alive 
[…] while poor Mr. Floyd was becoming the Principal of Maresfield House” (15). She then goes 
over to Topaz, the cat that used to belong to Mr. Floyd but that was gifted to John, and pets him: 
“‘Poor old Topaz,” said Mrs. Flanders, as he stretched himself out in the sun, and she smiled, 
thinking how she had had him gelded, and how she did not like red hair in men. Smiling, she 
went into the kitchen” (15). The pathetic language Mrs. Flanders uses to describe poor Mr. Floyd 
and poor old Topaz connects the two, and Topaz’s inability to reproduce sexually symbolizes 
Mr. Floyd’s social sterility, for, like his father before him, he is a small town clergymen able to 
grant only limited access to the English social establishment. Just as Topaz has grown old and “a 
little mangy around the ears” (15), Mr. Floyd’s social capital has suffered now that he has 
become the principal of a small school, so Mrs. Flanders is pleased she had the good sense to 
avoid tying her lot, as well as her sons’ lots, to Mr. Floyd’s progress. 
 For Mrs. Flanders, then, the primary value of a Cambridge education is the access it 
provides to the English social establishment, but this value is not shared by Jacob, who, shortly 
after he arrives at Cambridge, gets swept up in the belief that he has arrived at the centre of 
England’s cultural and intellectual heritage and begins to shape an identity around this position. 
Much of the novel involves Jacob’s experiences at Cambridge and plays with some of the stock 
conventions and episodes of university novels: Dons’ lunches, intellectual conversation with 
friends, and descriptions of Dons. There isn’t an overwhelming desire to get the descriptions of 
Cambridge “right” in Jacob’s Room, though, for the descriptions of Jacob come either from an 
essayist-narrator who seems never to have been to Cambridge and who at times consciously 
positions herself outside the university looking at the young men inside, or from random women 
Jacob encounters while he is at Cambridge. Thus, at the same time as Jacob tries desperately to 
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fashion an identity that accords with his new position as a Cambridge student, the narrator 
continuously unwrites this “I” by choosing and exhibiting fragments of Jacob’s life that 
undermine his attempts at actualization or that demonstrate his actualization is often little more 
than a performance of the rituals associated with Cambridge’s institutional patriarchal ideology. 
What Jacob’s Room does attempt to get right, therefore, is Jacob’s imaginary relationship to his 
changing material reality, but this process, rather than revealing Jacob as the heroic figure of his 
own adventure, reveals he is little more than a conduit for the patriarchal traditions of 
Cambridge. 
 Jacob’s meeting with Mrs. Norman, a middle-aged woman he shares a carriage with, is a 
good example of the way the essayist-narrator unwrites Jacob and the Bildungsroman form, for it 
reveals that the beginning of Jacob’s journey out, far from being heroic, is marred by banality 
and misconception. The meeting takes place as Jacob travels to Cambridge for his first college 
term, and should represent one of the defining events in the life of a Bildungsroman’s hero: the 
journey away from his childhood home into the greater world he will one day change for the 
better. If the hero’s journey should begin with a momentous event, however, then Jacob’s voyage 
out starts off rather slowly with Mrs. Norman “nervously but very feebly” reminding the 
“powerfully built” Jacob that their carriage is non-smoking (21). Believing that Jacob does not 
hear her, Mrs. Norman responds by checking her bag to find a “scent-bottle and a novel from 
Mudie’s,” and devises a plan should Jacob attack her: “She would throw the scent-bottle with her 
right hand, she decided, and tug the communication cord with her left. She was fifty years of age, 
and had a son at college. Nevertheless, it is a fact that men are dangerous” (21). Mrs. Norman’s 
fear of Jacob initiates what will be a rather inauspicious start for Jacob, who, rather than being 
borne gloriously toward his future by some prolific event or adventure, is borne to Cambridge in 
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a train carriage with a middle-aged woman who is afraid he might attack her. Jacob’s voyage out, 
then, is part of a comedic unraveling of the Bildungsroman form, for, as Judy Little argues, “the 
traditional male growth-pattern, full of great expectation, falls like a tattered mantle around the 
shoulders of the indecisive hero, heir of the ages” (229). From the off, Jacob’s is a story that 
suggests nothing great will come of its protagonist: there is no compulsion to growth, no grand 
reason for Jacob’s voyage out, only a letter from the friend of a family friend. 
 The limitations brought about by gender in this passage prevent the narrator from 
gleaning any valuable information about Jacob other than the status read onto him in the train 
carriage, so, as the narrator herself points out, Jacob becomes even more obscure in this fragment 
of his story. The signifying economy within the carriage becomes central to the passage as soon 
as Mrs. Norman chooses to “decide the question of safety by the infallible test of appearance” 
and stealthily steals glances at Jacob as they travel (21), but this test yields little information 
beyond the fact that he’s a loose-socked, shabby-tied young man reading the Daily Telegraph 
(21). Indeed, what each person reads becomes one of the only indicators of identity in the 
passage, for Mrs. Norman carries a book from Mudie’s, a “Popular circulating library, known for 
its strict moral standards in the selection of its books” (Brake and Demoor 21), and the Morning 
Post, a “Right-wing daily newspaper popular with retired officers” (21), whereas Jacob’s Daily 
Telegraph is an intellectually serious liberal-leaning paper “directed at a wealthy, educated 
readership” interested in politics and the arts (159). Of course, the reader already knows that 
Jacob is, for the most part, disinterested in intellectual pursuits, so his choice of newspaper seems 
to be a performance undertaken in an attempt to fit into his new role as a Cambridge student. The 
verisimilitude of this performance is also hinted at in this passage, as Mrs. Norman notes that, 
having lost interest in the paper, Jacob “looked up, past her” and “fixed his eyes—which were 
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blue—on the landscape” (21). Mrs. Norman has no way to know of Jacob’s general disinterest in 
education, however, and does the best she can with Jacob’s shabby clothing, the fact that he is 
travelling to Cambridge, and the Daily Telegraph to quickly assess that Jacob is similar to the 
son she is travelling to visit at Cambridge. In this fragment, therefore, Jacob becomes ever more 
indistinguishable at a time when his recent departure from home should allow his identity to 
become more definite and refined. Absent in all but what he wears and what he reads, Jacob once 
again escapes representation, a point the narrator brings to the reader’s attention when she 
interjects to explain that “Nobody sees any one as he is, let alone an elderly lady sitting opposite 
a strange young man in a railway carriage. They see a whole—they see all sorts of things—they 
see themselves” (22). In her own mind, Mrs. Norman goes from being a sexual object to being 
completely anonymous in mere moments, a transition predicated entirely on how she imagines 
herself in relation to the young man she shares a train carriage with. Consequently, Jacob’s 
indifference comes to guide the entire interaction and leaves the frustrated narrator with little to 
build upon but this indifference, which she does by noting that “since, even at her age, [Mrs. 
Norman] noted his indifference, presumably he was in some way or other—to her at least—nice, 
handsome, interesting, distinguished, well built, like her own boy?” (22). In the end, therefore, 
Jacob—into the world for the first time—is the ceaselessly vanishing ground of a gender 
performance that renders him indistinguishable from every other Cambridge undergraduate. But 
it is the equivocation in the narrator’s voice that is most telling here, for even she, the compiler 
of the exhibit she is constructing for the reader, must finally admit that Mrs. Norman’s 
deficiencies as a source of information are too many to draw an accurate description of Jacob. In 
the end, a presumption about Jacob’s assumed similarities to Mrs. Norman’s son based on what 
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she notices at her specific age is the sum total of the information the narrator is able to get from 
Mrs. Norman, so it seems it’s not only Jacob whose story has an inauspicious beginning.  
 The narrator doesn’t leave Jacob’s train carriage empty-handed, though, for her 
interaction with Jacob and Mrs. Norman, marred as it is by the latter’s deficiencies as a narrating 
consciousness, provides her opportunity to begin outlining the epistemology her exhibit will use 
to present Jacob. Following the narrator’s admission that Mrs. Norman’s description has more to 
do with her own personal circumstances than with Jacob, she explains that hers will not be a 
story of heavy exposition: “One must do the best one can with [Mrs. Norman’s] report. Anyhow, 
this was Jacob Flanders, aged nineteen. It is no use trying to sum people up. One must follow 
hints, not exactly what is said, nor yet entirely what is done—for instance, when the train drew 
into the station, Mr. Flanders burst open the door, and put the lady’s dressing-case out for her, 
saying, or rather mumbling: ‘Let me’ very shyly; indeed he was rather clumsy about it” (22). 
Woolf’s desire that in Jacob’s Rooom “one thing should open out of another” (Diary 2, 13) is 
fully realized in this passage. Jacob, it appears, has also been concerned with gender during this 
train ride, but the narrator lets a simple act of awkward chivalry as he exits the carriage reveal it. 
Rather than being completely indifferent to Mrs. Norman’s presence as she fears, Jacob’s 
clumsiness suggests an adolescent nervousness and lack of self-confidence in the presence of 
women, which isn’t surprising given Jacob attended an all-boys public school. Whether this 
shyness is caused by a general lack of familiarity with women’s company or the fact that he did 
indeed hear Mrs. Norman’s reminder about the non-smoking carriage is unclear, but it is clear 
that Jacob falls back on the conventions of chivalry to ease his discomfort. Both characters, 
therefore, resort to performances and norms of gender—Mrs. Norman to her chastity and Jacob 
to chivalry—to help them navigate the situation they’ve found themselves in, so what comes of 
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this first fragment in the narrator’s exhibit is naught but a conventional encounter between a 
conventional middle-aged woman and a conventional Cambridge undergrad. Thus, the narrator’s 
metanarrative intrusion about summing people up reminds readers that character, much more 
than simply the expression of an essential identity, is an accounting of many different factors 
such as gender, class, age, family, and, in this case, even travel destination. At the same time that 
her exhibit of Jacob insists upon this intersectionality, it never lets him come into complete focus 
by never allowing his consciousness, or indeed any one consciousness, centre the narrative, and 
the result is a formal framework that builds character piecemeal rather than creating a ready-
made character and loosing him on the world. Jacob’s is a continual process of becoming, but it 
is a becoming always narrated from the outside to ensure the focus remains on the institutions 
and ideologies that shape Jacob as he disappears within them.  
 The extent to which Jacob disappears into the university as well as the vast banality of his 
voyage out is made clear when he and Mrs. Norman leave the train carriage, for no sooner does 
Jacob step onto the platform than his memory fades into the signifying vacuum of Cambridge. 
Mrs. Norman almost asks her son about Jacob but stops because “As this was Cambridge, as she 
was staying there for the week-end, as she saw nothing but young men all day long, in streets and 
round tables, this sight of her fellow-traveller was completely lost in her mind, as the crooked pin 
dropped by a child into the wishing-well twirls in the water and disappears for ever” (22). Quite 
aside from the fact that he fails to make an impression in Mrs. Norman’s mind, Jacob almost 
fails to make an impression in this sentence. Lost among subordinate clauses that continually 
defer meaning, that shift the narrative emphasis ever further toward the institution at which he 
has arrived, that present him as the ceaselessly vanishing ground of his own life story, Jacob all 
but finally disappears. Into the patriarchal institution that will eventually convince him to 
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sacrifice his life ambles Jacob, the future victim of a war absurd in its pointlessness and 
grotesque in its voraciousness. One of many, many young men ambling toward this death, Jacob 
is not so much lost as he is subsumed by a signifying system that will quickly come to define 
him as he strives to become a Cambridge man.  
 The text introduces Cambridge immediately after Jacob’s train ride with Mrs. Norman, 
and in the passage the narrator imagines Cambridge as a fixed point of light in the darkness. This 
indicates that, for all the perceived beauty of the intellectual tradition it represents, the institution 
has the effect of establishing constitutive differences between insiders and outsiders. Cambridge 
acts as a guiding light for humanity in the narrator’s initial description of the university; indeed, 
after she notes that “the sky is the same everywhere” and that “Travellers, the ship-wrecked, 
exiles, and the dying draw comfort from the thought” of this consistency (22), she suggests there 
is something different about the sky above Cambridge. “Out at sea,” the narrator explains, “a 
great city will cast a brightness into the night. Is it fanciful to suppose the sky, washed into the 
crevices of King’s College Chapel, lighter, thinner, more sparkling than the sky elsewhere? Does 
Cambridge burn not only into the night, but into the day?” (22). Praising Cambridge in the form 
of questions rather than declarative statements indicates the narrator’s equivocation in presenting 
the city as a beacon of light that differs from other cities harkening people in from the darkness. 
Importantly, she doesn’t even ask whether or not the sky above Cambridge is actually different, 
but, instead, whether the act of supposing such a thing unduly romanticizes Cambridge as 
different. That Cambridge is a place to find knowledge, discover new ideas, and become 
enlightened does not seem under dispute in this passage; the narrator’s questions imply, instead, 
that this tradition has the potential to establish a dichotomy between those inside Cambridge’s 
light and those travellers and exiles outside who aspire towards this light. This division between 
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inside and outside is only strengthened when the narrator begins to describe the light inside 
King’s College Chapel. The stained glass of the chapel colours the outside light as it enters and 
shines upon the space within, and, “where it breaks upon stone, that stone is softly chalked red, 
yellow, and purple. Neither snow nor greenery, winter nor summer, has power over the old 
stained glass” (23). Once again, the beauty of the chapel, dappled in a mosaic of different 
coloured light, is not disputed by the narrator, but at the same time she presents this beauty 
askance by noting how the chapel’s windows change the outside light to ensure it does not 
disturb the inner sanctum of the chapel. An institution of control and discipline, the Church is not 
presented here as a force that prepares its congregation to confront the maelstrom outside. 
Rather, it is a building that buttresses them against the outside by ordering everything within. A 
final simile from the narrator makes this clear: “As the sides of a lantern protect the flame so that 
it burns steady even in the wildest night […] so inside the Chapel all was orderly” (23). Thus, at 
the same time as the stained glass windows are transforming the light from without, they are also 
protecting the light that shines within, thereby ensuring the enlightenment the Church provides 
will remain forever unmolested by the outside world. A closed system, the Church insists upon 
the threshold between inside and outside in order to construct a coherence within its walls that 
legitimizes its traditions and rituals. 
 Just as light is shaped and ordered inside the chapel, so too are the bodies of the people 
within. In particular, the boys participating in the church service appear more as statues that 
signify the majesty of the chapel and the Church’s traditions than as individual, complex people: 
“Look, as they pass into service, how airily the gowns blow out, as though nothing dense and 
corporeal were within. What sculptured faces, what certainty, authority controlled by piety, 
although great boots march under the gowns. In what orderly procession they advance” (23). 
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Critics have pointed out that the boys’ individuality is displaced by the disciplinary process that 
shapes them into Church figurines, but this displacement is generally imagined as the boys’ 
disappearance into the institution rather than as ideological embodiment. Jane De Gay notes that 
the young men in this passage seem to be “insubstantial” because “their gowns appear empty, 
reinforcing the anonymity and insignificance of the thousands who died in battle” (70). 
Similarly, William R. Handley focuses on Woolf’s use of the word “sculptured” to argue that 
“these young men, robbed of their bodies, become objects of war—but objects that, like war, 
have been rendered aesthetic” (120). Thus, their “lives serve as an exchange value for the status 
quo” inasmuch as they become commodities the patriarchal establishment exchanges to maintain 
their power (120). Being stripped of their individualities does not, however, make them 
“insubstantial” or “rob them of their bodies”—quite the opposite. The young men’s 
individualities are replaced in this instance by bodily performances that realize—that is, make 
real—the patriarchal ideology of the Church by bringing it into material existence. Rather than 
losing their bodies, these young men are embodied as representatives of the Church’s traditions 
because they wear its robes and march in orderly procession as they enact its rituals. Disciplined 
ideological subjects, they may have lost their individuality, but they have not become 
anonymous: if anything, indeed, they have become more substantial—in the sense of gaining 
agency within the English patriarchal establishment—as a result of their embodiment, for their 
actions connect them to a tradition that empowers men by legitimating patriarchal power.  
 That these young men are treated both as the victims of a patriarchal tradition that strips 
them of their individuality and as embodied members of that tradition is in keeping with the 
narrator’s uncertain view of Cambridge, and her unease with the young men’s enactment of the 
Church’s traditions is further indicated grammatically. The young men’s embodiment is most 
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evident in the phrase “as though nothing dense and corporeal were within” (23, emphasis 
added). Handley and De Gay seem to treat this clause as a simile that suggests there is nothing 
substantial underneath the airy gowns. However, the comma before this clause, which cuts it 
away from the rest of the sentence and makes it non-restrictive, and the use of the subjunctive 
“were” indicate this is not a simile so much as a sarcastic comment that the billowing gowns do 
not actually hide or distract attention from the all-too substantial bodies beneath. These 
grammatical subtleties transform the gowns from a veil that obscures the young men and makes 
them anonymous into a mask that hides the true power conferred when they embody the 
Church’s patriarchal traditions. It is with “certainty” and “authority” that these young men march 
in “orderly procession,” and the narrator draws our attention to the “great boots [that] march 
under the gowns” (23) because it is these boots that more accurately signify the underlying 
power of patriarchal institutions than the decorative gowns they wear to distract the eye. When 
Woolf revisits the issue of ceremonial dress almost twenty years later in Three Guineas, she 
points explicitly to the spectacular aspect of the military costumes of men, which are as 
disciplined as those who wear them: “every button, rosette and stripe seems to have some 
symbolic meaning” (134) and thus designates the achievements of each man to every other. All 
these baubles, Woolf goes on to explain, serve two primary functions. On one level, ceremonial 
clothing’s “splendour is invented partly in order to impress the beholder with the majesty of the 
military office, partly in order through their vanity to induce young men to become soldiers” 
(138). On another level, these costumes are ways “for educated men to emphasize their 
superiority over other people” and, along with adding titles before and letters after their names, 
constitute “acts that rouse competition and jealousy” by insisting upon difference (138). Clothing 
then becomes constitutive of difference: it marks those inside the tradition that the ceremonial 
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dress ritualizes and, just as importantly, those outside the tradition. Far from merely obscuring 
the young men by stripping them of their individuality, these sartorial signifiers add layer upon 
layer of ideological meaning to their bodies until they, too, symbolize and propagate the beliefs 
and traditions of patriarchal institutions. Put differently, the patriarchal ideologies of England’s 
institutions are made real by the clothing, rituals, and performances of these young men, who 
have become conduits of power rather than merely its victims. 
 Sartorial choices are also at issue when the narrator finally comes to mention Jacob and 
his objection to women attending the church service because their dresses break the illusion of 
the ideological ritual taking place before him. His disinterest in the service at King’s College 
Chapel is apparent: “Jacob looked extraordinarily vacant,” explains the narrator, “his head 
thrown back, his hymn book open at the wrong place” (23), and he believes that “if the mind 
wanders it is because several hats shops and cupboards upon cupboards of coloured dresses are 
displayed upon rush-bottomed chairs” (23). What distracts Jacob is the disorder the women’s 
dresses introduce into the orderly space of the chapel and the orderly dress of the Church’s 
institutional reproduction taking place at the service. The dresses ruin the illusion of the service 
for him, where their variety is juxtaposed with the conformity of the gowns worn by the young 
men participating in the Church’s rituals, and they remind him that there are outsiders permitted 
into the ceremony. The particular reason these outsiders upset Jacob has little to do with 
protecting the sanctity of the chapel as a physical space, however, for he is largely unconcerned 
they are in the chapel. Rather, his concerns veer more toward how their presence, and 
specifically their presence in colourful dresses, affects the chapel as an ideological space. 
Looking at the women, Jacob thinks that “Though head and bodies may be devout enough, one 
has a sense of individuals—some like blue, others brown; some feathers, others pansies and 
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forget-me-nots” (23). Their attention to fashion, which draws attention to individuality through 
clothing, does not adequately defer to the Church’s austere traditions according to Jacob; he 
chastises the women more for their refusal to take part in the Church’s performance of authority 
than for their presence in the chapel. Unlike the young men who walk together with ordered 
discipline and dress uniformly, the women’s dresses and less regulated movement signals to 
Jacob a misperformance in the structured production of the church service. He imagines that the 
results would be the same if one brought a dog to the service: “For though a dog is all very well 
on a gravel path, and shows no disrespect to flowers, the way he wanders down an aisle, looking, 
lifting a paw, and approaching a pillar with a purpose that makes the blood run cold with horror 
[…] a dog destroys the service completely” (23). The fact that Jacob imagines the women as 
male dogs scenting the pillars in the church with their urine reveals that he fears the women 
might ultimately corrupt the service by leaving their own individual impression on the 
proceedings in a deviation of the rituals that realize the protected patriarchal power of the 
institution. 
 Ideologically speaking, he has come a long way since arriving at the university. No 
longer the nervous young man who shared a train cabin with Mrs. Norman and remained quietly 
deferential to the older woman, Jacob has now begun to embody the cultural privilege that comes 
with a being Cambridge insider. He has begun to mark the threshold between being an insider 
and outsider, and has made these differences constitutive. Women, like dogs, destroy the service 
completely, and they are tolerated only because they are “separately devout, distinguished, and 
vouched for by the theology, mathematics, Latin, and Greek of their husbands” (24). The women 
are reduced to mere extensions of their husbands in Jacob’s assessment, and their husbands are 
also reduced to the fields of knowledge they have come to represent in the academy. To be an 
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insider, therefore, is to be validated, whether by virtue of being the wife of a professor or by 
virtue of having one’s contribution to a certain field of knowledge guaranteed by the academy. 
Once an insider, one is protected by a closed system of knowledge that ensures its coherence by 
demanding participants perform according to its rituals, traditions, and ideologies, so that what 
emerges in the academy is a never-ending production of knowledge that self-legitimates itself. 
Woven seemingly naturally into the academy’s studies, theses, and dissertations are the 
epistemic limitations of the academy itself, and to become an insider one must write, speak, and 
think within acceptable deviations of these limitations. This is not to say that these epistemic 
limitations are not useful or valuable, but it is to say that they create difference and make this 
difference constitutive: one is either an insider or an outsider in accordance with one’s ability to 
mirror the forms, structures, and methodologies deemed acceptable by the academy. What 
underlies Jacob’s vapid critique of the women at the church service, for instance, is an insistence 
upon difference that is largely built upon the structural and ideological foundations of an 
institution that privileges men by excluding women. It is almost inevitable that Jacob begins to 
rely on the threshold between insiders and outsiders to order his imaginary relationship to the 
material conditions of his existence. Jacob goes to classes in which he is surrounded by men, is 
taught exclusively by men, and studies knowledge created almost exclusively by men (apart from 
the rather marginalized Miss Umphelby). Little wonder, then, that Jacob imagines he is different 
than those outsiders who do not share these privileges.  
 While the narrator is hesitant about the social value of these institutions and, from the 
Outsider’s position, points out both their advantages and their flaws, Jacob is clear that access to 
the enlightenment Cambridge provides should be limited. The narrator’s opening passage on 
Cambridge suggests that the city is a beacon that calls the exiled and the shipwrecked in from the 
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darkness, but Jacob’s description of Cambridge as a source of light is much less flattering to 
those who are not citizens to begin with:  
If you stand a lantern under a tree every insect in the forest creeps up to it—a 
curious assembly, since though they scramble and swing and knock their heads 
against the glass, they seem to have no purpose—something senseless inspires 
them. One gets tired of watching them, as they amble round the lantern and 
blindly tap as if for admittance, one large toad being the most besotted of any and 
shouldering his way through the rest. (23) 
The ellipses that begin this description transition the reader to Jacob’s consciousness and initiate 
an image that is familiar to Jacob, who as a child and young man used a lantern to attract 
butterflies so he could examine them during midnight butterfly chases. That this image is 
connected to Jacob’s past experiences is made clear when he imagines that “A terrifying volley 
of pistol-shots rings out” when, in fact, it is just a tree that “has fallen, a sort of death in the 
forest” (23). This very event took place the night Jacob returned home late from chasing 
butterflies and was chastised by Mrs. Flanders, as that night Mrs. Flanders, too, heard the pistol-
shots of a falling tree. Jacob seems to connect this personal experience and the image he uses to 
understand the women’s presence at the church service based on his role as a voyeur, for in both 
instances, Jacob is participating in a categorization of the creatures that congregate around the 
lantern. At the church service, however, his categories seem less refined and more oppositional. 
He had noticed the “kidney-shaped spots of a fulvous hue” and “no crescent upon the 
underwing” of the butterflies he chased as a young man (16), yet at the church he insists the 
blues, browns, feathers, and forget-me-nots of the women’s dresses merely distract them, and 
him, from properly revering the service (23). The butterfly had circled round the lantern in a 
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flash then disappeared as quickly as it appeared (16); while watching the women, the bugs he 
imagines “knock their heads against the glass” as if “something senseless inspires them” to 
“blindly tap for admittance” (23). Jacob had marked each butterfly down in his guidebook, 
meticulously making notes when the guidebook had provided the wrong information (16); the 
women, on the other hand, are cast aside with the spurious question “why allow women to take 
part in [the service]” (23). The answer is delayed until Jacob dismisses it with “For one thing, 
thought Jacob, they’re as ugly as sin” (24). In short, Jacob can see the women only as outsiders 
trying to ruin his service. Having reduced gender to a simple dichotomy, due largely to the 
insider privilege he enjoys as a man of Cambridge, the women are as insects gathering round the 
light of Cambridge—a light their presence dims through the individuality they express during its 
rituals. The transformation of Jacob’s previous experience, from an activity that allowed Jacob to 
explore the complexity and diversity of the world to an image he uses to assert the threshold 
between those who belong and those who do not, reveals the extent to which Jacob’s ideological 
view has changed since coming to Cambridge. More than this, however, it reveals that Jacob is 
not merely a victim of a patriarchal ideology that insists on and amplifies differences in order to 
find coherence but a subject whose beliefs are beginning to be shaped by this ideology.  
 One of the women vouched for by her husband’s place in Cambridge is the focal point of 
a fragment in which Jacob and his friends attend a luncheon hosted by the Plumers. As Mrs. 
Plumer tries to ensure the luncheon is a success when Jacob arrives late, the narrator once again 
explores what role performance and participation plays in the legitimation of institutions. The 
entire scene is the group’s awkward attempt to feel comfortable in a situation that neither the 
Plumers nor the students seem particularly to enjoy, and Mrs. Plumer lets her frustration at 
Jacob’s tardiness come to the fore: “‘How tiresome,’ Mrs. Plumer interrupted impulsively. ‘Does 
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anybody know Mr. Flanders?’” (24). Her outburst brings forth an ashamed response from 
Durrant who “blushed slightly, and said, awkwardly, something about being sure—looking at 
Mr. Plumer and hitching the right leg of his trouser as he spoke,” while “Mr. Plumer got up and 
stood in front of the fire” (24). The men’s nervous fidgeting does not go unnoticed by Mrs. 
Plumer, the hostess of the luncheon and the one responsible for establishing a comfortable 
environment for her guests. To set everything in order once more, “Mrs. Plumer laughed like a 
straight-forward friendly fellow” (24), an action so awkward that the narrator feels the need to 
account for the awkwardness she is describing: “In short, anything more horrible than the scene, 
the setting, the prospect, even the May garden being afflicted with chill sterility and a cloud 
choosing that moment to cross the sun, cannot be imagined” (24). While just pages before the 
narrator had positioned herself sympathetically to the Cambridge wives who must live at the 
margins of the institution, she takes a more subversive position in this instance to question Mrs. 
Plumer’s participation in the rituals of an institution that marginalizes women and delegitimates 
their voices. It is not difficult to imagine a good many things more horrible than a tardy 
undergraduate, so the narrator’s hyperbole points out that both Mrs. Plumer’s initial annoyance 
and her awkward attempt to hide this annoyance are disproportionate responses to what is 
ultimately a rather mundane situation. This hyperbole and the irreverence it implies is continued 
when the narrator shifts her focalization to Mr. Plumer, who thinks as he cuts the mutton that 
“There can be no excuse for this outrage upon one hour of human life, save the reflection […] 
that if no don ever gave a luncheon party, if Sunday after Sunday passed, if men went down, 
became lawyers, doctors, members of Parliament, business men—if no don ever gave a luncheon 
party——” (24). His inability to complete his own conditional statements questions the 
relevance of the ritual being performed, but it also accentuates the role performativity plays in 
	
 170 
the perpetuation of patriarchal power. Not holding luncheons is unimaginable to Mr. Plumer not 
because they are actually integral to the lives of the men who pass through Cambridge, but 
because they are integral to the traditions of the institution. The awkwardness of Durrant, the 
annoyance of Mrs. Plumer, and the momentary anger of Mr. Plumer all indicate that none of the 
actors involved in this production gain anything valuable, let alone tangible, from the luncheon, 
but because it happens Sunday after Sunday this ritual legitimates the institution through simple 
reenactment. “Now,” Mr. Plumer asks as he carves the mutton, “does lamb make the mint sauce, 
or mint sauce make the lamb?” (24). This ontological question might equally be asked of rituals 
like the luncheon: does the institution make the ritual, or the ritual the institution? The 
ontological reciprocity between rituals and institutions is, of course, not meant to be 
meaningfully questioned lest one realize the self-legitimating nature of each and begin to wonder 
seriously what would happen if dons no longer invited undergrads to luncheon. 
 The narrator’s subversive critique of women’s participation in Cambridge’s rituals comes 
under scrutiny itself later in the passage when Mrs. Plumer’s history provides some context for 
her luncheon, and these duelling critiques present the personal, social, and political conundrum 
the patriarchal establishment has created for women like Mrs. Plumer. When Jacob finally 
arrives at the luncheon, the rest of the diners are already done their main course, so Mrs. Plumer 
takes a second helping to ensure Jacob doesn’t have to eat alone and orders the dessert to be 
brought in (25). Mrs. Plumer notices that there will not be much mutton left over, a thriftiness 
that is attributed to her middle-class upbringing in Manchester: “how could she do other,” the 
narrator asks, “than grow up cheese-paring, ambitious, with an instinctively accurate notion of 
the rungs of the ladder and an ant-like assiduity in pushing George Plumer ahead of her to the top 
of the ladder?” (25). This rhetorical question reveals that few better options than participation 
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exist for Mrs. Plumer in a patriarchal system that restricts women’s access to property, 
employment, and education, as well as denying them the right to vote. If she wants to elevate her 
station in life, this is the best way available to Mrs. Plumer, so she plays the game according to 
the rules she has been given and worries about pleasing the disinterested and ungrateful 
undergraduates of an institution she would not be allowed to enter were it not for her husband. 
Quite rightly, the narrator points out that, as a woman unable to participate in the law, business, 
education, and politics, “It was none of [Mrs. Plumer’s] fault” (25) that she must participate in 
the patriarchy to build a life for herself. However, she also points out that the end of Mrs. 
Plumer’s participation aligns with the ends of the institution as described in the church service 
passage. All that awaits one at the top of the ladder, the narrator suggests, is a “sense that all the 
rungs were beneath one” (25), for once Mr. Plumer becomes a professor “Mrs. Plumer could 
only be in a condition to cling tight to her eminence, peer down at the ground, and goad her two 
plain daughters to climb the rungs of the ladder” (25). Just as Cambridge’s exclusivity creates 
constitutive differences between insiders and outsiders, Mrs. Plumber’s social climbing creates 
constitutive differences between the rungs of the social ladder. Participating in this luncheon 
helps Mrs. Plumer solidify a place, however tangential, within a patriarchal institution that 
excludes her by supporting the husband who grants her access. In doing so she legitimates the 
very framework of power Cambridge uses to codify difference and exclude outsiders. More than 
this, however, Mrs. Plumer initiates this same complicity in her own daughters, indicating that 
this participation in patriarchy is a learned response passed down from mother to daughter. If, as 
Woolf suggested in A Room of One’s Own, “we think back through our mothers if we are 
women” (69), then what Mrs. Plumer’s daughters have to think back to is a life participating in 
the rituals of men. They enter the luncheon after it is all over wearing “white frocks and blue 
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sashes” and handing out cigarettes to the men, and the narrator is quick to explain the daughters’ 
role in legitimating the patriarchy by indicating “It was none of their fault either” (25). That said, 
the repetition of this exculpatory phrase—having now been used to pardon both mother and 
daughters—fairly begs readers to consider the implication of these and generations of women 
participating in luncheons like this one. The narrator, here, chooses a subject position similar to 
that chosen by the “daughter of an educated man” narrator of Three Guineas, whose critique of 
Mrs. Plumer aligns with the Society of Outsiders’ experiment to “show that to be passive is to be 
active” (245) by refusing to participate in the rituals that legitimate the patriarchy. At some point, 
the narrator implies, women must stop performing rituals that support institutions that 
marginalize or oppress them; at the same time, Mrs. Plumer’s personal experience warns that 
such refusal may not be feasible given the economic, educational, and legal restraints placed on 
women. What the reader is left with, then, is a political conundrum that the narrator presents but 
never resolves, thereby inviting readers to become active participants in interpreting the curated 
fragment of Jacob’s life that she exhibits, not necessarily to take a firm position one way or the 
other, but to acknowledge that women are often faced with political choices that are difficult to 
navigate. 
 As for Jacob, the Plumers’ luncheon party becomes the backdrop against which Jacob’s 
youthful anarchism begins to confront the trajectory of a life shaped by the patriarchal machine. 
Now comfortably situated at Cambridge, Jacob has the chance to examine his life, and what he 
encounters at the Plumers’ house scares him. As he leaves the luncheon, Jacob refers to it as 
“Bloody beastly!” the only words he can conjure for “summing up his discomfort at the world 
shown to him at lunch-time” (26). The beastly discomfort Jacob feels comes over him because he 
suddenly understands that “the cities which the elderly of the race have built upon the skyline 
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showed like brick suburbs, barracks, and places of discipline against a red and yellow flame” 
(26). This is a rare moment of self-reflection for Jacob, and the luncheon seems to represent an 
experience that could change his life until the narrator explains that his youthful rebellion is 
merely an attempt to differentiate himself from the Plumers based on his class. What the Plumers 
choose to read plays an important role in this differentiation: “such a thing to believe in—Shaw 
and Wells and the serious sixpenny weeklies! What were they after, scrubbing and demolishing 
these elderly people? Had they never read Homer, Shakespeare, the Elizabethans?” (26). Here, 
Wells and Shaw are connected with the strict, choreographed luncheon world of the Plumers and 
set against the red and yellow flame of youth, freedom, and exuberance represented by Homer 
and Shakespeare. The irony, of course, is that for all Jacob waxes poetic about these literary 
masters we later find out that he has never “managed to read [a Shakespeare play] through” (35). 
His claims after the luncheon to be “a young man of substance,” therefore, appear to stem from 
as “meager” an “object” as that the Plumers have erected (26). What makes him substantive, that 
is to say, is no less performative than the luncheon at the Plumers, for he bases his identity on his 
ability to perform youthful freedom, the font of inspiration for which are the books he has been 
told to read at university by professors like Mr. Plumer.  
 Despite the fact that Jacob’s anarchic spirit seems to be built on a shaky idealization of 
cultural elitism, the narrator still insists this luncheon represents an epiphanic moment that has 
the potential to change the trajectory of his life. In words reminiscent of Woolf’s discussion in A 
Sketch of the Past of “moments of being” (72), in which the “nondescript cotton wool” (72) of 
everyday life is pulled back—often with “a sudden violent shock” (71) or “peculiar horror” 
(72)—to epiphanically reveal a profounder reality beneath, Jacob knows that each Sunday will 
bring the same series of events “shock—horror—discomfort—then pleasure” as he gets to leave 
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the stifling luncheons to re-join the freedom of the outside world (Woolf, JR 26). However, the 
extent to which Jacob truly understands this as an epiphanic moment is unclear because most of 
the actual explanations of what this epiphany means to his life are provided by the narrator. In 
addition, the fact that he still intends to attend these luncheons of a Sunday and that he counters 
the banality of the Plumers’ existence with a youthful exuberance born of the words of others 
makes one question whether his revolutionary spirit will persist. In addition, the narrator explains 
that Jacob’s epiphany is not all that unique. The world of the elderly, she suggests, comes “as a 
shock about the age of twenty” to every person, so Jacob’s current revolutionary cry “I am what I 
am, and intend to be it” comes with the narrator’s caveat “for which there will be no form in the 
world unless Jacob makes one for himself” (26). On one hand, this is merely an assertion that 
Jacob will never gain autonomy if he is unwilling to stop performing the rituals of other people, 
but, on the other hand, it is a solemn reminder that there is a danger of disappearing in these 
performances. As Zwerdling has pointed out, the narrator’s caveat reminds readers that with 
repeated performances comes the risk of complaisance owing to “the possibility, perhaps even 
the likelihood, that our rebellious adolescence will give way not to strong adult individuality but 
to a stale, despairing conformity” (67). Such complaisance is particularly likely in Jacob’s case 
since he steels himself for the “shock—horror—discomfort—then pleasure” of continually 
attending these Sunday luncheons. Jacob verily courts interpellation with this response as, at 
some point, even the strongest shock will fail to pass through the cotton wool of everyday life. 
 The threat that Jacob will slip into complaisant acceptance of a banal adult life like that of 
the Plumers is heightened when he leaves the luncheon, for he does not use the shock of his 
epiphany to reflect on what caused his feeling of horror. Jacob and Durrant travel down a river in 
a rowboat, and Jacob, having escaped the banality of the Plumers’ luncheon, is hyper-attentive to 
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the “grey spires soft in the blue,” “chestnut bloom, pollen, whatever it is that gives May air its 
potency,” meadows “gilt with buttercups” and the “munch, munch, munch” of cows “as they tore 
the grass short at the roots” (26-27). Such imagery engages eyes, nose, and ears alike to create an 
impression of a sensual experience. Juxtaposed against the drab claustrophobia of the Plumers’ 
dining room with its awkward formality, Shaw, Wells, sixpenny weeklies, and daughters 
perfunctorily handing out cigars, this passage brings Jacob into the light and freedom of the 
natural world where all his senses are engaged simultaneously and image after image fights for 
his attention. Like Impressionist paintings that focus more on how light alters one’s perception of 
visible objects, fine contours are not drawn between the senses in this passage. The air of May, 
potent with fragrance, seems to have an effect on the visual world by “blurring the trees, 
gumming the buds, daubing the green” (26), and the grass of the meadow, which “did not run 
like the thin green water of the graveyard grass about to overflow the tombstones, but stood juicy 
and thick” (27), connects the sensations of touch and sight. Everything moves in this passage, the 
broken thresholds of the senses indicating a freedom that does not exist during the stifling 
luncheon. Such pastoral impulses remind the reader of Jacob’s early life chasing butterflies, but 
they also connect him to a past of revolutionary non-conformity in the Romantics and to a 
mythology that challenges the entrapments of social niceties in the pastoral as if to ask whether 
he will ever achieve such autonomy and simplicity in his own life. The outcome is not at all 
certain, especially when Durrant, looking up from his novel at Jacob who is now lying in the 
boat, notes that “Jacob’s off” (27). For all his shock and horror, then, Jacob has fallen asleep 
after gaining his freedom, only to be woken again with a groaning “Oh-h-h-h” when Durrant 
moors the boat outside “Lady Miller’s picnic party” and explains she is a friend of his mother’s 
(27). Jacob’s epiphanic moment seems to have passed him by for the time being, for the shock he 
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has felt and the sense of freedom he has momentarily revelled in after leaving the luncheon 
dissipate quickly as he moves from one performance at the Plumers’ to the next at Lady Miller’s 
picnic. Jacob agrees to go with Durrant, but shortly afterwards a “sort of awkwardness, 
grumpiness, gloom came into his eyes” as he asks “Shall we move on…this beastly crowd” (28). 
As shock and horror become awkwardness and gloom—two words that are often used to 
describe Jacob going forward—Jacob’s complaisant acceptance of a life of conformity and 
banality seems more and more certain. Even the exclamation “Bloody beastly!” that expressed 
his horror over the luncheon has become a cowed question, its lack of enthusiasm demonstrating 
a diminishing spirit and its repetition a lack of introspection. 
 How the narrator situates herself in these chapel and luncheon fragments does not remain 
coherent but, instead, changes depending on what aspect of patriarchal ideology she is exploring 
and on Jacob’s progress through the patriarchal machine of Cambridge. In the church service 
fragment, the narrator enhances the opposition between the men and the women at the service by 
positioning herself more clearly on the side of the women who are objectified and marginalized 
by Jacob. She begins the passage by gently questioning the exclusivity of Cambridge before 
making the women the object of reader sympathy as Jacob crassly questions their presence in the 
chapel. By choosing to treat Jacob’s harsh views as a predetermined consequence of the 
institution and its ideology rather than as a personal fault, the narrator lets Jacob hoist himself 
with his own petard and allows the women to become victims of an institution whose very 
intellectual foundations oppress them. Rather than approaching the issue of patriarchal 
oppression head on, therefore, the narrator’s voice is there to guide readers to recognize that 
Jacob’s changing view of women and growing sense of insider privilege is indicative of 
institutions that shape minds to accept constitutive differences between different groups in 
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society. The Plumers’ luncheon, on the other hand, represents a cross-roads Jacob has come to in 
the trajectory of his life, for it is an epiphanic moment between the freedom of youth and the 
conformity of adulthood. Since Jacob’s epiphany establishes a clear opposition between the 
Plumers and himself, the narrator resists codifying this opposition in order to retain focus on 
participation and its role in legitimating institutions and their ideologies. She gives each position 
in the opposition context but does not sympathize strongly with either side, choosing instead to 
demonstrate that the threshold between young and old is not as definite or impermeable as Jacob 
makes it seem. Her focus on performativity once again guides readers to consider how the 
rebelliousness of youth often transforms into the conformity of middle age via complaisance and 
inattention to the ideologies people reify with their actions. The narrator accentuates 
performativity further by choosing a position in relation to Mrs. Plumer that is markedly 
different than that she chose to the women at the church service: the women at the church service 
are treated with sympathy, but Mrs. Plumer is challenged for her participation in a luncheon 
whose exclusivity aligns with that of the institutions described at the church service. Such 
inconsistencies in narrator positioning are not indicative of unreliability, however, as readers are 
shown very early on using free indirect discourse that perspective and situatedness will be 
important themes in Jacob’s Room and that normal interpretive strategies concerning narration 
will be subverted or insufficient. These narrator inconsistencies, rather, demonstrate that the 
narrator’s first priority is story telling. The consummate curator of Jacob’s life, she chooses a 
subject position in each fragment that allows the fragment to tell the story she wants it to in her 
overall exhibit of the patriarchal machine. The narrator’s fidelity is not to the material realism of 
the lives she narrates, but to the formal presentation of Jacob’s life in a way that accurately 
represents how patriarchal institutions interpellate individuals as subjects. 
	
 178 
 Indeed, for the narrator, the academy is primarily an ideological state apparatus rather 
than a place to find enlightenment, a point she makes using three professors, Huxtable, Cowan, 
and Sopwith, who represent the epistemic limitations of Cambridge while also emphasizing its 
role in interpellating young men for the patriarchy. Referring back to her previous description of 
Cambridge as a beacon of light for outsiders and outcasts, the narrator insists that “If any light 
burns above Cambridge, it must be from three such rooms” as those occupied by Huxtable, 
Cowan, and Sopwith (29). Huxtable and Cowan are treated rather light-heartedly by the narrator 
and appear themselves to be victims of the institution they have come to represent. Huxtable, a 
man of great intellectual breadth and erudition, is machine-like in his thinking, which like “a 
procession tramps through the corridors of his brain, orderly, quick-stepping, and reinforced, as 
the march goes on, by fresh runnels, till the whole hall, dome, whatever one calls it, is populous 
with ideas” (30). An example of the reclusive academic trapped in his ivory tower, Huxtable is 
unique in his ability to process information, yet he feels “stranded” in a mind that examines the 
world while never actually leaving the comfortable confines of Cambridge (30). While Huxtable 
synthesizes vast amounts of information from variable sources, Cowan has mastered the art of 
storytelling until his brain has become “Virgil’s representative among us” (31). Unfortunately, 
all his stories are limited to his experiences at Cambridge and his only audience is “one rosy little 
man, whose memory held precisely the same span of time” (31), so while “language is wine 
upon his lips” (31), Cowan spins the insular yarns of Cambridge dons rather than the epic tales of 
Virgil that explore humanity in all is variation. For all the jocularity used to describe these two 
professors, however, their role in the academy is still concerning to the narrator because the 
mental asceticism of Huxtable and the mimesis of Cowan both help to legitimate the academy by 
reproducing its epistemes and stories. Huxtable’s mind is expansive yet limited because it draws 
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only on the work of other men who have constructed knowledge with the same ordered 
discipline and epistemic limitations And, as for Cowan, he is the keeper of Cambridge’s present 
history, the story-teller who helps construct the academy by incessantly reproducing the tales of 
its members. Both Huxtable and Cowan, therefore, bask in what the narrator calls the “lamp of 
learning” or the ideological light of Cambridge that they themselves have created, and she notes 
“how priestly they look!” in the self-legitimating sheen of their institution (30). By any other 
light, the two would look much less impressive—Huxtable troubled by “corn twinges, or it may 
be the gout” (30), while Virgil would certainly ask “‘This my image?’ […] pointing to the 
chubby man” were he to meet Cowan (31)—but in this ideological light that they and the other 
insiders have constructed, they can be revered and validated. Men like this, the narrator explains, 
are “the fabric through which the light [of Cambridge] must shine, if shine it can” (31). Here, 
light refers to the actual enlightenment that one can receive from studying the cultural and 
scientific achievements of past generations, but this is an enlightenment that one must struggle to 
find through the ideological filter of educational epistemes that exclude certain voices and 
prioritize certain forms of knowledge in order to ensure their own coherence. 
 It is Professor Sopwith, however, who causes the narrator the most amount of concern, 
for while Huxtable and Cowan have rather limited access to their students, Sopwith spends much 
time speaking with his students, extolling the virtues of the academy, and fashioning illusions 
meant to feed the young men for the rest of their lives. Sopwith is directly compared to a priest in 
this passage as the undergraduates who visit his room in groups “sometimes as many as twelve” 
come to him as if taking communion: “Sopwith went on talking. Talking, talking, talking—as if 
everything could be talked—the soul itself slipped through the lips in thin silver disks which 
dissolve in young men’s minds […]. Oh, far away they’d remember it, and deep in dulness gaze 
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back at it, and come to refresh themselves again” (30). Unlike the ascetic Huxtable and the 
insular Cowan, Sopwith is more Socratic in his communication with undergraduates, whom he 
guides gently toward a lifelong attachment to the academy by creating moments they may look 
back on fondly. The narrator imagines an undergraduate, Chucky Stenhouse, meeting Sopwith 
years after graduation only to recognize that Sopwith’s proselytizing “all seemed childish, 
absurd” (30), and that his taking the awkward phrases of young men and “plaiting them round 
his own smooth garland” until they showed “the vivid greens, the sharp thorns, manliness” 
amounted to little once Sopwith’s silver disks began to “tinkle hollow” with the passing of time 
and the living of life (31). Sopwith’s illusions are not enough to make Stenhouse break the 
traditions of the patriarchal machine, however, for “he would send his son there. He would save 
every penny to send his son there” (30). What makes Sopwith so much more threatening than his 
peers is the role he plays in mythologizing the exclusivity of being a Cambridge man, for he 
teaches the undergraduates that they are different, that this difference will be with them always, 
that this difference is connected to “manliness,” and that this difference is worth protecting and 
continuing into the future.  
 Thus, the narrator places herself in direct opposition to Sopwith when she proclaims that, 
while these undergraduates may continue to respect their old professor no matter how thin his 
illusions, “A woman, divining the priest, would, involuntarily, despise” (31). Where the narrator 
has been reluctant to take the side of women like Mrs. Norman and Mrs. Plumer in past 
fragments, she firmly positions herself as a woman in this passage, but in doing so, as Froula 
points out, she “embraces interpellation as ‘feminine’ only to turn it into a critical outsider’s 
perspective” (75)—here, of the academy as an ideological state apparatus. The most important 
thing she does as an outsider is merely refuse to respect Sopwith and his hollow silver coins: it is 
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the work of ideology to naturalize the performance of its rituals, to so thoroughly interpellate the 
subject that he or she acts without stopping to think what ideology these actions help realize, so 
the narrator simply intervenes in the smooth functioning of this process by refusing to respect 
Sopwith. Despite long questioning the value of Sopwith’s “childish, absurd” nightly talks, it 
never occurs to Stenhouse that he should not send his son to these three priests of Cambridge, so 
the narrator’s simple act of disobedience opens a space of potential change in a patriarchal 
machine that retains its shape by limiting what can be expressed legitimately within its confines. 
Formally, too, the sentence “A woman, divining the priest, would, involuntarily, despise” (31) 
mirrors the disruptive intent of the narrator. If Sopwith goes on talking, talking, talking with 
eloquence about manliness and the academy, the narrator uses a difficult-to-navigate sentence 
that slams and crashes its way toward meaning. It interrupts readers by making them linger on its 
meaning, but it also interrupts itself, finally getting to the verb, twice removed from the subject 
by subordinate words and phrases, by the final word of the sentence. The sentence powerfully 
interjects in Stenhouse’s reverence for his priest Sopwith, but by inelegantly lurching towards its 
tendentious critique as if a little nervous to make this interjection, it never lets readers forget that 
it speaks from a marginalized subject position that is not meant to be heard amongst Sopwith’s 
nightly perusals of manliness.  
 Against these three priests of Cambridge, the narrator juxtaposes the lives of the 
undergraduates they shape, and she connects the heritage of Cambridge with the future of Jacob 
and his friends to suggest that, while they appear to be merely one cohort of undergraduates in 
Cambridge’s long tradition as an ideological state apparatus, their fates as part of England’s Lost 
Generation gives their lives a significance beyond the continuation of the patriarchal hegemony 
in England. This group of men form a literal break in the reproductive cycle of the patriarchy, 
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their deaths creating a historical, cultural, and, in the case of Jacob’s Room, textual rupture in 
which Woolf’s narrator, and the text more generally, find the potential to consider what sent so 
many young men to their deaths. Standing outside Cambridge, the narrator watches the 
undergraduates return at night to their dormitories, when suddenly she sees Jacob through the 
window: “He looked satisfied; indeed masterly; which expression changed slightly as he stood 
there, the sound of the clock conveying to him (it may be) a sense of old buildings and time; and 
himself the inheritor; and then tomorrow; and friends; at the thought of whom, in sheer 
confidence and pleasure, it seemed, he yawned and stretched himself” (34). She without, he 
within, the cultural inheritance of each sex is revealed by the distance and pane of glass that 
separates the narrator outside from Jacob inside. More than this, however, the narrator’s 
language seems to give Jacob’s existence a permanence through both time and space: the 
buildings belong to him—and have belonged to men like him throughout history—so while the 
clock marks time’s progression it also marks the stability of his cultural inheritance and the 
structures it has built to reinforce its power. Of course, the past and inheritance that lives on 
through these men will come to a crashing halt with the Great War, a fact the narrator reminds 
readers of earlier in this passage when she mentions “there is no need to think of them grown 
old” (32). These men will be the war dead, but the conflation of past, present, and future in this 
passage mark them as having died long before arriving in France. Cultural insiders interpellated 
by the patriarchal machine, their path toward destruction began long ago in institutions that 
taught them to establish constitutive differences and insist upon the thresholds that distinguish 
insiders from outsiders. Thus, the narrator-outsider—a woman excluded but also protected from 
the institutions of man by her gender—explains that the atrocities of the Great War do not exist 
in a cultural vacuum, that the industrialization of death is a natural consequence of competition 
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and the construction of difference. Jacob’s Room, therefore, elegizes the lives of Jacob and his 
friends, for the narrator, while she sympathizes with the men’s deaths, laments the lives of 
discipline and illusion that led them inevitably toward their deaths. The patriarchal establishment 
defined these lives and initiated its own historical and cultural rupture when it sent them to war, 
and the narrator points out that this rupture also creates a space of potential in which these lives 
and the institutions that shape them can be examined. Therefore, when Mrs. Flanders holds “out 
a pair of Jacob’s old shoes” at the end of the novel and asks “What am I to do with these, Mr. 
Bonamy?” (143), it is not only a powerful image of a mother grieving for her son but also a 
reminder that Jacob’s shoes, like the shoes of so many men in his class, are left unfilled after the 
war. Jacob is initiated into Cambridge by a church service in which “great boots march under the 
gowns” of the young men who move with “certainty” and “authority controlled by piety” (23); a 
few years and a war later a pair of old shoes is all that remains of Jacob and who will step into 
patriarchy’s great boots is left uncertain. 
 Revealing “there is no need to think of [these men] grown old” and, thereby, deciding 
Jacob’s fate as part of England’s Lost Generation so early in the novel also creates a textual 
rupture that shifts the focus from what Jacob will become to why Jacob fulfills his fate, and this 
shift helps exploit the space of potential the narrator notes by introducing a new set of narrative 
conventions. Because readers now know Jacob’s fate, they find themselves in the realm of Greek 
Tragedy as well as in that of the Bildungsroman, and this introduction of a new genre brings with 
it new narrative conventions and interpretive strategies that help hold open the textual rupture the 
narrator has created. The Bildungsroman is a genre of change and personal autonomy, a genre in 
which actions matter because they lead inevitably to the as yet unknown future emergence of the 
protagonist. In Greek Tragedy, however, ends are known and fates are sealed from the 
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beginning, so the genre promotes an interpretive strategy that is fundamentally retrospective as 
opposed to predictive inasmuch as readers start from an end point and trace backwards the 
actions that bring about this end. One genre celebrates fate, the other autonomy, and by blending 
the two with the assertions that “there will be no form [for Jacob] in the world unless Jacob 
makes one for himself” (26) but that “there is no need to think of [these men] grown old” (32), 
the narrator insists Jacob has the ability to autonomously change his future but reveals that his 
actions will inevitably lead him to the fate decided for him by the institutions and ideologies 
these actions support and realize. In this textual rupture between the self-actualization of the 
Bildungsroman and the inevitable catastrophe of Greek Tragedy, the narrative conventions of 
both are conflated so that Jacob is in a constant state of becoming one of the war dead. 
Accordingly, the interpretive strategies for Jacob’s Room cannot look wholly forward to predict 
Jacob’s emergence, nor can they look wholly backward to retroactively discern what random 
actions led him to his fate. Readers are inextricably caught in the present where ideologies are 
realized through participation, and they are forced to confront the fact that with every 
performance Jacob pushes himself closer and closer toward his own death. The industrialized 
death of the Great War, the narrator reminds readers, is not an anomaly but rather the logical 
consequence of a patriarchal hegemony that, day-in and day-out, pushes men to compete and 
institutionalizes difference. However, if the patriarchy requires participation to legitimate itself 
and retain coherence, then refusing to participate denies the system this legitimation.  
 Of course, as an inheritor of Cambridge, Jacob never refuses to participate in protecting 
this institution, and his life becomes a series of performances that reiterate the subject position he 
assumes as a graduate of Cambridge and “a young man of substance” (26) who must protect 
culture and defend civilization. When a professor from Leeds University publishes an edition of 
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Wycherley with the “indecent phrases” removed, for example, Jacob pens an essay denouncing 
the professor, and he proclaims to his friends that the edition was “a breach of faith; sheer 
prudery; token of a lewd mind and a disgusting nature” (54). Amongst Jacob and his friends, to 
substantiate these claims, “Aristophanes and Shakespeare were cited. Modern life was 
repudiated. Great play was made with the professorial title, and Leeds as a seat of learning was 
laughed to scorn” (54). Although the narrator points out that the young men are correct in their 
assessment of the professor’s prudishness and notes no middle-class magazines would publish 
the essay due to their own prudishness, Jacob’s argument, like his objection to women at the 
church service, is based on the constitutive ideological differences he constructs to establish the 
threshold between insiders and outsiders. This time the threshold is predicated on the relative 
cultural capital conferred by Cambridge and Leeds, and Jacob’s simple dichotomy shows that he 
is still prone to the oppositional thinking that is foundational to the way knowledge is 
constructed at Cambridge. Jacob’s mission to save culture is also what takes him to the British 
Museum, where he goes to “Stuff [Mr. Masefield and Mr. Bennett] into the flame of Marlowe 
and burn them to cinders” (85). Such things must be done, according to Jacob, in order to protect 
culture, and he believes that “The flesh and blood of the future depends entirely upon six men 
[Jacob and his friends]” because the “Victorians, who disembowel, or the living, who are mere 
publicists,” cannot be trusted to save culture (85). What precisely Jacob means by the Victorians 
disembowelling and the living publicizing is unclear, but this ultimately doesn’t much matter 
because his argument is merely intended to position the canonical works of literature he has 
studied at Cambridge in opposition to contemporary literature in order to suggest it poses an 
existential threat to high culture. Jacob’s argument, then, employs the discourse of “the battle of 
the brows” to establish cultural boundaries that legitimate him and his friends as young men of 
	
 186 
substance who refuse to “palter with the second rate” (85). But what comes of all this fiery, 
youthful revolt against those destroying highbrow culture is sadly predictable: when Jacob 
receives letters that his essay will not be published by any magazines, he throws them into a 
“black wooden box” and sees the “lid shut upon the truth” (54), and the sum of his research into 
Marlowe amounts to naught but the chance to “read incredibly dull essays upon Marlowe to [his] 
friends” (85). Jacob participates in these performances merely to impress his friends and prove 
himself a man of Cambridge, so, far from making a form for himself in the world, he further 
codifies the hegemony of a patriarchal machine that has moulded and shaped him into an ideal 
subject of the patriarchy ready to defend its institutions and embody its ideologies. 
 Just how ideal a subject Jacob has become is tested when he goes to Greece on his Grand 
Tour of Europe a few years after he graduates from Cambridge, for it is there that he recognizes 
his education has done little more than create an illusion that obscures, instead of enlightens, his 
understanding of the world. His trip marks Jacob’s first time away from England on his own and 
includes a trip to Rome “after doing Greece” (108), but he quickly discovers that the real Greece 
is nothing like the Greece he has been told about since he was a child. Jacob goes into the streets 
of Patras expecting to discover people with the passion of Greek tragic characters and the 
cultural sophistication of the ancient thinkers he has studied, but he instead finds a common 
twentieth-century city with trams clanking and chiming, “advertisements of corsets and of 
Maggi’s consommé,” and busy city streets that “[smell] of bad cheese” (109). This reality 
confounds Jacob, who, like so many men of his class, has been raised to think of Greece and 
Rome as the unchanging seat of Western civilization. Greece draws the “superfluous 
imagination” from a young age, Jacob thinks, for “it is the governesses who start the Greek 
myth” (109), but then “you read Xenophon; then Euripides” until “One day—that was an 
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occasion, by God—what people have said appears to have sense in it; the Greek spirit; the Greek 
this, that, and the other; though it is absurd, by the way, to say that any Greek comes near 
Shakespeare. The point is, however, that we have been brought up in an illusion” (110). This is 
Jacob’s second epiphany about the patriarchal machine, as he, like Stenhouse, begins to 
recognize that people like Sopwith, Huxtable, and Cowan have constructed a false reality he has 
used to shape his life rather than leading him toward enlightenment. This epiphany about 
illusions, enlightenment, and education is similar to the ideas explored in Plato’s allegory of the 
cave, in which he suggests that education is an orientation process meant to help people by 
turning their minds toward the truth until they become “capable of bearing the sight of real being 
and reality at its most bright” (245). The “lamp of learning” at Cambridge ostensibly operates 
with this goal in mind but is, in reality, an ideological apparatus that trains students’ minds to see 
things in a particular way that reinforces its own legitimacy. Thus, when Jacob is confronted 
with the realities of Greek life in Patras, he cannot help but feel like “The whole of civilization 
[is] being condemned” (110). Remarkably, therefore, it is not the illusion that Jacob ends up 
condemning, even if he does acknowledge it as an illusion, but modernity itself, as he blames the 
existential gloominess he feels on the trams that “clanked, chimed, rang, rang, rang imperiously 
to get the donkeys out of the way, and one old woman who refused to budge” (110). Modernity 
crowds ever further into Jacob’s illusion and begins to puncture its coherence, but rather than 
reassess this illusion he defends it just as he has done in the past. His essay on Wycherley, his 
burning of Bennett and Masefield in the fire of Marlowe: both are merely precursors to his 
reaction at this moment of existential doubt during which he, the inheritor of Western civilization 




 While the trams and chaotic streets of Patras literally represent the speed of modernity in 
this passage, modernity’s effect on the psyche of Jacob’s generation is symbolized in this 
passage by the Daily Mail, which he returns to again and again in this passage as he works his 
way through his existential gloominess. The newspaper is the only aspect of modernity that 
Jacob feels he has any control over in this passage, so he crumples the Daily Mail in a symbolic 
act of destruction. This only leads Jacob to the further realization that his gloom is caused as 
much by a slide toward conventionality as it is by modernity. Founded in 1896, the Daily Mail, 
whose motto was “‘The Busy Man’s Daily Journal,’” was marketed toward the middle-class as a 
cheaper and more fast-paced alternative to the London Times, and it featured “in its eight sober-
looking pages a compact and effective overview of the morning news alongside lighter fare, all 
mixed with copious advertisements” (Brake and Demoor, 157). Ideologically, the paper was not 
so forward-thinking: it did not print the “long parliamentary speeches familiar in other dailies” 
and it “largely avoided partisan politics but was nationalistic and supportive of the imperialist 
project, becoming known as the ‘Voice of the Empire in London journalism’” (157). Jacob 
seems to be aware of the Daily Mail’s bias toward nationalism: he begins thinking about the 
“British Empire which was beginning to puzzle him” and whether or not he is “altogether in 
favour of giving Home Rule to Ireland,” and he briefly wonders what the paper has to say about 
these things before reminding himself that the “the Daily Mail isn’t to be trusted” (111). Jacob is 
never precise about why the Daily Mail is not to be trusted, but he does suggest that it plays a 
part in the angst he feels as part of a modern generation that “[does] not believe enough” (110). 
This lack of belief is a “modern invention” according to Jacob, who thinks that “Our fathers at 
any rate had something to demolish. So have we for the matter of that, thought Jacob, crumpling 
the Daily Mail in his hand” (110). Jacob has reached the point in his life when he feels the need 
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to make his mark—as he puts it, “he had grown to be a man, and was about to be immersed in 
things” (111)—but he faces the conundrum of what he can demolish in order to make this mark 
in a world that lacks belief. According to Jacob, there is no one epistemological framework that 
underpins his generation full of people with divergent goals, interests, and desires, so he chooses 
to demolish the Daily Mail, with its fast-paced and easily digested stories, because he sees it as 
symbolic of the ephemerality and impermanence of the modern age. Of course, to demolish 
something is not enough to truly make one’s mark; one must also rebuild something to stand in 
its place. Here, too, Jacob is lost because on the other side of his gloominess stands “something 
solid, immovable, and grotesque” in the tedious “evening parties where one has to dress” and in 
the “wretched slums at the back of Gray’s Inn” (110-111), where Jacob now lives as a barrister’s 
assistant. Stuck between the solid conventionalism of middle-class educated life he first revolted 
against at the Plumers’ luncheon, but towards which he now feels himself slipping, and a fast-
paced modernity in which belief in any grand narratives has seemingly vanished, Jacob feels 
alienated from both and cannot understand or dispel his existential gloom. So, finally, the cause 
of Jacob’s existential gloominess is revealed: for the first time in his life he feels like an outsider, 
unwilling to embrace the speed and ethereality of modernity yet unable to accept his 
conventional life as a lawyer. 
 It is to help cope with the angst that comes with these feelings of marginalization that 
Jacob attempts to reassert the illusions of Greece that remind him of his youth and his Cambridge 
days when he felt comfortable as the inheritor of Western civilization. Jacob begins visiting the 
ruins of ancient Greece hoping they will reignite his belief in civilization and the Greek spirit, 
but the crowds and guides, at least according to Jacob, prevent him from feeling anything. In 
reality, what hampers his tourism is the same thing that hampers Jacob’s experience of Greece as 
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a whole: he finds it “highly exasperating that twenty-five people of your acquaintance should be 
able to say straight off something very much to the point about being in Greece, while for 
yourself there is a stopper upon all emotions whatsoever” (109). Jacob likely overestimates his 
friends in this lament, but his exasperation reveals that Jacob comes to Greece, in part, because 
he hopes the visit will reify the Greek character he has spent so many years pontificating about 
with his Cambridge friends. Then, he was a young man of substance valued and validated by 
peers who were all invested in the same illusion; now, he discovers it is difficult to reinvigorate 
this illusion alone. At the Parthenon, Jacob can only muster the observation that “the Greeks, like 
sensible men, never bothered to finish the backs of their statues” (119), so he turns to his 
Baedeker’s guide book to learn that the slight irregularities in the Parthenon’s steps demonstrate 
“‘the artistic sense of the Greeks preferred to mathematical accuracy’” (119), a fact that, while 
“accurate and diligent,” leaves Jacob “profoundly morose” because he still has not felt the Greek 
spirit as he hoped he would (119). In desperation, Jacob writes a telegram to Bonamy asking him 
to come to Greece, but he never sends it because he feels certain that “this sort of thing,” the 
gloominess that Jacob can only define as an “uneasy, painful feeling, something like selfishness” 
(120), will eventually wear off. Jacob’s desire to have one of his friends with him once again 
points out the communal aspect of the Greek illusion and suggests it is a lie meant less to deceive 
these men about the Greek spirit than to create a foundational myth for their class that can be 
used to legitimate their status as the inheritors of Western culture and civilization. Thus, 
Sopwith’s nightly meetings with his students are important not because they teach the young 
men anything about Greek culture, but because they create the conditions in which this myth 
about the Greek spirit can flourish: a closed room, in a building closed to all but the students and 
faculty of Cambridge, in an institution closed to most members of the English public. What is in 
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fact behind Jacob’s gloominess, therefore, is the lack of a space in which the identity he has 
fashioned for himself during his time at Cambridge can remain coherent. At Cambridge the 
honeyed words of Sopwith and the camaraderie Jacob shared with friends as they validated one 
another with performances of substance kept any existential angst at bay, but without this closed, 
self-legitimating system Jacob feels the full intensity of his thoroughly conventional life.  
 Britain declares war on Germany shortly after Jacob returns to London from Greece, and 
on the day of the declaration, two processions—one in Whitehall made up of war supporters and 
one near the Royal Opera House made up of people waiting in carriages to attend the Opera—
represent Jacob’ political future and cultural past. On August 4, 1914, the Whitehall area of 
London, which contains most of the English government’s administrative buildings, becomes a 
noisy, united throng of people in a parade through the streets calling for war with Germany. 
Narratively, this passage demonstrates the relationship between base and superstructure by 
moving from the ground up, for the call to war begins in the streets. In a “procession with 
banners,” the people march down Whitehall “behind the gold letters of their creed” (138); 
passing Trafalgar square, “Nelson received the salute” of the crowd while the “wires of the 
Admiralty shivered with some far-away communication” (139); on a loudspeaker a “voice kept 
remarking that Prime Ministers and Viceroys spoke in the Reichstag” (139); clerks in 
government offices “listened, deciphered, wrote down” what the voice revealed (139); 
newspapers “accumulated, inscribed with the utterances of Kaisers, the statistics of rice-fields, 
the growling of hundreds of workpeople, plotting sedition in back streets, or gathering in the 
Calcutta bazaars” (139); and, finally, in a room in Whitehall “sixteen gentlemen, lifting their 
pens or turning perhaps rather wearily in their chairs, decreed that the course of history should 
shape itself in this way or that way, being manfully determined, as their faces showed, to impose 
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some coherency upon Rajahs and Kaisers and the muttering in bazaars” (139-40). The speed and 
efficiency of British imperialism becomes apparent in this short fragment that moves quickly 
from the people, to the administrative buildings and media that act as ideological state 
apparatuses, to the government members ultimately responsible for declaring war. Thusly the 
narrator never lets readers forget that this ideological machine functions neither entirely top-
down nor entirely bottom-up, but reciprocally. It is the people’s willing participation in the 
performances of nationalism that materially realize the imperialist project that is decided upon in 
the offices above. Indeed, the narrator wonders if the sixteen men in the office envy the 
“immortal quiescence” of the busts of Pitt, Chatham, Burke, and Gladstone in the government 
halls, “the air being full of whistling and concussions, as the procession with its banners passed 
down Whitehall” (140). The men in bust have finished their service steering the course of 
history, but the sixteen in the office above must make their decisions amongst the din and chaos 
in the street as thousands of Londoners come together in a frightful unity that transforms the 
Whitehall area into a vast legitimating system in which overt performances of nationalism 
propagate war and normalize imperialism.  
 Jacob, in Hyde Park talking with Bonamy about his recent visit to Greece, does not attend 
the Whitehall parade. His discussion with Bonamy ends abruptly, however, when Jacob blushes 
to reveal he has fallen in love with a woman and Bonamy storms off, after which “Jacob rose 
from his chair in Hyde Park, tore his [chair rental] ticket to pieces, and walked away” (140). 
These are the last actions Jacob takes in the novel: he never speaks again in the novel and his 
movements are only described. Having recently been disillusioned in Greece and now seemingly 
abandoned by Bonamy, the person he most wanted with him in Greece to help him through his 
existential gloom, Jacob is cast out into a London currently under the hysteria of nationalism and 
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imperialism, and as he leaves Hyde Park is hailed by the loudspeaker: “‘The Kaiser,’ the far 
away voice remarked in Whitehall, ‘received me in audience’” (141). Jacob does not answer this 
hail immediately—war would not be declared officially until eleven o’clock on the night of 
August 4th, 1914—but he eventually does join the army, entering himself into yet another 
ideological state apparatus that promises his life meaning. 
 Walking east to Piccadilly near to the north entrance of Whitehall, Jacob is seen by 
Reverend Floyd, who, remembering that he gave Jacob the works of Byron, stops briefly but 
misses the opportunity to call to Jacob as they pass one another. Requesting Byron from Mr 
Floyd was Jacob’s first performative act as a fledgling entering the patriarchal machine, and this 
missed meeting serves as a fitting bookend for Jacob’s final journey in the novel, as Floyd 
describes Jacob as “so tall; so unconscious; such a fine young fellow” (141). Because this 
meeting takes place at sunset, several hours before war was declared that day, Floyd’s 
description of Jacob as “so unconscious” does not indicate that Jacob is walking with single-
minded purpose toward an enlistment centre so much as it indicates that Jacob is walking 
absentmindedly after his recent existential crisis in Greece and fight with Bonamy. Continuing 
east and slightly north along Long Acre, Jacob enters the Covent Garden area of London and is 
spotted by Clara Durrant, who is waiting with her mother in “Another procession, without 
banners,” that contains “dowagers in amethyst and gentlemen spotted with carnations” and 
blocks the path of “jaded men in white waistcoats […] on their way home to shrubberies and 
billiard-rooms in Putney and Wimbledon” (141). Jacob’s journey through London, therefore, 
takes him between the Whitehall hails of a political future that is uncertain but compels him 
since, in his own words, “he had grown to be a man […] about to be immersed in things” (111), 
and the cultural past he inherited at Cambridge that has now been intersected by the conventions 
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of middle-class life lived in South London suburbs. While his path through London takes him 
away from the hails of nationalism and empire, the procession he sees in Covent Garden reminds 
him that his current trajectory leads toward the “bloody beastly” existence of people like the 
Plumers. The hail from Whitehall may be noisy and chaotic but the unity of its many voices 
offers camaraderie, and in this camaraderie, fortified by performances of national pride and 
sacrifice for one’s country, Jacob can find renewed meaning in a life that he is beginning to feel 
has slipped from his grasp.  
 It is from Mrs. Flanders, woken in the middle of the night by the sound of artillery in 
France, that we learn all three of her sons are off “fighting for their country” (143), and while it 
is not ever made clear whether Jacob enlists in the army or is conscripted, his growing concern 
with politics and sudden disillusionment with his life, as well as the disorganized state of his 
room, suggests that he has left hurriedly and likely enlisted shortly after war was declared. 
Indeed, Bonamy marvels that “‘He left everything just as it was […] Nothing arranged. All his 
letters strewn about for any one to read. What did he expect? Did he think he would come 
back?’” (143). To the rational literalist Bonamy, who knows nothing of Jacob’s existential crisis 
in Greece, the state of Jacob’s room indicates ill-founded idealism, but given the recent events in 
his life it more likely indicates that Jacob sees the war as an escape from a life of convention he 
never wanted and does not know how to change more productively. In addition, the ubiquitous 
calls to enlist and fight for one’s country following the declaration of war promise a renewed 
sense of purpose in a world from which Jacob feels increasingly marginalized.  
 Jacob, now interested in the political affairs of Britain and Europe, enlists hoping to find 
a renewed sense of purpose as he immerses himself into politics, but a passage that describes 
young men dying in war indicates that Jacob is merely entering another state apparatus that will 
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use him, and the millions like him, to embody their ideologies of nationalism and imperialism. 
The language used to describe the soldiers is remarkably similar to that used to describe the 
young men at Cambridge who perform the rituals of the Church with “sculptured faces” and 
movements guided by “certainty” and “authority controlled by piety” (23). On the field of battle, 
the soldiers on a destroyed ship “descend with composed faces into the depths of the sea; and 
there impassively (though with perfect mastery of machinery) suffocate uncomplainingly 
together” (125). Both choir boys and soldiers, statue-like in their discipline and regimental in 
their actions, have moulded their bodies into conduits for their respective ideologies. This 
embodiment lends their lives meaning by connecting them to the institutions and traditions they 
serve, but it also hollows them out as individuals because their value within the ideology is 
dependent entirely on their ability to faithfully perform its rituals. While the men are active 
participants in the military’s wars of nationalism and imperialism, therefore, their participation in 
these ideologies, with their notions of national sacrifice and dying with valour, make them 
impassive to the point of death. The soldiers on the land, “Like blocks of tin soldiers” (125), act 
with equal machine-like precision, all dying when and where they are told save the few that “still 
agitate up and down like fragments of broken matchstick” and can be seen “through field-
glasses” by on-looking commanders (125). This change in perspective from the soldiers dying to 
the commanders watching marks the young men as mere objects in a game played by their 
commanders and England’s political class. Handley suggests that this objectification 
commodifies the young men ideologically so that they do little more than “serve as an exchange 
value for the status quo” (120), and that “the men in [political] cabinets have disembodied the 
human subject” (122). That the soldiers’ deaths are orchestrated by men that deem these deaths a 
reasonable price to pay for British nationalism and imperialism certainly makes the soldiers an 
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ideological commodity, but the clockwork precision with which the soldiers die also mark them 
as embodied participants in this orchestra. These men are not “the lost” or “the fallen”—those 
perverse euphemisms Paul Fussell points out were used during the Great War to justify the 
sacrifices of those who died (22)—but, Woolf’s narrator insists, willing participants in England’s 
nationalist imperialism. Yes, their deaths are part of an ideological transaction, but it is their lives 
that she begs us to look at. Jacob’s Room is an elegy for these soldiers’ unnatural decision to 
mechanically step toward death rather than an eulogy for the victims of the political class. This 
much is made clear when the narrator explains “These actions [of the soldiers], together with the 
incessant commerce of banks, laboratories, chancellories, and houses of business, are the strokes 
that oar the world forward, [men] say” (125). These large institutions may be steered by cabinet 
ministers, managers, and chief executive officers, but the strokes are made by “men as smoothly 
sculpted as the impassive policemen at Ludgate Circus” whose “face is stiff from force of will” 
and whose discipline ensures “not an ounce [of this force] is diverted into sudden impulses, 
sentimental regrets, wire-drawn distinctions” (125). Far from being disembodied, this policeman 
is the very embodiment of the British empire, directing the traffic of London as England directs 
the traffic of the world through the sheer force of will and discipline of its men. Men like this 
policeman, like the soldiers, like the choir boys, like Sopwith, like Jacob are the products of 
England’s patriarchal machine, and for this the narrator has some sympathy, but she never lets us 




“The greatest of Mankind”: Septimus Smith as Post-war Scapegoat in Mrs Dalloway 
When Virginia Woolf wrote Mrs Dalloway, postwar English society was still learning 
how to go on living in the face of the industrialized death and barbarity of modern military 
conflict—products of the patriarchal machine that she analyzes through its effects on Jacob 
Flanders and his materialisation of its exclusionary ideology. For many this meant eulogizing 
and memorializing the war dead who had given their lives in service of their country, but Woolf 
uses her novel to explore further the social system that had led to the catastrophes of total war to 
begin with and that had been profoundly destabilized in its wake. In her diary entry on 19 June 
1923, Woolf concisely expressed the overarching themes of Mrs Dalloway (1925): “In the book I 
have almost too many ideas. I want to give life & death, sanity & insanity; I want to criticise the 
social system, & to show it at work, at its most intense” (Diaries 2, 248). The plot that acts as the 
vehicle for these themes could not be more simple, for the novel follows the lives of two people 
for a single day in London: Clarissa Dalloway as she prepares for a dinner party and Septimus 
Smith as he struggles with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and ultimately commits suicide. 
Thus, Clarissa represents sanity and life while Septimus represents insanity and death, but the 
difficulty in Mrs Dalloway is the relationship between these themes. Generally considered as 
opposites connected with “or,” life/death and sanity/insanity are brought together by Woolf 
through the lives of Clarissa Dalloway and Septimus Smith, who never meet and are of different 
genders and classes, but whose stories intersect to reveal how the lives of individuals are 
intertwined with social institutions. 
The novel, therefore, is neither wholly Clarissa’s nor Septimus’s story, but combines the 
two lives to create a palimpsest that marks their textual and thematic interrelatedness in a social 
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system that moulds and shapes people’s lives not just leading up to war but also as it stabilizes 
itself after the war. This social system functions most intensely in the relationship between 
Septimus and his doctors, Dr. Holmes and Sir William Bradshaw, the first of whom prescribes 
bodily discipline that prioritizes masculinity to alleviate Septimus’s PTSD, while the second, 
Bradshaw, is more concerned with using Septimus to extend his discursive authority in postwar 
England than with helping cure his patient.	Septimus’s war trauma is in fact used by Holmes and 
Bradshaw to establish the norms that constituted the common man in interwar England, for 
against what they designate as the veteran’s abnormal mental and physical state, they propose as 
treatment a reprioritization of his body to fit his new role as a husband and worker. It is 
Septimus’s status as a common reader, however, that Woolf uses to critique the social and 
cultural institutions in which he is caught, and to emphasize, especially through his reading of 
Shakespeare, his position outside the educational and institutional power represented by 
Bradshaw in particular. The effects of Bradshaw’s discursive authority are revealed to Clarissa in 
an epiphany during her dinner party when Bradshaw talks of Septimus’s suicide. Clarissa sees 
Septimus’s suicide as an act of “defiance” that allows him to retain “a thing” that has been 
“defaced, obscured in her own life, let drop every day in corruption, lies, chatter” (156). Her 
frustratingly vague noun—“thing”—seemingly defers meaning at what should be the climax of 
the novel because precisely what “thing” Septimus has retained and she has let slip is made 
simultaneously immaterial and overwhelmingly important to Mrs Dalloway. As Simpson 
suggests, here as in so many of her other works, Woolf “considers that, although we are 
individuals and have a sense of our identity as separate from others, we are also in many ways 
part of one another” (A Guide 89). While the complicated negotiation between private selves and 
public selves is highlighted in the novel, the social system that shapes, orders, and inhibits this 
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negotiation is the entity on trial. In wanting to talk about life and death, sanity and insanity, 
Woolf draws attention to the connective tissue that shapes the ways these terms are 
conceptualized and applied in her society, and by refusing them the discursive oppositions in 
which they so often find conceptual refuge, Woolf asks her readers to consider the roles such 
terms and concepts play in the interrelated lives of her characters. One is asked not to consider 
only the life of Clarissa or the death of Septimus, or only Clarissa’s sanity and Septimus’s 
insanity, but to consider what each has to do with the other and with the rest of their society. 
What ultimately matters most in Mrs Dalloway is, therefore, not the content of Clarissa’s 
epiphany but how she comes to her epiphany: that is, the social circumstances that make the 
epiphany possible, and the inequality of the power structure that makes the epiphany necessary. 
Septimus’s mad body becomes an important discursive battleground in England’s 
postwar struggles to deal with a war that had significantly destabilized the governmental and 
patriarchal establishment’s power when his doctors attempt to cure Semptimus using different 
approaches. Dr Holmes wants to render Septimus’s war experience illegible by reprioritizing his 
body for capitalist employment now it is no longer needed for military deployment. Dr Bradshaw 
wants to render it as all-too legible in order to make Septimus the centrepiece for a new 
government bill that will expand Bradshaw’s powers as an establishment functionary in charge 
of hiding mental illness, especially shellshock, away in asylums from the public. Bradshaw plans 
to use Septimus as the scapegoat for a society trying desperately not to confront the realities of 
the war and return to normal, a fate Septimus seems to recognize while he sits on a park bench, 
his wife Rezia trying to make Septimus notice the world around him: 
Look, the unseen bade him, the voice which now communicated with him who 
was the greatest of mankind, Septimus, lately taken from life to death, the Lord 
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who had come to renew society, who lay like a coverlet, a snow blanket smitten 
only by the sun, for ever unwasted, suffering for ever, the scapegoat, the eternal 
sufferer, but he did not want it, he moaned, putting from him with a wave of his 
hand that eternal suffering, that eternal loneliness. (22) 
Septimus’s position as a social outsider, the first and most obvious characteristic of scapegoats, 
is revealed when he refers to Rezia as the unseen and, thereby, implies that he is “seen” as 
noticeably abnormal due to the physical manifestations (shaking, speaking to himself) of his 
mental illness. But his repeated insistence that as a scapegoat he renews society is more difficult 
to parse. As René Girard has pointed out, inasmuch as the scapegoat functions as that which is 
blamed for some negative circumstance that has befallen a community, it simultaneously reveals 
the power relationships that govern the social system and revitalizes the social system by 
continually providing the outsider needed to define its boundaries. Thus, Girard writes, the 
“transgressor restores and even establishes the order he has somehow transgressed in anticipation. 
The greatest of all delinquents is transformed into a pillar of society” (42). Put differently, 
scapegoats are chosen not because they have transgressed some socially-defined boundary of 
behaviour, but because they can serve as that which establishes the boundary in the first place. In 
a very real sense, then, scapegoats mark the thresholds of acceptance within social systems, but, 
more importantly, they ensure these social systems remain coherent by continually “offering” 
themselves as examples of that which is considered abnormal within a given community or 
society. In Mrs Dalloway, Septimus is the scapegoat who marks the threshold of Bradshaw’s 
Proportion, a notion of sanity that is based on a set of normalized bodily actions associated with 
what it means to be English, precisely because Bradshaw excepts him from society. Social refuse 
excluded from the social system by Bradshaw, Septimus is still very much included in the system 
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because his mad, abnormal body serves as a constant reminder how others must act in order to be 
considered sane and remain comfortably inside the social system. Septimus, therefore, exists at 
the nexus of a biopolitical discursive structure focused on the organization of bodies that 
reinforce the ideological goals of the nation.  
 When discussing Septimus, critics generally focus on his mind and the psychological 
trauma he suffered for one of two reasons, the first of which is to question his reliability as a 
narrator. Grandiosity is a common feature of Septimus’s character and critics have tried to 
coherently connect his feeling of self-importance to the novel’s content, but I argue that the 
nature of his illness is less important than what it reveals about the operation of the larger social 
system he finds himself stuck within. At various times Septimus is “the most exalted of mankind” 
and “the Lord who had gone from life to death” (82), and believes that “he, Septimus, was alone, 
called forth in advance of the mass of men to hear the truth, to learn the meaning, which now at 
last, after all the toils of civilization—Greeks, Romans, Shakespeare, Darwin, and now 
himself—was to be given whole to…‘To whom?’ he asked aloud, ‘To the Prime Minister,’ […] 
to the Cabinet” (57). Sir William Bradshaw, who notes that the belief one is Christ or Christ-like 
is “a common delusion” amongst the mad (84), dismisses such comments as mere symptoms of 
the mental trauma Septimus suffered during the war. Bradshaw’s dismissal makes sense in a 
purely psychological sense because there is no doubt that Septimus is mad; what’s at stake in 
Septimus’s life, however, isn’t whether readers can trust Septimus to accurately convey reality—
given that he has visual and auditory hallucinations of his friend Evans, he clearly cannot—but 
the role that Septimus plays as a character within the constructed world of the novel. 
Interpretations based on the content of Septimus’s madness tend to reinforce Bradshaw’s 
psychological view of Septimus to argue that, “unable to conform to society’s expectations 
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regarding gender and class, he [withdraws] into a world of megalomania and terror” (Henke 166), 
or that Septimus, rather than having a message, has become alienated due to the trauma he 
suffered and, ultimately, succumbs to the feeling that he belongs “more to the dead than to the 
living” (Herman 52). Such responses to Septimus’s madness tend to remove him from the text 
and shift focus from the troubling social system and power relations that Mrs Dalloway exposes 
using Septimus.  
 Other interpretations do acknowledge that the content of Septimus’s madness may indeed 
have some message to reveal to his society, but in trying to expose this message they often end 
up trying to piece together a fragmented consciousness that Woolf fractures beyond repair. These 
interpretations suggest that Septimus’s mind is capable of explaining something only madness 
can; thus Christine Froula argues that Septimus “tries to attest to the collective murder his 
civilization has commissioned from him, to offer a ‘truth’ on which to rebuild civilization more 
lastingly” (113), while Karen DeMeester suggests that Septimus’s trauma revealed to him a truth 
about society, but “left it fragmented, a stream of incongruous and disconnected images and bits 
of memory” (80). I agree that Septimus has a valuable message to convey, but I’m reluctant to 
try to understand his trauma, as Froula and DeMeester do, by attempting to piece his disrupted 
consciousness back together. In part, this reluctance comes because Woolf is careful not to tell 
the reader too much about Septimus’s primal scene of trauma. The closest readers ever come to 
hearing of Evans’s death is when a third-person narrator tells them that “when Evans was killed 
[…] Septimus, far from showing any emotion or recognizing that here was the end of a 
friendship, congratulated himself upon feeling very little and very reasonably” (73). And from 
Septimus himself readers hear only fragments of Evans when he mistakes Peter Walsh for Evans 
in the park (59) and when he believes he hears or sees Evans at various moments in the novel 
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(for example, he hears Evans speak from behind a screen [79], and hears a mouse squeak and 
believes it to be Evans [123]). Such delusions are common when victims suffer from “traumatic 
memories” that remain unassimilated into normal or “narrative memory” according to Bessel A. 
van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart, who advocate the victim’s need to assimilate trauma and 
appropriate it by transforming it into a narrative (163). Septimus, however, is never allowed to 
assimilate his traumatic memory, as his doctors, his inability to communicate, and then his death 
interrupt the process. In the search for meaning in Septimus’s madness, therefore, we should not 
attempt to exorcise Septimus’s traumatic demons—demons Woolf consciously leaves 
unknowable and locked away in Septimus’s consciousness—in order to make his story coherent 
by narrativizing his trauma for him. Instead, we should shift the critical focus to the more 
tangible aspects of Septimus’s madness such as the bodily treatments his doctors prescribe, for 
doing so emphasizes the incomprehensibility of Septimus’s symptoms and their resistance to the 
kind of narratives, linguistic structures, and medical discourses that represent the political system 
that caused the trauma in the first place and now hopes to use him as a scapegoat. 
 The authority wielded by the medical establishment is represented by two figures who 
possess different degrees of cultural capital in the novel, and the first, Dr. Holmes, is treated as 
an object of ridicule in Mrs. Dalloway because he adheres to a limited understanding of PTSD 
and one that reflects a common understanding of shellshock in the 1920s. Holmes “works as hard 
as any man in London,” sees many patients in a day, and has “forty years’ experience behind him” 
(78), yet his traditional perspective of mental illness leads him to drastically misdiagnose 
Septimus’s problem from the outset. Holmes insists there is “nothing whatever the matter” with 
Septimus (77), and his only suggestion for treatment is that Septimus “Throw [himself] into 
outside interests; take up some hobby,” a strategy that helps Holmes “switch off from his patients” 
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(78), and try not to think about himself. After all, in Holmes’ opinion, “health is largely a matter 
in our own control” (78), so all Septimus need do to cure himself is discipline himself to think 
about other things than the trauma he suffered during the war. Holmes pushes Septimus’s 
hobby—reading Shakespeare and Dante—aside and tells him to “do something” (78), an act that 
reveals both the corporeal nature of Holmes’ treatment and how little he concerns himself with 
Septimus’s mind. Such attempts to treat psychological illness through the retraining of the 
patient’s body are what Michel Foucault, in History of Madness, refers to as “kind” psychiatry, 
which attempts to replace patient’s mad bodily actions with reasonable actions in order to 
reintegrate them back into society. “Kind” psychiatry is ultimately repressive, Foucault argues, 
because it not only reconstructs the mad body to ensure it performs reasonably but also teaches 
the mad how to regulate their actions as if under the constant supervision of reason (xxviii). 
Holmes’s stolid lack of comprehension—asking Septimus “‘Talking nonsense to frighten your 
wife?’” and giving him something to sleep after a serious delusion (79)—is emphasized by 
Woolf through the Smiths themselves, who distrust Holmes’s opinion and his own sense of 
socially contextualized authority: “if they were rich people, said Dr Holmes, looking ironically 
round the room, by all means let them go to Harley Street; if they had no confidence in him, said 
Dr Holmes, looking not so kind” (80). While this narrated scene takes place in the present, it 
occurs outside the depicted action of the novel—“off stage” as it were—and the narrator reveals 
only Holmes’s third of the discussion. Limiting the involvement of Septimus and Rezia in the 
passage marginalizes them textually as well as socially, and thus signals the central role of 
Holmes and of the role Holmes’s ego plays in his medical decisions. It is his pride that takes 
precedence over Septimus’s mental health, which appears in the scene only as a tool for 
Holmes’s self-aggrandizement. Holmes’s narcissism and passive aggression in this scene are 
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comedic, but they also reveal that his psychiatric decisions are tinged with class biases and 
feelings of inadequacy that make competition with Bradshaw the primary concern in his 
diagnosis. The underlying seriousness of a medical authority predicated upon social position 
rather than patient welfare comes to the fore when Holmes shames Septimus for not behaving as 
a good Englishman should: “Didn’t [talking of suicide] give [Rezia] a very odd idea of English 
husbands? Didn’t one owe perhaps a duty to one’s wife? Wouldn’t it be better to do something 
instead of lying in bed?” (78). Questions in form only, Holmes’s suggestions are thinly veiled 
attacks on Septimus’s masculinity and are intended to imply that shell-shock is more a failure of 
masculine character than a mental disorder that requires serious psychiatric care and attention.  
 Holmes’s focus on Septimus’s body and masculinity rather than his psychological 
problems demonstrates the complexity of Septimus’s position within the military system and its 
view of mental illness. Shell-shock was a significant problem in England during World War I: 
“Between April 1915 and April 1916, 1,300 officers and 10,000 men from the other ranks had 
been admitted to special hospitals in Britain” (Reid 13). These special hospitals were not 
technically the same thing as asylums where other lunatics and pauper lunatics were housed, but 
were, instead, psychiatric hospitals specifically designated for victims of shell-shock. Such 
special hospitals were part of an effort spearheaded by military authorities and supported by 
soldier advocacy groups “to make a definite distinction between shell-shocked soldiers and 
lunatics,” a distinction, Fiona Reid argues, “clearly designed to preserve the dignity of male 
combatants and to ensure that shell shock did not undermine male authority” (21-2). Removing 
shell-shocked soldiers from regular asylums had the added bonus of preventing any comparison 
between England’s true lunatics and its traumatized soldiers, no doubt a boon to a war 
department trying as hard to win the propaganda war at home as the military conflict in France. 
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Just how effectively shell-shock was distinguished from lunacy as a result of these special 
hospitals is difficult to say. While there was certainly support for shell-shocked veterans in the 
forms of donations and newspaper coverage, many soldiers felt socially stigmatized as a result of 
common reactions to shell-shock. One soldier, for example, upon being admitted to a special 
hospital recorded hearing a young woman say “Let’s get off home. […] There’s only some of the 
barmy ones here” (qtd. in Reid 23). 
 Shell-shock was also connected to class since what type of treatment facility a soldier 
was sent to and even what the disease was called depended a great deal on both social and 
military class, meaning that mental illness and its treatment became a way of reiterating existing 
social hierarchies. Predictably, commissioned officers—members of the higher social ranks—
were taken to country estates that had been converted into special hospitals and given their own 
private room; non-commissioned officers, too, got their own rooms, but were typically not sent 
to country estates. In contrast, combatants of lower military rank “could be dispatched to filthy 
asylum-like conditions” that “may have been staffed by excellent and committed physicians, but 
the food was scarce, wards were dirty and the temporary huts that accommodated many men 
were ‘a disgrace’” (Reid 33). The language used in the diagnosis of shell-shock also differed, 
frequently according to social class. While the term neurasthenia was first used universally to 
describe shell-shock, it was quickly appropriated to define the affliction of upper-class 
combatants in opposition to lower-class hysterical shell-shock victims. Hysterical shell-shock, 
because it was associated with the lower classes, became associated with a lack of education and, 
more damagingly, with malingering or shirking one’s military and national duty as well as 
cowardice and idleness. Neurasthenia, on the other hand, became associated with “real” mental 
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illness and the anxiety of performing one’s duty under duress: of feeling one’s responsibility all 
too powerfully (Reid 17-8).  
 Given that cowardice, malingering, and anxiety were associated with a lack of 
masculinity, treatment was less focused on the mental trauma soldiers suffered than on the 
rehabilitation of proper performances of gender focused on exercises that promoted socio-
economic success. In Britain, but also in Germany, this meant rehabilitation through activity and 
work. “If shell-shock victims had failed as men,” writes Reid, “it was important not to mother 
them as boys, but rather to find some way of enabling them to demonstrate their adulthood and 
their manliness. So by completing honourable masculine work, shell-shocked men were 
recovering the masculinity that they may have lost when they initially became mentally ill” (154). 
This so-called active treatment was not just good for reinstalling masculinity, however; it also 
became closely associated with contemporary views of industry and the economy. In Germany, 
treatment of shell-shock victims became closely tied with “rationalization,” a theory of 
industrialization that stressed efficiency and organization, and the “goal of active treatment, as 
categorically spelled out by military-medical protocols, was to transform idle patients into 
productive workers” (Lerner 126). These protocols weren’t distinct from issues of morality 
either: idleness was considered “toxic” to proper masculine behaviour, and it was thought that 
such reintegration into the workforce would prevent men from thinking about themselves 
excessively and turn their attention to the nation as a collective (Lerner 127). In England, too, 
active treatment became a guard against “immorality” in general and, more specifically, against 
the immorality of malingering.  
 Given the physical bent of this discourse, is it perhaps not surprising that as the war came 
to an end, public sympathy for shell-shock victims became less certain as many people in Britain 
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were unable to understand why ex-servicemen still suffered from its effects. Subsequently, 
charges of malingering increased rapidly, some papers began running articles that cast shell-
shock victims “as morally unsound, or even dangerous” (Reid 107), and one medical 
professional even suggested “strong links between shell shock and crime, alcohol and syphilis, 
and concluded that the majority of service patients would have become patients in mental 
hospitals whether there had been a war or not” (Reid 108). The recommended treatment for 
shell-shock, however, had not changed by the mid-1920s: the Report of the War Office 
Committee of Enquiry into “Shell-shock,” published in 1923, acknowledged that the rest cure 
may be necessary for shell-shocked veterans, but, noting the inherent conflict between self-
preservation and duty in soldiers, recommended that “self-respect, duty, discipline, patriotism, 
and so forth” should be emphasized in treatment (qtd. in Thomas 55). Thus, the treatment of 
shell-shock closely aligned with the discourse that came to define it as a disease not of the mind 
but of the body, where lower-class “cowards” and “malingerers” saw their mad bodies first 
stigmatized then optimized through medical treatment to once again fulfill the requirements of a 
nation now in need of labourers who work rather than soldiers who kill. 
 Bodily discipline permeates Septimus’s relationship with both his doctors and his 
madness, and he frequently worries about what his actions signify while ever people can see him. 
Not only does Septimus imply he is “seen” while sitting in the park with Rezia, he also believes 
himself to be the centre of attention earlier in the novel when a car’s tire bursts in Bond Street 
and draws the attention of shoppers and passers-by. A moment of unity, like the “leaden circles” 
of Big Ben’s bell that “[dissolve] in the air” and unite the many lives of London as they chime 
with regularity throughout the novel (see 4, 41, 80, 158), the sound caused by the tire draws the 
attention of the people on Bond Street, but Septimus perceives this moment differently: 
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Everyone looked at the motor car. Septimus looked. Boys on bicycles sprang off. 
Traffic accumulated. And there the motor car stood, with drawn blinds, and upon 
them a curious pattern like a tree, Septimus thought, and this gradual drawing 
together of everything to one centre before his eyes, as if some horror had come 
almost to the surface and was about to burst into flames, terrified him. The world 
wavered and quivered and threatened to burst into flames. It is I who am blocking 
the way, he thought. Was he not being looked at and pointed at; was he not 
weighted there, rooted to the pavement, for a purpose? But for what purpose? (13) 
Septimus’s response seems to be yet another delusion of grandeur—a view that is ostensibly 
supported when it becomes clear that the people look at the car because the onlookers believe it 
is occupied by some royal figure or the prime minister (14)—but, in fact, Woolf describes the 
physical manifestations of Septimus’s PTSD that cause him so frequently to believe he is the 
centre of attention in the first place. His mention of flames metonymically refers to the death of 
his friend Evans in an explosion, the primal scene of Septimus’s trauma, and it also refers to the 
feeling of heat that one experiences when embarrassed or ashamed and to the heat of tears 
welling up in one’s eyes as they begin to cry. The world waving and quivering in front of him, 
therefore, is as much a physical description of trying to view the world through teary eyes as it is 
a psychological description of a fragmented perception of reality, and the horror that comes to 
the surface is as much an unwanted physical response that he fears will draw gazes from the 
public as it is a description of his own personal mental trauma. While Septimus suffers from a 
mental illness that is triggered when the tire is punctured, he can only think of himself at this 
moment as a publicly observable object and so imagines that his reaction is meant to be seen, is 
meant to convey something to the people around him. Far from indicating an exaggerated sense 
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of purpose, however, Septimus’s reaction to the physical manifestations of his mental illness 
indicates an existential dilemma, for, rather than being able to derive meaning from his own 
feelings and subjective existence, he derives meaning from his position as an object in a 
performance he feels unable to control.  
 Rezia’s actions after the tire bursts also indicate that Septimus is in some kind of physical 
distress that she fears others may notice, for when she finally gets his attention, the narrator 
indicates that Septimus “jumped, started, and said, ‘All right!’ angrily, as if she had interrupted 
him” (13). While it is possible that all she interrupted him from was contemplation, the fact that 
she immediately wishes to get him away from the crowd suggests otherwise: “People must 
notice; people must see. People, she thought, looking at the crowd staring at the motor car; the 
English people […] which she admired in a way; but they were ‘people’ now, because Septimus 
had said, ‘I will kill myself’; an awful thing to say. Suppose they had heard him?” (13). Already 
an immigrant trying to acclimatize herself to her new country, Rezia’s troubles are compounded 
by Septimus’s actions and force her also to constantly monitor her position as an object of others’ 
gazes. The difference is that she is able to remove herself enough from the performance to seek 
shelter in Regent’s Park while Septimus’s physical reaction to the events mire him in place. That 
Rezia’s decision to remove Septimus to Regent’s Park is prudent seems to be confirmed later on 
by Maisie Johnson, who stops to ask Rezia and Septimus the way to the tube station. Johnson is 
given “quite a turn” by Rezia and Septimus, for the former “start[s] and jerk[s] her hands” when 
Johnson asks for directions while the latter seems very “queer,” a word Johnson repeats a 
number of times (22). Whether or not Johnson would have noted Septimus’s queerness without 
Rezia’s reaction to her simple question is unclear, but the couple makes enough of an impression 
on her “that should she be very old she would still remember and make [the encounter] jangle 
	
 211 
among her memories” (22). At the very least, therefore, Septimus’s actions, aided perhaps by 
Rezia who feels objectified by her husband’s actions and tries to take responsibility for them, are 
queer enough to remove Johnson from what Woolf, in Moments of Being (1972), calls the 
“nondescript cotton wool” in which so much of one’s life is lived, and he provides a “moment of 
being” she will remember for the rest of her life (70). Septimus, of course, is not meaningful only 
because his mad body allows others to experience moments of being or revelations, but 
Johnson’s response does suggest that the physical manifestations of Septimus’s mental trauma 
are severe enough to warrant his concern about hegemonic definitions of madness and his fear of 
appearing mad in public. 
Sir William Bradshaw, who is more medically astute and authoritative than Holmes but 
who is still subject to similar class biases and feelings of inadequacy as his counterpart, 
represents the hegemonic power of the government establishment when it comes to treating shell 
shock in soldiers. Unlike Holmes, who sees many patients each day, Bradshaw gives “three-
quarters of an hour” to all his patients and answers Rezia’s questions calmly after meeting with 
Septimus (84). Of general practitioners like Holmes, Bradshaw must take “half his time to undo 
their blunders” (81), and it is with little effort that he more correctly diagnoses Septimus’s shell-
shock: “he was certain directly he saw the man; it was a case of extreme gravity. It was a case of 
complete breakdown—complete physical and nervous breakdown, with every symptom in an 
advanced stage, he ascertained in two or three minutes” (81). The treatments prescribed by each 
doctor differ, too. Instead of the activity that Holmes recommends, Bradshaw suggests “rest, rest, 
rest; a long rest in bed” at a psychiatric facility (82). It is only when Bradshaw suggests this 
treatment plan to Septimus that the narrator reveals the doctor suffers from the same feelings of 
inadequacy and class biases as Holmes:  
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 “We have been arranging that you should go into a home,” said Sir 
William. 
 “One of Holmes’s homes?” sneered Septimus. 
 The fellow made a distasteful impression. For there was in Sir William, 
whose father had been a tradesman, a natural respect for breeding and clothing, 
which shabbiness nettled; again, more profoundly, there was in Sir William, who 
had never had time for reading, a grudge, deeply buried, against cultivated people 
who came into his room and intimated that doctors, whose profession is a constant 
strain upon all the higher faculties, are not educated men. 
 “One of my homes, Mr Warren Smith,” he said, “where we will teach you 
to rest.” (83) 
Again Septimus’s healthcare is secondary to the ego of his doctor, who perceives the words of 
the man he has just diagnosed as “very seriously ill” (82) as a personal slight meant to question 
his ability as a doctor as well as his class. Futhermore, while a significant portion of Bradshaw’s 
diagnosis concerns Septimus’s language because his tendency of “attaching meanings to words 
of a symbolic kind” presents a “serious symptom to be noted on the card” (81), it is Bradshaw 
who attaches symbolic meaning to words in this passage: in “Holmes’s homes” and a sneer, 
Bradshaw hears a comparison to Holmes, whom he considers an inept general practitioner, and 
thus a challenge to his intelligence and an attack on his socioeconomic background. In this 
passage, therefore, Bradshaw fails according to his own standards that suggest “if in this exacting 
science [psychiatric diagnosis] which has nothing to do with what, after all, we know nothing 
about—the nervous system, the human brain—a doctor loses his sense of proportion, as a doctor 
he fails” (84). This passage not only notes the hypocrisy in Bradshaw’s diagnosis—the 
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subjective nature of psychiatric evaluation and the way personal biases can affect the process are 
well known—but also points out Bradshaw’s flaw in thinking about psychiatry as an “exacting 
science,” a view that limits his ability to treat patients effectively. The rigid structure that 
informs Bradshaw’s understanding inevitably diminishes the human complexity of mental health 
disorders such as PTSD that present with many different mental and physical manifestations. 
Thus, rather than recognizing that attaching symbolic meaning to language is a foundation of 
human knowledge and trying to understand what meaning Septimus attributes to “war” and why, 
Bradshaw focuses his energy on Septimus’s improperly assertive vocal gestures and 
disproportionate bodily actions and recommends a treatment that targets his body so that 
Septimus might at least act like a sane person.  
 In order to ensure that people perform a socially designated sanity, Bradshaw employs 
the twin goddesses of his exacting science Proportion and Conversion, both of which are 
troublingly connected to nationalism and what Bradshaw believes to be English values. 
Bradshaw is intimately invested in the nation and in notions of Englishness, for he “not only 
prospered himself but made England prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade children, penalized 
despair, made it impossible for the unfit to propagate their views until they, too, shared his sense 
of proportion—his, if they were men, Lady Bradshaw’s if they were women (she embroidered, 
knitted, spent four nights out of seven at home with her son)” (84). Quite literally an agent of the 
state, then, Bradshaw makes sure citizens are duly performing their part according to his own 
proportionate understanding of what it means to be English, and when people stray, he engages 
Conversion to remind them of their imperfect proportions. Conversion “feasts on the wills of the 
weakly, loving to impress, to impose, adoring her own features stamped on the face of the 
populace” (85). Thus, Woolf describes what Foucault calls a biopolitics of the human body—the 
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standardization, optimization, and prioritization of the body—with Bradshaw’s two goddesses, 
for each recognizes a power that functions by disciplining the body to ensure the appropriate 
performance of “good” subjects who act as the conduit through which the ideologies of a 
society’s superstructure are made into material reality. In terms of Bradshaw’s patients, they are 
hailed by a medical establishment that demands they act proportionately if they are to be 
reintegrated into society, and by answering this hail, they are interpellated and become subjects 
of England’s (via Bradshaw) concept of what constitutes normal behaviour. As Bradshaw 
recognizes, nation-states have much to gain by disciplining bodies to ensure they behave as the 
state wants them to, as military, economic, and political power depend on that ability to convince 
citizens to act on behalf of the state. The asylum as ideological state apparatus, along with the 
educational and military institutions of which Septimus is all too aware, relies on this dynamic of 
ideology (proportion) and punishment (conversion) to produce disciplined subjects who 
materialize ideology for the state. In the reciprocal relationship between state and subject, the 
subject both realizes (makes real) ideology and is realized (made into a subject) by the ideology, 
providing them a sense of identity that connects them to their fellow subjects. Whether the 
gendered subject, the national subject, or the sane subject, the subject is thus constituted by the 
actions of the body, rather than by any innate gender, nationality, or sense of reason.  
 Woolf’s portrayal of Septimus as a subject of such ideological enactment is represented 
also in the experiences and actions of other Londoners, particularly as they respond to patriotic 
moments.	After the car tire explodes and affects Septimus so powerfully, a rumour begins to 
circulate that someone important, such as the Prime Minister or a member of the royalty, is in the 
car. The rumour, rather than Septimus’s actions, is the reason the people stop to look. The car 
causes “a slight ripple” as it travels down Bond Street, which seems “so trifling in single 
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instances that no mathematical instrument […] could register the vibration; yet in its fullness 
rather formidable and in its common appeal emotional; for in all the hat shops and tailors’ shops 
strangers looked at each other and thought of the dead; of the flag; of Empire” (15). What makes 
nationalism so powerful, the narrator points out, is its ability to create feelings in groups of 
people; its ability to make one person in one car in a crowded London street an “enduring 
symbol of the state” (14) and cause all onlookers to think, however momentarily, of the same 
thing. This moment of unity is repeated as the car turns down St James’s Street past White’s, a 
gentlemen’s club, on the way to Buckingham Palace: the men inside “stood even straighter” and 
“seemed ready to attend their Sovereign, if need be, to the cannon’s mouth, as their ancestors had 
done before them,” an action of which “the little white tables in the background covered with 
copies of the Tatler and bottles of soda water seemed to approve” (16). While these actions are 
treated by Woolf with a certain amount of levity—the Tatler, a society gossip magazine, and 
soda bottles acting as much as a symbol of these upper-class men’s lives as the patriotism they 
display when their Sovereign (possibly) passes by—the scene itself speaks to the potential power 
of nationalism. Patriotism is instilled so deeply that its slightest ripple commands actions up to 
and including death. The attachment of symbolic meaning to an image this time instead of to 
words is once again highlighted, but here the attachment unites the onlookers rather than 
marginalizing an individual, as is the case with Septimus. Imperative to symbolic recognition, it 
seems, is that the right symbolic meaning is attached to the right symbol, not so much that it 
takes place in general. Thinking of King and Empire, in other words, is the proportionate 
response to this moment in order that one be considered appropriately British.  
 A military procession witnessed by Peter Walsh later in the novel solicits the same 
response from the people watching, but this time the narrator uses the language of Proportion and 
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Conversion to describe the spectacle. The procession moves south down Whitehall, a street in 
Central London that runs from Trafalgar Square to the Houses of Parliament and that is flanked 
either side by government and military buildings such as the Old War Office Buildings, Old 
Admiralty Buildings, the Ministry of Defense, and the Offices of Wales and Scotland. Boys of 
sixteen wearing military uniforms are carrying a wreath toward the Cenotaph that memorializes 
those soldiers who died in The Great War. They march down Whitehall “as if one will worked 
legs and arms uniformly, and life, with its varieties, its irreticences, had been laid under a 
pavement of monuments and wreaths and drugged into a stiff yet staring corpse by discipline” 
(44). Stripped of anything resembling individuality, these boys are little more than ideological 
conduits of the patriarchal militarism that is realized through their movements, their uniforms, 
and the very street they march down. Surrounded by the military and political traditions of 
England, the boys are simultaneously rendered visible and invisible by the uniforms that 
represent tradition. Their paradoxical position is highlighted by the fact that, rather than looking 
like “robust” figures who can carry the weight of England’s military culture and history, the boys 
look “weedy” and at odds with the uniforms designed to give them an identity and purpose 
within their society (43). Unlike the scene on Bond Street, there is neither lightness nor levity in 
this passage, for this procession is something more than a slight ripple. Taking place as it does 
and where it does, this is no momentary instance of nationalism but an orchestrated performance 
designed to instil in its viewers an even deeper response than has been felt by the shoppers on 
Bond Street and the gentlemen in White’s. If the Bond Street responses were brought about by a 
single note that has reverberated through the streets and brought people together momentarily 
before they have returned to their gloves, hats, and magazines, this march is designed 
specifically to hold people’s attention and ensure they remain fixated on this symbol of 
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England’s patriarchal militarism. Indeed, even Peter Walsh, who tends to treat England’s 
traditions with suspicion, succumbs at one point to the “regular thudding sound” of the march 
that “drum[s] his thoughts” and catches himself “beginning to keep step with them” (43). Peter, 
of course, regains his composure and does not continue in step with the boys, but the fact that 
this rebellious figure responds at all demonstrates how deeply ingrained are such feelings of 
nationalism. Other onlookers pay attention to the procession as Peter does, for the boys “had 
taken their vow. The traffic respected it; vans were stopped” (43). These marching boys, 
therefore, create a spectacle that, more than creating a momentary instance of unity, crystalizes 
unity around their disciplined bodies, which act as potent symbols of England. 
 Septimus is convinced, in part, to join the military by another potent symbol of 
England—William Shakespeare—but Shakespeare’s symbolic meaning in Septimus’s mind is 
different than the writer’s common cultural significance during the war. As Jane de Gay has 
pointed out, series such as the British Academy Annual Shakespeare lectures worked to co-opt 
the playwright for the war effort and were directed specifically at gentlemen: the officer class 
(74). Not a member of the upper-class trained at Oxford or Cambridge, Septimus is a common 
reader who receives his only formal education from “Miss Isabel Pole, lecturing in the Waterloo 
Road upon Shakespeare” (72), and while he does not have access to the same institutionally 
ingrained sense of patriotic duty as do the gentlemen of White’s, he nonetheless learns a kind of 
patriotism from his education. When Pole teaches Septimus the beauty of Shakespeare’s writing, 
he transfers this beauty onto her, falling in love with her to such an extent that he “went to 
France to save an England which consisted almost entirely of Shakespeare’s plays and Miss 
Isobel Pole in a green dress walking in a square” (73). When the gentlemen of White’s stand to 
attention as the Prime Minister or Royal personage passes by, they think of “the flowing corn 
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and the manor houses of England” (16); when Pole introduces Septimus to Antony and 
Cleopatra, on the other hand, she lights “in him such a fire as burns only once in a lifetime, 
without heat, flickering a red-gold flame infinitely ethereal and insubstantial over Miss Pole” 
(72). Where the gentlemen fight for a pastoral England their academic training and familial 
upbringing has taught them to mythologize, Septimus fights for his love of Pole, which he has 
connected to Shakespeare through their shared experiences of reading his works and through his 
correspondence with her. Neither is presented as a sane reason to go to war—Septimus’s love, 
after all, is as “ethereal” and “insubstantial” as the idyllic, pastoral England the gentlemen have 
imagined, and it never seems to be reciprocated by Pole, who ignores the subject of the love 
poems he writes her and comments upon them in red ink (72)—but the difference lies in Isobel 
Pole’s position. As a lecturer in a small college with a very limited ability to influence national 
narratives of English patriotism in any meaningful way, hers is a personal influence. Indeed, 
Septimus as a common reader is distanced from the institutions that play such an important role 
in the social system Mrs Dalloway exposes: rather than being taught, as Woolf will point out in 
Three Guineas, duty, honour, and patriotism through literature, he reads for pleasure and without 
a specific end in mind. As if proving the critical deficiency that Woolf argues is the primary 
characteristic of common readers, his reading of Shakespeare initially leads him to idealize Pole 
and go to war on her behalf, but, crucially, Septimus has not read to find patriotism in 
Shakespeare; rather, he has read Shakespeare and found patriotism. The end in this instance is 
the same, but Septimus’s path is personal rather than guided institutional instruction. 
 His lack of formal training is equally significant when Septimus finds a different meaning 
in Shakespeare’s plays after he returns from the war, for this change in interpretation represents 
the ever-changing reading epistemologies of Woolf’s ideal common reader rather than the 
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structured responses of institutional knowledge. Septimus’s altered view of Shakespeare, who, 
Septimus believes, far from revealing beauty in his words, “loathed humanity” (75), is a reading 
that foregrounds Septimus’s contempt for human nature. Precisely what Septimus means by 
“human nature” in Mrs. Dalloway is difficult to discern, but it is connected to his doctors, 
specifically Holmes: “Once you stumble, Septimus wrote on the back of a postcard, human 
nature is on you. Holmes is on you” (78). DeMeester relates his view of human nature back to 
the secret message Septimus has learned through his trauma, arguing that, as “A prophetic 
witness to the aggression instinctive in human nature and ineradicable from European 
civilization, he brings the war home in his very person” (112). It may be true that Septimus 
witnessed the worst of human nature during the war, and this horror may be inscribed on his 
body in the form of his PTSD, but the human nature he ascribes to Holmes—indeed, that he 
emphatically describes Holmes a representative of—is not the same aggressive, inhumane, 
destructive human nature Septimus experiences in the trenches during the war. Rather than 
conflating human nature with the violence experienced at the front—or, as Froula suggests, 
seeing Septimus as revealing how “the brute, human nature, that frightens and excites us, is not 
restrained within our souls but called forth by the very institutions struggling to repress it” 
(84)—Woolf presents a Holmesian human nature as one that watches, that monitors. It is a 
human nature that demands the citizen do the opposite of what Septimus has been asked to do in 
the trenches, for if in the trenches Septimus “developed manliness” that allowed him to feel 
“very little and very reasonably” when Evans died (73), then it is now, at home, that he must 
learn a different kind of manliness that centers on being a caring husband. Once asked to take 
life, Septimus is now asked to foster not only his wife’s life but also his own, which, to 
Septimus, inexplicably takes on more importance now that the war is over. Once cannon fodder 
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waiting to explode, like Evans, in service to King and country, Septimus must now serve by not 
dying—at least not by his own hand.  
 To Septimus, both his role as a soldier and his role as a husband are seen as performances 
he must maintain if he is not to become an outsider in his society, and it is this compulsion 
toward performance and the punishment of those who refuse to perform that he most despises in 
human beings. In his most coherent definition of human nature, Septimus thinks, “the truth is (let 
[Rezia] ignore it) that human beings have neither kindness, nor faith, nor charity beyond what 
serves to increase the pleasure of the moment. They hunt in packs. Their packs scour the desert 
and vanish screaming into the wilderness. They desert the fallen” (76). That human beings hunt 
does not seem to bother Septimus; what bothers him is that they hunt in packs or carefully 
organized groups that desert the fallen who don’t, won’t, or can’t fulfill their roles in the group’s 
coordinated actions. Septimus’s conception of human nature does not concern itself with the 
actions of humans during battle; rather, it centres on his sense that the slightest oddity, deviance 
from the script, or inappropriate action will bring down judgment. The human nature he 
experiences at the front, therefore, is the same human nature he experiences at home, for both 
demand his performance, first as a soldier and then as a husband, and both will punish any bodily 
actions deemed incongruous. All this becomes clear to Septimus after he returns from the war 
and reads Shakespeare: “That boy’s business of the intoxication of language—Antony and 
Cleopatra—had shriveled utterly. How Shakespeare loathed humanity—the putting on of clothes, 
the getting of children, the sordidity of the mouth and the belly. This was now revealed to 
Septimus; the message hidden in the beauty of the words. The secret signal which one generation 
passes, under disguise, to the next is loathing, hatred, despair. Dante the same. Aeschylus 
(translated) the same” (75). Once connected to his love for Miss Pole and the patriotism this love 
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inspired, Shakespeare is changed utterly for Septimus after his experiences at the front. The 
perceived beauty of Shakespeare’s words merely hides the banality and brutality of the civilian 
life he is now expected to live. As was the case before the war, Septimus finds in Shakespeare 
something that confirms his current worldview, a result that may show his deficiency as a critic 
but one that is nonetheless a product of his own life and reading experiences rather than the rote 
knowledge of educational institutions that co-opt Shakespeare to inculcate patriotism in service 
to the nation. Septimus’s common readerly practices, therefore, mark him as an outsider of the 
governing class that Mrs Dalloway critiques, and they reveal just how little access he has had to 
those institutions that shape future government officials to steer the nation.  
 Septimus’s access to such institutions changes, of course, once he transgresses 
Bradshaw’s sense of Proportion, and his entrance into Bradshaw’s purview reveals both the great 
power Bradshaw holds in his society and the central role Septimus plays in establishing this 
social system’s boundaries and ensuring its proper functioning. Because Septimus has talked of 
suicide, Bradshaw tells Rezia that his case is now a “question of law” and that there is “no 
alternative” to his confinement (82). Woolf makes clear that Bradshaw has worked with the law 
in other cases to confine patients in a home in Surrey where “unsocial impulses, bred more than 
anything by the lack of good blood, were held in control” (86), for when “family affection; 
honour; courage; and a brilliant career” are not enough to make the patient achieve Proportion, 
Bradshaw “had to support him police and the good of society” (86). Bradshaw’s power to impose 
his will, therefore, is far reaching, but it becomes truly frightening in the case of suicidal patients 
because Bradshaw believes it is incumbent upon the government to intervene in such 
circumstances, with him as the arbiter of who must be confined. Referring specifically to suicidal 
patients, Bradshaw explains that they believe “this living or not living is an affair of our own. 
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But there they were mistaken” (86). His language reflects the doctor’s “power to foster life or 
disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault, History of Sexuality 138). By controlling suicidal 
patients’ decisions to kill themselves, Bradshaw is simultaneously reforming their behaviour to 
make them proportionate subjects, and disallowing their lives to the point of death by confining 
them in asylums where they and, more importantly, their deaths cannot be seen by society. By 
secluding Septimus, Alex Zwerdling argues, law makers such as Bradshaw ensure the governing 
class’s ideology is propagated through acts of “covering up the stains and ignoring the major and 
minor tremors that threaten its existence” (125). As importantly, his overbearing presence in the 
novel demonstrates that “the complacency of the governing class is not a natural state but must 
be constantly defended by the strenuous activity of people like Sir William” (125). A state 
functionary in doctor’s clothing, Bradshaw manages the lives of people—at great expense to 
himself according to Lady Bradshaw, who says his life “is not his own but his patients’” (86)—
by limiting their access to society while at the same time limiting society’s access to lives 
deemed either too different to be accommodated by the governing class’s ideologies or too 
dangerous to their continued governance. 
 This interrelationship between Septimus’s body and the nation would have been treated 
very differently had he been one of the glorious dead killed during the war, for his body would 
have become an object to be eulogized rather than an object used by Bradshaw to increase his 
power. As Madelyn Detloff points out, “For Holmes and his ilk, had Septimus been killed in the 
war like his compatriot Evans, his death would have been glorified, patriotic” (158). Now, 
however, four years after the war, the most patriotic thing Septimus can do is remove himself 
from a society trying to return to peace. He is a remainder and reminder of war but does not 
memorialize it in the right way: no longer the stoic soldier who “congratulated himself upon 
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feeling very little and very reasonably” after Evans dies (Woolf 73), and instead a nervous, shaky 
man who suffers from delusions, Septimus’s traumatized existence and symbolic body are things 
to be hidden away and reformed so England may memorialize the war with cenotaphs that 
represent valour and honour. Septimus’s suicide can thus be regarded as a final effort to extricate 
himself from the nation and its representative, Bradshaw; but while Septimus physically 
succeeds in achieving this goal, his life and body live on as spectral political presences at 
Clarissa’s party. Predictably, they are renarrated by Bradshaw, who talks of Septimus’s suicide 
with Richard Dalloway in connection to a legal Bill, to which Bradshaw wishes to attach a 
provision concerning “the deferred effects of shell-shock” (155). Bradshaw, therefore, brings 
death to the party, but it is a certain death for a certain purpose: he plans to use Septimus’s 
corpse to further extend his legal power to seclude England’s lunatics. Septimus’s discursive 
body is to have no respite after all, for it will now be used to generate lasting legislation that will 
be used to confine people like him. Or, as Zwerdling suggests, “the living Septimus becomes a 
category, his life an ‘it’ to be considered by government committees drafting legislation” (128). 
Objectified in death as he believed himself to be in life, Septimus lives on as a symbol of 
madness that Bradshaw uses to further his own power.  
 It is his continued use for Bradshaw’s sense of Proportion that Septimus describes when 
he refers to himself as that which is “for ever unwasted, suffering for ever, the scapegoat, the 
eternal sufferer” (22): Septimus functions as the exclusion Bradshaw needs to protect his 
definition of Proportion. Scapegoats are primarily useful within social systems because they are 
excluded from that social system: in this way, the scapegoat serves as a constant reminder of the 
threshold between inclusion and exclusion. More importantly, the scapegoat reveals the 
relationship between social institutions, such as the asylum, and the juridical and biopolitical 
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management of bodies. As Giorgio Agamben has argued, social institutions that focus on the 
discursive management of bodies cannot function legally without the relationship between two 
people: the sovereign and the exception. The laws that govern a community are established and, 
indeed, retain validity only because there are those who fall outside their parameters, but some 
sovereign (this can be a king, but it more generally refers to any figure with the authority to 
adjudicate whether a person must be excluded from society for transgressing laws or norms) 
must make an exception of them by marking them as outside the law: 
The exception is a kind of exclusion. What is excluded from the general rule is an 
individual case. But the most proper characteristic of the exception is that what is 
excluded in it is not, on account of being excluded, absolutely without relation to 
the rule. On the contrary, what is excluded in the exception maintains itself in 
relation to the rule in the form of the rule’s suspension. The rule applies to the 
exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it. The state of exception is 
thus not the chaos that precedes order but rather the situation that results from its 
suspension. (17-18) 
Important, here, is what is created in the wake of the sovereign exception, for in suspending the 
law to exclude the exceptional action or person, the law legitimates its own validity. Law and 
order becomes the normal situation to which the exception, marked by his/her exclusion from the 
norm, stands in opposition. The exception, then, brings the law as norm into relief, so that “what 
is at issue in the sovereign exception is not so much the control or neutralization of an excess as 
the creation and definition of the very space in which juridico-political order can have validity” 
(19). The exception thus simultaneously establishes and guards the threshold of the law; it 
creates the norm through the exception’s very exclusion. The “law,” Agamben argues, is thus 
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“made of nothing but what it manages to capture inside itself through the inclusive exclusion of 
the exception” (27). In excluding the exception, that is to say, the sovereign defines a space in 
which his/her law is able to function, and all bodies caught within this space are then subject to 
the law, which is itself predicated on its own suspension in the figure of the sovereign exception. 
 Thus, Bradshaw, with his sovereign power to seclude England’s lunatics, can establish 
the threshold of what is considered reasonable behaviour in England and capture others inside 
the norms and laws he himself has determined, a situation Clarissa recognizes at the end of the 
party when she hears Bradshaw discussing Septimus. The exception Bradshaw uses to establish 
what constitutes reasonable behaviour is obviously Septimus, yet the biopolitical space this 
exception ends up creating extends much further and portends much more than Septimus’s 
private confinement in an asylum. Bradshaw’s proportionate man is precisely the “common 
man” held up as cultural arbiter in middlebrow conceptions of English culture, so his immense 
institutional power to diagnose proportion and enforce conversion, which he seeks to extend 
legally with the help of Richard Dalloway, reaches well past Septimus and into the lives of 
everyone in England. Clarissa recognizes the full extent of this power as a result of hearing about 
Septimus, but she always feels deeply uncomfortable around Bradshaw, who, even though “He 
looked what he was, a great doctor,” inspires fear in Clarissa because “what she felt was, one 
wouldn’t like Sir William to see one unhappy” (155). Clarissa’s language here reveals that she 
feels herself to be, as Septimus has felt himself to be, an object under the gaze of Bradshaw, 
especially when she switches from the more personal pronoun “she” to the impersonal pronoun 
“one” halfway through the sentence. All, she suggests, are subject to Bradshaw because of the 
immense power he wields, and one can almost feel how he oppresses her by demanding she 
appear at all times happy. Importantly, Clarissa then connects her feelings about Bradshaw to 
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Septimus, who she imagines may have had the passion of poets and thinkers before “Sir William 
had impressed him, like that, with his power” (157). The word “impressed” carries with it a dual 
meaning that represents both of Bradshaw’s goddesses, for it signals the impressive figure 
Bradshaw cuts as a great doctor and the shining example of Proportion twinned with the 
moulding power of Conversion, which itself “feasts on the wills of the weakly, loving to 
impress” (85). Clarissa’s near incommunicable revelation as she thinks about Septimus’s death, 
therefore—the “thing, wreathed about with chatter, defaced, obscured, in her own life” but that 
“he had preserved” in death (156)—centres on the mechanism of power that his body’s final 
disproportionate action reveals to her. His death constitutes the defiant transgression of 
Bradshaw’s law of Proportion, which she, too, feels and describes as an “indescribable outrage—
forcing your soul” (157).  
 This indescribable outrage is mirrored in Clarissa’s final outburst about the intolerability 
of men like Bradshaw, and while it seems Clarissa quickly forgets about her revelation because 
she goes back to her hosting duties, her parties are so important precisely because they create a 
space of potential in which epiphanies like her own can occur. Clarissa connects herself to 
Septimus when she explains that “She felt somehow very like him” and that she is glad he had 
“thrown [his life] away while they went on living,” but she then notes that “The clock was 
striking. The leaden circles dissolved in the air. But she must go back. She must assemble” (158). 
Clarissa was not always such a dutiful host, however. Rebellious in her youth to the point that 
she and Sally Seton “meant to found a society to abolish private property, and actually had a 
letter written, though not sent out” (28-9), Clarissa becomes less rebellious through her decision 
to marry Richard Dalloway, and she looks back on her actions as a young woman as “very 
absurd” (29). But having taken her place in the governing class, Clarissa becomes, according to 
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Peter, “one of the most thorough-going sceptics he had ever met” inasmuch as she sees humanity 
as a “doomed race” and life as “a bad joke,” yet she believes that, if this is the case, we should 
“at any rate, do our part; mitigate the sufferings of our fellow-prisoners” (66). There’s a sense of 
defeatism and determinism in Clarissa’s outlook, a sense that Conversion has stripped her of her 
revolutionary spirit and convinced her that life is merely something to be made the best of 
depending on one’s position within society. There is something much more powerful in 
Clarissa’s scepticism, however, which becomes clear when Peter explains that her acquiescence 
to the role she assumes when she marries Richard is based on the belief that “Those ruffians, the 
Gods, shan’t have it all their own way—her notion being that the Gods, who never lost a chance 
of hurting, thwarting and spoiling human lives, were seriously put out if, all the same, you 
behaved like a lady” (66). This seems like the mere capitulation of her individualism to what is 
expected of her as the wife of a Member of Parliament (MP), but it is actually a profound 
realization that her social position is an important determinant in what agency she has within the 
social system and how best to apply this agency. Behaving like a lady is less a total abnegation 
of her revolutionary youth than a realization that her skills and the benefits her social position 
provides can be put to better use than small revolts against her parents and the upper-class life 
into which she has been born. Clarissa, in other words, chooses to work within the confines of 
her governing class subject position to effect change where she can, rather than actively choosing 
a rebellious outsider position like Peter Walsh or Doris Kilman. The change Clarissa tries to 
effect comes in the moments she creates as a hostess, which Peter once again explains when he 
describes Clarissa’s “transcendental theory” that the influence others’ lives may have on one is 
often only discovered when a moment spent with a person makes such an impact that it initiates 
a revisioning process in oneself. As Peter explains with reference to his relationship with 
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Clarissa, “You were given a sharp, acute, uncomfortable grain—the actual meeting; horribly 
painful as often as not; yet in absence, in the most unlikely places, it would flower out, open, 
shed its scent, let you touch, taste, look about you, get the whole feel of it and understanding, 
after years of lying lost” (130). Clarissa’s theory suggests that layer after layer of revisions are 
added to the moments that constitute one’s relationships with others, a process that shapes both 
one and the other but that relies explicitly on the interpersonal relationship between the two. 
Where each abrasive moment is a grain of sand that has the potential to become a valuable pearl, 
her theory of personal interrelationship counters the more static power relations Bradshaw’s two 
goddesses build between people in reducing them to mere insiders and outsiders of the social 
system. Her own epiphany serves as an example of her theory, for it is Bradshaw’s decision to 
talk about death at her party that provides her with the moment she needs to forge a personal 
connection with Septimus that both transcends the class boundaries that separate the two and 
causes her to revise her view of Bradshaw, transforming him in her mind from a “great doctor” 
(155) into to a man who makes life “intolerable” (157).  
 Clarissa therefore uses her public life to supplement the private lives of those around her 
and indeed herself by providing moments that contain the potential to create epiphanies, and this 
is why she refers to her parties as a “gift” in the only passage in which Clarissa herself discusses 
her gatherings. Clarissa initially struggles to describe precisely why she gives her parties, saying 
that what she gets out of the parties is “simply life” (103), but as she tries to define her 
motivations more clearly they end up sounding very similar to the transcendental theory that 
Peter explains on her behalf. People she knows from around London—South Kensington, 
Bayswater, Mayfair—live in close proximity to one another, she explains, and she feels “quite 
continuously a sense of their existence” with one another even though they might never have met 
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(103). It seems a “waste” and a “pity” to Clarissa that such lives should never intersect, so she 
attempts to bring them together at her parties, which she considers “an offering; to combine, to 
create; but for whom?” (103). Clarissa is unable to answer this last question and decides her 
parties are an “offering for the sake of offering, perhaps,” finally settling on the idea that her 
parties are “her gift” because she has nothing else to offer of any value (103). Zwerdling argues 
that one should resist seeing too much positive potential in Clarissa’s offerings, for all the 
neighbourhoods Clarissa mentions are “upper-middle-class preserves” and indicate that 
“Clarissa’s integration is horizontal, not vertical” (127). While it may be true that most of the 
guests at Clarissa’s parties are of the same class, Woolf distinguishes between the individuals 
that Clarissa invites and the categories that Bradshaw uses to dehumanize or abject his patients. 
The aim of Bradshaw’s social system is to neglect the private selves of individuals by reducing 
them to mere ideological subjects, but the social space Clarissa creates is something quite 
different and mirrors the textual spaces Woolf creates for common readers in essays like 
“Character in Fiction” and “Street Haunting,” where her focus on relationality leads readers to 
recognize their active role in cultural production.  
 Clarissa’s party does not take from people; it is a gift freely given to no clear end. The 
power relations Bradshaw creates serve a specific purpose—the aggrandizement of the nation—
and hold only negative potential because they withdraw freedoms and demand proportionate 
performances, but the social relations Clarissa builds have the possibility of positive potential 
through the moments they may create or recall: moments like Clarissa’s kiss with Sally, “the 
most exquisite moment of her whole life” and one which is held onto by Clarissa as if “she had 
been given a present, wrapped up, and told just to keep it, not to look at it—a diamond, 
something infinitely precious” (30). Moments, also, like her epiphany about Bradshaw, which all 
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begins with the uncomfortable grain of Septimus’s suicide and Bradshaw’s decision to talk about 
it at the party. Clarissa’s private self, therefore, might be likened to a string of pearls, the centre 
of each a moment—sometimes exquisite, other times uncomfortable—that has been revised and 
reshaped until it becomes something precious, something indispensable: the private self that 
must sometimes be obscured by her position as the wife of an MP. As Zwerdling notes, 
Clarissa’s “reactions to Septimus […] suggest that Clarissa’s soul is far from dead, that she can 
resurrect the intense emotions of youth despite the pressure of a society determined to deny them 
quarter” (142). If Mrs Dalloway does examine the struggle between the private self and the 
public self as so many critics have suggested, then Clarissa’s transcendental theory and parties 
represent a middle road between the two, a way to explain that the private self can supplement 
the public self rather than die in its service. Clarissa’s ability to host is her only real private skill 
but it is simultaneously a performative act of her class and of her specific subject position as an 
MP’s wife that she uses to provide her guests with moments of unity that may shape their lives. 
Clarissa creates spaces of potential for private change or growth, and while the potential of such 
spaces is not always positive, as Dr Bradshaw proves, Clarissa uses her public subject position 
and its vast institutional power and social network as a point of connection that gathers the 




“It is worse perhaps to be locked in”: Positioning Oneself in A Room of One’s Own 
  
 There are few phrases in English literature more famous than “a woman must have 
money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction” (3), the statement that begins Virginia 
Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own (1929). Woolf’s thesis has reached near mythological levels in 
the academy, especially in the fields of Women’s and Gender Studies and Feminist Theory, due 
to its sharp theorization of the psychological imperative that underpins patriarchal hegemony and 
its exploration of women’s educational, legal, economic, domestic, and literary history. As 
Brenda Silver has noted, “by the early 1970s, the emerging women’s movement had made 
Woolf’s words—‘a room of one’s own,’ for instance—into public slogans and her face, 
emblazoned on T-shirts, into a public sight” (9). Ever since, Woolf’s cultural value has been an 
accurate barometer of feminism’s evolution. So much so, indeed, that Jane Goldman notes A 
Room of One’s Own “is cited as the locus classicus for a number of important modern feminist 
debates concerning gender, sexuality, materialism, education, patriarchy, androgyny, 
subjectivity, the feminine sentence, the notion of ‘Shakespeare’s sister’, the canon, the body, 
race, class, and so on” (97). That such varied interpretations can be made of one text is 
remarkable, and if, as Woolf writes in one of the most oft-quoted passages in A Room of One’s 
Own, “we think back through our mothers if we are women” (69), then one can say with 
confidence that Woolf is, and will likely continue to be, a mother to women’s movements, 
women’s writing, and feminist theory for some time to come. 
 A Room of One’s Own has also caused its fair share of controversy amongst feminists, 
most of which surrounds difficulties integrating its secondary argument about the androgynous 
mind, which ends the essay and Woolf’s argument as a whole. The difficulty comes because the 
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theory of the androgynous mind seems to countermand much of the rest of the essay in its status 
as gynocriticism. As the narrator writes of Mary Carmichael, she has “mastered the first great 
lesson; she wrote as a woman, but as a woman who has forgotten that she is a woman, so that her 
pages were full of that curious sexual quality which comes only when sex is unconscious of 
itself” (84). The narrator later argues “It is fatal for a woman to lay the least stress on any 
grievance; to plead even with justice any cause; in any way to speak consciously as a woman” 
(94). Ellen Bayuk Rosenman sums up the disturbance these passages of A Room of One’s Own 
create amongst feminist thinkers when she wonders what value Woolf’s essay ultimately has in 
the face of such statements given that “So much of its purpose is to clarify women’s 
consciousness of their sex and undo repression” (104). All the time spent detailing how women’s 
consciousnesses have been shaped by social institutions, education, history, and literature seems 
for naught in the face of an androgynous mind that espouses a form of gender neutrality, which 
meant for Woolf, as Michèle Barrett writes, “an aesthetic creed in which feminist political anger, 
and indeed any sex consciousness, should be subordinated to the general vision and narrative of 
the work” (xxii). This subordination of anger would shape interpretations of A Room of One’s 
Own for some time, and it was the sticking point in a now famous critical discussion that reveals 
how difficult it is to reconcile these two halves of Woolf’s essay. Elaine Showalter famously 
used a modified version of Woolf’s title, A Literature of Their Own (1977), for her landmark 
essentialist feminist study of women’s literature, despite the fact that she roundly criticized 
Woolf’s theory of the androgynous mind as “a response to the dilemma of a woman writer 
embarrassed and alarmed by feelings too hot to handle without risking real rejection by her 
family, her audience, and her class” (286). Showalter was not alone in her argument that Woolf’s 
call to gender neutrality constitutes a flight from the body into androgyny: Adrienne Rich, too, 
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writes that she is “astonished at the sense of effort, of pains taken, of dogged tentativeness” in A 
Room of One’s Own and recognizes in it “the tone of a woman almost in touch with her anger” 
(37). Finally, Jane Marcus argues that Woolf’s primary creative force is anger but that she felt 
“the need to sublimate some of that anger in order to survive” (125). In response to these 
readings Toril Moi presents a poststructuralist perspective of female identity informed by Hélène 
Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva to argue that A Room of One’s Own challenges 
essentialist readings in its rejection of “the fundamental need for the individual to adopt a 
unified, integrated, self-identity” (8). Moi asserts “the goal of the feminist struggle must 
precisely be to deconstruct the death-dealing binary oppositions of masculinity and femininity” 
(14). The problem here, and also likely the reason A Room of One’s Own has enjoyed such 
longevity, is that neither Showalter nor Moi, despite arguing two contradictory viewpoints, is 
entirely wrong. At times Woolf speaks glowingly of Jane Austen’s masterpieces because she 
abandoned the ill-adapted tools of men’s sentences and “devised a perfectly natural, shapely 
sentence proper for her own use and never departed from it” (70); at other times, however, she 
insists that “anything written with that conscious [sex] bias is doomed to death” (94). 
 This chapter examines this contradiction in A Room of One’s Own, but it does so less by 
trying to explain the content of Woolf’s arguments than by examining the argument structurally 
and formally to explore the narrator’s lecture to a group of students at a women’s college. The 
anxiety concerning how individual subjects fit themselves into groups and institutions is a theme 
common to many of Woolf’s fictional characters and to her conception of common readers 
brought together through critical deficiencies that mark differences and initiate self-reflection of 
one’s subject positionality, and my intention for A Room of One’s Own is to draw out the 
narrator’s discomfort with the lecture she’s been asked to present in order to explore how she 
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uses her subject position as a lecturer to challenge the women’s college audience to consider the 
limitations of thinking in terms of gender rather than with an androgynous mind that foregrounds 
gender neutrality. The narrator is uncomfortable with her topic and position as lecturer for 
different, but interrelated, reasons. The topic, “Women and Fiction,” makes her think in terms of 
her gender when she has spent time in and money on a room that has given her the “freedom to 
think of things in themselves” rather than focusing on the anger, fear, and bitterness she feels 
toward men (35). Her position as a lecturer implies that the narrator shares, at least in part, the 
views of the women’s college students that make up her audience—after all, the mere fact that 
they have come to be lectured to instantiates her as a part of their institution—and requires her to 
determine how she will fit into this collective and their institution as an individual subject. I 
argue that the narrator presents her first, very visible thesis—that “a woman must have money 
and a room of her own if she is to write fiction” (3)—as a way to unite herself symbolically with 
the gendered collective and institution she lectures before, but that this thesis is also used 
throughout the text to substantiate her theory of the androgynous mind that maintains her 
autonomy and prevents the narrator from falling into uniformity with her audience and topic. The 
theory of the androgynous mind, therefore, is thus quite literal throughout Woolf’s essay. At the 
beginning of the essay, the narrator is fishing for ideas near a river at Oxbridge when she catches 
a tiny idea that I contend is her theory of the androgynous mind, and she uses her thesis about 
money and a room to fatten this idea by providing the context needed to explain a theory of 
gender neutrality that questions the views of the group of women and institution to whom she 
lectures. Structurally, as a lecture, A Room of One’s Own carefully negotiates a topic and 
position that compels its narrator toward an uneasy unity with the female college students that 
make up her audience and the institution they represent. However, formally, her primary 
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argument builds toward a theory of the androgynous mind that resists uniformity with her 
audience while still acknowledging that women are united in many ways and by many things. 
 The anxiety between individuals and the way they fit into groups is also crucial to 
Woolf’s conceptualization of the common reader because the autonomy of the individual within 
the literary marketplace is asserted to counter the pressures of institutionalized reading practices 
and cultural values. These institutions, systems, and traditions, as we’ve seen are encapsulated by 
her representations of the patriarchy in works like Jacob’s Room, where men become statues 
moulded by the institutions in which they find themselves from the time they are very young. 
Thus, the boys in the church service at Cambridge have “sculptured faces” that demonstrate the 
“certainty, authority controlled by piety” (23) that serves as the foundation of their identity. 
Likewise, in Mrs. Dalloway when Peter Walsh encounters that military procession of young men 
marching in London, he compares them to statues “drugged into a stiff yet staring corpse by 
discipline” (44), and the dons and students at Oxbridge in A Room of One’s Own seem “creased 
and crushed into shapes so singular that one was reminded of those giant crabs and crayfish who 
heave with difficulty across the sand of the aquarium” (8). Such conceptions of bodies and the 
role performance and participation plays in ideology and power become the foundation for the 
political praxis that Woolf promotes in her writing shortly before her death. In The Years (1937), 
North feels as though he doesn’t “fit in anywhere” (300) in his own culture, and he wonders what 
kind of political action is open to a man of his generation who has seen the rise of fascist 
ideologues in “black shirts, green shirts, red shirts—always posing in the public eye” as they 
speak to herds of followers through “reverberating megaphones” (300). It is this marginal 
position, of course, that Woolf uses in Three Guineas when she theorizes her Society of 
Outsiders as those who will refuse to participate in the ideological rituals that promote war. Like 
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the common reader, the Society of Outsiders will “experiment not with public means in public 
but with private means in private” (239), and by choosing not to act, “show that to be passive is 
to be active” because “By making their absence felt their presence becomes desirable” (245)—
particularly in the context of war work. Woolf’s pacifism in later life is built on the idea of 
remaining aware how one’s body can be used to further the political ends of states and 
institutions. Such awareness is perhaps most palpable in Woolf’s final novel, the posthumously 
published Between the Acts (1941), in which Miss La Trobe stages a pageant play at a private 
house that culminates with her audience, united by the shared history presented on the stage, 
being reduced to “orts, scraps, and fragments” when the players enter with mirrors to reveal the 
audience to itself (127). La Trobe’s play breaks the unity of the audience and a gramophone 
loudly repeats “Dispersed are we; who have come together. But […] let us retain whatever made 
that harmony” (133) as the audience leaves. Between the Acts is frustratingly unclear about 
“whatever” it is that makes the harmony between its audience members, though several things, 
including the pastoral private home where the pageant is staged, Reverend G. W. Streatfield, and 
military aircraft flying overhead, do offer symbols of the gentry, the church, and the nation as 
possible answers. Group power relations and the tendency for individuals to become subsumed 
by the groups they exist within, willingly or not, are themes that run through much of Woolf’s 
work, but her anxiety about these things increases throughout the interwar period. 
 While it is difficult to precisely sketch the narrator in A Room of One’s Own because 
Woolf does all she can to deconstruct her character, the narrator does reveal certain things about 
her identity that can help readers position her as a subject. Firstly and most importantly, the 
narrator is not Woolf. In a letter to Ethyl Smith, Woolf wrote that if she’d been more forthright in 
her criticism that she was unable to be educated because her brothers had been given the bulk of 
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the family’s education funds, people would have said “she has an axe to grind […] though I 
agree I should have had many more of the wrong kind of reader” that would merely seek, using 
her text, to “prove once more how vain, how personal, so they will say, rubbing their hands with 
glee, women always are” (Letters 5 195). Here, the “wrong kind of reader” refers to readers who 
want only fodder for their own attacks against Woolf, against feminists, or against women in 
general. One foot in the wrong direction, Woolf believed, would see her work thrown into 
others’ discursive dustbins as they jeered at Woolf the feminist, Woolf the angry daughter, or 
Woolf the dilettante academic of the Bloomsbury coterie. Therefore, Woolf tells Smith that, even 
though “I didnt write ‘A Room’ without considerable feeling […] I forced myself to keep my 
own figure fictitious; legendary” (195). Woolf does this from the outset of A Room of One’s Own 
not only by employing a narrator—something most essayists don’t do—but also by having the 
narrator insist on her own fictitiousness early in the text by stating “‘I’ is only a convenient term 
for somebody with no real being” (4). The reader knows immediately, therefore, that this “I” is 
not a stable “I” like that of the noted author Mr. A, whose masculine “I,” “hard as a nut, and 
polished for centuries by good teaching and good feeding,” creates a shadow across the pages of 
his works in which “all is shapeless as mist” (90). The narrator’s “I” in A Room of One’s Own is 
unstable and slippery, a riposte to the stable, transcendental masculine “I” that has constructed 
itself as superior over the long history of patriarchy explored in the text. Unstable and slippery 
though her identity may be, however, readers do know that the narrator is a writer, since she 
plans on “making use of all the liberties and licences of a novelist” (4) in her argument, and that 
she is an uneducated woman who has “no more right […] in Fernham than in Trinity or 
Somerville or Girton or Newnham or Christchurch” (16) to present her argument to such an 
audience. Finally, she is independent owing to an aunt who has “left [her] five hundred pounds a 
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year for ever” (34). Thus, the narrator may not actually be Woolf, but it is safe to assume that she 
fits roughly within the group Woolf defines more clearly in Three Guineas as the “daughters of 
educated men,” and these intersectional identity coordinates, particular as regards class, 
education, gender, and profession, can be used to interrogate the narrator’s argument. 
 And readers should interrogate her argument, if for no other reason than she asks them to 
directly by explicitly connecting herself and her reader to the common reading tradition she 
theorized in The Common Reader (1925). As we’ve seen, Woolf’s common reader, “is guided by 
an instinct to create for himself […] a portrait of a man, a sketch of an age, a theory of the art of 
writing” (1), and, due to this instinct, is “Hasty, inaccurate, and superficial, snatching now this 
poem, now that scrap of old furniture, without caring where he finds it or of what nature it may 
be so long as it serves his purpose and rounds his structure” (1). The ephemeral nature of the 
common reader’s critical framework, Woolf argues, means that his “deficiencies as a critic are 
too obvious to be pointed out” (1), and that one must take into account his biases, beliefs, and 
argumentative goals. There could be no better description for how the narrator of A Room of 
One’s Own positions herself and how she asks readers to position themselves in relation to her: 
“Lies will flow from my lips,” she explains, “but there may perhaps be some truth mixed up with 
them; it is for you to seek out this truth and to decide whether any part of it is worth keeping” 
(4). Lies are not traditionally what one looks for in an academic essay or lecture, but the 
narrator’s deficiencies in this case should not be looked down upon because, by asking readers 
directly to question her, they promote an active construction of knowledge between 
lecturer/narrator and listener/reader. The narrator’s are not ideas that will come fully formed and 
ready for consumption, but ideas in the midst of being constructed so that her argument is in the 
act of becoming even as it is presented to her audience. This focus on construction makes A 
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Room of One’s Own more playful and less assertive than most essays, but it also helps reveal 
what Randi Saloman calls the “counterfactual potentiality” of the essay form (81). There is, 
Saloman argues, little reason for readers to imagine what might have been in novels since the 
plot and character development are set from the beginning, but “the essay’s interactive status 
suggests the possibility of change or progress—that the future might be significantly affected by 
one’s present reflections” (81). This change and progress does not happen in the text itself, of 
course, but in the effects the text has on the reading subject, and an important aspect of 
uncovering this counterfactual potentiality in the essay form is acknowledging the positionality 
of the reading subject and the writing subject. Readers/listeners should not passively consume 
the ideas in essays, Woolf’s narrator explains, for their active participation is what provides the 
essay its potential for change as they evaluate the deficiencies of the narrator’s argument. 
 With this critical framework in place, let us turn to the first sentence of A Room of One’s 
Own, for it is here that the narrator begins challenging her topic “Women and Fiction” by 
presenting the thesis of her essay while simultaneously subverting the expectations of her 
audience. Her opening line questions the way knowledge is typically constructed in university 
lectures by abandoning the power dynamic created between lecturer and audience in lieu of a 
form that carefully positions herself in relation to her audience: “But, you may say, we asked you 
to speak about women and fiction—what has that got to do with a room of one’s own?” (3). 
Starting the essay in media res with the word “but” is jarring both in terms of form and content 
because, as Judith Allen points out, it creates ambiguity. Grammatically, “but” is a coordinating 
conjunction that “functions as a connective, as a way of continuing and extending,” but in terms 
of meaning, the word “resists that continuity, cuts things off, and most importantly, negates what 
was said before its appearance” (58). What’s being negated in this instance isn’t some previous 
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statement, however, but the very discursive relationship between speaker and listener, writer and 
reader, essayist and essay. The sentence departs from what is expected of the essayist, Kathryn 
Simpson argues, by reversing the typical structure of an essay and beginning “with the narrator’s 
conclusion on the topic,” a simple but effective way of ensuring that “the reader’s experience is 
not focused on reaching the conclusion but on enjoying and actively engaging in the process of 
exploring the issues” (A Guide 74). Offering her conclusion at the beginning disrupts the logical 
progression one typically finds in essays, for since the argumentative end (the content of the 
essay) is known immediately, readers may more readily focus on the means used (the form of the 
essay) to bring about this argumentative end.  
 A Room of One’s Own, that is to say, does not shy away from its own construction but, 
verily, leans into it by employing a structure in its first sentence, in particular through the shifting 
pronouns, to insist on the firm distinction between the narrator/lecturer and reader/audience 
while simultaneously connecting them to one another for, at the very least, the length of the 
lecture. The first “you” is ambiguous grammatically as it could refer to singular audience 
members or the audience as a whole, but in both cases the reader is confronted immediately with 
questions about who is being addressed and what constitutes this group. Next, this ambiguous 
“you” is replaced with the singular “you,” referring specifically to the narrator/lecturer and 
positioned in relation to the plural “we” as the audience is now clearly referred to as a collective 
of women who listen to the woman whom they’ve asked to lecture. Questions about how the 
individual interacts with and integrates herself within a collective are raised immediately by 
these shifting pronouns, but, more than this, expectations about what this group wants and what 
the individual will provide to the group are challenged and redrawn. The boundaries created in 
this sentence remind the reader/audience that positionality—even within a group one may for the 
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most part align with politically and in terms of identity—is important because it prevents facile 
political agreement and limits the possibility of becoming subsumed by the ideologies of the 
group. The narrator here is hailed by and responds to the group and the institution they represent, 
but she is quick to remind them that she is also an individual who insists on carefully positioning 
herself within their group and the institution they now both represent. 
 The narrator goes on to refuse the authority usually provided college and university 
lecturers in order to indicate that she will also be challenging the expectations of the institution 
she’s been asked to address. She refuses this authority by flatly stating that “I should never be 
able to fulfil [sic.] what is, I understand, the first duty of a lecturer—to hand you after an hour’s 
discourse a nugget of pure truth to wrap up between the pages of your notebooks and keep on the 
mantelpiece for ever” (3). The narrator removes herself from the responsibilities of the university 
lecturer here, promising from the off that she has no intention of providing what is traditionally 
expected of someone in that position, and indeed positions herself as an outsider with the words 
“I understand.” Her responsibilities as a lecturer are not technically shirked in this instance 
because, as an uneducated daughter of an educated man, she is under no obligation to perform 
the college’s rituals as expected. There is significant leeway in how she may perform her role as 
lecturer, especially since she is not attempting to gain employment through her talk or become a 
student at the college, so the narrator makes the position work for her. On one hand, as Simpson 
has pointed out, her independence from the monetary economies that govern the university 
allows the narrator to refuse her audience a “nugget of pure truth” and offer “words about 
women and fiction [that] cannot be readily absorbed into a monetary economy” (Gifts 33). It is a 
refusal that “offers her ideas in the hope of their ongoing circulation and transformation in the 
lives of her female audience/readers, seeking a relationship of mutual co-operation and 
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reciprocation” (33). On the other hand, her refusal to provide a “nugget of pure truth” also tells 
her audience/reader that she will be actively constructing knowledge before them, for she 
explains “I am going to do what I can to show you how I arrived at this opinion about the room 
and the money. I am going to develop in your presence as fully and freely as I can the train of 
thought which led me to think this” (4). It is, of course, true that all university lecturers are 
constructing knowledge when they lecture since they are participating in an intellectual tradition 
that never sees its work as finished, but few are as upfront about the fact as the narrator. All that 
glitters is not gold, the narrator informs her reader, so even if one does receive a nugget of pure 
truth from her lecture, its value must still be assayed in accordance with one’s own critical 
position. 
 All this subversion and positioning explains how the narrator wishes to situate herself in 
relation to the collectives and institutions that intersect during the seemingly simple act of 
delivering a lecture, but her personal response to lecturing at the college and to her topic is also 
revealed in her introduction. That she is uneasy with the topic of her lecture becomes clear when 
the narrator says her intention is “to tell you the story of the two days that preceded my coming 
here—how, bowed down by the weight of the subject which you have laid upon my shoulders, I 
pondered it, and made it work in and out of my daily life” (4). The fact that she must labour on 
the subject in her daily life implies this is a topic she generally does not think about, but it also 
indicates she has done so because the college has asked her for a lecture on the subject. Once 
again, the narrator acknowledges her connection with the collective in this instance while also 
maintaining her distance, suggesting a willingness to participate in their ritual as long as she gets 
to perform her part as she chooses. She refers again to feeling burdened by the subject in the next 
paragraph, saying “That collar I have spoken of, women and fiction, the need of coming to some 
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conclusion on a subject that raises all sorts of prejudices and passions, bowed my head to the 
ground” (4). Collars weigh the wearer down as the narrator suggests, but, more importantly in 
this instance, they are also disciplinary implements used to train the wearer, which in this case 
constitutes forcing the narrator’s head and eyes toward the ground to make her focus myopically 
on her topic. This is also the third of three times “prejudices” are mentioned in the introduction, 
as again and again the narrator notes that her topic cannot help but raise strong feelings in those 
who discuss it. As much is plainly stated when she points out that “when a subject is highly 
controversial—and any question about sex is that—one cannot hope to tell the truth” (4); the best 
she can do as a lecturer, consequently, is “give one’s audience the chance of drawing their own 
conclusions as they observe the limitations, the prejudices, the idiosyncrasies of the speaker” (4). 
This appears to be another instance of the narrator asking her readers to interrogate her closely, 
yet one must also ask what effect this subject that raises and exposes the narrator’s prejudices has 
on her as an individual. To track this, one need only turn to the explanation of her own room’s 
importance in her life and development as a thinker. She notes that her room has been integral to 
releasing the emotions and prejudices gender creates between the sexes, for after realizing that 
men’s anger toward women is a symptom of patriarchal institutions that ask him to continuously 
reiterate his superiority in order to be legitimated within those institutions, “by degrees [my own] 
fear and bitterness modified themselves into pity and toleration; and then in a year or two, pity 
and toleration went, and the greatest release of all came, which is the freedom to think of things 
in themselves” (35). The topic “Women and Fiction” dredges up prejudices the narrator has 
spent many years releasing, but more than this it asks her to employ a gendered epistemology 
that necessarily limits what can be thought or argued as no matter what she provides at the 
lecture must be made to work within the confines of this topic. To be clear, the narrator is not 
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saying discussions of gender are unimportant to women and fiction, and should not be studied at 
women’s colleges. Indeed, she asks at various times for the students of Newnham and Girton to 
supply a thorough history of women’s domestic lives (41), to discover why the world has such 
hostility for women’s writing (48), to explore men’s opposition to women’s suffrage (51), and to 
examine chastity and its value in women’s lives (58). But she is saying that discussions of gender 
are not her work as a writer of fiction. Her work, the work of an uneducated woman writer with 
inherited wealth enough to afford a room of her own, is to “think of things in themselves” and 
her topic limits her ability to do so (35). 
 The introduction to A Room of One’s Own also raises the question of whether or not the 
narrator’s primary conclusion about a room and money is, in fact, the argument she sets out to 
make when she begins thinking about her topic, for she vaguely mentions another idea at the 
beginning of the text that seemingly gets left behind in the experiences she has at Oxbridge. The 
reader is told they will hear the story of the two days prior to the narrator giving her lecture, but 
the narrator begins with a brief description of her “sitting on the banks of a river a week or two 
ago in fine October weather, lost in thought” (4). As she sits contemplating the topic she’s been 
given, the narrator compares what she’s doing to fishing: “Thought—to call it by a prouder name 
than it deserved—had let its line down into the stream” until a “sudden conglomeration of an 
idea” formed itself on the end of her line and she hauls in her small and insignificant prize (5). 
What precise idea she catches is not clear, as the narrator explains “I will not trouble you with 
that thought now, though if you look carefully you may find it for yourselves in the course of 
what I am going to say” (5), but it is clearly not her conclusion about rooms and money since she 
has already explicitly introduced that idea so one needs hardly look for it carefully. It is on her 
way to the Oxbridge library to research this thought that the narrator is reprimanded, first by a 
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Beadle for walking on the grass and second by a library employee telling her that women are not 
allowed in the library. She loses track of the thought, explaining that “they had sent my little fish 
into hiding” by reminding her she does not belong in Oxbridge (5). When first caught, this idea 
is “small” and “insignificant,” “the sort of fish that a good fisherman puts back into the water so 
that it may grow fatter and be one day worth cooking and eating” (5). The narrator’s argument 
regarding women writers and rooms is the discussion that helps her theory of androgyny grow 
until it is ready for presentation to her readers. I say this in part because the narrator uses the 
image of a river, this time referring to a city street in London along which numerous people walk 
and she sees a man and woman entering a taxi, to introduce her theory of androgyny, which 
returns to her “the unity of the mind” (87) that she has lost due to her topic “Women and 
Fiction.” More importantly, however, her theory of the androgynous mind ends an argument that 
has been marked by her anxious attempts to make her own personal need for a room that allows 
her to “think of things in themselves” (35) work within the collective of women she lectures 
before. For, in the end, what Woolf’s narrator proves through her examination of women’s 
rooms is not that all women need a room in order to think of things in themselves, but that 
women have used their rooms for many things throughout the history of women’s writing. 
Rooms have been, for women, spaces of respite, seclusion, and liberation, as well as a foundation 
for their own distinctly feminine voice, but while rooms may unite the lives of women in the 
narrator’s argument they do not create uniformity between women’s lives. In the end, the theory 
of the androgynous mind is a specific argument that explains what value the narrator’s own room 
has to her as a woman writer, and to substantiate this argument, to grow her own little fish into 




 If the theory of the androgynous mind is indeed the thought the narrator catches at the 
river, then the inspiration for the narrator’s argument about rooms seems to come as she is going 
to research this thought. It is during this trip that the narrator wanders onto the grass in the 
Oxbridge quad: “Instantly a man’s figure rose to intercept me. […] His face expressed horror and 
indignation. Instinct rather than reason came to my help; he was a Beadle; I was a woman. This 
was the turf; there was the path. Only the Fellows and Scholars are allowed here; the gravel is 
the place for me. Such thoughts were the work of a moment” (5). Such thoughts, as revealed by 
the simple, oppositional sentence structure in this passage, are also not very open to 
interpretation or exploration. Gone are the long, subordinate clause-laden sentences used to 
describe the narrator’s contemplations at the river, replaced with the terse dichotomies of gender 
that stifle thought and inspire disciplined compliance. Gender, she suggests, is felt, and her work 
of a moment is the physical manifestation of power relations made instinctual through the 
performative reiteration of masculinity and femininity. Being a woman, that is to say, is 
something women understand simply by virtue of existing as a woman in a patriarchal world 
according to the narrator. It is this instinctual understanding that will help form her argument 
about rooms because her experience with the Beadle makes her focus on the way space and 
institutions affect gender. After all, she has now entered Oxbridge, a giant room of men’s own, 
only to be immediately reminded that she is an outsider in this space and does not share the same 
privileges as male students. 
 The Beadle’s reminder also draws attention to the narrator’s physical movement through 
various rooms in the text, allowing readers to focus on these spaces as she moves through them. 
In the university quad, the patriarchal history of Oxbridge stands behind the Beadle, and the 
narrator reveals that universities, far from being ahistorical and apolitical institutions solely 
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concerned with the education of their students, play an important role in the patriarchal machine 
by ensuring men receive the bulk of the country’s educational resources, both familial and 
governmental. Oxbridge becomes a monument to education thanks to “An unending stream of 
gold and silver” (8) from the moneyed classes of England—the nobility to begin with and the 
mercantile class more recently—and her descriptions of Oxbridge’s luncheon and Fernham’s 
dinner reveal how important money is to education. The pomp and circumstance of the Oxbridge 
luncheon signifies the permanence of the institution and its intellectual traditions. 
Undergraduates sit enjoying their meals and talking with one another, “[a]nd thus by degrees was 
lit, half-way down the spine, which is the seat of the soul, not that hard little electric light which 
we call brilliance, as it pops in and out upon our lips, but the more profound, subtle and 
subterranean glow which is the rich yellow flame of rational intercourse. No need to hurry. No 
need to sparkle. No need to be anybody but oneself” (10). The comparison between the electric 
light of brilliance and yellow flame of rational discourse points out that the bulk of human 
knowledge does not owe itself to the genius of a few extraordinary men but to the slow 
construction of knowledge over centuries of luncheons like this one at Oxbridge. Time allows 
ideas to develop not in the vacuum of one mind but through a discourse that allows 
presuppositions to be challenged and ideas refined. When the women at Fernham are done their 
dinner, however, they hastily retreat back to their dorms and the hall is “emptied of every sign of 
food and made ready no doubt for breakfast the next morning” (16). In part, this occurs because 
“The lamp in the spine does not light on beef and prunes” (16), but the history of women’s 
colleges also necessitates strict scheduling and careful spending. Time, the real luxury at the 
Oxbridge luncheon, is something Fernham simply cannot afford. 
	
 248 
 What effect these economic and institutional imbalances have had on men is revealed 
when the narrator goes to the British Museum, a space also marked by men and the knowledge 
they have created amongst themselves, and discovers that economic, historical, psychological, 
legal, and ecumenical discourses all presume and maintain patriarchal hegemony by excluding 
women’s voices and insisting on the inferiority of women. There exists, she argues, a 
psychological imperative amongst men to construct their own superiority by presenting women 
as inferior, which she explores through a fictional work, The Mental, Moral, and Physical 
Inferiority of the Female Sex. The book’s author, Professor von X, writes of women “as if he 
were killing some noxious insect as he wrote” (28) and displays an anger that initially confuses 
the narrator. He is, or men very like him are, proprietor, editor, Foreign Secretary, judge, 
cricketer, and company director; “he left millions to charities and colleges that were ruled by 
himself”; he was the scientist who, looking over a murder scene, would “decide if the hair on the 
meat axe was human”; and he was the judge and jury who would “acquit or convict the 
murderer, and hang him, or let him go free” (30-31). Professor von X’s rage seems strange given 
that England’s institutions recognize his individual autonomy and rights to an extent far 
exceeding that of women. The more she explores his anger, though, the more she comes to 
understand that its goal is less about explaining women’s actual inferiority than about defining 
men’s superiority using women as “looking-glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of 
reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size” (32). Across all of England’s institutional 
discourses, man’s superiority comes at women’s expense, for as an object of discourse she 
appears as his opposite, his inferior. “Are you aware that you are, perhaps, the most discussed 
animal in the universe?” (24), the narrator asks women as she recounts going to the British 
Museum and reading book after book about women—some written by biologists, doctors, 
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schoolmasters, and clergymen, others by novelists, poets, and graduate students, but all by “men 
who have no apparent qualification save that they are not women” (24). All the supposed 
virtuous characteristics of men take shape because women are defined in legal, political, 
philosophical, economic, medicinal, and psychological terms as the natural opposite of these 
virtues: men are strong, rational, analytical, civic, and women weak, emotional, intuitive, 
domestic.  
 The institutions that fill men like Jacob Flanders with the confidence to believe in the 
superiority of their gender here, not surprisingly, have the opposite effect on the narrator who 
feels enervated by her day at Oxbridge and Fernham. But she also has little trouble sloughing off 
her experiences once she leaves the campus and returns to her room at an inn. She uses “I” 
throughout the passage to signify how her entire day has been shaped by her gendered body, and 
how she has been forced into the acceptance of a gender identity. It is not until she gets to her 
room that she is able to shed this gender identity, signaled when she switches to the gender 
neutral pronoun “one”: 
So I went back to my inn, and as I walked back through the dark streets I 
pondered this and that, as one does at the end of the day’s work. I pondered why it 
was that Mrs Seton had no money to leave us; and what effect poverty has on the 
mind; and what effect wealth has on the mind; and I thought of the queer old 
gentlemen I had seen that morning with tufts of fur upon their shoulders; and I 
remembered how if one whistled one of them ran; and I thought of the organ 
booming in the chapel and of the shut doors of the library; and I thought how 
unpleasant it is to be locked out; and I thought how it is worse perhaps to be 
locked in; and, thinking of the safety and prosperity of the one sex and the poverty 
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and insecurity of the other and of the effect of tradition and of the lack of tradition 
upon the mind of a writer, I thought at last that it was time to roll up the crumpled 
skin of the day, with its arguments and its impressions and its angers and its 
laughter, and cast it into the hedge. A thousand stars were flashing across the blue 
wastes of the sky. One seemed alone with an inscrutable society. All human 
beings were laid asleep—prone, horizontal, dumb. Nobody seemed stirring in the 
streets of Oxbridge. Even the door of the hotel sprang open at the touch of an 
invisible hand—not a boots was sitting up to light me to bed, it was so late. (21-22 
emphasis added) 
It is telling that what allows the narrator to finally crumple up the skin of the day—a skin that 
has defined and limited her since she left the river that morning—is a populace prone, horizontal, 
and dumb. Only in a city lying asleep can she find the solitude she needs to be anything other 
than a woman, a subtle reminder that gender power relations extend far past the walls and quads 
of Oxbridge University, and a not-so-subtle reminder that women can achieve freedom only 
when their society is unconscious. Her ‘I’, which to the narrator is nothing more than “a 
convenient term for somebody who has no real being” (4), is forced into embodied reality on 
campus because the university insists on, even constitutes, her gender in the classes it teaches, 
the books it writes, the libraries it restricts, and the turf it protects. The long sentence in the 
middle of this passage with its seemingly interminable “ands” demonstrates the narrator’s 
inability to conclude and implement what she has learned at Oxbridge about women and fiction; 
she provides, instead, a relisting of all that has happened to her on her search for truth, forcing 
her readers to experience, just as she had to, the endless reiteration of becoming a woman (or a 
man) on campus. What is it like to be a woman at Oxbridge, her list asks, before answering itself 
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with a repetitive structure that reveals one becomes a man or a woman on the Oxbridge campus 
not based on anything essentially masculine or feminine but through being allowed to walk on 
the grass (or not), being allowed to enter the library (or not), and receiving the full and unbridled 
economic, political, educational, and legal support of the country’s institutions (or not).  
 In the next chapter, the narrator begins her search for information with renewed vigour as 
she walks through London, where the crowded city streets allow her to move with more freedom 
amongst other Londoners who do not monitor her as closely as the Oxbridge Beadle. London is 
presented very differently than Oxbridge: gone is the exclusivity of Oxbridge and in its place 
rises a city that is inclusive if only because one can find anonymity amongst the many lives that 
intersect on London’s busy streets. Still, all these individual lives in London make amongst 
themselves something that approximates a unity, for, the narrator says, “London was like a 
workshop. London was like a machine. We were all being shot backwards and forwards on this 
plain foundation to make some pattern” (24). Here, London is compared to a loom that produces 
a pattern from the many individual lives that cross and intersect with one another each day, so 
when the narrator returns home that night, she says that “the great machine after laboring all day 
had made with our help a few yards of something very exciting and beautiful—a fiery fabric 
flashing with red eyes, a tawny monster roaring with hot breath” (35). Culture is both 
democratized and made temporal in this comparison, which explains that the people, simply by 
living their lives each day, produce the culture of their cities, their nations, and their people—an 
aspect of culture oft forgot by Oxbridge Beadles and Dons who believe themselves the 
gatekeepers of culture. If universities are generally considered the institutions responsible for 
establishing, exploring, and defending the culture of a people, it is their authority that is 
challenged when the narrator reveals culture belongs to all the lives who make it each day.  
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 Despite the cultural egalitarianism expressed in this comparison between London and a 
loom, the narrator has a little more trouble forgetting her gender after visiting the British 
Museum, for all her contemplation of the way men rank their superiority in relation to women 
has altered her perceptions. The British Museum plays its own role in the cultural tapestry of 
England inasmuch as it is “another department of the factory” that is London life (24), but it, too, 
provides little information about her topic. The pronouns she chooses when describing the 
process of finding books in the museum confirm the narrator is thinking little about gender as she 
enters the museum: “One went to the counter; one took a slip of paper; one opened a volume of 
the catalogue, and . . . . . the five dots here indicate five separate minutes of stupefaction, wonder 
and bewilderment. Have you any notion how many books are written about women in the course 
of one year?” (24). Almost immediately, the narrator is brought back to the realities of her topic, 
her gender, and the revelations about male psychology in Professor von X’s book on the myriad 
inferiorities of women. Another entire day, therefore, is spent parsing the divisions of the 
genders before the narrator returns to her street where “domesticity prevailed” amongst the 
workaday lives of painters, nursemaids, coal-heavers, and green-grocers (36). But the narrator is 
much less able to crumple up the gendered skin of this day and throw it in the hedge than she 
was when she left Oxbridge:  
so engrossed was I with the problem you have laid upon my shoulders that I could 
not see even these usual sights without referring them to one centre. I thought 
how much harder it is now than it must have been even a century ago to say 
which of these employments is the higher, the more necessary. Is it better to be a 
coal-heaver or a nursemaid; is the charwoman who has brought up eight children 
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of less value to the world than the barrister who has made a hundred thousand 
pounds? (36) 
Once again the narrator complains of the topic she has been given because it forces her to bring 
everything back to gender, back to a centre that her room and her money usually allow her to 
ignore when she writes. Beyond simply reducing everything to gender, though, the narrator’s 
time with her topic has begun to change her perception of the world so that she now examines 
people’s worth using Oxbridge’s most enduring educational product: comparative value. The 
exams, papers, degrees, and designations of Oxbridge create an intellectual reliance on 
classification and comparison that pervades the lives and worldview of Oxbridge men, 
sometimes with dire consequences. The narrator explains that Professor von X’s “education had 
been in some ways as faulty as [her] own” since it has bred in him and all men sent through 
patriarchal institutions “the instinct for possession, the rage for acquisition which drives them to 
desire other people’s fields and goods perpetually; to make frontiers and flags; battleships and 
poison gas; to offer up their own lives and their children’s lives” (35). While the narrator’s 
education is faulty because she has not been provided the same access to England’s educational 
institutions as men, her exclusion from such places has protected her from the compulsion to 
understand the world in terms of dichotomies that simplify existence by establishing thresholds 
between things and that are relied upon to constitute character and capacity. And yet gauging and 
weighing the differences between people is precisely the result of the narrator’s time spent in the 
rooms of men. In the morning, the narrator had viewed London as a vast factory where every 
person played his or her part in the production of a few yards of fabric as lives crossed and 
intersected with one another. This view changes utterly at night: individual is pitted against 
individual as the value of each person is weighed to discern who plays the most significant role 
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in the process of manufacturing English culture. This worldview centered on incessant 
comparisons and definitions could be crumpled up and thrown away with ease on the first day 
because Oxbridge is so obviously a room of men’s own that the narrator is never allowed to feel 
like anything other than an outsider, but after this second day, spent in a place she believed was 
filled with minds seeking essential truths, the compulsion toward rank and exclusivity has begun 
to influence her perception. This influence diminishes quickly when the narrator reminds herself 
that “the comparative values of charwomen and lawyers rise and fall from decade to decade” and 
that “we have no rods with which to measure them even as they are at the moment” (36), but her 
realization comes only when she thinks about how “foolish” she has been to ask professors “to 
furnish [her] with ‘indisputable proofs’” (36) about something like gender. As she has told 
readers at the beginning of her essay, questions about gender make plain “the limitations, the 
prejudices, the idiosyncrasies of the speaker” (36), so any argument made about gender must 
necessarily be conditional and temporally dependent, never possibly ascending to the stature of 
indisputable proof. 
 The beginning of Chapter 3 in A Room of One’s Own marks an important shift in the 
essay because the narrator moves from the rooms of men into a room of her own until she 
emerges back into the London streets in the last chapter, and it is in this room that she begins for 
the first time to discuss women writers. In terms of providing immediate relief from the binary 
mode of thought she has fallen into at Oxbridge and the British Museum, the narrator’s room 
serves as a reprieve from “seeking for the truth,” which has led only to finding the biased and 
self-legitimating opinions of men, while also allowing her to “draw the curtains” and “shut out 
distractions” as she searches histories for facts about women (38). Here again, she encounters a 
problem, though, for the narrator explains that women have very little existence historically 
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because virtually “nothing is known about women before the eighteenth century” (42): their lives 
are not written of except in their letters and diaries; their exclusion from social institutions 
largely erases them from the histories of science, philosophy, literature, politics, religion, 
business, and military combat; and their roles in the lives of men, the only place they might find 
mention in most of these histories, is downplayed beyond the care they provide in the nursery. In 
fiction, however, women are often either idealized beyond recognition or vilified beyond 
redemption, so that juxtaposing the real and the literary figures of women, according to narrator, 
births something quite paradoxical: 
A very queer, composite being thus emerges. Imaginatively she is of the highest 
importance; practically she is completely insignificant. She pervades poetry from 
cover to cover; she is all but absent from history. She dominates the lives of kings 
and conquerors in fiction; in fact she was the slave of any boy whose parents 
forced a ring upon her finger. Some of the most inspired words, some of the most 
profound thoughts in literature fall from her lips; in real life she could hardly read, 
could scarcely spell, and was the property of her husband. (40) 
Here, the narrator uses the oppositional forms foundational to Oxbridge’s weighing and 
comparing people against itself to reveal what an “odd monster” is “made up by reading the 
historians first and the poets afterwards” discussing women (40). Whether in literature where 
they have worked well as foils for men’s ambitions, served admirably as objects that guide a 
hero’s progress, and been moral compasses as often as immoral temptresses, or in reality where 
they have been completely omitted from the history books or judged against the fictional 
representations of women created by men, women have rarely ever been autonomous beings 
capable of existing outside their relationships to men. Thus, women always exist between 
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fictional and historical discourses as deformed or twisted beings, their monstrosity revealing the 
limitations of the very systems men use to weigh and define women.  
 The tension between historical and literary representations thus reveals the double bind 
women find themselves in when it comes to negotiating their identities and their agency at the 
intersection of two such varied discourses, as bettering their material realities often places 
women at odds with the feminine ideals represented in literature. The concept of chastity, for 
example, reveals how the historical conditions and literary representations of women work hand-
in-hand to twist and deform them, especially with regards to its effects on women writers. 
Chastity, the narrator argues, is a “fetish invented by certain societies” (45) and literature has 
played no small part in this invention from its Medieval Romances and Renaissance sonnets to 
its Romantic and Victorian fallen women. But there is no doubt that “Chastity had [in the 1600s], 
it has even now, a religious importance in a woman’s life, and has so wrapped itself round with 
nerves and instincts that to cut it free and bring it to the light of day demands courage of the 
rarest” (45). Like the instinct that aids the narrator when the Oxbridge Beadle reprimands her for 
walking on the grass, chastity—in particular its ideals of humility and being seen rather than 
heard—has become natural through performative reiteration to the point that discerning its rules 
is the work of mere moments. Importantly, however, early women writers would become 
monstrous whether or not they chose to be chaste. To participate in chastity meant, on one hand, 
to discipline herself according to nigh unachievable ideals of restraint, comportment, and grace 
until she became a twisted version of herself; to use her gift for writing in order to better her 
material reality, on the other hand, meant abandoning her chastity to seek public recognition and 
adulation and being cast out of society as a deformed woman “crazed with the torture that her 
gift had put her to” (45). Thus, Judith Shakespeare’s “gift for poetry,” the narrator imagines, 
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“would have been so thwarted and hindered by other people, so tortured and pulled asunder by 
her own contrary instincts, that she must have lost her health and sanity to a certainty” (45). 
Speak or not speak, Judith would have found herself deformed and twisted by her decision, her 
fate representing the fate of all gifted women who either lacked the opportunity to write or could 
not summon that courage of the rarest needed to choose social exile so she could write. 
 The world’s indifference to works of genius as well as the relational value of 
masterpieces also helped to ensure women were unlikely to write prior to the 18th Century 
according to the narrator. Completing a work of genius, she notes, constitutes a miraculous 
achievement for men inasmuch as it overcomes “the world’s notorious indifference” (47), for in 
a world that “does not ask people to write poems and novels and histories” and “does not care 
whether Flaubert finds the right word or whether Carlyle scrupulously verifies this or that fact” 
(47), works of genius force readers to care about these things. They compel the world, in other 
words, to pay attention in spite of itself, for if the world “will not pay for what it does not want” 
(47), then the work of genius gives the world what it needs to understand itself. Works of genius, 
that is to say, gain value because they reveal the world to itself, and when the narrator explains 
“masterpieces are not single and solitary births” but “the outcome of many years of thinking in 
common, of thinking by the body of the people, so that the experience of the mass is behind the 
single voice” (59-60), she means this quite literally. Handholds in a world constantly moving 
forward while ever looking backward to define and explain itself culturally, masterpieces mark 
the world’s cultural progression by representing the people and, however momentarily, asking 
them to stop and view themselves using the words Flaubert has found or the scrupulous facts 
Carlyle has discovered. 
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 How big a role women can play in this “body of the people” is severely limited, though, 
because they have had limited access to the public sphere for so much of their existence. The 
narrator points out that where William Shakespeare, in London, “lived at the hub of the universe, 
meeting everybody, knowing everybody, practicing his art on the boards, exercising his wits in 
the street, and even getting access to the palace of the queen” (43), his sister Judith, having “had 
no chance of learning grammar and logic, let alone of reading Horace and Virgil” (43), and 
having snuck out one night to escape a marriage that “was hateful to her” (43), made it to 
London only to find “Men laughed in her face” at the thought of her becoming an actress until 
she became pregnant out of wedlock with the one man who “took pity on her” and “killed herself 
one winter’s night” (44). For one, London opens itself entirely, its institutions offering him 
places to explore, ideas to discover, and relationships to create so that he, returning the favour, 
could breathe life into its world; for the other, London shrouds itself in mystery and its 
institutions, barring her from public life entirely, become an eventual mausoleum that obscures 
the corpse of a life smothered from its beginning. Thus, the narrator suggests, where the world is 
merely “notoriously indifferent” to men’s attempts to write a work of genius, it is openly hostile 
to women’s attempts, for “The world did not say to her as it said to them, Write if you choose; it 
makes no difference to me. The world said with a guffaw, Write? What’s the good of your 
writing?” (48). It is here that we finally arrive at the Gordian knot at the centre of why, before 
the 18th Century, few women wrote literature: naught but a work of rarest genius, a masterpiece, 
could possibly have overcome the world’s hostility to women writers, but a masterpiece is 
precisely what a woman could never write because her place in the world made it impossible to 
speak for “the body of the people.” So when the narrator agrees with the bishop that “it would 
have been impossible, completely and entirely, for any woman to have written the plays of 
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Shakespeare in the age of Shakespeare” (42), it is not because she believes women incapable of 
writing a work of genius but because she believes women lacked access enough to the world to 
make a masterpiece possible. Had she with rarest courage broken her chastity to write and 
become, in the eyes of the world, a twisted and deformed monstrosity; had she, despite all 
domestic distractions, managed to write a work of genius; had she made the world, in spite of its 
open hostility, stop to look at this work of genius; had she done all this, she still could not have 
written a masterpiece that represented the single voice of the masses because she had always 
existed outside the public sphere and its institutions. 
 While the double bind created between chastity and monstrosity prevented most women 
from writing, there were some who braved monstrosity to write before the eighteenth century, 
but the rooms of these women, the narrator argues, tended to become sites of confinement rather 
than of liberation because they allowed women writers to escape the world but not their gender. 
Lady Winchilsea and Duchess Margaret (Cavendish) of Newcastle were both noble by birth, 
married to kind noblemen, and childless, and each used her “comparative freedom and comfort 
to publish something with her name to it and risk being thought a monster” (53). All their 
advantages in life, however, could not prevent Winchilsea and Cavendish from being “disturbed 
by alien emotions like fear and hatred” (53) in a world that thought them monstrous simply for 
daring to write, and each woman used her room to escape the world physically while still being 
unable to escape it mentally and psychologically. Winchilsea’s room, in particular, became a war 
room, according to the narrator, for she viewed men as “the ‘opposing faction’” (54) and was 
“forced to anger and bitterness” to the point that she “must have shut herself up in a room in the 
country to write, and been torn asunder by bitterness and scruples perhaps, though her husband 
was of the kindest, and their married life perfection. She ‘must have’, I say, because when one 
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comes to seek out the facts about Lady Winchilsea, one finds, as usual, that almost nothing is 
known about her” (55). Certainly, the pieces of Winchilsea’s poetry the narrator supplies seem to 
suggest an anger toward men, but we should note the similarities between the narrator’s 
description and criticism of Winchilsea and the narrator’s own biography. Indeed, she uses 
almost the exact same words to describe her own relationship to her room when she writes, “fear 
and bitterness modified themselves into pity and toleration; and then in a year or two, pity and 
toleration went, and the greatest release of all came, which is the freedom to think of things in 
themselves” (35). In and of themselves, these similarities don’t seem particularly important; after 
all, the narrator tells us at the beginning of the essay that she will lie to the reader. One must 
wonder, though, if Woolf, who has done so much formally to remove herself from A Room of 
One’s Own, isn’t having a little fun with readers in making her narrator’s argument so obviously 
biographical. What readers are presented with, after all, is a narrator who invents Winchilsea’s 
biography based on the narrator’s own invented autobiography, making plain that this argument 
is operating on a metafictional level that ties various stories to one another specifically to draw 
attention to the constructedness of the argument. As Pamela Caughie has noted, in A Room of 
One’s Own it “is not the mind’s method we explore but the storyteller’s” (42), and the “I” that 
represents the narrator in the text “is implicated in its own stories” because “as both narrator and 
character, the ‘I’ is a construction of its own fictions” (42). The intersecting stories of the 
narrator and Winchilsea draw attention to the fact that the narrator is making her history up as 
she goes by filling the gaps in other women’s stories with her own perceptions as a woman, and, 
moreover, she does this in a way that elides time, class, and culture. Mere pages before this 
passage the narrator reminded readers that “the comparative values of charwomen and lawyers 
rise and fall from decade to decade” and that “we have no rods with which to measure them even 
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as they are at the moment” (36), yet here she is using her own experience as the daughter of an 
educated man to create an argument about rooms, writing, and a noblewoman who lived more 
than 200 years in the past. 
 This is not to cynically suggest that readers view Woolf’s narrator as an unreliable 
manipulator of the truth who adjusts facts to fit her argument, but to point out that the history she 
invents—and invent she must in the absence of any historical information about Winchilsea—is 
contingent. There is no critical sleight of hand happening here, and if there is, the intent is less to 
deceive readers than it is to draw further attention to the distinctions between the narrator and the 
topic Women and Fiction by revealing how she “made [the subject] work in and out of [her] 
daily life” (4). Newnham has asked the narrator to speak about Women and Fiction, and, 
common reader that she is, she “is guided by an instinct to create for [her]self, out of whatever 
odds and ends [she] can come by, some kind of a whole—a portrait of a man, a sketch of an age, 
a theory of the art of writing” (Common Reader 1). Perhaps Winchilsea did not shut herself up in 
a room where she was “torn asunder by bitterness” (55), and perhaps she did not take the world 
into her room with her and transform it into a place to ruminate endlessly about her lot in the 
patriarchal hegemony, but two things in the narrator’s portrait of Winchilsea are incontrovertible: 
first, men controlled the means of production and so had “the power to bar her way to what she 
want[ed] to do—which [was] to write” (54); and second, the anger and bitterness the narrator 
feels as she visits Oxbridge and the British Museum existed for Winchilsea also, but in a form 
unmitigated by later social and political advances that gave women the opportunity to vote as 
well as access to education and the professions. The narrator’s story is connected to Winchilsea’s 
as a way to unite women across the generations through their anger and bitterness, and the room 
as well remains an important constant in the lives of both women. But the text resists creating a 
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uniformity between the two women because it marks the historical and contextual distinctions in 
the lives of the narrator and Winchilsea. Much of Winchilsea’s considerable talent as a writer 
goes into work that focuses closely on the injustices of women, which, to the narrator, only 
reinforces her position as a woman and prevents her from thinking beyond gender. However, 
comparing the story of a twentieth-century narrator with access to a literary marketplace, the 
ability to own property, the ability to earn money, the ability to seek education, and the ability to 
vote, to that of a seventeenth-century Countess, who did not have access to any of these things, 
asks readers to consider the historical differences that play an important role in the narrator’s 
ability to use her room to “think of things in themselves.” After all, as Alex Zwerdling has 
pointed out, the narrator may argue that “the direct expression of anger is fatal to art” in the case 
of Winchilsea, but “she also quotes them at length, thus simultaneously denying the ‘soundness’ 
of their approach and incorporating their angry voices into her own text” (253). Winchilsea is 
thereby honoured in the text while still being questioned, and the anger that unites her with the 
narrator also generates the differences between the two women writers and the uses they find for 
their rooms. 
 The narrator argues that Cavendish also used her rooms to lock herself away, but her 
intention was to escape a world that refused to train her prodigious intellect, a decision that led to 
her eventually becoming a misunderstood curiosity used to warn other women of the dangers of 
thinking and writing. Like Winchilsea, Cavendish was prone to “outburst[s] of rage” (56) at the 
men who refused to let her expand her intelligence until, finally, “She shut herself up at Welbeck 
alone” (56). She had a knack for learning and “should have had a microscope put in her hand” or 
“been taught to look at the stars and reason scientifically” (56) according the narrator, but 
because she wasn’t allowed access to such training, her intelligence “poured itself out, higgledy-
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piggledy, in torrents of rhyme and prose, and poetry, and philosophy” (56) until, eventually, 
Cavendish’s “wits were turned with solitude and freedom” (56). About this intellect, the narrator 
asks, “what could bind, tame or civilize for human use that wild, generous, untutored 
intelligence?” (56). The disciplinary language used here is remarkable given the narrator’s 
previous discussions about men’s institutions and the way they have instilled in men the desire to 
colonize the earth, build implements of war, and give their lives for false unities like nationalism, 
but it is also remarkable given her emphasis on common readers and their instinct to create for 
themselves. Indeed, of all the discussions of women writers in A Room of One’s Own, this one 
about Cavendish is the most prejudicial. Welbeck is an escape from the world, but it is also, 
according to the narrator, a place that does not allow Cavendish to reach her true potential as a 
thinker because her mind, although prodigious, runs free until its thoughts are lost in 
eccentricities that make her an object of amusement and wonder. Like Judith Shakespeare, 
Cavendish is never given the opportunity to interact with England’s institutions and, so, her gifts 
go unclaimed by the society that not only mocks and jeers her but also uses her as a “bogey to 
frighten clever girls with” (56). The rooms at Welbeck that were, to her, a sanctuary which 
allowed her to think what and as she pleased were, to the world, an asylum usefully hiding from 
view the ideas of the mad Duchess of Newcastle. It should not be forgotten that the narrator, like 
Cavendish, is also uneducated and that what prevents the products of her untutored 
intelligence—products the reader is in the midst of reading—from being used as a “bogey to 
frighten clever girls with” are the social and political advances that have made it possible for the 
products of her room to become something more than a mausoleum for her own hastily 
constructed ideas. Here, again, the stories of the narrator and her historical subject overlap as the 
narrator, worn down by the weight of her subject and angry after her experiences at Oxbridge 
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and the British Museum, seeks refuge in her room that locks her away from the world so she can 
begin building her sketch of women and fiction. For the middle section of this text, the narrator 
is very much like Cavendish: having tried to bind and tame her thoughts through study and 
finding little by way of facts or truths to help her formulate an argument about women and 
fiction, she enters her room to begin inventing a history of her own that centres on the 
importance of rooms in women’s lives. Rooms, according to her, have been the one thing that 
unites women writers, but it becomes clear that rooms are not uniformly meaningful to all 
women. Time and again, the narrator’s argument that a room of one’s own allows one to “think 
of things in themselves” fails to make sense in the lives of the women writers she discusses, for 
though they may experience similar feelings of anger, bitterness, and ostracism, their lives are 
simply too different to be bound into a unity using any one symbol or metaphor. It is the narrator, 
after all, who explains on her way home from the British Museum that, “Even if one could state 
the value of any one gift at a moment, those values will change; in a century’s time very possibly 
they will have changed completely” (36). She is talking about personal gifts and characteristics 
in the passage, but the sentiment applies equally to her discussion of rooms in the history of 
women writers. 
 The narrator’s final historical case study of women writers before the eighteenth century 
is of Aphra Behn, whom the narrator relates more closely to the discovery of writing as a 
profession than to any room. Behn was roughly a contemporary of Winchilsea and Cavendish, 
and, while, like them, she did not have any children, Behn was a middle-class woman who was 
forced to make a living for herself due to the death of her husband and some unpaid debts. She 
lived rather differently than most women at the time, having worked as a spy in the Netherlands 
for King Charles II and, upon her return to England, having become a friend to, if not member 
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of, a Restoration coterie of libertine poets and playwrights, including John Wilmot, Earl of 
Rochester, that was well-known for their carousing and lewd behaviour (Todd 195). For the 
narrator, Behn is particularly important because with her “We leave behind, shut up in their 
parks among their folios, those solitary great ladies who wrote without audience or criticism, for 
their own delight alone. We come to town and rub shoulders with ordinary people in the streets” 
(58). Behn proved there could be an audience for women’s writing for the first time, and the fact 
that “She made, by working very hard, enough to live on” (58) taught women that “Money 
dignifies what is frivolous if unpaid for” (59). Behn’s discovery that a woman could survive as a 
writer was monumental because it transformed writing into a profession for women at a time 
when they had little access to other professions. However, the narrator presents women’s 
entrance into the literary marketplace as a double-edged sword for the history of women’s 
fiction. Women writers had, for the first time in their history, left the confines of their private 
rooms to enter the world at large to write, but when women discovered the “practical 
importance” of writing, the narrator argues, “Hundreds of women began as the eighteenth 
century drew on to add to their pin money, or to come to the rescue of their families by making 
translations or writing the innumerable bad novels which have ceased to be recorded even in 
text-books, but are to be picked up in the fourpenny boxes in the Charing Cross Road” (59). 
With a steadily expanding literary marketplace and a dearth of works to fill the needs of a rapidly 
expanding English readership, early women writers wrote for the market rather than what they 
wanted according to the narrator, filling every nook and cranny of free market space with works 
that might serve the “practical importance” of making an income but served very little literary 
importance. This dismissiveness of early women writers for taking advantage of the expanding 
literary marketplace to generate income is objectively snobbish and belies the narrator’s 
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privileged position as an inheritor of money, but she does admit that when “The middle-class 
woman began to write” she initiated an historical event “of greater importance than the Crusades 
or the Wars of the Roses” (59). This statement finally makes it plain that the narrator’s thesis 
about money and a room is contingent upon contextual and historical distinctions, and it reveals 
that what initially seems to be a universal thesis—“woman must have money and a room of her 
own if she is to write fiction” (3)—should be treated more as a conditional statement that applies 
best to our singular narrator’s subject position. By the narrator’s own admission, it was women 
with no rooms of their own and little money who transformed women’s writing. 
 The next part of the narrator’s history of women’s writing discusses the emergence of the 
first great works by the middle-class women novelists like Jane Austen, Emily and Charlotte 
Brontë, and George Eliot, and the narrator argues these women succeeded in writing the first 
masterpieces of women’s writing not because they had rooms of their own but because they 
insisted upon and revealed the importance of women’s rooms in their novels. Austen, the 
Brontës, and Eliot were all middle-class women who had no rooms of their own but wrote from 
the domestic rooms they operated as wives, mothers, and daughters, and it was this world, 
according to the narrator, that was central to their fiction. The world of these middle-class 
women, because they had been excluded from all the social institutions of England, was 
constituted differently than the world of men: where men’s lives were ruled by institutions that 
taught them how to compete with one another and determine thresholds of difference, these 
women’s lives were shaped by the rooms of private houses. A middle-class woman’s skill as a 
writer, the narrator argues, was in “the observation of character” that came with having been 
“educated for centuries by the influences of the common sitting-room” where “People’s feelings 
were impressed upon her; personal relations were always before her eyes” (61). If men 
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understood the world by categorizing and organizing people, then women—for centuries the 
hostesses of parties that brought people together—understood the world by observing the 
interactions between people. The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century women writers had the 
courage to begin expressing the fundamentally different experiences that separated the lives of 
women from the lives of men, a difficult task given “it is the masculine values that prevail” in 
society and in the literary marketplace (67). Thus, the narrator argues the courage these women 
showed in writing the lives of women reveals their authorial integrity, which the narrator defines 
as the element in books that “holds them together in […] rare instances of survival” (65) and that 
indicates the author’s ability to convince her readers that she has represented reality accurately 
even if they “have never known people behaving like that” (65). Integrity produces longevity, 
and it is the women writer’s willingness to write the worlds of their rooms into existence that 
saved them from the fourpenny boxes. But even though the narrator never mentions it, one 
wonders what role the “innumerable bad novels” of women writers before the eighteenth century 
played in later women novelists’ ability to write about their world with the integrity needed to 
create their masterpieces. No matter how many reams of paper were written by early women 
writers only to be forgotten to time, this work helped generate the critical mass of women’s 
literature that allowed the great eighteenth- and nineteenth-century women novelists to begin 
writing the first masterpieces of women’s literature. A foundation had been laid that women 
could build upon, and if “the experience of the mass is behind the single voice” (59-60) that 
creates a masterpiece and forces the world to pay attention to it as a work of genius, then what 
comes before, no matter how bad and how innumerable, must play some part in establishing a 
world that requires a genius to gain the attention of readers in the first place. Out of this 
	
 268 
foundation stepped into the world, for the first time, a literature that represented the world of 
women, not the world of men. 
 Rooms might have been important to the great eighteenth- and nineteenth-century women 
novelists’ writing, but only Jane Austen and Emily Brontë, the narrator argues, were truly able to 
write about women’s rooms and worlds with complete integrity because only they were able to 
eschew the forms of men entirely and invent a distinct women’s writing style. Charlotte Brontë 
“had more genius in her than Austen,” but, like Lady Winchilsea, her work is “deformed and 
twisted” by angers and grievances until “at war with her lot” she could not “help but die young, 
cramped and thwarted” (63). And George Eliot, like Cavendish, squirreled herself away in “a 
secluded villa in St John’s Wood” and “settled down in the shadow of the world’s disapproval” 
(64), all because she was “living in sin with a married man and might not the sight of her damage 
the chastity of Mrs. Smith or whoever it might be that chanced to call” (64). Austen and Emily 
Brontë were able to avoid the fates of their contemporaries because “They wrote as women 
write, not as men write” (68). They were, that is to say, formal pioneers who recognized “we 
think back through our mothers if we are women,” and they taught women it is “useless to go to 
the great men writers for help, however much one may go to them for pleasure” (69). The 
narrator continues a page later that “The weight, the pace, the stride of a man’s mind are too 
unlike her own for her to lift anything substantial from him successfully. The ape is too distant to 
be sedulous. Perhaps the first thing she would find, setting pen to paper, was that there was no 
common sentence ready for her use” (69). For Austen and Emily Brontë, therefore, the room 
becomes less a physical space they retreat to or find salvation in than a literary form that in and 
of itself contains and reveals their genius and allows them to express the world of sitting-rooms 
and its characters from the ground up. They need no longer rely on the ill-fitting forms and 
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sentences of men because they created forms suited to their purposes as women writers, 
transforming women’s writing from something that merely emulates men’s sentences and forms 
into something that creates for itself. With Austen and Emily Brontë, the physical room that 
Behn proved women could attain through writing for “practical importance” finally becomes a 
space that represents women’s writing, not merely a place that allows women to vent their anger 
or hide themselves from sight. 
 It is not until the narrator gets to modern women’s literature and imagines a fictional 
author, Mary Carmichael, that readers are introduced to a writer who, like the narrator, uses her 
room to “think of things in themselves,” and Carmichael’s disinterest in gender as a construction 
of discourse indicates, once and for all, that A Room of One’s Own has been leading always to 
the theory of the androgynous mind rather than to the conclusion about rooms and money that 
begins the essay. Carmichael removes women from the discourses that have previously defined 
them using the simple phrase “‘Chloe liked Olivia’” (74), which connects two women to one 
another outside any relationship to a man and helps rescue her from “the peculiar nature of 
women in fiction; the astonishing extremes of her beauty; the alterations between heavenly 
goodness and hellish depravity” (75). This refers back to the narrator’s discussion of woman’s 
liminal position between the discourses of literature (where woman is of the utmost importance 
as the foil to men’s heroism, the object of affection that initiates men’s heroism, the moral 
paragon that guides men’s actions, and the immoral temptress that leads men to folly) and history 
(where they are absent from both historical records and biography) that renders women 
monstrous. When Carmichael frees Chloe and Olivia from this liminal position, she begins to 
imagine other possibilities for women that extend beyond their relation to men, but more 
importantly she creates a new discourse in which gender can be recast as, if not inconsequential, 
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less consequential to Chloe and Olivia’s relationship. Carmichael lacks “the love of Nature, the 
fiery imagination, the wild poetry, the brilliant wit, the brooding wisdom of her great 
predecessors” (83), but she has “certain advantages which women […] lacked even a half 
century ago. Men were no longer to her ‘the opposing faction’; she need not spend her time 
railing against them; she need not climb on to the roof and ruin her peace of mind longing for 
travel, experience and knowledge of the world and character that were denied her” (83). This 
condensed history that touches once more upon all those mentioned in her history of women 
writers reveals an evolution of women’s writing that is attached to their rooms throughout, but 
this space that unites them also marks the historical and contextual distinctions between them 
and ends, not coincidentally, with a writer in Carmichael who uses her room with an intent that 
matches the narrator’s. For the narrator writes that “she had—I began to think—mastered the 
first great lesson; she wrote as a woman, but as a woman who has forgotten that she is a woman, 
so that her pages were full of that curious sexual quality which comes only when sex is 
unconscious of itself” (84). Christine Froula notes that thinking of sex in this way marks “a 
disinterestedness that does not obliterate sex” (196) so that “sex ‘unconscious of itself’ signifies 
a living body and mind unburdened by grievances that bespeak ‘interest’ and compromise 
freedom” (197). Until Mary, the narrator implies, women have always conceptualized 
themselves using discourses that focus on their gender as the primary indicator of their identity—
either as the Countess barred from publication by men, or the Duchess unable to study in men’s 
institutions, or as the middle-class hostesses who brought people together in their rooms. As 
Froula suggests, then, Carmichael’s writing treats “sex as a pure fact of nature, apart from social 
law” (197), which would be impossible but for her own room that allows her to escape the 
discursive relations and signifying economies of gender in places like Oxbridge and the British 
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Museum. If both the narrator’s arguments in A Room of One’s Own work together, it is because 
the former serves the necessary function of feeding the latter and letting it grow until the narrator 
is ready to reveal that tiny fish she caught at the river at the beginning of the text. Her topic 
“Women and Fiction” specifically asks her to present an argument interested in gender, but 
everything in her argument—her exposition of how the rooms of men shape their identities 
toward competition and war, her presentation of women writers so often confined in or by their 
rooms, her being trapped in her own room and made to think of gender—leads to the 
androgynous mind that presents a disinterested view of gender. 
 Rivers bookend A Room of One’s Own, and the river that ends the essay also ends the 
narrator’s confinement in the various rooms she visits in the text, for as she gets ready to leave 
her own room and stop thinking about “Women and Fiction,” she presents her theory of the 
androgynous mind, now fattened by her discussion of rooms and women’s lives, to an audience 
she hopes will see the value of gender neutrality. The narrator looks out from her room’s window 
onto a busy London street, and, leaving no doubt readers are meant to compare the end of the 
text with its beginning, she compares the street to a river “that took people and eddied them 
along, as the stream at Oxbridge had taken the undergraduate in his boat and the dead leaves” 
(87). While she caught a thought in the river at Oxbridge that she refuses to trouble the reader 
with at the time, what captures the reader’s attention this time is a young man and woman 
meeting to catch a taxi. The sight produces one final argument about her topic: “Perhaps, to 
think, as I had been thinking these two days, of one sex as distinct from the other is an effort. It 
interferes with the unity of the mind. Now that effort had ceased and that unity had been 
restored” (87). This is the first time in the text the narrator mentions unity, and it is to call for a 
unity of mind, born of prioritizing neither one sex nor the other, rather than any unity among 
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women or women writers because, for the narrator, unity based on sex consciousness leads to 
terrible consequences. She suggests that the Suffragette movement “roused in men an 
extraordinary desire for self-assertion” and “made them lay an emphasis upon their own sex and 
its characteristics which they would not have troubled to think about had they not been 
challenged” (89). What comes of men’s “extraordinary desire for self-assertion,” the narrator 
points out, is the “self-assertive virility” and “unmitigated masculinity” of Italian and German 
fascism (92), and she proclaims “All who have brought about the state of sex-consciousness are 
to blame, and it is they who drive me, when I want to stretch my faculties on a book, to seek that 
happy age, before Miss Davies and Miss Clough were born, when the writer used both sides of 
his mind equally” (93). Miss Davies is Emily Davies, a suffragette and the founder of Girton 
College, and Miss Clough is Anne Clough, a suffragette and the first principal of Newnham 
College. The comment from the narrator is thus doubly biting given that the essay is ostensibly 
delivered as an address to students at a women’s college. However far into hyperbole the narrator 
strays in this portion of her argument—and I would suggest it’s a considerable distance given 
that the narrator previously offered the students of Girton and Newnham possible topics to 
explore concerning the history of women—the correlation she implies between European 
fascism and the Suffragette movement reveals just how troubled the narrator is about the 
potential to lose one’s autonomy in collectives. The narrator’s specific subject position also plays 
a part in this argument: as an uneducated woman writer with inherited wealth, she doesn’t 
particularly need the civil rights the Suffragette movement fought for to improve her life—
between her inherited money and the vote, she muses, the money seems “infinitely the more 
important” (34)—and her job as writer is to represent reality with integrity rather than to fight on 
behalf of one institution, nation, or sex. Indeed, if anything, her position benefits by maintaining 
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distance from collectives if her goal is the “freedom to think of things in themselves” (35): she 
need never worry about serving the interests of a collective if she maintains a distance that 
allows her to maintain a critical disinterest. Thus, the very last thing she does before leaving her 
room is explain that “the very first sentence that I would write here, I said, crossing over to the 
writing-table and taking up the page headed Women and Fiction, is that it is fatal for anyone who 
writes to think of their sex” (94). This final argument, the ultimate end of her theory of the 
androgynous mind, is also her first sentence, the essay having come full circle to present a thesis 
that challenges unity only after it has united women using the room that not only connects the 
narrator to her sex but also separates her from it. Hers is a self-confident, but also self-aware “I,” 
cognizant of the power structures of the literary market into which her work and words will exist 
and engaging with the institutions and professions from which she is excluded, but asserting 







“Those also serve who remain outside”: The Society of Outsiders and Disruptive Politics in 
Three Guineas 
	 While A Room of One’s Own uses a slippery and intersectional narrative position to resist 
unification with the collective and institution the narrator lectures before, ultimately presenting a 
position of gender neutrality in the theory of the androgynous mind, Three Guineas (1938) 
appears almost a decade later and takes quite a different approach to the topics of patriarchal 
hegemony and women’s political praxis. Rather than challenging and subtly subverting the social 
discourses men use to construct their superiority and women’s inferiority—the dynamic behind 
the institutionalization of exclusionary knowledge depicted in its effects on a generation of dead 
soldiers in Jacob’s Room, and the system behind the political import of medical authority against 
which Clarissa’s epiphany and assemblages operate in Mrs Dalloway—Woolf’s narrator 
mediates her world for an educated man. This mediation is an exchange that foregrounds both 
parties’ critical deficiencies, thus representing a textual space in which both parties exercise 
agency as readers not merely of text or of the debates surrounding the literary marketplace, but 
also of the institutional forces that play upon the subject as a body and mind located in historical, 
socio-economic, personal and cultural context. Given her main reader’s positioning, as well as 
her own, the narrator in Woolf’s The Guineas emphasizes the gap between them even as both are 
on the brink of facing another war. In response to a letter from an educated man requesting 
money to aid in the prevention of war, Woolf’s narrator marvels at the singular nature of the 
question “How in your opinion are we to prevent war?” (117), before demonstrating conclusively 
that women, specifically the “daughters of educated men” like herself, have little power to 
prevent war because they have been denied access to and still struggle for a foothold in the 
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institutions that govern England. Using evidence collected from sources including literature, 
histories, biographies, social science research, newspapers, and official documents over the six 
years prior to her writing Three Guineas, Woolf produces, as she never tires of stating in the 
essay, a fact-based argument—supported by numerous direct quotations in the body of the essay 
and over one hundred endnotes—that links military aggression and dictatorship to the patriarchal 
imperative that pervades England’s social institutions. A systematic dressing down of these 
numerous institutions, among which she includes the government, the professions, the academy, 
the church, the media, and the family, what emerges in the essay is as much an exploration of 
English culture’s pervasive gender inequalities as it is a pacifist political manifesto written in the 
face of the ever-increasing likelihood of a second European conflict in the first half of the 
twentieth-century.  
 To link her social and political critiques, Woolf focuses on the “daughters of educated 
men,” a term that in and of itself marks this group’s marginalization within England’s patriarchal 
institutions. Woolf notes how profoundly women lack the “two prime characteristics of the 
bourgeoisie—capital and environment” (274)—the men of her class possess, and in what 
constitutes the thesis of the essay, Woolf explains that men have many weapons, including taking 
up arms, ready access to the business world, influence over the government through diplomatic 
service, and the ability to preach sermons, at their disposal to aid in the prevention of war before 
discussing educated men’s daughter’s access to such things: “both the Army and the Navy are 
closed to our sex. We are not allowed to fight. Nor again are we allowed to be members of the 
Stock Exchange. […] We cannot preach sermons or negotiate treaties. Then again although it is 
true that we can write articles or send letters to the Press, the control of the Press – the decision 
what to print – is entirely in the hands of your sex” (127). The entire institutional superstructure 
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of England, that is to say, is under the control of men, and is passed down from generation to 
generation by the social institutions that support men’s lives, goals, values, and traditions. 
Outsiders to this tradition, women necessarily see and experience the world differently. As one 
example, Woolf explains that women, who have seen the money for their education endlessly 
syphoned from them into Arthur’s Education Fund, view Oxbridge not as their old schools but as 
a symbol of oft-ignored educations that frequently consist of “a schoolroom table; an omnibus 
going to class; a little woman with a red nose who is not well educated herself but has an invalid 
mother to support” (119). Woolf thus postulates that “Any help we can give you [in the 
prevention of war] must be different from that you can give yourselves, and perhaps the value of 
that help may lie in the fact of that difference” (133). The end of Woolf’s argument is that 
women participate in what she calls “The Society of Outsiders,” which is a society only in the 
loosest sense of the word and does not prescribe political actions, or hold meetings, or seek funds 
but, rather, refuses to act or speak in any way that supports the patriarchal tradition that 
perpetuates war. Woolf’s political call to action, therefore, is essentially a politics of everyday 
life that focus on private actions that are temporally and spatially specific depending on one’s 
relation to institutions and their discourses of power, as it calls for careful consideration of both 
subject positionality and performative participation in the public sphere. Much like the kind of 
discriminate buying Woolf advocates for the common reader in the literary marketplace in 
“Street Haunting,” the political action she calls for from her “Society of Outsiders” focuses on 
steering politics using subversive participation or non-participation intended to make one’s 




 In terms of form, however, Three Guineas is a failure, and is so quite deliberately. At the 
beginning of the essay Woolf points out facetiously that “one does not like to leave so 
remarkable a letter as yours – a letter perhaps unique in the history of human correspondence, 
since when before has an educated man asked a woman how in her opinion war can be 
prevented? – unanswered” before writing more seriously “Therefore let us make the attempt; 
even though it is doomed to failure” (117). What dooms the essay to failure is the difference 
between men’s and women’s experiences and perceptions of the world, which Woolf makes the 
centerpiece of women’s political praxis. This difference hinders communication between the 
letter writer (the daughter of an educated man) and receiver (an educated man) throughout the 
essay, an impediment that is signalled formally by argumentative repetitions, gaps, and incessant 
definitions and refinements of words, as wells as by the text’s mixing of genres. Written in 
epistolary form, the essay is a series of letters drafted to different recipients: three complete 
letters are written to the organizations to which the narrator donates money, five more letters that 
have been sent to the narrator are referred to, and parts of four letters are drafted and put to the 
side. Three Guineas is, therefore, both a public and a private document inasmuch as it is an essay 
meant for public distribution that deals with current cultural events and issues, and yet it is 
written to resemble the private correspondence between two people. The text, that is to say, 
straddles two different literary genres, each with their own traditions. Given that Woolf’s 
argument ends with the assertion “that public and private worlds are inseparably connected; that 
the tyrannies and servilities of the one are the tyrannies and servilities of the other” (270), it is 
not surprising that she chooses to mix these forms and their audiences, but the fact that she 




 Three Guineas is unlike most of Woolf’s essays because it seems to abandon many of the 
essay writing techniques she’d spent years refining and instead emulates the academic 
argumentative essay tradition; for, more than any other Woolf essay, Three Guineas utilizes—
indeed, continually points out its insistence upon—facts to present its argument. This reliance on 
facts and the attendant narrative voice stands in distinction from the playful and slippery 
narrators of A Room of One’s Own and “Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown,” who use shifting pronouns 
and complex positioning to allow readers to interject and position themselves within Woolf’s 
textual spaces. They are replaced by a narrator who positions herself statically as the daughter of 
an educated man and delivers an argument much less congenial to her reader’s agency. Indeed, 
the word “polemic” is one rarely seen in Woolf scholarship outside discussions of Three 
Guineas. If Woolf was worried readers of A Room of One’s Own might think she had an “axe to 
grind” and so worked to make the essay’s argument stylistically subversive, she holds readers’ 
noses to the grindstone in Three Guineas, not only in terms of the forcefulness of her message 
but also in terms of the work required to parse the essay. Characterized by repetition and gaps 
that disrupt the argumentative flow, Three Guineas comes to a point, but slowly and circuitously 
rather than following a clearly defined progression of ideas that is the hallmark of the academic 
argumentative essay tradition. The essay presents facts to support its thesis, but it does so in a 
form that highlights the interpersonal context of an epistolary correspondence between an 
educated man and woman, so that while Three Guineas presents a reasonable argument, it does 
so by fracturing the argumentative essay form and blurring the boundaries between the personal 
and the public. Literally written by a common reader rather than the type of professional reader 
forged in the patriarchal institutions of England, Three Guineas subverts the traditional essay 
form by participating in the essay tradition on its own terms, choosing what it takes from the 
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form, a reliance on facts and the meticulous documentation, while countering the impersonality 
of academic writing with a highly personal epistolary form. 
 Three Guineas achieves this fracturing of the argumentative essay form through its use of 
the epistolary form, which Woolf had long considered a form not only associated with the private 
sphere but also with fluid subjectivities and temporal specificity. Letters had long been 
associated with women, especially the middle- to upper-class daughters of educated men who, 
before their relatively recent acceptance into the world of literature, had found in letters their 
only real means of written communication. Thus, as Jane Marcus points out, Woolf employing 
the voice of a “‘daughter of an educated man’ responding by letter to requests for donations to 
Good Causes is itself a radical reflection of women’s powerlessness” (110). More than this, 
however, letters represent for Woolf an attempt at personal communication that is ephemeral and 
meant to perish as quickly as it is read, for what is revealed in letters are the words of one person, 
at one moment, on one day to another person who is imagined by the sender at the same moment 
on the same day. Scraps, orts, and fragments of oneself, letters are the clearest indicator for 
Woolf of the fleeting existence of subjectivity. The letter’s evanescence therefore creates a 
natural counter to the argumentative essay’s supposed timelessness, and it is used by Woolf to 
represent the ever-changing political strategy she presents in Three Guineas. Put most simply, 
both Three Guineas and the Society of Outsiders are about disruption—disruption of the 
language and symbolism used to promote war, disruption of the patriarchal traditions that 
perpetuate war, and disruption of the state by refusing to use one’s body to reify its nationalist 
ideologies—and so Woolf gives her common reader a text in which one form literally and 
consistently disrupts the other. The argumentative essay form is interrupted and subverted by an 
epistolary form that eschews timeless tradition and values timely political actions. The 
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institutions—the academy, the government, the media—used to legitimate the reasonableness of 
war are thus asked to account for their actions in Three Guineas, and Woolf advocates a politics 
of the body that aims to disrupt the material reification of the ideologies espoused by so many of 
England’s patriarchal public institutions: Jacob’s Cambridge, Britain’s military, Bradshaw’s 
medical practice.  
 For Woolf, the epistolary tradition was one of capturing not just moments but identities 
that vanished as quickly as they appeared, for as private correspondence between two people, 
letters reveal the relationship between the sender and receiver at any given time. In Jacob’s 
Room, letters are referred to as “speech attempted” by a “phantom of ourselves, lying on the 
table” (73), for throughout time “Masters of language, poets of long ages, have turned from the 
sheet that endures to the sheet that perishes…and addressed themselves to the task of reaching, 
touching, penetrating the individual heart” (73-4). Unabashedly personal, letters live in stark 
contrast to the impersonal texts of academia, the latter presenting themselves as objectively as 
possible in an attempt to avoid claims of bias as well as make themselves accessible to all who 
read them, while with the former one knows one’s reader and tailors one’s words to that reader. 
Indeed, in Three Guineas Woolf begins by drawing “what all letter-writers instinctively draw, a 
sketch of the person to whom the letter is addressed,” for “Without someone warm and breathing 
on the other side of the page, letters are worthless” (117). Such a personal form makes a strange 
bedfellow for a modernist such as Woolf, for this sketch-drawing—inasmuch as the sender 
writes as one temporally-determinate individual to another, imagined temporally-determinate 
individual—sets the subject positions of both sender and receiver before the letter begins. Using 
the epistolary form for an essay, therefore, seems to limit the flexibility of the narrator, which 
had become a staple of Woolf’s essays by the time she wrote Three Guineas. But what the 
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narrator loses in flexibility she more than makes up for in the multiplicity created by the 
ephemerality of her subjectivity. As S.P. Rosenbaum points out, letters are a “transitive form” 
because they begin with “an objectified reader inside” (64), and thus allow for great variance in 
subjectivity depending upon circumstance. The same person may be formal in a letter to her 
lawyer, authoritative in a letter to her disrespectful child, and romantic in a letter to her lover, as 
the tone of each letter changes in accordance with the person who is imagined on the other side 
of the page; the epistolary form, therefore, demonstrates the type of intersectional identity Woolf 
established for herself as a writer, publisher, and thinker in the literary marketplace in addition to 
being a form that represents her common readers’ critical ephemerality based on their subject 
positions. Letters, that is to say, are of a time and place: they capture their correspondents and 
reveal momentary subjectivities, which, paradoxically, stabilizes the two communicants 
temporally while leaving the message conveyed ephemeral precisely because it represents only 
the subjectivities of one time and space.  
 Woolf’s main letter in Three Guineas, therefore, establishes the subject positions of each 
participant in the text’s discussion and, unlike many of her essays, does not allow much room for 
the reader to intervene in the discussion. This closing off of the text did not go unnoticed by 
readers at the time. Q.D. Leavis believed Three Guineas was too limited in perspective for its 
suggestions concerning political praxis to be broadly applicable, writing that “almost the first 
thing we notice is that the author of Three Guineas is quite insulated by class” (409), for Woolf 
“has personally received considerably more in the way of economic ease than she is humanly 
entitled to” and “cannot be supposed to have suffered any worse injury from mankind than a rare 
unfavourable review” (410). Predictably hyperbolic, Leavis’s argument is one personal attack 
amongst many exchanged with Woolf, who in many of her works, not the least of which Three 
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Guineas, questioned the usefulness of the educational institutions Leavis worked so hard to 
establish herself within and the debates over cultural value in which demographics were 
scrutinized so closely. Yet, Leavis points to the static narrative viewpoint in Three Guineas, 
which appears to be a text written by the daughter of an educated woman only for other 
daughters of educated men and for educated men like the one to whom the letter is addressed. It 
seems, at best, to neglect the perspectives of other readers and, at worst, to actively exclude 
them.  
 The feeling of exclusion some readers felt is perhaps best explained in a letter Woolf 
received from Agnes Smith, an unemployed textile worker from Holmfirth, Yorkshire. Smith 
writes to Woolf that “You say glibly that the working woman could refuse to nurse and to make 
munitions and so stop the war. A working woman who refuses work will starve – and there is 
nothing like stark hunger for blasting ideals” (99). She also offers to “write a similar [book] from 
the working woman’s point of view” as an alternative to Woolf’s glib argument before again 
challenging Woolf’s privilege by pointing out that “if I had your access to books, the stimulus 
which you can obtain from conversation, and living, with people who know how to follow a line 
of thought, and work out its implications – and if, in addition, I had economic freedom I might 
do so” (99). Smith then insists that “the lumping of individuals into classes is odious” (102), and 
she ends the letter by writing, “I resent the fact of any ‘educated woman’ inferring that working 
women are of different clay to the ‘daughters of educated men’ and felt 6666 [sic] impelled to 
say so – though it is doubtful if you will so much as read it” (103). Woolf did read the letter; she 
also responded to Smith—as she did to many of the letter writers who inquired about Three 
Guineas—and the two women became regular correspondents until Woolf’s death in 1941. None 
of Woolf’s letters to Smith exist, but it is clear that Woolf encouraged her to write about her 
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experiences because Smith had enclosed some critical writings, for which she had earned £30, in 
a later letter. It is also known that Woolf at some point suggested to Smith that she publish her 
autobiography with the Hogarth Press, and the book Smith suggested from the working woman’s 
perspective was later published by Hillcroft Studies in 1944 under the title A Worker’s View of 
the Wool Textile Industry (Snaith 103).  
 What’s most interesting about Smith is that she represents a common reader since she is 
presumably uneducated and outside the institutions that help determine worldviews like those of 
Jacob or of the students at the women’s college. Instead of professional training, or a rejection of 
“high culture” in favour of an embrace of a mass or common identity, she exercises her agency 
and creates a space in which the author’s—and ultimately the reader’s—deficiencies enable a 
conversation. Striking is the fact that Woolf uses that conversation carried out in the 
correspondence to demonstrate the intersectionality that characterizes her cultural position. As  
author, publisher, and letter-writer, she engages in different modes of subjectivity, and thus 
engages as a writer to enable the reader to be both subject and object too. What emerges is a 
corresponding shift in Smith’s positioning. Her first letter thoroughly evidences Woolf’s 
suggestion that letters capture people at a specific moment of time and reveal how the sender 
imagines the recipient. Full of anger and indignation in her first letter, Smith is calmer in her 
second letter to Woolf, explaining that she now agreed with Woolf’s decision to write from a 
point of view “of which [she has] first hand knowledge” and commiserating that she knows from 
personal experience that writing is difficult (105). As the relationship between the women 
changes, therefore, the tone of the letters also changes, so that what one sees in Smith’s letters is 
an ever-shifting subjectivity as she consciously chooses a subject position she believes best 
represents her current relationship with Woolf. Smith’s letters also reveal that the letter form, 
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perhaps more effectively than other written forms, can be used to communicate topics that are 
difficult to discuss in person, for, as Naomi Black suggests, letters can “provide a way in which 
to speak bluntly, as one might not face to face, to someone who may be hostile but still possibly 
persuadable” (75). Letters are so effective in broaching difficult subjects because, unlike in-
person communications, they inherently contain spaces of time between writing, delivery, 
reading, and response during which correspondents may consider their replies. The fact that the 
writer has the mental space to imagine the reader as an object to whom she addresses herself also 
plays a role in airing grievances and broaching difficult subjects. Smith’s insulting tone in her 
first letter, which she uses to explain Woolf’s privilege to her, is bolstered by the fact that, as the 
correspondent currently in control of their communication, Smith is able to imagine Woolf as a 
snobbish highbrow unlikely to read her letter, let alone respond to its argument. Woolf’s 
objectification provides Smith with an oppositional figure, against which she can position her 
own subjectivity and make her argument rhetorically, if not necessarily logically, stronger. 
 The objectification of the face on the other side of the page is a characteristic of letter 
writing that Woolf takes advantage of a number of times throughout Three Guineas, and the 
adjustments she makes to her recipients signal shifts in her argumentative position and create 
textual disruptions that demonstrate Woolf’s argument is temporally dependent and, thereby, 
fluid. Such a readjustment occurs when Woolf’s narrator begins to draft a response letter to the 
treasurer of a women’s college who asks for donations to the college. The narrator begins the 
letter by promising a guinea if certain conditions are met that distinguish women’s colleges from 
men’s colleges. She associates the “subtle distinctions of hats and hoods, of purples and 
crimsons, of velvet and cloth, of cap and gown” (142) in men’s colleges with competition, and 
suggests these complex symbolic economies teach “the arts of dominating other people” (155) 
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that result in naught but jealousy. In contrast, Woolf’s narrator argues that women’s colleges 
should represent a new academy “in which learning is sought for itself; where advertisement is 
abolished; and there are no degrees; and lectures are not given, and sermons are not preached, 
and the old poisoned vanities and parades which breed competition and jealousy…The letter 
broke off there” (156). This is just one ellipsis of many in Three Guineas, and these breaks in the 
text are usually either viewed as places for readers to interject in the argument—thereby 
representing the kind of textual freedom explored previously in Woolf’s other essays—or as 
places in which silence interjects to represent women’s marginalization from the public sphere. 
For Patricia Laurence, the ellipses in Three Guineas invite “the reader to be open to the fugitive 
wanderings of his own mind as well as the author’s” (108). While the ellipsis may create an 
argumentative and visual break in the letter, there is little sense that this break offers the kind of 
readerly freedom one usually finds in Woolf’s essay, in large part because the narrator’s 
authority in Three Guineas is never questioned in the same way it is in her other essays that 
employ slippery narrators. No sooner does the narrator give up her previous polemical argument 
based on who she imagines on the other side of the page than she moves onto another polemical 
argument based on who she now sees across from her. As the narrator explains, this disruption is 
not caused by a “lack of things to say” but “because the face on the other side of the page” no 
longer matches the face she had previously imagined she was speaking to (156). In other words, 
Woolf is performatively presenting her argument in Three Guineas to an audience she herself has 
constructed since she is the letter writer imagining the reader to whom she is writing. In this 
instance the dynamism of the common reader, whose “deficiencies as a critic are too obvious to 
be pointed out” (2), is staged by Woolf herself, who self-reflexively adjusts her argument every 
time the reader’s face she imagines on the other side of the letter slips out of focus. While there 
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may be a slippage in her argument, this slippage reflects not the narrator’s lack of authority but 
rather the shifting status of the objectified letter readers for whom she writes. There is no loss of 
narrative control that invites the reader into the textual space in Three Guineas—as was the case 
in essays like “Character in Fiction” and A Room of One’s Own that employed more slippery 
narrators who asked openly to be questioned. Instead, this narrator acknowledges her 
deficiencies in real-time, shifting with alacrity from one argument to another and always 
remaining in control of the argument because she has imagined the reader she is writing to 
herself. Three Guineas is a much more closed text than something like A Room of One’s Own, 
therefore, but its mixed form also demonstrates the political praxis Woolf argues for in the text, 
for whenever she feels the essay’s factual argument begin to falter, she realigns it with an 
adjustment of the reader she imagines writing to as a letter writer. The public form of the 
institutionalized academic essay, then, is righted by the personal interventions of a careful 
narrator ever-vigilant of how her essay performatively conveys its politics of everyday life 
argument. 
 That the ellipses in Three Guineas create silences representing women’s marginalization 
from public discourse and public institutions becomes clear in the rapid argumentative shifts that 
follow the use of the ellipsis in this passage. After the elliptical break, the three people involved 
in the discussion—the narrator, the educated gentlemen reader Three Guineas addresses 
throughout, and the women’s college treasurer to whom the current letter draft is being 
addressed—become much more distinct, and the narrator begins to change her argument 
concerning the women’s college depending on whom she is addressing. Woolf’s narrator 
previously imagines very little difference between the treasurer and the educated man. Both 
being educated readers, she treats them similarly and makes her idealistic argument about a 
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women’s college unburdened by the jealousies that infect the men’s college. After the elliptical 
break, however, the face of the treasurer turns melancholy in Woolf’s narrator’s mind as she 
considers the reality that, in order to ensure their students may obtain valuable employment, and 
in order for them to remain viable as educational institutions, women’s colleges have to follow 
the lead of men’s colleges. Their obligation to do so is shown through the repetition of the modal 
verb “must” when Woolf shifts her argument in relation to the newly imagined letter recipient. 
The realities of women’s access to education and employment mean the women’s colleges 
must also make Research produce practical results which will induce bequests and 
donations from rich men; it must encourage competition; it must accept degrees 
and coloured hoods; it must accumulate great wealth, and, therefore, in 500 years 
or so, that college, too, must ask the same question that you, Sir, are asking now: 
“How in your opinion are we to prevent war?” (157) 
While “must” does not actually constitute an imperative command, it does suggest that men’s 
colleges and the role they’ve played in creating the traditions of England present women’s 
colleges with an obligation to continue in their pedagogical footsteps. So entrenched is the idea 
that education must create distinctions by acting as the entrance point to exclusive communities 
like the professoriate, the government, and the professions that women’s colleges have little 
choice but to work within this system.  
 The price daughters of educated women will pay if women’s colleges deviate from this 
tradition is made clear shortly after, where a series of conditional statements present the realities 
these women face when they enter the academy and the workplace:  
We [the narrator and the educated male reader] have said that the only influence which 
the daughters of educated men can at present exert against war is the disinterested 
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influence that they possess through earning a living. If there were no means of training 
them to earn their livings, there would be an end of that influence. They could not obtain 
appointments. If they could not obtain appointments they would again be dependent upon 
their father and brothers; and if they were again dependent upon their fathers and brothers 
they would again be consciously and unconsciously in favour of war. (157)  
This passage contains precious little of the choice usually associated with conditional statements, 
and, instead, seems to reveal the illusion of the options for women who want to enter public 
institutions. All these conditional statements point back to the power of the patriarchal hegemony 
within the academy—represented in this passage by one half of the “We” with which it begins—
for it is the men’s college, not the women’s, that controls how women’s colleges must function. 
There are rules and expectations that must be followed in order to access cultural and economic 
capital, and these rules and expectations are created by patriarchal institutions with the express 
purpose of reinforcing their values and marginalizing those who refuse to follow them. A self-
legitimating, closed system of education, governance, and employment, the patriarchal 
institutions of England maintain their discursive power and structural integrity by demanding the 
replication of their academic forms, their governmental procedures, and their employment 
requirements. If this system of legitimation seems rather tautological, it should: closed systems 
function effectively because their means reproduce their ends. All speech acts and physical 
actions undertaken within a closed system are deemed legitimate only if they support the ends of 
that closed system; any speeches or acts that do not support these ends are deemed illegitimate a 
priori and marginalized by the system. Thus, as Jean-François Lyotard writes, closed systems 
“define what has the right to be said and done in the culture in question, and since they are 
themselves a part of that culture, they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they 
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do” (23). Put differently, one must speak and act using patriarchally approved forms in order to 
be legitimated by, and gain agency within, patriarchal institutions. The headmaster’s tools, it 
seems, must be used in the seemingly inevitable replication of his house.	 
 Another, similar interruption in Woolf’s argument occurs as she imagines herself writing 
to the honorary treasurer of a society committed to helping the daughters of educated men enter 
the professions, for, once again, the face of her recipient changes while Woolf’s narrator is in the 
middle of a peroration about the failure of the women’s movement. Despite having been able to 
enter the professions for some twenty years and having been able to vote, she claims, for some 
ten years, women, Woolf’s narrator laments, have neither “ended war” nor “resisted the practical 
obliteration of [their] freedom by Fascists or Nazis” (166). Shortly afterward, Woolf’s narrator 
interrupts herself once more with an ellipsis, and using almost the same language as before 
explains that the face on the other side of the page had “an expression, of boredom was it, or was 
it of fatigue?” (166). Whatever the emotion, the face changes because, as has been the case with 
the women’s college treasurer, reality intervenes. What follows are myriad examples—
government pay scales according to gender, one of Prime Minister Baldwin’s speeches, and two 
newspaper articles—of how wage inequality between men and women and gender stereotypes 
divest women of power in the professions. Moreover, these examples reveal how men have 
attempted to limit the role women are able to play in the professions by either prioritizing men’s 
work or by actively trying to marginalize women from the professions. Particularly troubling is 
the effect marriage has on employment, for the narrator explains that “the word ‘Miss,’ however 
delicious its scent in the private house, has a certain odour to it in Whitehall which is 
disagreeable to the noses on the other side of the partition,” and “so rank does [the word ‘Mrs’] 
stink in the nostrils of Whitehall, that Whitehall excludes it entirely” (174). Still reduced in the 
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professions to the prefixes that signify her relationship to men, a woman’s risk of exclusion from 
Whitehall increases with her decision to marry: married or unmarried, it is her status in the 
private sphere rather than her value to the public sphere that most determines her cultural capital. 
Marriage transforms the woman into the angel in the house and transfers her responsibility to the 
husband and family; further, the wage disparity between the sexes is designed to promote this 
“choice” by making marriage a more economically stable option than professional labour. The 
professions, therefore, are technically open to women, but their patriarchal structure does all it 
can to ensure that women do not gain too much agency through public careers. 
 Thus, the professions, like the academy, establish the patriarchal public space which 
remains coherent by excluding women, thereby making women a foundational pillar of 
patriarchal power: as in A Room of One’s Own, where the turf is defined by the gravel. If in 
Jacob’s Room the difference between women and students in the church at Cambridge 
establishes the threshold of privilege in Jacob’s view of his position; if in Mrs Dalloway the 
exclusion of Septimus Smith establishes the threshold of sanity in Bradshaw’s theory of 
Proportion, women play the same role for patriarchal England in Three Guineas. As Froula 
argues, the text “decodes women’s function as the scapegoat whose expulsion establishes bonds 
between men—thereby exposing women’s crucial (and sacralized) structural role in the founding 
and perpetuation of a masculinized public sphere that dominates a feminized private house” 
(264-5). The mutually definitional binary of masculinized public sphere and feminized private 
sphere is signaled a number of times throughout Three Guineas, and especially when the narrator 
imagines herself standing on a bridge. For Froula, Woolf’s narrator uses this bridge imagery to 
represent women’s movement from the private sphere to the public. In actively exposing 
women’s role in structuring the patriarchal institutions of England, she “moves out of the 
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scapegoat’s role and into autonomous public speech” so as “to advance humanity from tyranny 
and war toward peace and freedom” (265). In this reading, Three Guineas represents a seminal 
text in Bloomsbury’s attempt to confront cultural barbarity by carrying on the Enlightenment 
struggle for human rights and democratic self-governance, and the bridge is a connective device 
between the public sphere that propagates barbarity and the private lives that either support or 
challenge these barbarities. Certainly, Woolf believed the private and public spheres must work 
together to prevent war, for near the end of Three Guineas she argues that mutual ruin will be the 
result “if you, in the immensity of your public abstractions forget the private figure, or if we in 
the intensity of our private emotions forget the public world” (271). Woolf counsels unity, then, 
but significantly, she resists any notion of collective political action: though there is a connection 
between the private and the public, men and women have different roles to play in preventing 
war and must continue to base political praxis on these differences in order to achieve their 
mutual goal. Indeed, the first time Woolf mentions the bridge in Three Guineas, she refers to the 
narrator’s position in a “moment of transition on the bridge” (133). Suspended between the 
private spaces of the West End and the public spaces of Westminster, the bridge is not only a 
connective device but a liminal and temporary space betwixt and between the private and the 
public. Neither wholly in one sphere nor the other, the bridge marks a span of time that enables 
decision-making, such as how to transition between the private homes of the West End and the 
public buildings of Westminster. For the first time in English history, women have a direct route 
between the spheres; what Woolf argues that women should consider what it means to move 
from one to the other, and under what conditions they should follow the procession of fathers 
and brothers who cross the bridge every day to rule England. 
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 In prompting such considerations, Woolf challenges the integrity of public institutional 
traditions, not just in terms of women’s participation in the procession, but also in terms of her 
argument itself. Woolf exposes the drawbacks of the closed system that is the argumentative 
essay through such breaks and considerations of a shifting and multiple audience. Subverting the 
formal limitations of the argumentative essay, as well as its illusory coherence, she splices her 
essay with letters that allow her to converse with multiple imagined readers at the same time and 
express multiple arguments about the same topic, thereby staging the dynamic she established for 
her agential common readers who build ramshackle theories and refine them by comparing their 
own critical deficiencies with those of other common readers. Where argumentative essays 
address one topic and make one coherent argument, Woolf’s essay addresses two people and 
creates a dialectic in which more than one argument can be made and discussed. Thus, between 
the realistic passages that explain what women’s colleges “must” do and what will happen “if” 
they don’t, Woolf’s narrator becomes idealistic once more to explain that “No guinea of earned 
money should go to rebuilding the college on the old plan; just as certainly none could be spent 
upon building a college upon a new plan; therefore the guinea should be earmarked ‘Rags. 
Petrol. Matches’” and be used to burn the old colleges and their traditions to the ground (157). 
Woolf claims that this idea is “not empty rhetoric” (157), crediting a former master of Eton and 
current Dean of Durham University with having made a similar argument, but this claim is 
clearly disingenuous given its location between two passages describing the real obligations of 
women’s colleges. Still, the rhetorical positioning of the narrator’s idealism is far from empty, 
for it creates an important disruption in both her argument’s progression and the institutional 
realities she describes before and after. Thus, while Zwerdling argues that Woolf “gritted her 
teeth, determined to beat the enemy at his own game” by using a logical, well-evidenced 
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argumentative essay (257), she deliberately undermines this form in such passages to show how 
its rigidity limits expressions that do not support its ends. The supposedly obvious realities of 
educational institutions and the way they function are thus challenged, so that the seemingly 
necessary progression from institutional education, to exclusion, to jealousy, to war becomes a 
little less predetermined. More than one outcome for educational institutions is offered in this 
passage, as the narrator’s argument frequently counteracts itself depending on whether she’s 
addressing the educated gentleman or the women’s college treasurer, and relating to how she 
imagines their responses at different moments within the text. 
 While Woolf’s use of the epistolary tradition is the primary disruptor in Three Guineas, 
she also engages the reader in reflection by repeating phrases, images, and, at times, entire 
passages so as to break the flow of her arguments and insist on contemplation. In part, these 
repetitions further confound the argumentative essay form Woolf chooses in order to represent 
the patriarchal hegemony of public intellectual discourse, for, as Kathryn Simpson points out, 
these repetitions ensure “Woolf’s argument moves forwards by looking back, by recalling earlier 
points, and this creates a sense of indirection at odds with generic expectations of a teleological 
drive and a logical line of reasoning” (A Guide 72). Thus, when Woolf repeats the list of 
conditional “if” statements that foreground the obligations of women’s colleges just one page 
after its first appearance (158), she does so not only to reiterate the power of patriarchal 
traditions in the academy but also to demonstrate that her attempts to counter these traditions fail 
when they are confronted with the realities of women’s education and employment. Coming 
back to the list reminds readers of the limitations of Woolf’s argument, whose pauses repeat a 
current inevitability that she finds problematic but that she also hopes will be rectifiable at some 
point. If there is any hope for change in the academy, it is contained in the fact that, no matter 
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how rigidly they define the obligations of educational institutions, these conditional statements 
contain the possibility for change built inherently into their structure. They argue that the 
reader—the common reader—can ask if these conditions are the conditions under which women 
should live and be granted economic independence and intellectual freedom, and their repetition 
argues that the reader can stop and consider whether or not these conditions are worth 
supporting. 
 In drawing upon the reader’s potential resistance to or participation in such systems, 
Woolf extends the critique presented in texts such as Jacob’s Room and Mrs Dalloway, and links 
patriarchal social institutions and the discourses they promote to the bodily actions that reify 
their common status. Repeated passages feature her narrator standing on the bridge watching a 
procession of men go to work. In the first passage, the narrator notes the “colossal size” and 
“majestic masonry” of the governmental, legal, and religious buildings in Westminster and 
explains, “There […] our father and brothers have spent their lives. All these hundred of years 
they have been mounting those steps, passing in and out of those doors, ascending those pulpits, 
preaching, money-making, administering justice” (133). The grandeur of the buildings, however, 
soon vanishes and is “broken up into a myriad points of amazement mixed with interrogation” as 
the narrator begins to focus on the clothing worn in a procession: “Not only are whole bodies of 
men dressed alike summer and winter […] but every button, rosette and stripe seem to have 
some symbolic meaning” (134). The exclusivity of patriarchal social institutions becomes much 
more than an abstract concept when the narrator indicates that what constitutes the power of 
these institutions is not the grand, symbolic architecture but the numerous tiny details of the 
men’s clothing, which signify their inclusion and place within these systems of power. Quite 
literally messengers of the institutions’ ideologies, each man carries with him the traditions that 
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have shaped him and that he, in turn, gives shape to as he assumes his position within the 
buildings of Westminster. Institutional power is thus presented as cyclical and exclusive, and is 
predicated as much on the bodies that reiterate its rituals and wear its baubles as on the 
discourses that serve as its foundation.  
 The argument is made in concrete form through the photographs Woolf includes with her 
essay. Photographs, Woolf suggests when she describes pictures of Spanish Civil War dead, “are 
not arguments addressed to the reason; they are simply statements of fact addressed to the eye” 
(125). The photographs of the dead, she argues, bring the narrator and the educated man together 
because they objectively demonstrate the barbarity of war. Of course, the facts of the 
photographs actually included in Three Guineas are anything but simple, and they push the two 
correspondents apart and represent what Elena Gualtieri calls “a mid-way position between the 
two poles of objective statement and rhetorical construct” (174). One of the photographs, for 
example, depicts an old man in formal military dress, his chest covered in the medals that signify 
his achievements and the conflicts in which he has participated. Like the “weedy” boys who 
march by Peter Walsh in Mrs Dalloway, this man carries England’s military traditions with him, 
yet, also like the boys, it is an incongruous image. His smiling, wrinkled face is at odds with the 
military actions and patriotic grandeur his clothing denotes. He, too, lacks the “robustness” one 
usually associates with soldiers and looks encumbered by the medals, which, due to their sheer 
size and number, have overtaken his uniform and make him look dishevelled. Objectively just a 
picture of a man in uniform, this photograph signifies the construction of social status, especially 
where it points to the narrator’s exclusion from the military traditions of England. It serves as a 
reminder of the role bodies play in the iteration and reproduction of patriarchal power, and it 
provides a physical space in which her reader can consider how a change in perspective based on 
	
 296 
a difference in gender can disrupt this process and create the time needed to contemplate what it 
means to participate in the rituals that realize this power. 
 Woolf’s narrator watches the procession again later in the essay, and after re-presenting 
the scene of men climbing the steps of buildings in Westminster, she once more examines the 
bodies of the men, this time paying particular attention to the ones who deviate from the 
procession. “Great-grandfathers, grandfathers, fathers, uncles,” the narrator says, all walk in the 
group, and while, like Peter Walsh, some of them “left the procession and were last heard of 
doing nothing in Tasmania” or “rather shabbily dressed, selling newspapers in Charing Cross,” 
most “kept in step, walked according to rule” and “made enough to keep the family house […] 
supplied with beef and mutton for all, and with education for Arthur” (183). Much more than a 
mere procession toward Westminster, therefore, this is a procession through time that cycles 
endlessly as sons become fathers and fathers beget sons. This inevitability, born of the discipline 
patriarchal institutions demand and borne through time by the disciplined bodies the narrator 
watches, reveals the confinement that is a necessary consequence of their insider’s privilege. 
Beginning at birth and ending at death, the men’s lives are predetermined as they are taken into 
the “great patriarchal machine” (152) that Woolf describes in Moments of Being and are ground 
down—edges smoothed, corners rounded—to emerge as the perfectly formed figure of an 
English gentleman. The limitations imposed on the individual by this seemingly endless cycle 
remind one of Woolf’s question in A Room of One’s Own concerning whether it is “worse 
perhaps to be locked in” patriarchal institutions than it is to be excluded from them (21), and it is 
this question she reiterates in Three Guineas as she imagines the procession of men for the 
second time. For twenty years, she writes, the procession has been something “at which [women] 
can look with merely an aesthetic appreciation” (184), but they have now been asked to join the 
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group moving toward Westminster. While crossing the bridge, that symbol of transition, she asks 
women to consider three questions: “do we wish to join that procession? On what terms shall we 
join that procession? Above all, where is this leading us, the procession of educated men?” (184). 
Woolf’s implied argument is that to fall in line, to enter this procession without first 
contemplating what it means to do so, will be merely to continue a cycle that ends in war, for 
Judith L. Johnston points out that Three Guineas “envisions contemporary violence not as an 
interval in the progress of civilization, but as a part of a continuous history of repressive personal 
and political relationships, rooted in a patriarchal culture” (255). The narrator’s questions disrupt 
women’s easy adherence to this patriarchal culture and resist an easy conflation between 
inclusion and social progress. If women accept the expectations of men’s colleges as their own, 
if women join the professions yet remain dedicated to racing round the “Mulberry Tree” of 
property and capitalism (190), then their ability to aid the march from the cultural barbarity of 
war toward Enlightenment liberalism becomes an increasingly dubious prospect. 
 The movement of Woolf’s argument through repetition resists that sense of patriarchal 
duplication, for it is a literary intervention that is more about recasting an argument in multiple 
forms for multiple recipients. In working as a letter-writer within the form of the argumentative 
essay, and in working to suggest the alternative perspective that could prevent further war, she 
must, however, remember her audience. Woolf apologizes at the end of Three Guineas to the 
educated man, whom she knows is “pressed for time,” for the “length of this letter,” “the 
smallness of the contribution,” and “for writing at all” (272). The last two apologies are not-so-
subtle jabs at the fact that, as a woman, she has never before been asked to contribute to 
questions of politics and war. Apologizing for the length of letter, after subjecting the reader to a 
long, repetitive argument of nearly two hundred pages, is thus highly ironic on Woolf’s part and 
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is meant to suggest that preventing war requires much more than donating money to or joining 
societies for the prevention of war. More specifically, preventing war requires time to question 
the performative responses to certain symbols that discipline attempts to build: time to decide, 
like the gentlemen of White’s must decide, whether to forgo the Tatler in order to stand and 
make ready to go “to the cannon’s mouth” for a passing car that may contain the King or Prime 
Minister (Mrs Dalloway 16); time to decide, like Peter Walsh must decide, whether or not to 
keep step with the “regular thudding sound” of a passing group of soldiers (Mrs Dalloway 43); 
time to decide, as women must decide, under what circumstances to follow the procession of 
men going to Westminster (Three Guineas 184). Woolf “trifles with time, which is such a 
precious commodity in this busy commercial society and which is of the utmost importance in 
this society on the brink of war” (Caughie 118), by repeating and shifting her narration so as to 
make the reader spend as much time with the text as possible.  
 In a society on the brink of war or in the midst of a war, time is particularly important 
given the immediate emotional responses prompted by the ubiquitous symbols of patriotism. 
Woolf discusses the performative dimension of such nationalism in a 1915 diary entry about a 
concert she attended at Queen’s Hall, writing, “I think patriotism is a base emotion. By this I 
mean […] that they played a national Anthem & a Hymn, & all I could feel was the entire 
absence of emotion in myself & everyone else” (Diaries 1, 5). These symbols, meant to fill the 
listener with pride of one’s country, evoke only a profound absence for Woolf because they rely 
on the disciplined actions of solemnly acknowledging the flag rather than on any real emotional 
attachment to the nation. In the time between this diary entry and the publication of Three 
Guineas, Woolf had still not discovered any strong feelings toward patriotism, and she again 
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points out the differences between her narrator and the educated man through the connection 
between patriarchy and patriotism: 
if you insist upon fighting to protect me, or “our” country, let it be understood, 
soberly and rationally between us, that you are fighting to gratify a sex instinct 
which I cannot share; to procure benefits which I have not shared and probably 
will not share; but not to gratify my instincts, or to protect either myself or my 
country. “For,” the outsider will say, “in fact, as a woman, I have no country. As a 
woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the whole world.” (234) 
With this statement, Woolf reiterates her argument: the shifts in pronoun use that begin the 
passage point out women’s exclusion from the public institutions that rule English education, 
law, government, and media, and her decision to remove herself from patriotism’s symbolic 
economy by insisting that men do not consider her an object worthy of dying for implores men to 
contemplate their own justifications for war. By doing so, she intervenes in any hardwired 
performative response the man may have that would use her as a justification for war, insisting 
he spend the time to find another reason to go to the cannon’s mouth. Moreover, in refusing a 
country she refuses the nationalistic divisions that ignited many of the wars in Imperial Europe 
and proposes a global citizenship that will never again require the words dulce et decorum est 
pro patria mori. 
 In place of nationalist divisions and patriotic competitions, Woolf proposes the Outsiders’ 
Society. Its imagined structure emphasizes the importance of personal political action by 
insisting that men’s and women’s different experiences of the private and public spheres must be 
the centerpiece of political life. Woolf leaves the rules of her Outsiders’ Society purposefully 
vague, but the overarching principle is that outsiders use the difference in perspective they gain 
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through their exclusion from or limited inclusion within social institutions to interrogate the 
political and cultural ends of these institutions. Indeed, Woolf is reluctant even to call the loose 
community of outsiders a society because that word has become so associated with “conspiracies 
that sink the private brother, whom many of us [daughters of educated men] have reason to 
respect, and inflate in his stead a monstrous male” empowered by ceremonies in which “daubed 
red and gold, decorated like a savage with feathers he goes through mystic rites and enjoys the 
dubious pleasures of power and dominion” (230-1). Exclusive societies are connected to cultural 
barbarity in this passage—through an unfortunate and deeply racist comparison to non-European 
peoples’ cultural dress—that reiterates Woolf’s focus on the roles that clothing, bodies, and the 
rituals play in solidifying ideology. But the passage also outlines the fact that societies prescribe 
political actions that strip their members of individuality, an argument Woolf makes more 
forcefully when she refuses to join the educated gentleman’s society: “by so doing,” she writes, 
“we should merge our identity in yours; follow and repeat and score still deeper the old worn ruts 
in which society, like a gramophone whose needle has stuck, is grinding out with intolerable 
unanimity ‘Three hundred millions spent upon arms’” (231). This image, of course, refers back 
to the cyclical nature of the Mulberry Tree of capitalism and property, but this time it serves as 
an apt reminder that political praxis can become stagnant if all voices are forced to speak 
together rather than being allowed to speak of their own accord. What Woolf fears in joining the 
gentleman’s society is a conflation of the private and public spheres that results in what Hannah 
Arendt calls the social sphere, a space in which the necessities of life—food, shelter, clothing, 
etc.—become the stuff of politics rather than of the household. Because the social sphere blurs 
the line between the private and public sphere, Arendt adds, “we see the body of peoples and 
political communities in the image of a family whose everyday affairs have to be taken care of 
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by a gigantic, nation-wide administration of housekeeping” (28). The birth of the social sphere is 
the foundation of mid-nineteenth century fascism, inasmuch as fascism seeks to install its 
dictators as the head of the family to look after the needs of the nation’s citizens. So Three 
Guineas argues that there is no fundamental difference between European fascist dictators and 
any English patriarch “who believes that he has the right whether given by God, Nature, sex or 
race is immaterial, to dictate to other human beings how they shall live; what they shall do” 
(175). England’s patriarchy may enact its power more diffusely through the use of social 
institutions, but this power, Woolf argues, can be resisted by refusing to offer institutions the 
bodies that are required to reify their power. Thus while the gentleman seeks to amplify the 
group’s voice so as to be heard more clearly in the public sphere, Woolf seeks to challenge the 
public sphere by refusing to participate in actions that support war.  
 Woolf’s conceptualization of political praxis, therefore, is predicated on the active refusal 
to take part in any of the rituals or performances that support nationalism and patriotism, an idea 
that transforms the body from a political tool used by patriarchal social institutions into a 
political weapon used to disrupt the smooth performance these institutions rely upon to promote 
and maintain power. In terms of preventing war through refusal, Woolf suggests outsiders can 
refuse to “fight with arms,” “refuse in the event of war to make munitions or nurse the 
wounded,” and refuse “to incite their brothers to fight, or to dissuade them, but to maintain an 
attitude of complete indifference” (232). The first two suggestions are obvious attempts to 
disrupt war by not actively participating in the war machine, but the final suggestion demands a 
little more self-awareness from women and suggests a politics that is dependent on reasoned 
responses to individual situations. The narrator uses the example of a small boy marching in the 
streets mimicking the actions of soldiers, and she suggests that women should react by doing 
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nothing because if one “implore him to stop; he goes on; say nothing; he stops” (235). Woolf’s is 
a politics of timeliness rather than of timelessness, as political praxis is founded on assessing a 
situation and responding rather than reacting to situations with patterned and practiced responses. 
Thus political action can be based on “reason” rather than “instinct,” for patterned, practiced 
performances rely on emotional response whereas she suggests women take time, disrupt any 
instinctual responses to shows of patriotism, and act in a way that does not further the goals of 
the patriarchy (233). Rather than promoting war with their actions, women must “train 
themselves in peace” Woolf argues in order to ensure they stand firmly against any ritual 
associated with war (235), and, in doing so, they will use their new-found agency within the 
public sphere to change, however slightly, the structural problems in England’s patriarchal 
culture. Woolf mentions other examples of outsider behaviour as well, noting that a women’s 
football league refused to offer a cup or award to winning teams (242) and that, in what Woolf 
calls an “experiment of passivity” (243), a sudden decrease in the attendance of educated men’s 
daughters at church services concerned the church, suggesting that “to be passive is to be active; 
those also serve who remain outside” (245). These examples, Woolf suggests, show that the 
body may be used to create political change in a public sphere that functions by disciplining 
bodies, for, as Foucault explains, “Suddenly, what had made power strong becomes used to 
attack it. Power, after investing itself in the body, finds itself exposed to a counter attack in the 
same body” (56). To not perform as expected interrupts institutional power, refusing nationalism, 
patriotism, capitalism, patriarchy, according to the body that ideology requires as a conduit. 
 Thus, the Outsiders that resist the disciplining power of institutions, of hegemonic norms, 
of behaviour, and especially of thought, use their bodies to disrupt moments in which habitual 
participation materially realizes institutional ideology, and this disruption creates the potential 
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for a different social vision that recognizes the intersectionality of the subject-citizen. What 
culminates with Woolf’s Society of Outsiders, then, is in fact the theory of political praxis that 
she had worked on throughout her career as a novelist, essayist, and publisher and that found its 
first conceptualization in her common reader, that figure whose agency she insisted must stand, 
however lonely and marginalized, against the professionalism of other highbrows and the 
middlebrow’s homogenous common man. For, at its core, Woolf’s outsider politics is little more 
than a politics of everyday life built upon the foundation of a careful and considered approach to 
how one interacts against, within, and through institutional discourses of power. If the body had 
become the nexus of political power and institutional discipline, then, Woolf revealed throughout 





 My first encounter with Woolf’s theorization of outsiders came in a graduate seminar 
discussion of Three Guineas during which the professor asked the students if they considered 
themselves outsiders, and their answers helped crystalize the spatial and temporal components of 
Woolf’s outsider politics in my mind. There weren’t many students in the class, maybe 6 or 7, 
but what I remember most was how each student staked their claim to an outsider position in 
some way. The son of two working-class parents, just the second male member of my extended 
family to pursue a post-secondary education, and a former oilrig worker, my claim was there to 
be staked as well. After all, less than a year before this discussion took place I’d been on an 
oilrig talking about “fuck-sticks,” “donkey cocks,” and “nippling-up” (all equipment or 
procedures on an oilrig), while more recently I’d been discussing essentialism, social 
constructivism, gender performativity, and signifying economies. I thought momentarily about 
how the latter discourse might query the former’s strange attachment to phallic and infantile 
suckling euphemisms as a subconscious symptom of an existing Oedipal Complex and oral 
fixation amongst oilrig workers. I then began to smile thinking about how these same workers 
would describe our conversation about Woolf and Three Guineas, but believing some words 
should remain outside, I won’t offer an approximation here. When it came time for me to answer 
the professor’s question, I let the fact that we were sitting in an air-conditioned room on the 
upper floor of a university building discussing Virginia Woolf answer for me. “No,” I said, “at 
this moment, in this place, I’m not sure any of us are really outsiders.” 
 I mention this discussion, now nearly a decade old, because it captures the key aspect of 
Woolf’s outsider politics explained and explored in this work. When she argues in Three 
Guineas that a politics of the outside is undertaken by people with the assumption that “By 
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making their absence felt their presence becomes desirable” (245), Woolf is arguing for a politics 
that is primarily temporal and spatial in its conception and execution. Hers is a politics that does 
not choose a static point of resistance, but claims a temporary outsider position of one’s own and 
makes it effective inasmuch as it subverts using quick, timely strikes that challenge and expose 
discursive power relations. It is a politics of performance and of the change potential 
performances can bring about rather than a politics that focuses on changing political policy or 
sparking revolutions. Sustained political pressure from an outsider position is certainly possible 
and the various civil rights movements of the last two hundred years prove their effectiveness, 
but such actions are made in unison as one accepts a political identity that amplifies the voices of 
many to speak as one. It is a mode of politics Woolf was deeply skeptical of because she feared 
prolonged uniformity could override the will of individuals within the group. Unity rather than 
uniformity is the foundation of Woolf’s politics—the contingent unity of a moment, of voices, of 
lives brought together by something or someone. 
 Between the Acts (1941), Woolf’s posthumously published final novel explores this 
potentiality of time, space, and temporary unities. The events in the novel take place at a summer 
pageant performed at Pointz Hall, a fictional private country home, in June, 1939, some three 
months before the start of the Second World War on 3 September 1939. England’s countryside is 
the setting of the novel, but any pastoral mythology evoked by this setting is destroyed by the 
two great military acts evoked in the novel’s title. The pageant director Miss La Trobe presents a 
history of England broken into four short vignettes that include an Elizabethan romance, a 
Restoration comedy of manners, a parody of Victorian social problem plays, and a final piece 
entitled “Present time. Ourselves” (158). While the first three scenes employ common tropes and 
dramatic genres to narrate England for the audience, keeping them at a relatively comfortable 
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historical and artistic distance from themselves, the final act breaks the dramatic fourth wall and 
invites the audience to contemplate themselves as the players enter their space with myriad shiny 
objects, including “tin cans,” “candlesticks,” “the cheval glass from the Rectory,” and mirrors 
(165), that reflect the audience to itself. La Trobe unites the audience by forcing it to recognize 
its participatory role in cultural production, but she avoids creating any sense of uniformity in the 
collective by having the audience watch itself making culture using fragmented reflective 
surfaces that prevent the individual audience members from seeing themselves in whole, let 
alone as a whole. What emerges in the La Trobe’s final act, therefore, is an acknowledgement 
that cultural production does not belong solely to the dramatist, or poet, or novelist, who are but 
mere collectors of impressions, but is instead created daily by the people of a nation as they 
move thorough their workaday lives. More than this, her final act shows that a unity born of a 
moment in time and space creates a potential for change that exists in spite of the social 
institutions that attempt to discipline bodies and their actions, for in those brief moments of unity 
something beyond mere subjection becomes possible if one chooses something beyond 
uniformity. 
 That the people in La Trobe’s audience believe themselves to be mere passive consumers 
of culture is apparent in their discomfort and apprehension as they await how she means to reveal 
“Present day. Ourselves.” Positioned where they are as viewers of a theatrical performance, the 
audience feels distanced from the history of English culture being presented on the stage, so they 
spend the time between La Trobe’s third act and final act wondering “what could she know about 
ourselves? The Elizabethans yes; the Victorians, perhaps; but ourselves; sitting here on a June 
day in 1939—it was ridiculous” (160). This reaction exposes the extent to which cultural 
narratives are generally considered retroactive constructions that require many years to know—
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note that the crowd seems comfortable after four hundred years that they know the Elizabethans 
but not so comfortable as to suggest they know the Victorians nearly forty years after Queen 
Victoria’s death, as Mrs Lynn Jones demonstrates (156)—but it also reveals that the audience 
believes their engagement with culture, even with a mode so timely as drama, is fundamentally 
passive. Moreover, La Trobe’s play and program forces the audience to think of the cascading 
assemblages of which they, as individual subjects, are a part: all at once, each individual in the 
audience is a part of the audience, a part of the church that will receive the proceeds of the 
pageant, a part of the community in which the church is located, a part of England as a nation, 
and part of Present time as related to the Elizabethans and Victorians they’ve seen in the pageant. 
And this does not mention assemblages based on things like class, gender, and education. Any 
attempt to know ourselves in the present may well be ridiculous, therefore, for one person could 
never create a coherent representation of all the individuals assembled in the audience, let alone 
in England, let alone in the Elizabethan era or the Victorian.  
 But La Trobe’s final act does show that there can be moments of unity amongst disparate 
individuals, and in these moments of unity one discovers, for better or for worse, what it means 
to be a part of an assemblage, to be in this audience, to be English, to live in the present time. For 
the most part, the audience is led toward moments of unity by songs, a useful medium for the 
purpose because sound blankets a group simultaneously in noise and is not as dependent on 
individual perspective as are images. The nursery rhyme “Sing a Song of Sixpence” leads the 
audience from the break but is quickly replaced with a flowing waltz, which in turn is replaced 
with Jazz as the players get ready to enter the crowd (162-164). The comfortable unity that 
brings the audience together under the common nursery rhyme and easy waltz is dispersed by La 
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Trobe using the Jazz, but there is still a unity between them, however broken and uncomfortable 
its rhythms may be: 
The tune changed; snapped; broke; jagged. […] What a cackle, in a cacophony! 
Nothing ended. So abrupt. And corrupt. Such an outrage; such an insult; And not 
plain. Very up to date, all the same. What is her game? To disrupt? Jog and trot? 
Jerk and smirk. Put a finger to the nose? Squint and pry? Peak and Spy? O the 
irreverence of the generation which is only momentarily—thanks be—‘the 
young’. The young, who can’t make, but only break; shiver into splinters the old 
vision; smash to atoms what was whole. (164) 
Woolf is obviously trying to mimic the brokenness of jazz music linguistically in this passage, 
but through all the fragments and wreckage, the rhyming words in the passage cobble it together 
to make it whole. Individual clauses compete with one another visually, but read aloud the 
passage becomes almost spoken word poetry, its pieces ragged enough to mark the individual 
thoughts that make up the narrative yet connected enough to remind us these are the thoughts of 
an audience brought together.  
 Woolf’s early writings on modernist fiction are also recalled in this passage: in particular, 
the suggestion that the young “can’t make, but only break” looks back to her call for readers to 
tolerate “the spasmodic, the obscure, the fragmentary” in “Character in Fiction” (436), and the 
charge that the young “smash to atoms what was the whole” is similar to her idea in “Modern 
Novels” that life is best represented not by the materialist literature of the Edwardians but by the 
“incessant shower of innumerable atoms” Georgians attempt to capture in their psychological 
literature (177). These metafictional references to Woolf and high modernism connect La Trobe 
to an aesthetic tradition of the new that is comfortable with breakage and the idea of failure if it 
	
 309 
reveals the inner life they strive to represent. Given the pageant is being performed in 1939, 
however, these references also ask if La Trobe’s formal experimentation with breakage is very 
useful with England hurtling toward another war. 1922, which saw the publication of Ulysses, 
The Waste Land, and Jacob’s Room, had been literary high modernism’s banner year, but those 
works had emerged into a post-Great War world where the class, governmental, and cultural 
traditions that held Europe together had been fractured by the atrocities of total war, and public 
trust in social institutions continued to erode. W.B. Yeats captures this cultural rift most 
succinctly in “The Second Coming” when he describes the “widening gyre” (1) of post-war 
Europe and warns readers of what might emerge from “Spiritus Mundi” (12) in the chaos of 
modernity. Then, when it seemed like Europe had learned its lesson and would never revisit the 
horrors of total war, the literary high modernists could take their time writing massive novels that 
track the motions and thoughts of one man on an ordinary day in Dublin, poems layered with 
references to past literature meant to coalesce a fragmented and sterile modern culture around a 
past cultural tradition, a faulty Bildungsroman that displaces its subject to reveal his mediocrity 
using the impressions of the women he encounters during his war-shortened life. In the hangover 
of war, form, difficulty, and innovation could prevail as the order of the day, but in 1939 its 
value seems rather more dubious. After all, the poets of the thirties, W.H. Auden, Stephen 
Spender, and Cecil Day-Lewis, and novelists like George Orwell had long since moved to more 
overtly political and less formally innovative writing styles, which they believed better suited to 
countering the rise of nationalism, fascism, and communism. 
 The mirror scene that comes immediately after the jazz music also seems to suggest La 
Trobe’s aesthetics of breakage is not particularly useful, for while it unites the audience in self-
consciousness and discomfort as intended, their disarray is ultimately brought to an end by 
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religious and national authorities that symbolize a uniform togetherness rather than actually 
representing a unity between the people. As the players in the pageant enter the audience with 
mirrors, pots, and candlesticks, the people see themselves reflected in their shiny surfaces and 
become increasingly uncomfortable as they recognize that La Trobe’s “little game” is to “show 
[them] up, as [they] are, here and now” until each “evaded or shaded themselves” (167). Only 
Mrs. Manresa—who is rumoured to be a colonial and who is certainly “vulgar […] in her 
gestures” and “over-sexed, over-dressed for a picnic” (37)—“preserved unashamed her identity” 
with the players in the crowd and, using the various reflective surfaces they hold, “powdered her 
nose; and moved one curl, disturbed by the breeze, to its place” (167). Manresa already 
understands that life is a series of performances, so she carries on unperturbed while the others 
search for meaning in La Trobe’s little game as a megaphonic voice comes from the bushes to 
proclaim, “Look at ourselves, ladies and gentlemen! Then at the wall [on stage]; and ask how’s 
this wall, the great wall, which we call, perhaps miscall, civilization, to be built by (here the 
mirrors flicked and flashed) orts, scraps and fragments like ourselves?” (169). This crescendo to 
La Trobe’s pageant crashes onto the audience: all their assemblages—this audience, their 
Englishness, and the cultural historicity of the Elizabethans or Victorians—are simultaneously 
constructed and deconstructed as the individuals in the audience are reminded that they, at this 
moment and in this space, have become the meaning making system by and through which 
theatrical convention, national identity, and cultural tradition are realized and given material 
existence. Civilization, La Trobe forces her audience to recognize, is messy in that it is made up 
of individuals with different goals, dreams, and interests, but this messiness simultaneously 
reveals the active role each person already plays in civilization and acknowledges that self-
conscious and careful participation can actively change civilization.  
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 Unfortunately, the audience is almost immediately brought back into order by a number 
of symbols that seem to limit the effectiveness of La Trobe’s final scene by providing the 
audience members narratives to ease their discomfort. First, Rev. G. W. Streatfield, who is 
described as “an intolerable constriction, contraction, and reduction to simplified absurdity” 
(170), stands before them as “their representative spokesman; their symbol; themselves; a butt, a 
clod, laughed at by the looking-glasses” (171). A representative of the Christian Church, 
Streatfield is a symbol for the people to gather round, but in doing so they return to passive 
consumers of their culture and forgo the active role La Trobe has just demarcated for them, even 
going so far as to “[fold] their hands in the traditional manner as if they were seated in church” 
listening to a sermon as Streatfield couches the pageant’s final scene in the Christian message 
that “We act different parts; but are the same” (173). A familiar narrative the members of the 
audience seem comfortable adopting to explain what they’ve just seen, Christianity brings the 
people together in a timeless uniformity rather than the time-specific unity constructed on this 
June day at this pageant about themselves. Streatfield himself is interrupted by an even more 
potent symbol of uniformity when “Twelve aeroplanes in perfect formation like a flight of wild 
duck [comes] overhead” and severs his speech in two (174). A symbol of both the nation and 
their historical present, these military planes make the audience into one once again, completely 
replacing the pageant that has drawn them together under the auspices of a practically 
compulsory nationalistic uniformity in the lead-up to war. Even La Trobe herself seems to accept 
her final act has failed: as the audience finally decides the pageant is at an end and looks to thank 
its director, she plays “God save the King,” upon which the audience “all rose to their feet” 
(175), in unison to recognize the nation once more. La Trobe leaves the gramophone playing 
“Dispersed are we; who have come together. But […] let us retain whatever made that harmony” 
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(176-77) as the people leave the pageant, but after Streatfield, the military planes, and the king 
have made their symbolic presence felt, any sense of self-conscious reflection in the audience 
members seems to have largely disappeared. 
 To what extent should we thus agree with La Trobe that her play, in her own words, is 
“‘A failure’” (188)? She does not, after all, seem to have changed anyone’s perspective, and the 
audience members, if anything, have left her pageant more confused than when they arrived. 
Unmitigated, then, seems to be the right adjective, since La Trobe’s pageant has apparently 
failed to communicate anything to her audience that they may take home with them. Her artistic 
legacy, at least in this instance, seems to be merely communication attempted. Perhaps the 
attempt is all that really matters, though. Alain Badiou has argued that what really matters in art 
is the artistic “event.” For Badiou the event “is something that brings to light a possibility that 
was invisible or even unthinkable. An event is not by itself the creation of a reality; it is the 
creation of a possibility, it opens up a possibility” (9). I can’t think of a better way to begin 
describing Virginia Woolf’s artistic legacy. Whether it be a narrator asking us to question her 
authority in A Room of One’s Own, an upper-class wife of a member of parliament hosting a 
party in Mrs Dalloway, or a middle-aged artist showing a pageant audience to themselves, 
Woolf’s attempts to pull “moments of being” from the “nondescript cotton wool” of everyday 
life (Moments of Being 70) provide the possibility to see and to think differently. 
 To this notion of possibility, I have tried to add the notion of potential because whenever 
Woolf’s writing opens a possibility, it then drags us into the space created to show us the 
cultural, political, historical, educational, economic, potential of thinking, acting, speaking, and 
writing from that outside space. La Trobe, too, believes herself to be “an outcast” in that “Nature 
had somehow set her apart from her kind” (190), and she too uses this position to create artistic 
	
 313 
events for her audience. And La Trobe’s event does not go entirely to waste, for Isa, though she 
sees it “drifting away to join the other clouds” and remembers “not the play but the audience 
dispersing” (192), recognizes that she and Giles must have it out after a long day of marital strife 
that has seen her admitting to herself that she loves Mr. Haines, and that has featured Giles 
petulantly flirting with Manresa: “Left alone together for the first time that day, they were silent. 
Alone, enmity was bared; also love. Before they slept, they must fight; after they had fought, 
they would embrace. From that embrace another life might be born. But first they must fight” 
(197). In this, the smallest of assemblages in the play, there is unity and dispersion as well, but 
from its moments of unity new life can grow, one more ort, scrap, or fragment for the wall of 
civilization. In the end, therefore, we are left with the hope that unity will return, though the last 
lines of the novel remind us of the battle that must first cause dispersion, and of the role we all 
play in bringing unity back round: “Then the curtain rose. They spoke” (197). 
 In what sounds like an elegy to artists, Miss La Trobe laments after the pageant is over 
that “She could say to the world, You have taken my gift! Glory possessed her—for one 
moment. But what had she given? A cloud that melted into the other clouds on the horizon. It 
was in the giving that the triumph was. And the triumph faded. Her gift meant nothing. If they 
had understood her meaning; if they had known their parts […] it would have been a better gift. 
Now it had gone to join the others” (188). Woolf, of course, would be dead before her public 
read these words in Between the Acts, but they would join the others she had gifted it in the past. 
She spent her artistic life asking readers to recognize their part in cultural production, and she did 
so not by catering to their whims or teaching them what to read, but by taking them, gently if 
possible but forcefully if necessary, to see what the other side means. She was an unapologetic 
outsider, especially at the end of her life, because she believed that only by visiting the outside 
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could we begin to trace the contours of the inside. And contouring the inside was not only 
beneficial but necessary politically in a state that subjected bodies and disciplined them to the 
point of total war and genocide. In an inter-war period marked by oppositional dialectics and the 
rise of authoritarian ideologies, Virginia Woolf attempted to show readers what was possible 
outside the institutions that governed their lives through discipline, optimization, and 
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